

J-PAL GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE

AFRICA POLICY OUTREACH CONFERENCE

IMPROVING ELECTORAL
PARTICIPATION: EVIDENCE FROM
RANDOMISED EVALUATIONS

Accra, Ghana

5-6 November 2015

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ABOUT J-PAL

The Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) is a network of 131 affiliated professors from over 40 universities around the world. Our mission is to reduce poverty by ensuring that policy is informed by scientific evidence. We do this through research, policy outreach, and training.

RESEARCH: Our affiliated professors conduct randomised evaluations to test and improve the effectiveness of programmes and policies aimed at reducing poverty.

POLICY OUTREACH: We analyse and disseminate research results and build partnerships with policymakers to ensure that policy is driven by evidence and that effective programmes are scaled up.

TRAINING: We train implementers and policymakers on how to become better producers and users of evidence from impact evaluations.

OUR PARTNERS

We partner with research centres, governments, non-governmental organisations, multilateral organisations, funders, and businesses who are driven by a shared belief in the power of scientific evidence to understand what really helps the poor, and what does not.

HOW WE ARE ORGANISED

Our global office is based at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and our Africa office is based at the University of Cape Town. We have five other regional offices based at leading universities in Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, North America, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. We focus on eight sectors: Agriculture, Crime and Criminal Justice, Education, Environment and Energy, Finance, Health, Labour Markets, and Political Economy and Governance.

Regional offices and sectors are directed by members of our Board, which is composed of J-PAL affiliated professors and senior management. Our affiliates set their own research agenda and raise funds to support their evaluations.

The lab is named for Abdul Latif Jameel, father of MIT alumnus Mohammed Abdul Latif Jameel, who has been supporting us since 2005 with three major endowments.

ABOUT THE GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE

J-PAL's Governance Initiative (GI) funds randomised evaluations of interventions designed to improve participation in the political and policy process, reduce leakages in public programmes, and increase state capacity.

By providing funding for rigorous evaluations of the most promising approaches to improving governance in low-income countries, GI aims to provide evidence as to what works (or does not



work) and disseminate these findings to policymakers in governments, foundations, NGOs, and multilateral organisations. To date, GI has awarded a total of US\$5.2 million in funding to 38 unique projects in Africa, Latin America, South Asia, and Southeast Asia.

GI is led by J-PAL affiliated professors Ben Olken (MIT) and Rohini Pande (Harvard Kennedy School) who set the initiative's research priorities and chair

the review board. Oriana Bandiera (LSE), Frederico Finan (UC Berkeley), and Asim Khwaja (Harvard Kennedy School) serve on the review board. Anna Schickele is the Initiative Manager.

GI is supported by The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation and the UK Department for International Development.



ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION EVALUATION MAP

ESTABLISHING CAUSALITY: WHY RANDOMISE?

The primary purpose of randomised evaluations is to determine whether a programme has an impact, and more specifically, to quantify how large that impact is. Impact evaluations typically measure program effectiveness by comparing outcomes of those (individuals, communities, schools, etc.) who participated in the programme against those who did not participate. Randomised evaluations randomly assign participation in the programme.

In its most simple sense, randomisation is what happens when a coin is flipped, a die is cast, or a name on a piece of paper is drawn blindly from a basket, and the outcome of that flip, cast, or draw determines what happens next. When these tools (the coin, the die, the lottery) are used to make decisions, the outcome can be said to be left to chance, or, randomised.

Statisticians use randomisation because, when enough people are randomly chosen to participate in a survey, the attributes of those chosen individuals are representative of the entire group from which they were chosen. In other words, what is discovered about them is probably true about the larger group. Using a lottery to get a representative sample is known as random sampling or random selection.

When two groups are randomly selected from the same population, they both represent the larger group. They are not only statistically equivalent to the larger group; they are also statistically equivalent to each other. The same logic carries forward if more than two groups are randomly selected. When two or more groups are selected in this way, we can say that individuals have been randomly assigned to groups. This is called random assignment and is the key element of randomised evaluation.

In a simple randomised evaluation, one group receives the programme that is being evaluated and the other does not. If we were to evaluate a water purification programme using this method, we would randomly assign individuals to two groups. At the beginning, the two groups would be

statistically equivalent (and are expected to have equivalent trajectories going forward). But then we introduce something that makes them different. One group would receive the water purification programme and the other would not. Then, after some time, we could measure the relative health of individuals in the two groups. Because they were statistically equivalent at the beginning, any differences seen later on can be attributed to one having been given the water purification programme, and the other not, thus generating an unbiased estimate of the impact of the water purification programme.



WHY RANDOMISE

CONFERENCE BACKGROUND

The Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) is pleased to welcome you to this regional policy outreach conference on Improving Electoral Participation as part of its Governance Initiative.

This two-day event brings together policymakers, implementing organisations, media representatives, and researchers to discuss the emerging lessons from several randomised evaluations related to providing information to voters, and to discuss how findings from effective interventions may be applied in new contexts, particularly in countries with upcoming elections.

Evidence suggests that voters in many countries lack information and settings to discuss candidate qualifications and legislators' performance. Providing information on how well politicians and political parties deliver on promises can help voters make more informed decisions and can also create forums for engagement on political issues. A growing number of randomised evaluations have tested the effect of providing information to voters through active and passive channels. Across diverse contexts, evidence from randomised evaluations has shown that voters

update their beliefs in response to the active and passive provision of information.

Our objective is inform ongoing efforts to educate and engage voters with the recent results and insights from these randomised evaluations. The conference is structured to allow participants to critically reflect on how the evidence could be operationalised in their respective contexts. In guided breakout sessions, participants will use theory of change analysis to explore which voter information interventions may be appropriate for their contexts. Participants will also have the opportunity to discuss operational considerations with the implementing organisations on three of the featured evaluations.

The conference further aims to catalyse new relationships between stakeholders in the electoral process from within Ghana and across the West African region, with a goal to help ground future collaboration in scientific evidence.

The conference is intended to be the beginning of an ongoing conversation and possible collaboration between conference participants and J-PAL. If organisations need

further help after the conference, the J-PAL policy team may be able to offer the following assistance upon request:

- **Technical Assistance.** If organisations are interested in particular evaluations from the J-PAL network, the policy team can help gather more detailed information about the implementation of the programme of interest and can help the organisations think about how to apply the lessons from the randomised evaluations.
- **Exploratory Work.** If governments or implementing partners need more assistance in determining if a programme which has been proven to be effective in one place will be effective in another, the policy team can help design in-field scoping work and policy pilots to determine if the conditions are right to scale the program.
- **Scaling Up.** Where the evidence is contextually appropriate, J-PAL can support governments and implementing organisations in designing and launching evidence-based programmes, developing operational plans and budgets, and coordinating logistics.



FEATURED EVALUATION SUMMARIES AND IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS

The next section of the booklet summarises the results of IO prominent randomised evaluations focussed on providing information to voters. These studies were selected for their relevance to the West African context. Further studies can be found on the J-PAL website.

The highlighted studies provide important lessons for organisations interested in or already implementing voter information programmes. At the end of each summary, we include a list of questions organisations might want to consider about whether and how to integrate the lessons from the research into their programmes. These lists are not meant

to be comprehensive, and consideration of these questions alone are not a recipe for success. Rather, these lists are designed to help implementers think through which lessons would apply to their context, how and when the lessons would apply, and how they can tailor their programmes to be more effective based on the evaluation results.

FEATURED EVALUATIONS: PASSIVE INFORMATION PROVISION

Passive provision of information includes providing voters with flyers or scorecards on a candidate's performance or broadcasting radio advertisements with information about performance of different parties prior to an election. Interventions in this category relay specific information to voters about political candidates, policies, and processes.



Informing and Mobilizing Voters by Texting

Evidence from a Large-Scale Experiment in Kenya

RESEARCHERS:

Benjamin Marx, Vincent Pons, Tavneet Suri

IMPLEMENTING ORGANISATION:

Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC)

POLICY ISSUE

Citizen trust and participation in the political system are necessary for the stability of democratic regimes, as distrust and disengagement can lead to civil violence and regime change. In the aftermath of national elections, fragile democracies face the challenge of ensuring that individuals on the losing side of politics remain satisfied with, and committed to the democratic system, as the cooperation of election losers is essential for peaceful democratic transitions. While there is a growing literature on the impact of various forms of information provision on short-term electoral outcomes, there is a dearth of empirical evidence on the medium-run effects of information campaigns on citizens' trust in the electoral system and democracy. These effects are likely to matter especially in fragile democracies, where higher mobilisation from effective information campaigns could build up expectations about the electoral outcome—expectations which in many instances may not be fulfilled.

POLITICAL CONTEXT OF KENYA

The intervention took place in the six days leading up to the March 2013 National Election in Kenya. The elections were the first to take place after the adoption of a new constitution in 2010. The new constitution introduced an upper house of Parliament and

established a new unit of local government (the county). This led to the creation of two new types of elected representatives: Senators and Governors. On Election Day, voters elected candidates to these new positions, as well as voting for president, National Assembly representatives, ward representatives, and women's representatives.

The elections were also the first to be organised by a new electoral commission, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC). The IEBC replaced the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK), which had been held responsible for the failure of the previous national election that led to an outburst of interethnic violence in 2007-2008. Kenyan politics is organised along ethnic lines, and few individuals are willing to vote for candidates representing other tribes.

