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**Aging in Less Developed Countries**

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# Is Decentralized Iron Fortification a Feasible Option to Fight Anemia among the Poorest?

Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo, and Rachel Glennerster

## 10.1 Introduction

Iron deficiency is believed to be the most common nutrient deficiency in the world today. While estimating the number of anemic people is difficult, the World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that two billion people are anemic worldwide, and that about half of these cases can be traced to iron deficiency (WHO 2001). Iron deficiency anemia is more common among

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Funding for the evaluation is graciously acknowledged from the Center for Health and Wellbeing at Princeton University (for the baseline survey), the MacArthur Foundation, and the National Institute of Aging. Funding for the intervention was provided by the MacArthur Foundation and the R. D. Tata Trust. We thank Angus Deaton, whose collaboration on the baseline was instrumental in getting this project started, and Amitabh Chandra for useful comments. This project is a collaborative effort involving many people. We particularly thank the team at Seva Mandir, especially Neelima Khetan, CEO, Dr. Sanjana Mohan (the head of the health unit when this project was started, and who was instrumental in designing this project), Bhagirath Gop (coordinator for the fortification project), and Priyanka Singh (head of the health unit when the project was finished). Bruce Daviau played a key role in the design of this program. Specifically, we owe him the design of the mixing machine, but his contribution does not stop there. We thank Hardy Dewan (Organisation Secretary, Vidya Bhawan), Tushita Lodha (Project in Charge for the Health Study), and Pramod Tiwari (Field coordinator), from Vidya Bhawan, for directing and coordinating the data collection. Several research assistants have done spectacular work on the field over the years: Callie Scott, Danielle Li, Vanessa Valentino, Cindy Palladines, Andrew Fraker, Anuja Singh, Payal Sinha, Neil Shah, Dhruva Kothari, and Michael Eddy. Eric Lewis provided expert and incredibly timely data analysis.

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1 populations with a diet low in animal proteins and high in rice or in whole  
2 wheat with high phytates content (phytates reduce absorption). It is there-  
3 fore a particularly serious issue in Asia and in South Asia. In Indonesia, a  
4 large-scale study of iron supplements found that 50 percent of women aged  
5 fifteen and above and 40 percent of men sampled were anemic at baseline  
6 (Thomas et al. 2003) (using thresholds of 12g/dL and 13g/dL for women  
7 and men, respectively).

8 In our study area, tribal villages in the district of Udaipur in Rajasthan,  
9 80 percent of adult women and 27 percent of adult men out of a sample of  
10 2,519 adults had hemoglobin levels below 12 g/dL (Banerjee, Deaton, and  
11 Duflo 2004). Fifty one percent of men had hemoglobin levels below 13 g/dL,  
12 the WHO cutoff for anemia for men. Older women were at least as likely to  
13 be anemic as younger women, and nutrition was likely a key factor in these  
14 high levels of anemia.

15 Iron deficiency anemia (IDA) has been linked to low productivity in adults  
16 and slowing of cognitive and physical growth among children. It increases  
17 susceptibility to infection, and increases the likelihood of experiencing  
18 weakness or fatigue symptoms (see Haas and Brownlie [2001] for a review of  
19 the medical evidence). Among pregnant women, severe anemia can result in  
20 low birth weight and child mortality (Stoltzfuz 2001). The medical literature  
21 establishes a relationship between iron supplementation and productivity.  
22 Iron deficiency affects physical activity by reducing aerobic capacity and by  
23 reducing endurance. Few randomized evaluations have looked at the impact  
24 of IDA on actual output. Basta et al. (1979) found a large effect of iron  
25 supplementation on sugar tree tappers in Indonesia (but the study suffered  
26 from fairly large attrition). Li et al. (1994) and Edgerton et al. (1979) found  
27 a much smaller effect on productivity, but increased time spent on voluntary  
28 activities. The largest and most comprehensive study to date is Thomas et al.  
29 (2003), which found a large effect of an iron supplementation program on  
30 the labor supply of males who were anemic at baseline, and an increase in  
31 the earnings of self-employed males. This study also found reduced anemia,  
32 and improved health (including mental health).

33 While iron deficiency anemia has been recognized as a serious public  
34 health problem in developing countries for several years, not much prog-  
35 ress has been made against it. Possible interventions to address it include  
36 iron supplements (in the form of pills) and supplementation of food. On a  
37 large scale, iron supplements are commonly distributed to pregnant women  
38 and young children, but males and nonpregnant women are not the focus of  
39 regular distribution. Systematic distribution of iron supplements appears to  
40 be an unpractical policy in resource poor settings, where the public health  
41 systems do not have the capacity to distribute these supplements reliably on  
42 a large scale.

S Iron supplementation of foods is one alternative: it requires no additional  
N effort on the part of the consumer, and can be done relatively cheaply in  
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1 centralized locations. Foods that can be fortified with iron include flour, milk  
2 products, fish sauce, and (recently) salt. The number of countries routinely  
3 adding iron to flour increased from two in 1990 to almost fifty in 2004,  
4 including countries of Central and South America and the Middle East,  
5 plus Indonesia, Nigeria, and South Africa.<sup>1</sup> Several states in India are now  
6 promoting wheat fortification. Gujarat is the leading state for this program.  
7 Thirty-five mills produce 40,000 metric tons a month (enough to feed 6.7  
8 million people). Fortifying mills are private, and they receive 50 percent  
9 subsidy for iron and folic acid from the state government, and then sell  
10 the flour on the open market. West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Punjab, Andhra  
11 Pradesh, and Haryana have smaller, but growing programs. Distribution  
12 of fortified flour through the Public Distribution Shops (where those who  
13 have a means-test ration card are entitled to buy food at a subsidized price),  
14 is now authorized, and Gujarat is piloting it in Ahmadabad, Sabarkantha,  
15 and Valsad districts. The government is planning further distribution through  
16 school meals programs, hospitals, and other government schemes.

17 However, for very poor and isolated populations, such as the population  
18 in the tribal district of Udaipur where this study was conducted, centralized  
19 food fortification is not a practical solution: most households consume their  
20 own grain, and do not purchase any goods that could easily be fortified.<sup>2</sup>  
21 Even households who obtain wheat or maize from the Public Distribution  
22 system obtain whole grain, which cannot be fortified. Fortification of com-  
23 mercialized food would thus leave marginalized households behind, which  
24 would be particularly unfortunate given that they are likely to be the most  
25 at risk for IDA.

