The Millennium Challenge Corporation has pledged over US$130 million to support the next phase of Generasi, including revising the program to obtain improved child nutrition outcomes.
While increased community participation has been advocated as a way to improve the quality of public projects and services, evidence from randomized evaluations provides very mixed results about its effectiveness. While it is clear that the details and context matter for this type of program, some common themes about what works are beginning to emerge. Programs where the community had more direct control over service providers tended to work better. Community involvement is more effective when people are given specific tasks and training: in Kenya training of school committees improved how these committees handled teachers accountable to them 1, in India a program that trained local volunteers to directly intervene in child learning was very successful while general encouragement to participate was not 4 and a successful Uganda program developed specific action plans for communities and health providers on how services would be improved 2. The one program that compared community participation to centralized monitoring through audits found centralized audits were more effective in reducing corruption 3. One common finding across all studies was that community participation at the start of the evaluation was weak, even though in all cases mechanisms for community participation existed on paper.
| Evaluations | Cost Effectiveness | Academic Papers | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| see write-up | |||||||
| Local Oversight Interventions | |||||||
| 1 |
Extra Contract Teachers in Kenya Contract teachers employed and monitored by a local committee performed better than civil service teachers. |
Duflo, Dupas & Kremer, 2010 | Academic | green | |||
| 2 |
Community Health Monitoring in Uganda Locals and healthcare providers created a specific joint action plan to improve service, increasing community health. |
Bjorkman & Svensson, 2008 | Academic | green | |||
| 3 |
Road Construction in Indonesia Top-down auditing was more effective than community monitoring at preventing corruption in road construction. |
Olken 2009Olken, 2007 | Policy | green | |||
| 4 |
Village Education Committees in India Giving local committees the tools to evaluate student performance and monitor teachers had no effect. |
(no impact) | Banerjee et al., 2009 | Academic | green | ||
Government programs have long incorporated mechanisms for local oversight, but there is little evidence on the effectiveness of these programs. Banerjee, et al. (2009) found that 92% of villagers in rural Uttar Pradesh India were not even aware of the existing Village Education Committee (VEC), which supposedly monitored teachers and administrators 4. Working with the community on monitoring tools that revealed just how little children were learning at school, and informing the community of their rights to push for change prompted no increase activity by the community, no increased teacher effort and no improvement in education outcomes.
In contrast to this, Bjorkman & Svensson (2009) found that informing Ugandan citizens of the dismal state of local health service delivery and holding meetings between citizens and health workers to agree on “action plans” significantly reduced provider absenteeism, increased utilization, and improved health 2. One possible reason for the striking different between the results from these two similar projects is that in Uganda specific action plans were agreed upon, while in India the community was encouraged to develop their own approach to addressing the problem. Indeed, when the program in India gave a subset of communities training in how to hold remedial tutoring sessions for local children, many volunteered and reading scores in the communities rose. Not only were concerned individuals in the community given something specific they could do to make a difference, the solution (remedial reading camps) did not rely on cooperation from the government teachers.
In Kenya community oversight went even further—communities were given money to hire additional teachers on short term contracts 1. In some ways these local teachers looked similar to the para-teachers for which VECs in India are nominally responsible. But in the Kenya program, power over the contract and money for the teachers clearly rested with the school committees and the NGO behind the program. These additional teachers performed much better than regular teachers—showing up more and achieving higher test scores. Training of the school committees improved results further.
Only one study compared additional community participation with the alternative of strengthened centralized oversight and monitoring. To address the possibility of elite capture and corruption in local road projects in Indonesia some communities were told that their project would be externally audited while in others community monitoring was enhanced 3. The threat of central audit was more effective in reducing corruption—although it was also more expensive—than community monitoring. Again, however, the details matter: when community monitoring was organized through schools it was more effective than when organized through village leaders.
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