Intervention: The IEBC sent text messages to approximately two million registered voters across the entire country from randomly selected polling stations. The messages aimed to promote public interest and knowledge about the election and to raise voter turnout for all six ballots organised for Election Day. The messages provided either (i) basic encouragements to vote, (ii) information on the positions to be voted for on Election Day, or (iii) information on the IEBC itself.

PRELIMINARY RESULTS

The text message campaign led to a small increase in voter turnout, but it significantly decreased trust in the electoral commission, especially among voters linked to the party that lost the election for president. Voter turnout, as measured by both the number of votes cast and the number of valid votes, increased at polling stations where voters received text messages. Based on the official data from the IEBC, receiving any of the three messages increased turnout by 0.3 percentage points from a base of 87.7 percent in polling stations where no registered voters received the text messages. This effect was mostly driven by the message that provided a basic encouragement to vote.

However, the intervention significantly decreased trust in the electoral commission. Among survey respondents who received any of the messages, trust in the IEBC decreased by 3.6 percentage points from 80 percent amongst respondents who did not receive any messages. Respondents who received any of the messages were also 2.6 percentage points less likely to report being very satisfied Kenyan democracy, relative to 32 percent of respondents who did not receive messages.

These results suggest that the messages interacted with external information on the actual quality of the elections, including the

failure of the biometric and electronic system set up by the IEBC^[1]. The text messages may have made this external information more salient to voters and increased expectations about the performance of the IEBC.

Furthermore, the negative effect of the messages on political attitudes was driven by individuals from ethnic tribes from the losing coalition in the race for President, including the Luos, the tribe of the main opposition candidate. Individuals belonging to tribes from the losing coalition were 8.6 percentage points more likely to lose trust in the IEBC than individuals belonging to tribes from the winning coalition. A possible explanation is that the messages increased recipient expectations that the presidential election would be free and fair, but that individuals based their judgement of whether the elections were fair in part on whether their candidate won. After the election, voters associated with the losing candidate may have been more likely to feel that the election had been unfair, while voters associated with the winner may have concluded that the elections were free and fair.

Decreased trust in the IEBC, however, did not debase support for democratic principles; citizens who received the messages remained equally likely to find democracy preferable to any other kind of government, to agree that

leaders should be chosen through regular, open, and honest elections, and to disagree with the use of violence in politics.

Overall, the results indicate that raising expectations about the quality of elections comes at a clear risk. Failure by the institutions responsible for organising and supervising elections to fully deliver on their promises may dramatically reinforce distrust and dissatisfaction with democracy.

Questions for Implementers to Consider:

- Is mobile phone use prevalent enough for this type of programme to work?
- Does the organisation have the capacity to develop and send out text messages?
- Would a leading mobile network with wide coverage be willing to send the messages and provide technical support?
- How frequently would the text messages be sent? Will a programme with less frequent text messages be as effective?
- Is there a credible, well-functioning, non-partisan institution which would be willing to coordinate the programme?

^[1] Due to a series of human errors, the IEBC had to resort to manual methods to identify voters and count the ballots midway through Election Day.

TEXT MESSAGING KENYA

Group	Content	Date
1	It is your duty to vote. Please make sure you vote in the March 4 General Election	Feb 27
1	You have a duty to vote for good leaders in your country. Please vote on March 4	Feb 28
1	Don't just complain about leaders, do something. Make sure you vote for good leaders on March 4	March 1
1	A good citizen helps promote democracy in his country by participating in the elections. Please vote on March 4	March 2
1	Remember the General Election is next Monday, on March 4. Please make sure you vote	March 3
1	Make sure you have your original ID or passport when you go to the polling station on March 4	March 4
2	Vote for all 6 ballots on March 4: Governor, County Assembly Ward Rep, Member of Parliament, Women Rep, Senator, President	Feb 27
2	Your governor will manage funds on your behalf. Choose the right person for this important job. Vote wisely on March 4	Feb 28
2	Your senator will help determine how many resources your country receives from the central government. Vote for a competent candidate on March 4	March 1
2	Your member of National Assembly will be responsible for making laws for Kenya. Vote for a true nationalist on March 4	March 2
2	Every voter, male or female, votes for the Womens Rep on March 4. She will represent your county at the National Assembly	March 3
2	Your Ward Rep ensures that your interests at the County Assembly. Vote for an accessible leader on March 4	March 4
3	Free and fair Elections are important for democracy. The IEBC is committed to strengthening the democracy. Vote on March 4	Feb 27
3	Credible elections require a peaceful environment. The IEBC is committed to free and fair elections; please keep the peace	Feb 28
3	Elections are organised by the IEBC, an independent body created by the new Constitution to ensure free and fair elections	March 1
3	Show your confidence in the IEBC by voting in the election next Monday, March 4th 2013	March 2
3	The IEBC has managed 12 successful by-elections and the Constitutional referendum. Help us make this election a success	March 3
3	As part of its mission, the IEBC has established a clean voter register. You are in the register. Now, go and vote	March 4

Is Information Power? Using Mobile Phones and Free Newspapers during an Election in Mozambique

RESEARCHERS:

Jenny C. Aker, Paul Collier,
and Pedro C. Vicente

IMPLEMENTING ORGANISATION:

@Verdade newspaper,
Observatorio Eleitoral

POLICY ISSUE

Voter education, especially when designed to increase political participation and the demand for accountability, may be an effective way to increase competition in electoral campaigns and incentives for good governance. The use of information and communication technologies, such as mobile phones, as well as social enterprise innovations, such as free newspapers, may open new and effective avenues for long-term building of a more relevant citizenry.

POLITICAL CONTEXT OF MOZAMBIQUE

The intervention took place in the lead up to the October 2009 elections in Mozambique. Mozambique is a democratic republic with a unicameral parliament known as the Assembly of the Republic. The president is directly elected and may serve a maximum of two consecutive five-year terms, after which the incumbent must wait a term until he is eligible to run again. The Assembly of the Republic has 250 members, elected to serve five-year terms. Parties or coalitions must secure at least 5 percent of national vote share in order to qualify for a seat. There are 11 constituencies, each corresponding to one of Mozambique's provinces. In each election round, voters vote for a president,

the parliamentary assembly and the provincial assembly.

The winning party of the country's civil war, the Front for Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), has consistently increased its vote share since the first elections in 1994, while voter turnout has collapsed, falling to 36 percent in 2004. International observers have corroborated opposition party claims of election irregularities. Citizens are often hesitant to offer opinions about politics and are unlikely to believe that democracy has a role in improving economic outcomes.

Intervention: Researchers tested the impact of three broad voter education interventions on registered voters from randomly selected polling locations. The first intervention was a civic education campaign that shared voter information via an official voter-education leaflet and followed up with text messages conveying neutral, specific information about the elections and the importance of voter participation. Individuals received five messages a day.

The second intervention was a mobile-phone hotline to which citizens could send text messages reporting electoral problems in their locations. A leaflet with basic

All three treatments increased voter turnout for the presidential election by close to 5 percentage points.

information on how to use the hotline was distributed to targeted individuals. Reports made to the hotline were verified before they were publicly shared.

The third intervention was the distribution of a free newspaper focusing on civic education. The newspaper also provided information on a national hotline to which voters could report electoral problems. This intervention combined elements of the other two but used a different delivery channel.

RESULTS

All three treatments increased voter turnout for the presidential election by close to 5 percentage points. Similar results were found in the parliamentary election.

The newspaper intervention had a slightly larger effect than the other two, increasing turnout by close to 6 percentage points.

In the presidential election, all treatments increased the vote share of the FRELIMO candidate and reduced vote share for his opponents. Civic education increased the FRELIMO candidate's support by 5 percentage points, while decreasing his main opponent's vote share by 3 percentage points.

Furthermore, the free newspaper was particularly effective in increasing the demand for political accountability and in decreasing electoral problems, especially campaign misconduct before the Election Day. Civic education increased the demand for authority, and the mobile hotline decreased confusion over the distinction between the state and ruling party. Both components—education and the mobile hotline—increased voters' perceptions of electoral problems.

Questions for Implementers to Consider:

- Is political accountability a problem? Could lack of information be driving this lack of accountability? How much information do voters already know?
- Are there independent, nonpartisan, local correspondents who would be able and willing to verify reported electoral problems?
- What method would organisations use to disseminate verified reports of electoral problems? What would be the pros and cons of these methods in the country? What additional resources would be required based on each method?
- Who will develop the content for voter education? Is there a way to ensure this content remains unbiased?
- Can support be contracted from cell phone service providers and reputable newspapers with large coverage?

For Further Reading:

Aker, Jenny C., Paul Collier, and Pedro C. Vicente. "Is Information Power? Using Mobile Phones and Free Newspapers during an Election in Mozambique." Working Paper, May 2013.

(L-R) HOTLINE LEAFLET MOZAMBIQUE; VERDADE CIVIC EDUCATION PAGE; VERDADE FRONT PAGE

MELHORAMOS AS ELEIÇÕES!