26 The only way to reach these households through flour fortification is to  
27 fortify flour at the village level. In our study area, households get their grain  
28 (maize or wheat) milled once or twice a month by a local miller, or *chakki*.  
29 At this point, the flour can be fortified by mixing it with a preblend of flour  
30 and elemental iron, plus vitamin A or folic acid to facilitate absorption.  
31 This is a simple operation, which the miller can do immediately after having  
32 milled the grain. Community-level fortification is supported by the Micro-  
33 nutrients Initiative (2007), but we were not able to find documentation on  
34 other examples. It requires managing considerable logistics, including sup-  
35 plying, training, and monitoring millers in each of the villages. However,  
36 the decision to fortify has minimal impact on villagers' behavior. Villagers  
37 only have to decide to fortify once, and the nature of milled wheat and maize  
38 does not change with fortification. If they experience improvements in their  
39 health or in their work capacity, villagers may in turn be willing to pay for  
40

41 1. According to the Micronutrients Initiative website: <http://www.micronutrient.org/english/view.asp?x=579>.

42 2. With the recent exception of salt. Double fortified salt has recently become available  
S (Nutrients Initiative 2008) and has shown promising results in field-based randomized control  
N trials.  
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1 such a program. Thus, despite the logistical challenges, community-level  
2 (or decentralized) iron fortification is potentially a promising channel to  
3 increase iron bio-availability in a consistent and sustained way for the poor-  
4 est populations. There are, however, many open questions on whether this  
5 can be done in a sustainable way: are millers able to fortify regularly, will  
6 households demand the service, and how willing are they to pay for it?

7 This chapter reports on the evaluation of a novel community-level iron  
8 supplementation program designed and implemented by Seva Mandir, a  
9 nongovernmental organization (NGO) that has worked for over fifty years  
10 in tribal areas in the district of Udaipur, Rajasthan. The intervention was  
11 implemented in sixty-eight villages, randomly chosen out of 134, where  
12 there is a team led by Vidya Bhawan (a local consortium of schools and col-  
13 leges) and the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL).

14 A first objective of the evaluation was to assess the logistical feasibility  
15 of the intervention: is it possible to recruit, train, and monitor millers and  
16 to keep them regularly supplied? Will the population accept the program?  
17 A second objective was to determine the impact of the program on anemia.  
18 To this end, we collected data on hemoglobin levels at baseline, midline, and  
19 end line. The third objective was to determine whether the program had any  
20 health effect, beyond a possible reduction in anemia. To achieve this, we  
21 collected rich data on health at baseline and end line and a unique monthly  
22 health survey, where individuals reported every month on symptoms, self-  
23 reported health, and schedule during the past week. The final objective was  
24 to assess whether there would be any economic impacts of the program (e.g.,  
25 increase in work capacity, schooling attendance, etc.).

26 The results suggest that community-level iron supplementation, when  
27 adopted by a substantially large number of people, has the potential to lead  
28 to a significant decline of anemia, larger for men than for women (most likely  
29 because the dose of iron provided by the program is a lower fraction of the  
30 recommended amount for women than for men). However, a troubling find-  
31 ing is that after a rapid ramp up, the take up of the program declined over  
32 time in all the regions. In two blocks that took up the program particularly  
33 intensively, over 60 percent of the surveyed households were fortifying at the  
34 peak and this fell to about 40 percent after the program had been in place  
35 for more than a year. In the other three blocks, it fell to about 20 percent at  
36 the end of the study period. The consequence is that, in the entire sample,  
37 there is no impact of the program on anemia by end line. There is, however,  
38 a positive impact of the program on anemia in a midline survey conducted  
39 in the two first blocks to start the program after six months and at the end  
40 line survey for the two blocks that still had high fortification rates by the  
41 end of the program.

42 Our monthly health monitoring reveals a similar pattern for one of the  
S health symptoms, weakness. Symptoms of weakness declined in the treat-  
N ment group, relative to the control group in the first six months of the pro-  
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1 gram (when take up was increasing), yet increased again from this low point  
2 forward as take-up declined. Other symptoms (diarrhea, vomiting, cough)  
3 do not appear to be affected, but it is on weakness that we would expect to  
4 see an effect of iron, so this is not surprising. By the end line survey, there  
5 appears to be no effect on health (except for self-reported health, happiness,  
6 and symptoms of depression for women, but as we argue later there is a good  
7 chance that those are reporting or placebo effects).

8 Finally, there seems to be no impact on the program on the ability to work  
9 or the number of days worked. At the end line, the activities of daily living  
10 (ADL) scores are similar in treatment and control groups in all blocks, and  
11 the ability to do strenuous activities (carry something heavy, climb a hill,  
12 walk five kilometers) is no higher, even in the groups with the higher take  
13 up. In the continuous monitoring survey, we do not see an increase in days  
14 of work, either on average over the period, or concomitant with the ramp  
15 up of the program. Of course, they may have been more productive dur-  
16 ing these days or worked and made more money. Unfortunately we do not  
17 have data on this, (collecting income data on a monthly frequency would  
18 be impossible), and there is no prima facie evidence that decentralized iron  
19 fortification has helped create wealth by improving health. This may explain  
20 why the household's willingness to pay for the program, even in the form  
21 of a minor inconvenience of walking further to find a chakki that fortifies,  
22 is quite low.

23 The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: section 10.2 describes the  
24 context and the detail of the decentralized fortification program. Section  
25 10.3 discusses the identification strategy. Section 10.4 describes the result,  
26 and section 10.5 concludes.

## 27 28 **10.2 The Context and Program Details**

### 29 30 **10.2.1 Baseline Descriptive Statistics**

31  
32 This program took place in Udaipur District, Rajasthan. At the base-  
33 line (2002 to 2003), their average per capita household expenditure was 470  
34 rupees, and more than 40 percent of the respondents live in households  
35 below the official poverty line (compared with only 13 percent in rural Ra-  
36 jasthan in the latest official counts for 1999 to 2000). Only 46 percent of adult  
37 (fourteen and older) males and 11 percent of adult females report themselves  
38 as literate. Of the 27 percent of adults with any education, three-quarters  
39 completed standard eight or less.

40 The surveyed households have little in the way of household durable  
41 goods and only 21 percent have electricity.

42 In terms of measures of health, 80 percent of adult women and 27 percent  
S of the adult men had hemoglobin levels below 12 grams by deciliters. Fifty-  
N one percent of adult men had hemoglobin levels below 13, the threshold the  
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1 WHO recommends for men. Five percent of adult women and 1 percent of  
2 adult men have hemoglobin levels below 8 grams by deciliters. Using a stan-  
3 dard cutoff for anemia (12 g/dL for women, and 13 g/dL for men) 80 percent  
4 of adult women and 51 percent of men are anemic. The fact that the rate of  
5 anemia is high among men and among older women suggests that diet is a  
6 key factor. Indeed, the average body mass index (BMI) is 17.8 among adult  
7 men and 18.1 among adult women, which is very low by any standard.

8 Symptoms of disease are widespread, and adults (self) report a wide range  
9 of symptoms: a third reported cold symptoms in the last thirty days, and  
10 12 percent say the condition was serious. Thirty three percent reported fever  
11 (14 percent serious); 42 (20) percent reported “body ache”; 23 (7) per-  
12 cent reported fatigue; 14 (3) percent problems with vision; 42 (15) percent  
13 headaches; 33 (10) percent back aches; 23 (9) percent upper abdominal pain;  
14 11 (4) percent had chest pains; and 11 (2) percent had experienced weight  
15 loss. Few people reported difficulties with personal care, such as bathing,  
16 dressing, or eating, but many reported difficulty with the physical activities  
17 that are required to earn a living in agriculture. Thirty percent or more would  
18 have difficulty walking 5 kilometers, drawing water from a well, or work-  
19 ing unaided in the fields. Eighteen to 20 percent have difficulty squatting or  
20 standing up from a sitting position.

21 The baseline data suggest a correlation between anemia status and other  
22 measures of health and ability to perform activities of daily living. Those  
23 who are anemic have higher ADL scores (indicating more difficulty to per-  
24 form those difficulties), and lower reported self-reported health, for ex-  
25 ample. There is also a correlation between anemia and economic well-being.  
26 Furthermore, the correlation between anemia and household wealth is stron-  
27 ger for individuals who are earning an income, suggesting that the correlation  
28 may go in part from health to earning. However, these correlations remain  
29 difficult to interpret without exogenous variations in anemia status. The iron  
30 supplementation program provides such exogenous variation.

### 31 10.2.2 Community Iron Fortification Program

32 Most of the households in our sample rely on their own production or on  
33 whole grain purchased by the Public Distribution System (PDS) for their  
34 daily consumption of staples. Specifically, 76 percent of the households  
35 never mill their grain at home, and never purchase flour (12 percent some-  
36 times mill at home, and sometimes purchase flour). Wheat and Maize are  
37 the main staple foods and they are consumed seasonally in the form of rotis  
38 (flat bread made of maize or wheat flour).

39 The community-level iron program was designed to increase bio-  
40 availability of iron for families who do not buy commercial food. The pro-  
41 gram was designed by Seva Mandir’s health unit, headed by Dr. Sanajana  
42 Mohan, assisted by Baghirath Mop, in consultation with the Micronutrient  
S Initiative.  
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1 On average, each hamlet has four chakkis (this is also the median number).  
2 Three percent of the villages have one chakki, and 20 percent have two. When  
3 there was more than one chakki in a hamlet, Seva Mandir chose two partic-  
4 ipating chakki (thus, not all chakkis participate). Chakkis were offered a  
5 flat monthly payment to participate (subsequently the payment was changed  
6 to reflect the quantity milled, with bigger chakki getting a large compensa-  
7 tion). Chakkis were not chosen randomly, but to serve a maximum number  
8 of households. Involving only one chakki per month was a cost-minimizing  
9 measure for Seva Mandir (given the fixed cost involved in working with each  
10 chakki). It will also give us the opportunity to examine the willingness of  
11 households to switch to (or away from) a participating chakki.

12 This fortification program had two objectives: to supply a sufficient quan-  
13 tity of iron in the diet, and to avoid supplying too much iron. Safety was  
14 also a concern, as the process was not as tightly monitored as it would have  
15 been in a factory. It was important that the program was robust to accidental  
16 over fortification.

17 The technology for fortification begins with a premix, a dry powdered mix  
18 with specific concentrations of one or more micronutrients. This premix is  
19 diluted into a preblend (because premix is too concentrated to be properly  
20 hand-mixed into the flour) and then added to flour either (a) during the  
21 milling process, or (b) after the grain has been milled.

22 Elemental iron is available in different forms (reduced iron, ferrous sul-  
23 phate, or ferrous fumarate). After consultations with micronutrient initia-  
24 tives and various experts, Seva Mandir chose to use ferrous sulfate ( $\text{FeSO}_4$ )  
25 and folic acid (which helps with iron absorption). This premix was then  
26 mixed with flour at Seva Mandir (16.66 g of premix is added in 1 kg of  
27 flour), to produce a preblend that had 3300 ppm (or milligram per kilo) of  
28 elemental iron (as ferrous sulfate). This quantity is sufficiently diluted, so  
29 that if someone were to eat the preblend without mixing, there would be no  
30 health risk.

31 This preblend was then mixed with the ground grain (maize or wheat)  
32 using the following procedure. Customers bring their whole grains to the  
33 chakki in bags, boxes, or baskets. First, the chakki empties this into his own  
34 milling machine, which grinds the grains into flour, and weighs the resulting  
35 flour (chakki charge by weight, so they all have scales for weighing flours).  
36 Second, he transfers the flour into a separate mixing machine (see appendix,  
37 figure 10A.1 for a picture of the milling machine, which was designed for  
38 Seva Mandir by Canadian engineer Bruce Daviau), and adds the required  
39 amount of preblends using a 30 g scoop that was provided by Seva Mandir.  
40 A scoop thus contains 100 mg of iron. The number of scoops to be added  
41 corresponds to table 10.1. He then turns the handle of the mixing machine  
42 ten times in one direction, and ten times in the other, and gives the forti-  
S fied flour to the customer. He does not charge the customer for the extra  
N supplement.  
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**Table 10.1** Amount of preblends

|  | Kg of flours | Number of scoops |
|--|--------------|------------------|
|  | 3–5.99       | 1                |
|  | 6–8.99       | 2                |
|  | 9–11.99      | 3                |
|  | 12–14.99     | 4                |
|  | 15–18        | 5                |

The final concentration of iron in the flour thus ranges from about 20 to 33 mg per kilogram (except for the top of the first bin). A pilot survey on the kilograms of flour milled showed that the average adult eats .3 kg of flour per day. This implies that the average adult would get an extra 6 to 12 mg from the fortified flour. The WHO provides recommended iron intakes for populations with very low dietary intake of iron. For adult males the WHO recommends 27.4 mg/day. For adult, nonmenopausal females, this number is 58.8 mg/day. Thus, the program provides between 20 and 40 percent of the Recommended Daily Intake (RDI) in iron for males, and 10 to 20 percent for females. We should thus expect a larger effect on reduction in anemia for males, especially as they presumably eat more than women and thus absorb more than the average. In practice, intervention monitoring suggests that households consume on average 400 g of flour per day, which increases slightly the anticipated iron intake of a fortifying family.