REPORTE PROBLEMAS DURANTE A CAMPANHA ELEITORAL



ENVIE MENSAGENS SMS FORMATO LOCAL espaço PROBLEMA

POR EXEMPLO

"EPC Quelimane distúrbios no comício"

PARA

82 1112 OU 84 13333

APOIOS: OBSERVATÓRIO ELEITORAL

AMODE, CCM, CEDE, CEM, CISLAMO, FECIV, LDH, OREC

AMOX (Associação Moçambicana para o Desenvolvimento) CEDE (Centro de Estudos de Democracia e Desenvolvimento)
 COM (Comité de Cidadãos Moçambicanos) CISLAMO (Comité de Cidadãos Moçambicanos)
 Comissão Episcopal da Justiça e Paz da Igreja Católica REC (Instituto de Educação Cívica)
 LDH (Liga Moçambicana dos Direitos Humanos) OREC (Organização para a Realização dos Contatos)

@Verdade vodacom mcel

csae


PASSOS DE Votação

4^{as} ELEIÇÕES GERAIS
Presidenciais e Legislativas e

1^{as} ELEIÇÕES
para as Assembleas Provinciais

1st Dia

Vamos Todos VOTAR
28 Outubro 2009



CNE MOZAMBIQUE

STAE

@Verdade

Tiragem 50.000 Exemplares Certificado pela ANEP

facebook.com/jornal.verdade • twitter.com/verdademz www.verdade.co.mz

Quarta-feira, dia 28, o povo tem a palavra
Eleições | 28 Outubro

Vamos votar



As escolhas para as Legislativas

As escolhas para as Provinciais

As escolhas para a Presidência

Converse com João Paulo Borges Coelho

Conte-nos a sua experiência de votar no próximo dia 28

Envie uma mensagem SMS util com o formato LOCAL (bairro, localidade, provincia) espaço ocorrência.

821111 • 8412222

CIDADÃO REPORTER

Is Vote Buying Effective?

Evidence from a Field Experiment in West Africa

RESEARCHER:

Pedro C. Vicente

POLICY ISSUE

Despite the prevalence of vote-buying –the exchange of cash for votes before the elections– knowledge about the consequences of this practice is limited. Even though there is no obvious way to enforce vote transactions in the presence of secret ballots, vote-buying remains widespread. Understanding the impact of an effective voter education campaign against vote-buying could help shed light on how vote-buying affects electoral outcomes.

POLITICAL CONTEXT OF SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE

The intervention took place in the lead up to the 2006 presidential elections in São Tomé and Príncipe. This two-island country held its first free elections in 1991. Significant oil deposits were discovered in the late 1990s, and previous research linked the surge in oil-related interests to a steep increase in vote-buying, starting with the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2001-2002.

Post-democratization politics have been dominated by three “political families” across three political parties: the Liberation Movement of Sao Tome and Principe

(MLSTP), the Independent Democratic Alliance (ADI), and the Democratic Movement for Empowered Reform (MDFM). The 2006 presidential elections took place in July, following the MDFM’s victory in the parliamentary elections in March. The presidential elections featured incumbent candidate Fradique de Menzes of the MDFM and Patrice Trovoada, who had the sponsorship of both major opposition parties.

Intervention: The researcher evaluated the impact of an anti-vote-buying education campaign sponsored by the National Electoral Commission of São Tomé and Príncipe. The campaign consisted of door-to-door distribution of a leaflet that drew attention to the fact that vote-buying is illegal. The leaflet included an illustration to enable easier communication with illiterate voters. Distributors read the leaflet fully when they delivered it and subsequently discussed the content with recipients. The discussion emphasised voting according to one’s judgement about the quality of the politicians and not according to whoever had bought one’s vote. Leaflet distributors also addressed any questions that the recipients

had and verified that they had understood the campaign's message.

RESULTS

The campaign decreased the number of surveyed voters who reported perceiving or directly experiencing vote-buying. Those exposed to the campaign were 0.42-0.46 standard deviations less likely to report that they perceived that money offered by candidates affected voting decisions in their neighbourhood or village. The reported perception that voting was conducted in good conscience in their neighbourhood or village increased by 0.32-0.48 standard deviations. Taken together, these results suggest that the campaign decreased the effectiveness of vote-buying transactions.

The campaign also reduced the reported price and frequency of vote-buying by both presidential candidates. The price of votes reported by respondents in neighbourhoods exposed to the campaign was 12 to 18 USD less than the price of votes reported by respondents in neighbourhoods not exposed to the campaign of 7 USD. In neighbourhoods exposed to the campaign, reported vote-buying by the challenger,

Trovoada, was 8 to 9 percentage points lower than in neighbourhoods not exposed to the campaign. By comparison, reported vote-buying by the incumbent, de Menezes, was only 6 percentage points lower. Thus, the campaign had a greater effect on the challenger.

Voter turnout was 2-6 percentage points lower in neighbourhoods exposed to the campaign than in unexposed neighbourhoods. The campaign also caused a shift in vote share from the challenger toward the incumbent. In neighbourhoods exposed to the campaign, the campaign increased in the incumbent's vote share and reduced in the challenger's vote share by an estimated 4 percentage points each, as compared to neighbourhoods not exposed to the campaign. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that challengers are more likely to rely on vote-buying as a strategy to build support and that anti-vote-buying campaigns have greater effects on challengers than incumbents. In this context and in others, incumbents are often thought to have an advantage over challengers: They are likely to have a larger support base before the campaign, having had more time and

influence than the challenger to secure such support. In this scenario, an effective anti-vote-buying campaign reduces the challenger's ability to sway swing voters, thereby strengthening the bias favouring the incumbent.

Questions for Implementers to Consider:

- Is vote-buying an issue in the region in which the implementer works? If so, where are the hotspots for vote-buying? (Note, this might include some fieldwork to determine.)
- How will the content be created for the leaflet, including developing and illustrating the message?
- Would it be possible to get an endorsement from the Electoral Commission or another credible, non-partisan institution?
- Who will fund, hire, and train personnel for door-to-door leaflet distribution?

For Further Reading:

Vicente, Pedro C. 2014. "Is Vote-Buying Effective? Evidence from a Field Experiment in West Africa." *Economic Journal* 124(574): F356 - F387

(L-R) VOTER EDUCATION CAMPAIGN LEAFLET FRONT; VOTER EDUCATION CAMPAIGN LEAFLET BACK

CAMPANHA CÍVICA INFORMATIVA

Não dê 'BANHO' à sua consciência
"O voto deve ser livre e em consciência" ⁽¹⁾

"A participação política é fundamental para a consolidação da República" ⁽²⁾
O 'Banho' pode impedir os cidadãos de participar no processo eleitoral.

"Todos os cidadãos são iguais perante a lei" ⁽³⁾
O 'Banho' pode favorecer aqueles que são capazes de comprar votos.


"Todas as despesas de campanha têm de ser documentadas" ⁽⁴⁾
O 'Banho' não passa facturas.

O 'Banho' é contra os Princípios DE SÃO TOMÉ E PRÍNCIPE

(1) Lei de Financiamento dos Partidos Políticos e das Campanhas Eleitorais (N.º 09/04) de São Tomé e Príncipe: Preâmbulo.
(2) Constituição de São Tomé e Príncipe: Artigo 55.º
(3) Constituição de São Tomé e Príncipe: Artigo 15.º
(4) Lei de Financiamento dos Partidos Políticos e das Campanhas Eleitorais (N.º 09/04) de São Tomé e Príncipe: Artigo 19.º

CAMPANHA CÍVICA INFORMATIVA

Não dê 'BANHO' à sua consciência
"O voto deve ser livre e em consciência"



The cartoon depicts a transaction where a ballot box is being offered for sale. The man on the left, representing a candidate or official, says "=\$\$\$\$" indicating a high price. The man on the right, representing a voter, looks thoughtful and says "COMPRA DE VOTOS... NEM PENSAR!!!", which translates to "Buying votes... Don't think!!!", suggesting that buying votes is a bad idea.

Diminishing the Effectiveness of Vote-Buying in India

RESEARCHERS:

Donald Green, Srinivasan Vasudevan

POLICY ISSUE

Vote-buying reduces the number of citizens casting their votes in a way that holds leaders accountable for their performance. There is growing evidence that vote-buying is accompanied by under-provision of public goods such as education, public health, and infrastructure. Vote-buying remains prevalent in developing countries even though most have the secret ballot, where parties cannot fully ensure that the voters they bribe actually vote for them. This suggests that voters may have intrinsic feelings of obligation to repay a 'gift' from a political party or see some other merit in voting for such parties. Educating voters about the consequences of voting for such parties could make them less responsive to bribes, diminishing the effectiveness of vote-buying in influencing voter decisions and potentially reducing its prevalence in the long-run.

POLITICAL CONTEXT OF INDIA

The intervention took place in the lead up to India's 2014 general elections for state assembly and national Parliament. India has 543 parliamentary constituencies (PC), each of which is further divided into several state assembly constituencies (AC). Official

rules prohibit campaigning in the 48 hours before polling begins, and the Electoral Commission of India enforces a ban on opinion polls during a designated campaign cooling off period.

Intervention: The researchers designed and evaluated a non-partisan anti-vote-selling radio information campaign to educate voters about the nature of vote-buying and the consequences of vote-selling. The radio ads dramatised the message that politicians distributed "gifts" not out of any kindness but only to buy their way into office. The ads argued that, if elected, such politicians would steal public money and provide fewer public goods. They encouraged voters to teach vote-buyers a lesson by voting for honest candidates but did not name any specific candidate or party.

PRELIMINARY RESULTS

During the elections (but prior to the announcement of election results) the researchers asked around 400 journalists to identify political parties that were reputedly engaging in vote-buying in areas covered by the study. Using electoral data, researchers assessed whether voters in areas that were randomly assigned to receive the radio ads

Preliminary results suggest that the radio messages significantly decreased the vote share of the putative vote-buying parties by more than four percentage points

became less likely to vote for reputed vote-buying parties, compared to those areas that did not receive the radio ads. They also assessed whether voter turnout rates were affected by the radio ads.