The participating chakkis, their employees, and all their family members involved in their business, were trained by Seva Mandir in these procedures. Chakkis were initially given a flat fee to participate in the program, independent of the volume of their business or the number of households who fortified.<sup>3</sup> Chakkis were instructed to keep logbooks where they indicated how much grain had been milled, and whether or not they had fortified.

Seva Mandir put in place a system of monitoring of the chakki, which was implemented by the research team at Vidya Bhawan. About once a month, a field officer visited each chakki, inspected the log book, performed a spot test of fortified flour at the chakki, and randomly visited a few families who had fortified recently to perform a spot test at their house. The spot test is semiquantitative: it indicates the presence of iron in the flour, but it cannot indicate how much there was.

Before the program was started in a village, a village meeting took place, where the cause and consequences of iron deficiency anemia were discussed, as well as what households could do to prevent it (changes in diet, etc.). The program was then explained to the village, and the village collectively agreed to participate (all villages agreed). To avoid creating spurious effects due to

3. Later on, the payment was made contingent on the chakki's size, to compensate him for the large amount of extra work involved.

1 the information regarding anemia, Seva Mandir held a village meeting in  
2 control villages as well, where the discussion was the same (except that the  
3 program was not discussed). Each village had participating and nonpartici-  
4 pating chakkis. At the individual level, a household had to initially agree  
5 to be a participant. Once a household had accepted the program once, the  
6 chakki were to consider them to be participating households, unless they  
7 explicitly declined fortification. However, in spite of the initial decision to  
8 fortify, many households did not regularly fortify, either because the chakki  
9 did not always fortify the grain, or because households switched to nonpar-  
10 ticipating chakkis.

11 Monitoring revealed some implementation challenges. Chakkis did not  
12 keep good records (many are illiterate), and seem to not have followed the  
13 instruction to continue to fortify flour for a household if they had initially  
14 decided to participate. On one key dimension, the program appears to have  
15 been consistently well-implemented, however: most of the spot checks do  
16 reveal the presence of iron among households chosen among those who had  
17 fortified. The household visit was also the occasion to collect information  
18 on any possible side effects or issue. There were essentially no side effects or  
19 complaints, except for a few complaints that the roti (flat bread) sometimes  
20 became black when on the fire. To our knowledge, this occasionally hap-  
21 pens, and the fact that the flour is fortified does not increase the likelihood  
22 of this event.

### 23 24 **10.3 Evaluation Design and Data Collection**

25  
26 This research is a collaborative undertaking of Seva Mandir (the orga-  
27 nization that designed and implemented the decentralized iron fortifica-  
28 tion program), Vidya Bhawan (a consortium of schools and colleges who  
29 undertook the data collection), and a team from MIT led by the authors of  
30 this chapter.

31 Ethical approval for this project and the study was obtained from MIT,  
32 the human subject committee at Vidya Bhawan, Udaipur, and the Indian  
33 Council of Medical Research.

34 One hundred and thirty four “hamlets” were part of the study. The sample  
35 was stratified according to access to a road (out of the 134 hamlets, half of  
36 them are at least 500 meters away from a road). Hamlets within each stratum  
37 were selected randomly, with a probability of being selected proportional to  
38 the hamlet population. A baseline survey of ten households in each of 100  
39 hamlets was conducted in 2002 and 2003. In 2004 and 2005, twenty addi-  
40 tional households were surveyed in each hamlet, and thirty-four hamlets  
41 were added to the sample.

42 Out of these 134 hamlets, 65 were randomly selected (by the research  
S team, using the random generator in Stata) to received the iron fortifica-  
N tion program. The randomization was done after stratification by block (a  
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1 block is an administrative area, below the district, and also an administra-  
 2 tive unit for Seva Mandir), and by the randomization status for two other  
 3 interventions that were conducted and evaluated in the same villages (a nurse  
 4 absenteeism study, and an immunization incentive program). The program  
 5 started in a staggered fashion by block: after an initial pilot in four villages,  
 6 it started in the first two blocks (Bargaon and Girwa) in January 2006. It  
 7 then was introduced in Jadhool in June 2006, in Kotra in October 2006, and  
 8 in Kherwara in November 2006.

9 An end line survey was conducted between July 2007 and March 2009.  
 10 All the individuals surveyed at baseline in all the households were attempted  
 11 to be surveyed at end line. Almost all households (96 percent) were found.  
 12 At the individual level, the attrition is 19 percent. Attrition is mainly due to  
 13 seasonal migrants, who could not be traced back to the village.

14 The baseline and end line survey data include a detailed household mod-  
 15 ule (including information about consumption, assets, etc.). For households  
 16 in treatment villages, we also have information specific to fortification (which  
 17 chakki they normally use, whether the chakki they use fortifies flour, whether  
 18 they choose to fortify, and if not, why not), and an individual module, which  
 19 includes, among other things, information about working hours for the past  
 20 week, and a detailed interview on health-seeking behavior. The individual  
 21 module also includes health and mental health information: self-reported  
 22 conditions experienced in the past thirty days, self-reported health status,  
 23 self-reported happiness, and a depression module. Finally, basic health mea-  
 24 surements are obtained: health, weight, blood pressure, peak flow meter,  
 25 and hemoglobin.

26 Hemoglobin was measured using hemocue machines. The respondent's  
 27 finger is pricked with a lancet, and the second drop of blood is put in a  
 28 cuvette, which is inserted in the machine, which provides an immediate  
 29 reading. In what follows, we adopt the following threshold from the World  
 30 Health Organization<sup>4</sup> to determine "anemia": a hemoglobin level below 12 is  
 31 considered to be anemic for nonpregnant women (11 for pregnant women),  
 32 and a hemoglobin level below 13 is considered to be anemic for men.

33 In addition to the baseline and end line survey, several other data sets were  
 34 collected for the analysis. First, we have data from the spot checks conducted  
 35 to monitor program implementation (availability of iron in the flour at the  
 36 chakki, and availability of iron in the flour of the households who were  
 37 reported to have recently fortified their flour). We also have information on  
 38 the location of all the chakkis in the village.