Preliminary results suggest that the radio messages significantly decreased the vote share of the putative vote-buying parties by more than four percentage points but had small and statistically insignificant effects on the voter turnout rate. Assuming that 150,000 voters cast ballots in a given electoral district (the average turnout), it implies that vote-buying parties would receive at least 6,000 fewer votes (assuming no effect on turnout). Across the 341 districts that received the, this estimated effect implies the radio messages drew around two million votes away from the putative vote-buying parties.

Questions for Implementers to Consider:

- Is vote-buying an issue in the region in which the implementer works? If so, where are the hotspots for vote-buying? (Note, this might include some fieldwork to determine. Local journalists may be able to help.)
- How will the content be created for the leaflet, including developing the script, translating and recording?
- Is it possible to purchase air-time on local radio stations which cover areas reputed to experience high levels of vote-buying, e.g. rural areas with high rates of poverty and illiteracy?
- What will be the timing of radio spots in the daily radio programming: popular prime time programs vs. regular programs?
- Is it possible to time the campaign to just before polling (when campaigning by parties is prohibited) to maximise relevance for voters on polling day and minimise ability of vote-buying parties to adapt their vote-buying strategy in response to the campaign?

For Further Reading:

Green, Donald, and Srinivasan Vasudevan. "Diminishing the Effectiveness of Vote-Buying: Evidence from a Large-Scale Radio Experiment in India." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, September 3, 2015.

RADIO MAST PATNA INDIA



Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits of Electoral Outcomes

RESEARCHERS:

Claudio Ferraz and Frederico Finan

IMPLEMENTING ORGANISATION:

Controladoria-Geral de União
(Federal Auditor General)

POLICY ISSUE

In a well-functioning democracy, citizens hold politicians accountable for their performance. However, when citizens lack information about politicians' performance, they cannot monitor and hold them accountable. Auditing government spending and publicly releasing this information may allow citizens to identify corrupt politicians and punish them at the polls, which could ultimately force them to act in line with voters' interests. However, it is not clear whether making performance and corruption information available is sufficient to generate greater electoral accountability.

POLITICAL CONTEXT OF BRAZIL

In 2003, the Government of Brazil started a pioneering anti-corruption program where municipal governments were randomly selected to be audited by the Controladoria-Geral de União (CGU), an agency responsible for overseeing the use of federal resources. After each audit, findings are submitted to the central CGU office and then sent to public prosecutors and the municipal legislative branch. The agency also posts a summary of the main

findings online and sends them to main media sources.

Intervention: Researchers leveraged the timing of when municipalities' audit reports were publicly released—before or after the 2004 municipal elections—to study the effect on electoral results.

RESULTS

Publicly released audits decreased vote share and probability of re-election for corrupt incumbent mayors. In municipalities where two corruption violations were reported, the audit policy and the information release reduced the incumbent's likelihood of re-election by 7 percentage points from a re-election rate of 43% percent for mayors with the same number of violations in the municipalities where information audit results came out after the elections.

In comparison municipalities, re-election rates remained steady across corruption levels. This suggests that voters disliked corruption but lacked the information they needed to punish corrupt politicians. Furthermore, informed voters punished higher levels of corruption more severely.

The impact of the audit policy increased with the number of violations reported. In municipalities audited before the election, every additional corruption violation reported reduced the likelihood of an incumbent's re-election by 7 percentage points.

Radio stations enhanced political accountability by disseminating information to voters. In cases where three violations were reported, incumbents in municipalities with a local radio station were 16

percentage points less likely to be re-elected. Incumbents with the same level of corruption in municipalities without a local radio station were only 3.7 percentage points less likely to be re-elected.

Local media also helped promote honest incumbents. In cases where no corruption was found, audit release increased the likelihood of the incumbent's re-election by 17 percentage points in municipalities where a local radio station was present.

Figure 1:
Re-Election Rates By Corruption Level





Figure 2:
Change In Probability Of Re-Election




Questions for Implementers to Consider:

- How can credibly-sourced budget expenditure information for various local or municipal governments be obtained? Is it legal/feasible to share this information?
- Would it be possible to get an endorsement from credible, non-partisan institution such as an Office of the Auditor General?
- Which type of local media would be relevant and influential enough to effectively disseminate the audits?

For Further Reading:

Ferraz, Claudio, and Frederico Finan. 2008. "Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 123(2): 703-44

BRAZIL EXPOSING CORRUPTION



Does Corruption Information Inspire the Fight or Quash the Hope?

A Field Experiment in Mexico on Voter Turnout, Choice and Party Identification

RESEARCHERS:

Alberto Chong, Ana L. De La Lo, Dean Karlan, Léonard Wantchékon

IMPLEMENTING ORGANISATION:

Innovations for Poverty Action, Federal Auditor's Office, two Mexican leafletting firms

POLICY ISSUE

Democratic theory often suggests that offering voters more information will enhance electoral accountability. If voters make decisions based on politicians' past performance, informing voters about politician quality will enhance the likelihood that well-performing incumbents keep their position and poorly performing incumbents are ousted. However, providing with the political system, lowering voter turnout. This study investigated the different ways in which information on incumbent corruption might affect voter engagement and electoral outcomes.

POLITICAL CONTEXT OF MEXICO

The intervention took place one week before the 2009 municipal elections in Mexico. Under Mexican law, political parties are not allowed to campaign in the week before Election Day. Municipal authorities serve three-year terms and have single-term limits, as is the case with all other elected officials in Mexico. In such a system, voters are unable to sanction incumbent politicians directly but may punish or reward the incumbent party for mayoral performance instead.

During their term, mayors are in charge of providing basic public services to

the municipality. Mayors receive a federal transfer of money called the Fund for Social Infrastructure (FISM) to use to improve service delivery in poor areas of their municipality. Mexico's Federal Auditor's Office (ASF) selects three to six municipalities in each state to be audited each year.

All audit reports are presented to the Lower House of Congress and then made publicly available on the ASF website.

Intervention: Researchers tested the impact of an information campaign that consisted of distributing flyers with audit results in randomly selected voting precincts. All flyers stated that it was the mayor's responsibility to provide lighting, safe water, sewage, and local roads, included information on the total amount of resources available to the mayor in that particular municipality to invest in public services, and listed the amount spent. In addition, the flyers either contained information on (i) corruption, as given by the percentage of resources the mayor spent in a corrupt manner; (ii) budget expenditure, as given by the percent of resources spent by the end of the fiscal year; or (iii) poverty expenditure, as given by the percent of resources mayors directed

toward improving services for the poor. Researchers were particularly interested in the effect of the corruption information.

RESULTS

Providing information about corruption lowered voter turnout. In voting precincts that received the corruption information flyer, voter turnout decreased by 1.3 percentage points (2.5 percent) relative to 52 percent turnout in precincts that received a different flyer. Reporting higher levels of corruption led to greater declines: turnout decreased by 1.8 percentage points (3.4 percent) when a low level of corruption was exposed and decreased by 7 percentage points (13.7 percent) with very high levels of corruption.

Moreover, information about corruption lowered votes for both incumbent and challenger parties^[1]. In voting precincts that received the corruption information flyer, votes for incumbent parties decreased

by 0.43 percentage points, relative to average incumbent votes of 18 percent in voting precincts that received one of the other flyers. Similarly, votes for challenger parties decreased by 0.86 percentage points from a base of 34 percent in comparison voting precincts. The level of corruption exposed also affected the impact on votes for incumbent and challenger parties. At low levels of corruption, incumbent votes decreased by 0.67 percentage points (3.7 percent) and challenger votes decreased by 1.1 percentage points (3.2 percent), and at high levels of corruption, votes for the incumbent parties decreased by 2.65 percentage points (14.8 percent).

In addition, survey results suggest that learning about high levels of corruption from the flyer changed individuals' opinions of the municipal government's honesty and decreased the probability that a person identified with the corrupt incumbent's party. Taken together, these results support

the interpretation that information on high levels of corruption can lower voter turnout by causing voters to disengage from the political process.

Questions for Implementers to Consider:

- For organisations which share information on corruption, what lessons can be learned from the study above? How might programmes be tailored to ensure that information leads to citizens engaging to demand accountability and not to voter disengagement?
- Would a similar programme in another country also lead to voter disengagement? Were there specific factors in Mexico, such as the single-term limit, which may have led to results which might not have occurred in countries with a different context?
- What further research needs to be done to determine if sharing information on corruption will lead to voter disengagement in other contexts?

^[1] Incumbent and challenger votes were defined as the votes cast for the incumbent and challenger party, respectively, divided by the number of people registered to vote (and then multiplied by 100).

For further reading: Chong, Alberto, Ana L. De La O, Dean Karlan, and Leonard Wantchekon. "Does Corruption Information Inspire the Fight or Quash the Hope? A Field Experiment in Mexico on Voter Turnout, Choice and Party Identification." Working Paper, May 2014

Policing Politicians: Citizen Empowerment and Political Accountability in Uganda

RESEARCHERS:

Macartan Humphreys,
Jeremy M. Weinstein

IMPLEMENTING ORGANISATION:

Africa Leadership Institute

POLICY ISSUE

If voters have limited information or ability to observe or influence elected officials' actions, politicians may engage in opportunistic behaviors or ignore the needs or preferences of their constituencies. Revealing information on candidates' performance could empower voters and incentivise politicians to be more responsive to citizens' concerns. However, there is limited evidence on the types of information that can induce shifts in both voters' and politicians' behaviours.