39 Second, we have collected a unique data set: the continuous household  
 40 survey (CHS). This data set is a short survey, performed every month. One  
 41 local person (a paraworker) was hired to conduct this survey every month  
 42 among the thirty households in the villages. The survey included questions

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 4. See [http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2008/9789241596657\\_eng.pdf](http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2008/9789241596657_eng.pdf).

on symptoms experienced by household members over the last thirty days (including vomiting, diarrhea, and weakness), days spent doing different activities (work for pay, work in the field, tending the animals, school, etc.) over the last week, and visits to different health facilities over the last month. The individual questions were to be asked directly to the individual. A few months after the program started in the first two blocks, a question was added asking how many times the household had milled grain in the past month, and whether or not they had fortified the flour.

A monitor visited the paraworker regularly (about once a month) to check that the surveys were properly filled, and accompanied the paraworker during the household visit that day for on-the-job training. There are 841,057 observations (individual-month) for a panel of about 4,000 households, spanning over two years. While the data is certainly not as good as a panel collected by a professional supervisor may be (and we still need to more work to validate it), it is a useful data source for other purposes.

## 10.4 Results

### 10.4.1 Program Take up

Figure 10.1 shows the fraction of households fortifying their flour at least once in the past month (according to their self-report in the continuous household surveys, which introduced the question a few months after the program started in the first regions), and figure 10.2 shows the fraction of times when they were fortifying their flour in the past month (out of the num-




Fig. 10.1 Whether ever fortified for month

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


Fig. 10.2 Fraction of milling occurrences with fortification

ber of times they actually milled flour), in the different administrative blocks where Seva Mandir is operating. Unfortunately, the fortification question was introduced with some delay in the CHS: we do not have the beginning of the program for the first two blocks to start (Girwa and Bagdaon).

Both figures show that take up varied across regions, with the two blocks that started later having consistently higher take up. They show very sharp time trend in the take up of the program: at the beginning, take up increases quickly. Following a peak about six months after the program was introduced, there is a strong decline in the take up of the program by households over time in all regions. Table 10.2, panel A, shows a regression of take up on a spline function of date since introduction, for the first six months of the program, and for the following six months, and shows that those trends are strongly significant.

Table 10.2, panel B, shows the fraction of household that fortified, and the fraction of time they fortified, over the entire period the program was in activity in the region, and over the last three months before the end line survey. By the time the end line survey took place, very few households were fortifying their flour in three of the blocks, while two had fortification rates above 50 percent.

Some insight on why the take up declined is provided by figure 10.3. Figure 10.3 plots the take up of the program as a function of the date the program started for all the blocks together, and separates the households into three groups: those for whom the closest chakki fortifies; those who do not fortify, but have a fortifying chakki nearby (within 1.5 kilometers for this specifica-

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**Table 10.2** Take up of the program

| A Take up over time            |                               |                     |                               |                  |
|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|------------------|
|                                | no. of households who fortify |                     |                               |                  |
| Spline: Slope all months       | 0.0645<br>(0.0081)            | 0.0694<br>(0.0087)  |                               |                  |
| Spline: Slope for months 7–end | –0.0854<br>(0.0095)           | –0.0863<br>(0.0096) |                               |                  |
| Average take up first 6 months | 0.5639                        |                     |                               |                  |
| Block fixed effects            | N                             |                     | Y                             |                  |
| B Average take up              |                               |                     |                               |                  |
|                                | Entire period                 |                     | Last 3 months before end line |                  |
|                                | Fortified last month          | % time fortified    | Fortified last month          | % time fortified |
| Badgaon                        | 0.31                          | 0.39                | 0.20                          | 0.28             |
| Kotra                          | 0.47                          | 0.58                | 0.42                          | 0.54             |
| Girwa                          | 0.41                          | 0.57                | 0.30                          | 0.48             |
| Kherwara                       | 0.50                          | 0.64                | 0.43                          | 0.56             |
| Jhadol                         | 0.35                          | 0.52                | 0.29                          | 0.43             |
| All blocks                     | 0.41                          | 0.54                | 0.33                          | 0.45             |

tion, but the findings are robust to other distance); and those who do not have a fortifying chakki within 1.5 kilometers (which does happen, given that Udaipur district is very sparsely populated). Take up initially increases in all three groups, but does not reach the same peak for those who do not have a chakki nearby. All those who have a chakki nearby reach the same peak, but take up falls down more quickly for those for whom it is not the closest one, presumably because households switched back to their normal chakki after a while.


#### 10.4.2 Impact on Anemia and Hemoglobin Levels

##### *Attrition*

One unfortunate limitation in our ability to detect any impact of the program on anemia is that while overall attrition in the survey is fairly low, attrition in hemoglobin measurement is much higher, and is significantly different in treatment and control groups (see table 10.3).

This is primarily due to a combination of dysfunctional hemocue machines (about two-thirds of the cases among adults) and refusals (about one-third among adults). While the interviewing team spent considerable time

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**Fig. 10.3 Percentage fortified for all blocks**

tracking down households and individuals, for ethical reasons, interviewers were instructed to address any concerns over safety, use of the blood, or confidentiality, but not to insist beyond this if individuals still refused the blood prick.<sup>5</sup> Refusals are particularly high among children: in the control group, only 20 percent of the children age zero to five who are in the end line survey have a valid hemocue measurement, and only 55 percent of the children aged five to fourteen have a valid hemocue measurement. Among adults, in the control group, 36 percent of those who are otherwise present in the end line do not have valid hemoglobin data.

Attrition does not appear to be random. First, it is lower in the treatment group than in the control group by about 6 percentage points for adults. Second, those for whom we have end line data on other variables but no anemia data tend to be older, skinnier, and more likely to be anemic at baseline (table 10.4). Since the anemia test involved a blood prick, refusals are more frequent when people are weak (or for young children), often because respondents feared that the test might make them even weaker. In villages where iron was distributed, it appears that interviewers were more likely to

5. Interviewers generally come from a much higher social background than respondents, and the line between persuasion and undue influence could have been quite fine if interviewers were requested to insist on the test.



1 **Table 10.3** **Attrition**

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|               | % observations in baseline with valid anemia data at end line |                        |                      | % individual with individual interview at end line, but no anemia test |             |                |
|---------------|---|------------------------|----------------------|--|-------------|----------------|
|               | Treatment (1)   | Control (2)            | Difference (3)       | Treatment (4)  | Control (5) | Difference (6) |
| A             |   |                        |                      |  |             |                |
| Adults (14+)  | 0.707   | 0.660                  | 0.047                | 0.215  | 0.276       | -0.061**       |
| Men           | 0.721   | 0.680                  | 0.041                | 0.217  | 0.270       | -0.053**       |
| Women         | 0.695   | 0.646                  | 0.050                | 0.215  | 0.281       | -0.066**       |
| Children 6-13 | 0.664   | 0.607                  | 0.057                | 0.347  | 0.421       | -0.075**       |
| Children 0-5  | X   | X                      | X                    | 0.737  | 0.812       | -0.075***      |
|               | Reason for no anemia test for people in end line              |                        |                      |  |             |                |
| B             | Technical issues  | Refuse or cannot do it | Invalid hemo reading |  |             |                |
| Adults (14+)  | 0.599   | 0.398                  | 0.003                |  |             |                |
| Men           | 0.757   | 0.241                  | 0.002                |  |             |                |
| Women         | 0.460   | 0.536                  | 0.004                |  |             |                |
| Children 6-13 | 0.349   | 0.648                  | 0.003                |  |             |                |
| Children 0-5  | 0.208   | 0.792                  | 0.001                |  |             |                |

25 be able to convince respondents to be subject themselves to the blood prick,  
 26 perhaps because respondents were grateful for the program, and happy to  
 27 cooperate to its evaluation. The likely effect of attrition is to lead to under-  
 28 estimate the impact of the program on anemia, since the extra observations  
 29 in the treatment groups are drawn from a weaker group.

30 *Impacts: Reduced Forms*

31 Despite this shortcoming of the hemoglobin data, we examine the impact  
 32 of the program on hemoglobin level and anemia. Given the very high rates  
 33 of attrition among children, we focus on adults.

34 The analysis is conducted with a simple linear regression, in the sample  
 35 of individuals aged fourteen or higher at the end line, and who are present  
 36 in the baseline:

37

38 (1) 
$$y_{ij} = \alpha + \beta T_j + X\gamma + \varepsilon_{ij},$$

39

40 where  $y$  is the outcome of interest,  $T$  is a dummy indicating whether the  
 41 household was in a treated village, and  $X$  are control variables. The standard  
 42 errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the village level  
 S using White standard errors. All the regressions are weighted by the inverse  
 N of the probability of selection of the village in the overall sample.  
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**Table 10.4** Attrition: Difference between attritors and nonattritors for selected characteristics

|   | Age                 |                |                   | BMI                  |                 |                    |
|---|---------------------|----------------|-------------------|----------------------|-----------------|--------------------|
|   | Treatment<br>(1)    | Control<br>(2) | Difference<br>(3) | Treatment<br>(4)     | Control<br>(5)  | Difference<br>(6)  |
| In end line survey                        | 36.6                | 36.7           | -0.125<br>(0.661) | 17.999               | 18.044          | -0.045<br>(0.181)  |
| Not in end line<br>survey                 | 37.2                | 36.0           | 1.109<br>(5.867)  | 17.917               | 17.296          | 0.621<br>(0.674)   |
| In end line survey<br>with anemia<br>data | 36.7                | 36.7           | -0.063<br>(0.694) | 18.025               | 18.019          | 0.006<br>(0.191)   |
| In end line survey<br>no anemia data      | 36.2                | 36.6           | -0.310<br>(1.310) | 17.932               | 18.099          | -0.167<br>(0.245)  |
|   | Hemocue at baseline |                |                   | Self-reported health |                 |                    |
|   | Treatment<br>(7)    | Control<br>(8) | Difference<br>(9) | Treatment<br>(10)    | Control<br>(11) | Difference<br>(12) |
| In end line survey                        | 11.702              | 11.605         | 0.097<br>(0.123)  | 5.929                | 5.858           | 0.071<br>(0.144)   |
| Not in end line<br>survey                 | 11.362              | 11.883         | -0.521<br>(0.438) | 5.972                | 6.332           | -0.359<br>(0.682)  |
| In end line survey<br>with anemia<br>data | 11.709              | 11.721         | -0.011<br>(0.123) | 5.855                | 5.803           | 0.052<br>(0.156)   |
| In end line survey<br>no anemia data      | 11.681              | 11.348         | 0.332<br>(0.209)  | 6.121                | 5.980           | 0.141<br>(0.236)   |

In the basic specification,  $X$  only contains dummies for blocks' age, age squared, and gender (unless the analysis is separated by gender). We also include a specification where we control for baseline hemoglobin level (observations without hemoglobin status are included, as well as a dummy for "missing hemoglobin status").

The results are presented in table 10.5, panel A, for the overall sample. There appears to be no detectable difference in hemoglobin or in the prevalence of anemia between the treated and the control groups for women. For men, there is a 4 percentage point reduction in anemia, significant at the 10 percent level when we control for baseline anemia. (However, surprisingly the reduction in anemia between treatment and control groups is no higher for those who were anemic at baseline.)

While these estimates are indicative of the (lack of) effect of the fortification program in the entire sample after eighteen months to two years of existence, they may reflect in part the very low take up of the program toward its end, at least in three of the blocks where it had been operating for a long time. The question of whether the fortification program *could* reduce anemia if take up were higher is therefore of independent interest.

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**Table 10.5 Effect on hemoglobin level and anemia indicator (all blocks)**

|  | Adult females        |                               |                      |                               | Adult males          |                               |                      |                               |
|--|----------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------|
|  | Hemoglobin level     |                               | Anemia status        |                               | Hemoglobin level     |                               | Anemia status        |                               |
|  | OLS Reduced form (1) | IV Average: Last 3 months (2) | OLS Reduced form (3) | IV Average: Last 3 months (4) | OLS Reduced form (5) | IV Average: Last 3 months (6) | OLS Reduced form (7) | IV Average: Last 3 months (8) |
| Means in the control group                                   | 10.888               | 10.882                        | 0.732                | 0.734                         | 12.805               | 12.771                        | 0.507                | 0.512                         |
| Iron treatment / take up                                     | -0.031 (0.077)       | -0.100 (0.189)                | 0.016 (0.020)        | 0.050 (0.049)                 | 0.129 (0.086)        | 0.301 (0.207)                 | -0.039 (0.024)       | -0.088 (0.057)                |
| N  | 3,890                | 3,362                         | 3,890                | 3,362                         | 3,527                | 3,154                         | 3,527                | 3,154                         |
| A Basic control (Age, Age2, block dummies)                   |                      |                               |                      |                               |                      |                               |                      |                               |
| Iron treatment / take up                                     | -0.024 (0.074)       | -0.087 (0.183)                | 0.014 (0.020)        | 0.046 (0.049)                 | 0.132 (0.082)        | 0.309 (0.196)                 | -0.040* (0.023)      | -0.091* (0.055)               |
| Baseline anemia  | -0.836** (0.062)     | -0.817** (0.069)              | 0.173** (0.019)      | 0.179*** (0.020)              | -0.861*** (0.072)    | -0.893*** (0.075)             | 0.199*** (0.020)     | 0.215*** (0.021)              |
| Missing baseline anemia                                      | -0.627** (0.087)     | -0.656** (0.088)              | 0.101** (0.025)      | 0.121*** (0.027)              | -0.422*** (0.090)    | -0.396*** (0.095)             | 0.071*** (0.027)     | 0.077*** (0.027)              |
| N  | 3,890                | 3,362                         | 3,890                | 3,362                         | 3,527                | 3,154                         | 3,527                | 3,154                         |
| B Controlling for baseline anemia (including missing values) |                      |                               |                      |                               |                      |                               |                      |                               |