POLITICAL CONTEXT OF UGANDA

Multi-party politics were introduced in Uganda in 2006 but party discipline remains important; the ruling party controls more than two-thirds of the seats in Parliament. Members of Parliament are elected for a five-year term as representatives of geographic constituencies and special interests groups, including women, youth, workers, people with disabilities, and the army. Voters know little about the role and performance of MPs: media penetration is limited and voters have access to little information about the activities of their MPs once in office.

Intervention: Researchers tested the impact of publicly releasing scorecards detailing performance and activities of elected MPs. Each scorecard included annual performance indicators, generally presented as a percentile ranking to facilitate comparisons among MPs. MPs were scored on their engagement in parliamentary plenary sessions, committee activity, and service to their constituencies. Four scorecards were produced during the Eighth Parliament in Uganda (2006-2011), with the final scorecard released just months before the 2011 Parliamentary election. Implementing organisation, Africa Leadership Institute (AFLI), released the scorecards in Kampala approximately once a year, and provided copies to MPs, civil society organisations, and media representatives.

AFLI also disseminated scorecard results through workshops in randomly selected geographic constituencies between 2008 and 2010. AFLI representatives planned the dissemination workshops in collaboration with influential community members and advertised the workshops through posters and press

releases. Workshop participants received a packet with scorecard materials in local languages that summarised the results for their MP with very few words and no numbers. Images and pictures were used to represent the concept being measured and the MP's relative performance. The workshops followed a set format: a local community leader welcomed participants and introduced the AFLI representatives; the AFLI representatives talked about the roles and responsibilities of an MP, the methodology of the scorecard, and the results for the local MP; panelists then provided comments; and the MP or his/her representative had an opportunity to respond. Furthermore, AFLI returned to these constituencies in the month before the 2011 Parliamentary elections to distribute flyers with updated scorecard information to households in two randomly selected polling station areas.

Finally, researchers also surveyed adult citizens of voting age across Uganda's 215 geographic constituencies in 2008 and 2011. In each survey, respondents were asked questions to provide an overall assessment of their MP's performance.

Researchers then provided a randomly selected group of these respondents with their MP's scorecard and asked them again to describe their overall opinion of the MP.

PRELIMINARY RESULTS

Survey results show that respondents who were provided with an MP report card were willing to incorporate the performance information and MP rankings to reevaluate their positions towards MPs. For individuals with low expectations *ex ante*, receiving positive performance information about their MP increased the approval rating of the MP by an average of 0.22 points on a four-point scale. In contrast, the effect of receiving the scorecard was negative for voters with high prior expectations who received negative information about their MP. However, self-reported voting patterns of the same respondents in 2011 do not reflect the changes in attitude that were observed in reaction to the scorecards in 2008.

MPs and party rulers responded to media coverage of scorecards. The scorecards became an important and hotly debated part of the national political discussion,

with leaders of the ruling party and the opposition speaking regularly to the press about them. However, there was little to suggest that MPs improved their performance in reaction to the dissemination of the scorecards. There were no significant increases in subsequent scorecard performance for those MPs whose constituencies had been selected for workshops, compared to those whose constituencies had not. Furthermore, the dissemination workshops did not make the scorecards more or less likely to influence electoral outcomes for MPs.

The results indicate that the scorecards had little impact on the strength of the accountability relationships between politicians and constituencies. Researchers suggest several possible reasons for this. The presence of politicians in the workshops may have had an impact on how voters understood the information revealed in the scorecard, or politicians may have been less concerned by how they were seen by their constituents than how they were seen by their peers. Additionally, the information contained in the scorecards may not have been relevant to individuals'

The results indicate that the scorecards had little impact on the strength of the accountability relationships between politicians and constituencies. Researchers suggest several possible reasons for this.

voting decisions. Whatever the reason, the evidence demonstrates that when specific information is revealed as part of an ongoing political process, it may simply become a part of the political debate. Indeed, MPs and their local representatives often challenged the validity of the information contained in the scorecards, possibly undermining the impact of new information on voter attitudes and preferences. In this context, specific information may simply become one of many factors that voters take into consideration.

Questions for Implementers to Consider:

- Why did the scorecards have little impact on political accountability?
- Is there some other gap beyond an information gap which prevents voters from holding politicians accountable?
- Could the politicians protesting that the information was not credible have led to a decrease in them being accountable to the increase in information? Would providing information that could be verified more transparently have led to different results?
- How can implementers tailor programmes providing information on politicians' performance to include the lessons of the study above? For example, can they create a strategy for dealing with possible backlash from MPs, including ways to communicate credibility and neutrality of scorecards?

For further reading:

Humphreys, Macartan, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. "Policing Politicians: Citizen Empowerment and Political Accountability in Uganda- Preliminary Analysis." IGC Working Paper, March 2012



FEATURED EVALUATIONS: ACTIVE INFORMATION PROVISION AND VOTER ENGAGEMENT

Active provision of information, including electoral debates and town hall meetings, enables voters to gain first-hand information about political candidates and policies by creating forums for discussion and engagement on political issues.

Debates: Voter and Politician Response to Political Communication in Sierra Leone

RESEARCHERS:

Kelly Bidwell, Katherine Casey,
and Rachel Glennerster

IMPLEMENTING ORGANISATION:

Search for Common Ground
Sierra Leone

POLICY ISSUE

Political debates are often considered an integral part of campaign strategy in democracies. Debates can reveal information about the relative quality and policy differences between candidates. By creating a public record of candidates' pre-election commitments, debates may also enhance the subsequent accountability of elected officials. In developing countries where voters may have little information about candidates' qualifications and policy positions, publicising debates could have a large impact on electoral outcomes. Yet there is little evidence on the impact of debates on voting behaviour.

POLITICAL CONTEXT OF SIERRA LEONE

The intervention took place in the lead up to the 2012 Parliamentary elections. Voting patterns in Sierra Leone have historically been based on ethnic ties and pre-existing party affiliations; the two largest political parties are closely associated with ethnic groups in the north or south. The country has 112 Parliamentary constituencies, in which one Member of Parliament (MP) represents approximately 40,000 residents in the national legislature. MPs are elected by first-past-the-post plurality.

Intervention: Researchers and implementers hosted public screenings of filmed debates between leading MP candidates at randomly selected polling stations in the lead up to parliamentary elections. The debates followed a standardised format: a moderator introduced the candidates and the basic roles and responsibilities of the office, followed by a casual "get to know you" section. Finally, five national policy questions and two local policy questions were posed to the candidates. All debates were conducted in Krio, Sierra Leone's lingua franca. Debates were screened in a convenient public place.

RESULTS

Exposure to the debates increased voters' political knowledge, including general political information, candidate attributes, and candidate policy positions. For example, the proportion of voters who could correctly state the amount in their constituency facilitation fund (CFF) increased from 3.4 percent in polling stations without screened debates to 17.4 percent in polling stations with screened debates. Similarly, the proportion of voters who knew which candidate (if any) in the past increased by 11 percentage points from a base of 49 percent in comparison polling stations. Increased voter knowledge translated into changed

voter behaviour. The debate winners (as judged by the audience at the debate) received a 4.9 percentage point increase in votes at polling stations where debates were screened, relative to comparison polling stations. Debate viewers were also 9 percentage points more likely than non-viewers (from 43 percent to 52 percent) to have voted for a candidate whose top priority issue aligned with theirs. This shift in voter behaviour suggests that debate viewers realigned their vote to better match their preferred policy positions. Policy alignment improved not only because voters were more likely to select candidates with views similar to their own, but also because voters changed their views to match those of their preferred candidates after watching them speak.

Candidate behaviour also changed in response to the debates. Candidates increased campaign expenditure in communities that viewed the debates, relative to their expenditure in communities that did not. Voters in communities where debates were screened reported receiving more and more valuable gifts from candidates, and candidates

visited the communities significantly more than in comparison communities.

The debates also caused politicians to engage with and invest more in their constituencies once they were in office. MPs who participated in the debates spent 2.5 times more on verifiable development expenditures for their constituency as MPs who did not participate in the debates. This corresponded to average gains of roughly US\$6,000 per constituency from a base of US\$4,070 spent in comparison constituencies, and was close to the total of US\$11,000 that MPs had available in the CFF. In addition, MPs that participated in the debate conducted an average of 4.2 community visits, compared to 2.9 in the comparison group, and held 2.1 public meetings, compared to one in the comparison group. However, MPs who participated in the debates were not more likely to promote the sectors that they had ranked as their top priority during the campaign, nor were they more active participants in Parliament than those who had not participated in the debates.

Questions for Implementers to Consider:

- Do political debates already take place in your context?
- Does a credible, nonpartisan institution exist that could host and film candidate debates?
- Will political candidates be willing to participate in debates?
- What are the national and local policy questions of relevance to voters? Could the organisation conduct fieldwork research to determine what these are?
- Does the organisation have enough personnel for a road show of debate screenings? Are there convenient and accessible public locations for screenings?
- Who will translate the debates into relevant local languages?
- What dissemination channels could provide less resource intensive alternatives to the road show of debate screenings? What would be the pros and cons of these alternative dissemination channels in your context? What additional resources would be needed for each alternative?

For Further Reading:

Bidwell, Kelly, Katherine Casey, and Rachel Glennerster. "Debates: The Impact of Voter Knowledge Initiatives in Sierra Leone." Working Paper, August 2015.

DEBATES SIERRA LEONE



Can Informed Public Deliberation Overcome Clientelism?

Experimental Evidence from Benin

RESEARCHERS:

Thomas Fujiwara, Léonard Wantchékon

IMPLEMENTING ORGANISATION:

Beninese Institute for Empirical Research in Political Economy (IERPE)

POLICY ISSUE

Elections in developing countries are often characterised by clientelism- the practice of securing votes through gifts and the promise of favours and patronage. Research in economics and politics suggest that this pandering to select members of the electorate is inefficient as a way to redistribute resources, but is effective in gaining voter support. In contrast, broad public good provision is associated with better economic outcomes but is politically costly. Furthermore, promises of broad public provision may not be viewed credibly in new democracies where politicians and parties have not interacted long enough with voters. If voters were exposed to a credible alternative, would they be less responsive to clientelist strategies?

POLITICAL CONTEXT OF BENIN

The intervention took place in the lead up to the 2006 Beninese presidential elections. Since its transition to multiparty democracy in 1991, Benin has had seven parliamentary and five presidential elections, and is considered one of the most successful cases of democratization in Africa. Presidential elections use the runoff system, where a first round election is held and the two candidates with the most votes face off in a second round against each other (the runoff).

Elections are at large, so the entire country functions as one single district.

Intervention: The Beninese Institute for Empirical Research in Political Economy (IERPE) held candidate-endorsed town hall meetings with candidates' representatives to discuss policy platforms, followed by an open debate of the policies proposed in the meeting^[1]. Town hall meetings were carried out by IERPE staff and followed a specific format. Staff first introduced the candidate they were representing, then the candidate representative gave a 15 minute speech on the key problems facing the country and the specific solutions proposed by the candidate. An open debate followed the speech, giving the audience an opportunity to suggest amendments to candidates' platforms and contextualize candidates' policy positions. Meetings were no more than two hours and occurred twice a week in the three weeks before Election Day.

RESULTS

Town hall meetings shifted self-reported voter behaviour in ways that suggest a reduction in clientelist practices. All survey questions that could be interpreted as a practice related to clientelism were included in an index to measure clientelist behaviour. Town hall meetings led to a 0.227 standard

The town hall meetings had no significant effect on voter turnout, suggesting that they did not negatively affect voter turnout and could be as effective as clientelist rallies in motivating voters to turnout.

deviation reduction in an index of voter perceptions of clientelist behavior.

The town hall meetings had no significant effect on voter turnout, suggesting that they did not negatively affect voter turnout and could be as effective as clientelist rallies in motivating voters to turnout. Meetings had a significant effect on vote shares depending on whether the candidate was the most dominant candidate in a given village. Town hall meetings had a large positive impact on the vote shares of candidates whose representative participated in the town hall meeting when they were not the dominant candidate in a village. But for the dominant candidate in any village, participating in the town hall in that village had a large negative effect on vote share. A possible interpretation of this result is that voters may find it “natural” to vote for the candidate with the stronghold in their village but that the injection of additional information and policy deliberation leads to more electoral competition. One implication of this finding is that a candidate may pursue this alternative to clientelism in villages

where they do not have a stronghold, and continue clientelist practices only in those villages where they do.

Questions for Implementers to Consider

- Does the organisation have the capacity to conduct fieldwork to establish priority policy areas and identify evidence-based policy solutions that political candidates will support?
- Is clientelism prevalent in your context?
- Do town hall meetings already take place or are there other forums for political debate/conversation?
- Can the organisation get buy-in from political candidates?
- Does a credible non-partisan institution exist that could provide personnel to act as representatives for each candidate? Are there convenient, accessible locations for town hall meetings?
- How frequently will town meetings be held and how may this affect their effectiveness?

For Further Reading:

Wantchekon, Leonard and Thomas Fujiwara. 2013. “Can Informed Public Deliberation Overcome Clientelism? Experimental Evidence from Benin.” *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 5(4): 241-255.

^[1]The specific platforms were drawn from the conclusions of a meeting of policy experts that suggested a wide range of policy proposals to improve government performance in the areas of education, public health, governance, and urban planning.



Votes and Violence: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Nigeria

RESEARCHERS:

Paul Collier and Pedro C. Vicente

IMPLEMENTING ORGANISATION:

ActionAid International Nigeria (AAIN)

POLICY ISSUE

In many newly democratic, low-income countries, there are neither checks nor balances upon the use of power nor effective regulations for the conduct of elections. By studying malfeasant electoral strategies like violence, and ways to counter them, we may begin to improve our understanding of ways to improve electoral conduct as a means of increasing political accountability in Africa. Researchers evaluated the effect of community campaigning against electoral violence, with the main mechanism being to lower the perceived threat to individual voters through collective action.

POLITICAL CONTEXT OF NIGERIA

The intervention was implemented before the 2007 national and state-level elections in Nigeria. The elections were the third democratically-held elections since the passing of a new federal constitution in 1999. The 2007 elections covered four distinct contests: presidential, federal House of Representatives and senate, gubernatorial and state assembly. Under the federal constitution, political power is particularly concentrated in the president and the state governors.

Intervention: A community campaign that consisted of a clear message against electoral violence, as embedded in its main slogan: “No to political violence! Vote against violent politicians”. Campaign activities included town meetings, popular theatre, roadshows, and the distribution of t-shirts, caps, hijabs for Muslim women, leaflets, posters, and stickers printed with the campaign slogan. Each intervention location had at least one town meeting and one popular theatre show. The town meetings provided an opportunity with the grassroots to meet with local representatives to discuss ways of counteracting politically motivated violence. Popular theatre was designed to target youths and others who were relatively difficult to attract to town meetings.

RESULTS

The anti-violence campaign appears to have increased the sense of security to the general population. Perceived local electoral violence induced by politicians decreased by 0.23 standard deviation units. The campaign also boosted empowerment to counteract electoral violence. People who experienced the campaign were more 8 percentage points more likely to send

Voter turnout increased by 11 percentage points (gubernatorial elections) and the study found that political intimidation was a strategy predominantly linked to non-incumbent political groups

a postcard to report electoral violence in the media. Voter turnout increased by 11 percentage points (gubernatorial elections) and the study found that political intimidation was a strategy predominantly linked to non-incumbent political groups (as reflected by the impact of the campaign on vote choices). All these effects on ordinary citizens may have undermined electoral violence as an electoral strategy: Journalists' diaries revealed a decrease in actual violence and the study found a 47 percentage point effect on the likelihood that physical violence occurs. This is evidence that the campaign was able to influence the behaviour of violent politicians. The study also found effects on untargeted individuals within treated locations, which may include spillovers of the campaign, specifically in terms of decreased perceptions of violence.

Questions for Implementers to Consider

- Is political violence a problem in your context?
- Would all the activities that made up the campaign be relevant dissemination channels for publicising the campaign message in your context? For example, would community theatre be a socially acceptable and well-attended activity during election time in your context?
- Who will design the necessary campaign materials and activities?
- Who will fund, hire, and train personnel to conduct campaign activities in the field?

For Further Reading:

Collier, Paul, and Pedro C. Vicente. 2013. "Votes and Violence: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Nigeria." *The Economic Journal* 124 (2): F327-F355

(L-R) NIGERIA CAMPAIGN STICKER; NIGERIA CAMPAIGN LEAFLET





BREAKOUT SESSIONS

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Session 1:

Case Study

WHAT IS A THEORY OF CHANGE?

A theory of change describes a strategy or blueprint for achieving a given long-term goal. It identifies the preconditions, pathways, and interventions necessary for an initiative's success.

The most basic theory of change consists of four parts: an input, output, outcome and long term goal. These four components create a theory of how a programme could have a particular impact.



INPUT

The first component of a theory of change is the input. This is the intervention: the intervention is what you are adding in a new system or changing in an existing system. For example, if you had an educational programme which provided free textbooks, your input would be the books, as this is what is being added to the existing schooling system due to the creation of the programme. Some programmes will have multiple inputs.

OUTPUT

The second component of a theory of change is the output. This is the “take-up” of an intervention. Continuing with the free textbook example, the output in this case would be that children have access to textbooks.

OUTCOME

The third component of a theory of change is the outcome. The outcome is how you expect

your beneficiaries to use or engage with the input. In the textbook example, the outcome would be that children read and use textbooks.

GOAL

The fourth component of the theory of change is the goal. This is the objective or aim of the intervention. In the case of free textbooks, improved learning outcomes would be the goal.

A theory of change enables you to understand why a particular intervention could have a particular impact. Numerous assumptions exist linking each component of the theory of change. Identifying the assumptions helps researchers and evidence users explain why an intervention did or did not work. It also aids policymakers in deciphering whether or not an intervention could work in a different context.

YOUR TASK

Your task is to develop a theory of change for a voter engagement intervention, which was evaluated by J-PAL affiliated researchers Kelly Bidwell, Katherine Casey and Rachel Glennerster. The details of the intervention can be found overleaf.

THE IMPACT OF VOTER KNOWLEDGE INITIATIVE IN SIERRA LEONE¹

CONTEXT

Voting patterns in Sierra Leone have historically been based on ethnic ties and pre-existing party affiliations; the two largest political parties are closely associated with ethnic groups in the north or south.

The country has 112 Parliamentary constituencies, in which one Member of Parliament (MP) represents approximately 40,000 residents in the national legislature. Search for Common Ground (SFCG), a nonpartisan civil society organization, operates programs designed to promote civic engagement and dialogue to build sustainable peace. The 2012 Parliamentary elections presented an opportunity for SFCG to test new electoral programs that could increase transparency, voter knowledge of candidates, and engagement between voters and MPs.