*Notes:* Average take up in the last three months and during the treatment period is taken from the monthly CHS survey. All IV regressions in panels A and B use original treatment status as the instrument. Standard errors (corrected for clustering at the village level) are shown in parentheses.  
 \*\*\*Significant at the 1 percent level.  
 \*\*Significant at the 5 percent level.  
 \*Significant at the 10 percent level.

**Table 10.6** Midline effect on hemoglobin level and anemia indice (Girwa and Bargaon)

|                            | Adults only   |                    |                  |                     |                     |                   |
|----------------------------|---|--------------------|------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
|                            | Hemoglobin level  |                    |                  | Anemic              |                     |                   |
|                            | All<br>(1)  | Female<br>(2)      | Male             | All<br>(3)          | Female<br>(4)       | Male              |
| Means in the control group | 11.466  | 10.717             | 12.416           | 0.706               | 0.789               | 0.601             |
|                            | <i>Basic control (Age, Age2, block dummies)</i>               |                    |                  |                     |                     |                   |
| Iron treatment             | 0.299<br>(0.183)  | 0.308**<br>(0.149) | 0.298<br>(0.288) | -0.071*<br>(0.040)  | -0.077**<br>(0.037) | -0.065<br>(0.059) |
| N                          | 2,253   | 1,324              | 929              | 2,253               | 1,324               | 929               |
|                            | <i>Basic controls plus control for baseline anemia status</i> |                    |                  |                     |                     |                   |
| Iron treatment             | 0.274<br>(0.179)  | 0.233<br>(0.154)   | 0.335<br>(0.292) | -0.068**<br>(0.034) | -0.075**<br>(0.031) | -0.059<br>(0.056) |
| N                          | 1,439   | 851                | 588              | 1,439               | 851                 | 588               |

\*\*Significant at the 5 percent level.

\*Significant at the 10 percent level.

A midline survey, which was realized in two blocks that started the program first (Girwa and Bargaon) sheds more light on this question: the midline was conducted there a year after the program started, when the take up in those blocks was still high. Table 10.6 shows the impact of the treatment on anemia in these two blocks at midline. It shows a significant difference in anemia rate of about 7 percentage points between treatment and control villages. The effects are larger than at the end line, are now similar for men and for women. The difference is due to the timing of the survey (when the take up was high) and not to the fact that the program effects are somehow larger in Girwa and Bargaon: to the contrary, when we separate the results by blocks, the endline anemia differences are highest in Kotra and Kerwara, the two blocks where take up was highest by the end line (results omitted to save space).

To sum up, flour fortification appears to be associated with a decline in the rate of anemia as long as a sufficient number of people take it up. But take up of the program was not sustained, which eventually made it largely ineffective. This suggests a potentially large impact of the iron supplementation itself on anemia, combined with a relatively low take up.

#### *Impacts of Iron Supplementation on Anemia Status Instrumental Variable Specification*

To estimate the effect of the supplementation program, we estimate an instrumental variable specification. In equation (1),  $T_{ij}$  is replaced by variables indicating the fraction of times in the last three months that a house-

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1 hold has fortified their flour ( $F_{ij}$ ). This equation is then estimated with two-  
 2 stage least squares,  $T_i$ , serving as the instrument for  $F_{ij}$ .

3 The results are presented in the even columns in table 10.5. Not surpris-  
 4 ingly, since the first stage is the same for men and women (since it is defined  
 5 as the household basis), we find the same conclusion that, at the end line,  
 6 iron supplementation seems to have significant impacts only for men. The  
 7 implied effects are fairly large: regular iron supplementation over the last  
 8 three months would lead to a reduction of 9 percentage points in the inci-  
 9 dence of anemia among men, a 17 percent decrease. It should be noted that  
 10 the instrumental variable (IV) estimate gives us the effect for those who chose  
 11 to fortify, and thus who may have experienced the largest effect.

### 12 10.4.3 Impacts on Health and Work Outcomes

14 Table 10.7 shows the impact on health at the end line survey. In the entire  
 15 sample, women in villages that received the program have significantly higher  
 16 BMI, higher self-reported health, higher self-reported happiness, and are less  
 17 likely to be depressed. There is no impact on symptoms reported, ADL score,  
 18 or their ability to carry strenuous activity. The results go in the same direction  
 19 for men (with the exception of the ability to climb a hill, which appears to be  
 20 lower in the treatment group), but are all insignificant. When we look at the  
 21 results separately for the high fortification and low fortification blocks, the  
 22 results (omitted to save space) are very similar in both types of blocks.

23 The fact that the results are higher for women than for men, and high  
 24 in all blocks irrespective of the take up by end line (and thus the effect on  
 25 anemia by end line), suggests that there may be a reporting bias in the self-  
 26 reported measures, with women ready to report themselves in better health  
 27 to be polite to the investigators.

28 The continuous household survey is the ideal data set to look at the impact  
 29 of the program on conditions experienced by each individual, self-reported  
 30 health, and activities, since we have one data point per household every  
 31 month. We can look at the impact of the program during the entire time it  
 32 was in place (rather than just at the very end, when take up was low), as well  
 33 as look at how the impact varies over time. It is also less likely that house-  
 34 holds would differentially report their health in treated and control villages,  
 35 since they are reporting this information to a village member, not to an out-  
 36 side surveyor, and they are reporting every week. The symptoms reported  
 37 in the continuous household survey are diarrhea, vomiting, weakness, and  
 38 “other.” Anemia should primarily affect weakness, which is therefore our  
 39 main symptom of interest. Diarrhea and vomiting are also of interest, since  
 40 they are possible side effects of iron supplementation. We also examine the  
 41 impact of the project on self-reported health and days of work activity over  
 42 the last week (these aggregate several possible work activities: work in the  
 S field, work for a wage, tending animals, etc.).