INTERVENTION

In the run-up to the November 2012 parliamentary elections in Sierra Leone, researchers partnered with SFCG to evaluate how the dissemination of political information through debates impacted voter knowledge and behaviour, campaign spending, and the performance of elected politicians.

After identifying what they predicted would be 28 relatively competitive races, SFCG organized and filmed debates organised in

a standardised format between the major candidates in a randomly selected half of these constituencies. After the debates, both the debate audience and an expert panel of government and civil society representatives separately determined the debate winner. From a total of 224 polling centres in the 14 constituencies where debates were filmed, 112 were randomly assigned to host public screenings of a video of the debate, between one and five weeks before the election. In total, an estimated 19,000 people viewed the videos. Surveys of voters before

¹ Bidwell, Kelly, Katherine Casey, and Rachel Glennerster. "Debates: The Impact of Voter Knowledge Initiatives in Sierra Leone." Working Paper, June 2015.

and after—in some cases only after—the screenings measured how their perceptions of candidates, knowledge of candidates, and voting intentions changed.

In a separate group of forty polling centres, the research team showed the debates to individual voters in order to test the effects of different kinds of information, such as policy positions, personal characteristics, or persuasive speeches, on voter behaviour. Voters were randomly assigned to one of the following groups:

1. **Full debate:** 400 individuals watched the entire video of the debate on a personal handheld device.
2. **Get-to-know-you only:** 400 individuals watched a video clip of the candidates speaking informally about their hobbies and interests.
3. **Radio report:** 400 individuals listened to a journalistic summary of the main policy positions articulated by the candidates during the debates.
4. **Surveyed comparison:** 600 individuals were surveyed before the election, like those in groups 1-3, but were not shown any media.

5. **Pure comparison:** The rest of the voters registered at these polling centres viewed no media and were not surveyed until after Election Day.

On or immediately after Election Day, researchers conducted exit polls among a random subset of all voters. They used these polls, as well as the Election Commission's official voting records, to measure voting outcomes. Once the elected MPs took office, they tracked their performance in both treatment and comparison constituencies.

RESULTS

Overall, exposure to the debates significantly increased voters' political knowledge and changed their voting behaviour. Candidates who participated in the debates increased campaign expenditures in communities where the debates screened. The debates also caused politicians to engage with and invest more in their constituencies once they were in office.

Voter knowledge: The public debate screenings led to substantial improvements in voter knowledge, including general political knowledge as well as knowledge of specific candidates and their policy positions. For example, the proportion of voters who knew which candidate (if any) had been an MP in the past increased by 11 percentage points (from 49

percent to 60 percent) and the proportion of voters who could correctly identify candidates' top priority for government spending doubled (from 14 to 29 percent).

Voting choices: Exposure to the public debate screening significantly increased policy alignment, measured as a match between a voter's reported policy position and that of the candidate he or she voted for. Debate viewers were 9 percentage points more likely (from 43 percent to 52 percent) to have voted for a candidate whose top priority issue aligned with theirs. Policy alignment improved not only because voters became more likely to select candidates with views similar to their own, but also because voters changed their views to match those of their preferred candidate after watching them speak.

The debate screenings also made some voters more likely to vote for high-quality candidates. There was a 5-percentage-point increase in votes for the debate winner (as judged by the audience at the debate) relative to the comparison group. This increase was in part driven by voters who switched votes across ethnic-party lines when the debate winner was from a rival party. For voters historically aligned with the party of the debate winner, the screening had no effect on their vote choice.

The individual treatment arms aimed to unpack which types of information—from “hard facts” about policy to more intangible information about charisma—drive these changes in voter behaviour. All three individual treatments (the full debate, radio report, and get-to-know you video), increased political knowledge, although the get-to-know-you was half as effective. Only the full debate, however, had a significant impact on voters’ policy alignment with their preferred candidates and their vote choice. The fact that the radio report treatment was as effective in building knowledge as viewing the debate, but only the full debate treatment impacted policy alignment, suggests that personality plays a key role in persuading voters.

Campaign spending: In communities that viewed the debates, candidates subsequently increased their level of campaign spending relative to the comparison group. Voters reported receiving more and more valuable gifts from the particular candidate, and the candidate visited the communities significantly more than in comparison communities.


Performance of elected officials: MPs who participated in the debates spent 2.5 times as much on verifiable development expenditures

for their constituency. This corresponded to average gains of roughly US\$6,000 per constituency from a base US\$4,070 spent in comparison constituencies, and was close to the total of US\$11,000 that MPs had available. In addition, these MPs conducted an average of 4.2 community visits, compared to 2.9 in the comparison group, and held 2.1 public meetings, compared to one in the comparison group. Constituents of MPs that participated in the debates were more likely to say their MPs were doing “a good job in promoting” various sectors in their constituency. However, MPs who participated in the debates were not more likely to promote the sectors that they had ranked as their top priority during the campaign, nor were they more active participants in Parliament than those who had not participated in the debates.

Policy implications: In sum, this research suggests that publicising candidate debates can significantly increase voters’ political knowledge, which can then influence their vote on Election Day. Debates may also encourage politicians to invest more in their constituencies, both during the campaign and after they are elected. Finally, this project demonstrates that publicized inter-party debates can be a cost-effective and logistically feasible method of improving voters’

knowledge; fixed production costs for the debates were roughly US\$5,000 each. In settings with higher mass media penetration, debates could be televised, reducing dissemination costs.

Fill in the theory of change box below:



Session 2:

Applying the Lessons

LOCALLY GROUNDED GLOBALLY INFORMED POLICY

Numerous rigorous evaluations have tested the effectiveness of many interventions. This means we now have an evidence base to inform policy decisions. However, the exact policy you may be interested in implementing has likely not been tested in the exact context in which you want to implement it, so considering how these policy lessons apply to the local context is also important.

How do we utilise existing evidence while still taking local context into account?

We need to learn from rigorous evaluations while at the same time acknowledging that programmes found to be successful in one context may not be suitable for another. In order to do this we need a systematic way of thinking through which lessons from rigorous research are relevant for our context and which are not.

This can be done by deconstructing the evidence into a theory of change and using descriptive empirical data as well as institutional knowledge to inform whether or not that theory could hold in a different context.

STEP 1

The first step in assessing whether or not a programme or policy lesson is suitable for a particular context requires asking a number of questions about the original programme or policy. These questions may change based on the kind of intervention or lesson, but here are some examples of important questions.

What were the basic conditions?

The initial intervention would have been targeted at resolving or ameliorating a particular problem. What was this problem?

What was required logistically?

Numerous people, systems and resources are required for the programme to run. What were these?

Are there behavioural biases?

Tendencies in beneficiaries' behaviour are often the focus of programmes. Interventions try and alter respondents' behaviour so that there is a better overall outcome. What behaviour was targeted in the programme or was behaviour targeted in this programme?

What is the theory behind why the intervention worked?

We need to understand the path that led the intervention to have a particular impact (input⇒ output⇒ outcome⇒impact). Understanding the theory behind why the intervention was successful and the local factors necessary for the programme to have a particular impact is a critical step in establishing whether or not the programme is appropriate for your context.

STEP 2

The second step is to assess whether these components or conditions hold in your setting. Do you have the same needs? Are there alternative structures that could play a similar role in your context? Do people behave in the same way? Could the programme's theory of change hold in your environment?

These questions can be answered in numerous ways- through descriptive data, a process evaluation, institutional knowledge, or all three.

YOUR TASK

1. Choose a country which your group will represent. This should be a country of which at least one group member has extensive knowledge.
2. Identify an intervention featured in your conference booklet that may be useful for the country you have chosen.
3. Map out a theory of change for the intervention you have chosen.

INPUT

OUTPUT

OUTCOME

GOAL

4. Use the intervention you have identified in (2) to fill in column one overleaf.
5. In column two in the table below indicate whether or not these conditions/logistical process/systems/behaviour hold in your context
6. How could you modify the original intervention so that it could work in the country you identified in (1)?

	FOR THE INTERVENTION IDENTIFIED IN QUESTION (2)	DOES THIS HOLD IN YOUR CHOSEN CONTEXT?	
Basic Conditions of identified programme		✓	x
		✓	x
		✓	x
		✓	x
		✓	x
Logistics, systems and processes required		✓	x
		✓	x
		✓	x
		✓	x
		✓	x
Behavioural biases targeted in chosen intervention		✓	x
		✓	x
		✓	x
		✓	x
		✓	x

BIOGRAPHIES



Speakers



TAVNEET SURI is the Maurice F. Strong Career Development Associate Professor at the MIT Sloan School of Management in the Applied Economics Group. She is an NBER Faculty Research Fellow, a Junior Affiliate at the Bureau for Research and Economic Analysis of Development (BREAD), a Research Affiliate at J-PAL, a Research Affiliate at the Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and the Co-Director of the Agriculture Research Programme at the International Growth Center (IGC). Tavneet's research centres on applied microeconomic issues in sub-Saharan Africa. In particular, she works on technology adoption (agricultural, water, cell phone), risk sharing and consumption smoothing, the role of measurement error in poverty dynamics, and the role of infrastructure in the development of markets. Her research currently spans Kenya, Ghana, Rwanda and Sierra Leone. Tavneet completed her

undergraduate studies in Economics at Trinity College, University of Cambridge in 1999, received her MA in International and Development Economics at Yale University in 2001, and her PhD in Economics at Yale University in 2006. She has been at MIT Sloan since 2006.



KELLY BIDWELL is a Fellow on the Social and Behavioral Sciences Team (SBST). Kelly holds an MA in International Affairs from Columbia University, where she focused on economic development, education and evaluation methods. Before joining the SBST, Kelly was a Senior Policy Manager at J-PAL North America where she helped build government capacity to apply academic insights and conduct rigorous low cost evaluations on priority policy issues. Kelly worked at Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA) for four years, leading randomised evaluations across sub-Saharan Africa and a range of sectors,

and serving as the Ghana Country Director from 2008-2010. Kelly served in highly technical positions launching, supervising and running randomised evaluations across sectors, leading training and dissemination efforts internationally, and supporting the use of impact evaluations and rigorous evidence for informed and effective policy making with numerous governments.



LÉONARD WANTCHÉKON is professor of Politics and associated faculty in the economics department at Princeton University. His research is broadly focused on Political Economy and development economics particularly in Africa, and his specific interests include experimental studies on democracy and governance, resource curse, and long-term social impact of historical events. He is the author of numerous publications in leading academic journals, including "The Slave Trade and

Discussants

the Origins of Mistrust in Africa” (with Nathan Nunn), in the *American Economic Review*; “The Paradox of “Warlord” Democracy: A Theoretical Investigation,” in the *American Political Science Review* (2004); *Clientelism and Voting Behavior: A Field Experiment in Benin*, *World Politics* (2003) as well as “Electoral Competition under the Threat of Political Unrest” (with Matthew Ellman) in the *Quarterly Journal of Economics* (2000).



SAMUEL ASARE AKUAMOAH is the Deputy Chairman for Operations at the National Commission for Civic Education. He

has over 20 years experience in civic and voter education in Ghana and has done extensive community engagements in all 275 constituencies in Ghana’s ten administrative regions. Before becoming a deputy chairman of the NCCE, Samuel worked as a Public Education Officer at the NCCE and rose through the ranks to become the Director of Programmes, a position he held until His Excellency the President of Ghana appointed him to his current position. His work as a civic educator was preceded by private media practice during which he covered political party activities, including activities pertaining to the electoral processes and its purposes. Samuel holds an MA in African Studies from the University of Ghana, a BA in Political Science from the University of Ghana, and a diploma in journalism from the Ghana Institute of Journalism GIJ.



REGINA OFORIWAA AMANFO is a Political Scientist and a Public Administration specialist by training. She has experience

in research, with special focus on parliamentary work. She plays a leading role in CDD-Ghana’s parliamentary strengthening programme, including building the capacity of the research department of Ghana’s Parliament and helping to facilitate access to information for Members of Parliament. Regina is also the programme officer responsible for human rights programmes such as protecting the rights of remand prisoners, promoting non-custodial sentencing in Ghana, and the HIV/AIDS Anti-Stigma initiative. Regina was also involved in the first round of the Afrobarometer, a research project that measures the social, political and economic atmosphere in Africa, as a field coordinator. She is the Center’s focal person on gender.

Discussants



CLAUDE CIRILLE is currently the Chief Editor of the Studio Mozaik, a training studio providing basic and continuous training in radio journalism in Côte d'Ivoire. He has more than twenty five years of experience in international journalism. Prior to joining the Hironnelle Foundation he spent his career working as journalist and Chief Editor at Radio France Internationale, station chief of Radio Okapi in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and as Director of Radio Miraya in Sudan. Since 2014 Claude has been the representative of the Hironnelle Foundation in Abidjan, a Swiss organization supporting independent media in crisis, transition, and post-conflict zones. Claude holds degrees in Law and Politics from the Université de Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne and Sciences-Po.



EDDIE D. JARWOLO is the Executive Director of NAYMOTE Partners for Democratic Development. NAYMOTE promotes

citizens' understanding of democratic processes and the long-term benefits of their participation in these processes. Established in 2001, the institution has been one of the leading grassroots organizations promoting democracy, peace building, human rights and civic engagement in Liberia. Eddie has over 14 years of professional experience in civic engagement and community organizing, grassroots democracy enhancement, and strengthening community-based organizations. He also serves as a member of the Elections Coordinating Committee (ECC), the largest CSO platform engaging Liberia's electoral process with the objective of contributing to free, fair, transparent and credible elections. Eddie has participated in the U.S. Department of State International Leadership Exchange program, Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow program, and the U.S. Department of State Community Solutions Fellow program. His extensive international exposure includes travels to the USA, South Africa, Qatar, Indonesia, Nigeria, Netherlands,

Sweden, Sierra Leone, Peru, and Costa Rica. Eddie holds a Masters degree in Public Administration from the Cuttington University and a Bachelor of Arts in Sociology from the A.M.E University both obtained in Liberia.



KINNA LIKIMANI is a member of BloggingGhana. She is the Team Lead for Ghana Decides, a non-partisan project focused on fostering a better-informed electorate using both online social media tools and offline engagements. Previously, she served as a project advisor for InformGhana, a Blogging Ghana project to ease information sharing and foster a better informed citizenry. Kinna is also the Programs Officer for the Mbaasem Foundation, which works to support and promote African women's writing. Kinna is passionate about the social media space and its role in development and literary arts advocacy. Kinna is a feminist, social activist and a writer. Her literary blog Kinna Reads, is

one of the go-to online locations for dialogue on African literature. She and her brood of boys live in Accra.



JEAN MENSA is the Executive Director of the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) and Coordinator of its Ghana Political Parties Programme. She is a barrister-at-law and a thought leader on governance and democratic issues in Ghana, with experience in the process of building and strengthening the capacity of institutions of political governance. She has contributed to the establishment of The Chairmen's Caucus and The Platform of General Secretaries and Policy Analysts; platforms which to date bring together the leadership of parliamentary political parties to discuss pertinent policy challenges facing Ghana and reach consensus on solutions. Additionally, Jean has led the organisation of Ghana's presidential and vice-presidential debates since 2004.

The debates have introduced an issue-driven approach to the electioneering process, helping to shift the focus of campaigns from personality attacks to a discussion of policies and ideas. In 2012, for the first time in Ghana's history, the sitting President of Ghana, H.E John Mahama, participated in the IEA presidential debate. Jean has also participated in research and advocacy processes of the IEA that have led to the development of policy documents and bills, some of which have passed into law. She is a tireless campaigner for a review of Ghana's current 1992 Republican Constitution and was a member of the government-led Constitution Review Commission. She is married with three children.

Panellists



SAA M. BANDABLA

is a Sierra Leonean development professional with over 12 years of work experience in both Government and Non-Governmental Organizations. He currently serves as Programme Manager of Search for Common Ground (SFCG) based in Freetown, Sierra Leone. Prior to his current positions, he served the organization as Design, Monitoring and Evaluation Coordinator for Sierra Leone and Liberia, and Regional Coordinator for the Southern Regional Office. Before joining SFCG, he worked as Technical Coordinator at Care International and as a Reintegration Officer for Sierra Leone's National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR). Saa has experience working on a range of issues related to issues of peace and security, humanitarian intervention, gender equality, youth development, democratic governance,

Panellists

elections, Common Ground advocacy, community engagement and organizational development (OD). He holds an MA in Agriculture extension and Rural Sociology from Njala University and a Bachelor's degree in General Agriculture from Njala University. He also holds a post graduate certificate in Social Work from the Institute of Public Administration and Management. Saa is determined to contribute to the development of a secure and functioning society.



OBO EFFANGA is Governance Programmes Manager at ActionAid Nigeria (AAN). He was the point-person for ActionAid intervention in the last general elections in Nigeria. Previously, Obo served as Parliamentary Liaison Advisor and Policy Advocacy & Campaigns Coordinator in AAN as well as Programme Officer Human Rights at Gender and Development Action. He also chairs the National Coordinating Committee of the Network on Police Reform in Nigeria (NOPRIN). A lawyer

and journalist, Obo is interested in human rights, good governance, and democracy. A consummate writer and newspaper columnist spanning more than 12 years, he won the 'Columnist of the Year 2005' in the Nigeria Media Merit Awards. His incisive newspaper commentaries and analyses cover a wide range of issues including law, politics, governance, human rights and social justice. Obo has a diploma in Mass Communications, is called to the Nigerian Bar and obtained an MA in Human Rights from the University of Sussex, UK. He has trained different groups on issues of governance, budgets & accountability, human rights and social justice within and outside his organisation and for partners and government agencies. He is an associate and external trainer for the MS Training Centre for Development Cooperation (MS-TCDC) Tanzania.



ANDRÉ GUÉGUÉHOUN is a Research Associate at the institute for Empirical Research in Political Economy (IERPE), where he leads or

contributes to numerous surveys and research projects. His recent research in political economy and public economy has a focus on issues related to political participation, accountability, governance, and foreign aid in Africa. Before joining IERPE, André worked as a consultant with the Econometrics Laboratory PREG-CECO of "Ecole Polytechnique de Palaiseau" (France) on a study on voting behaviour. He also worked as an economic analyst and statistician at Alindaou Consulting International (ACI). Through his participation in several research workshops of Afrobarometer Network, André is familiar with methods of analysis and research on the themes like Governance, Democracy and households' living conditions from the survey data, and then on design of empirical research project in social science. André holds an MSc in Public Economics and Applied Statistics and a Master's degree in Economics.

STAY IN TOUCH WITH J-PAL

We welcome inquiries from governments, international organisations, NGOs, and foundations about potential partnerships in research, training, and policy outreach. Potential opportunities for partnership include our Executive Education training course (see page 56), customised sector-specific evidence workshops, technical assistance on scaling up proven interventions, and occasionally, partnering on an evaluation with one of our research affiliates.

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THANK YOU



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