N For each outcome  $y_{ijt}$ , we present the following specifications:  
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**Table 10.7** Effect on health outcomes (all blocks)

|   | Females                       |   | Males                         |  |
|---|-------------------------------|---|-------------------------------|--|
|   | OLS<br>Reduced<br>form<br>(5) | IV<br>Average:<br>Last 3<br>months<br>(7) | OLS<br>Reduced<br>form<br>(9) | IV<br>Average:<br>Last 3<br>months<br>(11) |
| BMI   | 0.241*<br>(0.132)             | 0.521<br>(0.317)                          | 0.172<br>(0.113)              | 0.391<br>(0.267)                           |
| Self-reported health                          | 0.165*<br>(0.097)             | 0.450**<br>(0.223)                        | 0.088<br>(0.094)              | 0.192<br>(0.222)                           |
| Cold  | -0.004<br>(0.018)             | -0.006<br>(0.042)                         | 0.005<br>(0.019)              | 0.006<br>(0.043)                           |
| Any kind of cough                             | -0.010<br>(0.017)             | -0.009<br>(0.040)                         | -0.017<br>(0.017)             | -0.046<br>(0.039)                          |
| Fever   | -0.019<br>(0.017)             | -0.038<br>(0.038)                         | 0.014<br>(0.016)              | 0.032<br>(0.039)                           |
| Weakness                                      | -0.028<br>(0.018)             | -0.054<br>(0.042)                         | 0.011<br>(0.016)              | 0.015<br>(0.038)                           |
| Body ache                                     | 0.000<br>(0.014)              | 0.013<br>(0.033)                          | 0.022<br>(0.015)              | 0.045<br>(0.034)                           |
| Vomiting                                      | -0.010<br>(0.009)             | -0.015<br>(0.022)                         | 0.019***<br>(0.007)           | 0.039**<br>(0.018)                         |
| Diarrhea                                      | -0.001<br>(0.010)             | 0.000<br>(0.024)                          | 0.007<br>(0.009)              | 0.018<br>(0.024)                           |
| Self-reported happiness                       | 0.076*<br>(0.042)             | 0.139<br>(0.095)                          | 0.032<br>(0.041)              | 0.075<br>(0.093)                           |
| Depression index (higher = less<br>depressed) | 0.112**<br>(0.055)            | 0.245*<br>(0.128)                         | -0.020<br>(0.033)             | -0.047<br>(0.078)                          |
| ADL score ( $z$ ) (higher = less difficulty)  | -0.048<br>(0.220)             | -0.169<br>(0.492)                         | 0.193<br>(0.157)              | 0.412<br>(0.387)                           |
| Walk 5 km                                     | 0.005<br>(0.024)              | 0.018<br>(0.055)                          | -0.023<br>(0.018)             | -0.044<br>(0.045)                          |
| Draw water                                    | -0.003<br>(0.020)             | -0.013<br>(0.044)                         | -0.015<br>(0.012)             | -0.026<br>(0.030)                          |
| Carry object                                  | 0.003<br>(0.012)              | 0.003<br>(0.027)                          | -0.011<br>(0.009)             | -0.021<br>(0.023)                          |
| Work in a field                               | -0.012<br>(0.028)             | -0.031<br>(0.062)                         | -0.007<br>(0.019)             | -0.007<br>(0.045)                          |
| Climb a hill                                  | 0.010<br>(0.016)              | 0.003<br>(0.037)                          | -0.020**<br>(0.010)           | -0.046*<br>(0.026)                         |

*Notes:* Each row gives the coefficient of a separate regression, where the outcome is regressed on a dummy for whether the village is a treatment village. The standard errors (corrected for clustering at the village level) are in parentheses below the coefficient.

\*\*\*Significant at the 1 percent level.

\*\*Significant at the 5 percent level.

\*Significant at the 10 percent level.

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The first specification is:

$$(2) \quad y_{ijt} = \alpha + \beta T_j + \gamma TP_{ij} + \delta T_j * TP_{ij} + X_{ijt} \lambda + \varepsilon_{ijt},$$

where  $T_j$  is a dummy for whether the village was selected for the iron program, and  $TP_{ij}$  is a dummy for whether the program was in operation in this block at that date (irrespective of treatment status). The coefficient of interest in this specification is  $\delta$ .

The second specification accounts for the pattern of take up of the program, as shown in figure 10.1 and table 10.2: we reproduce

$$(3) \quad y_{ijt} = \alpha + \beta T_j + \gamma TP_{ij} + \gamma_1 S_{1ij} + \gamma_2 S_{2ij} + \delta T_j * TP_{ij} + \delta_1 T_j * S_{1ij} + \delta_2 T_j * S_{2ij} + X_{ijt} \lambda + \varepsilon_{ijt},$$

where the notation is as before, and in addition,  $S_1$  is a spline for the first six months of the program, and  $S_2$  is a spline for the second seven months of the program. This specification will tell us if the impact on health closely follows the take up pattern.

The results of both specifications are presented in table 10.8: panel A for the entire sample, panel B for males only, and panel C for females only. Over its entire duration, the program does not appear to have any significant impact on self-reported health, any symptoms, or days of work, for either men or women (cutting the sample by high and low take up blocks gives very similar results).

However, the spline specification shows that “weakness”, the one condition that we expect should be affected by the program, seems to follow a time pattern that corresponds closely with the evolution of the take-up of the program: the number of occurrences of weakness declines over time in the first six months after the program is introduced, and the trend is reversed afterwards. Figure 10.4 illustrates this: it is a line that represents the difference between treatment and control in a nonparametric regression of weakness on the number of days since the program started. It shows that the occurrence of the weakness symptoms initially declined, and then increased again, following the same time pattern as the take up of the program.

This pattern is similar for men and women, though it is stronger for women (recall that, by the midline, women also experienced positive effects on anemia). A similar shape is observed by women for occurrence of vomiting (note that vomiting *improved*, rather than worsened, as would be expected if iron had strong side effects on stomach functions) and a combined indicator for the reporting of any symptom. This suggests that the iron fortification program may indeed have improved stamina as long as it was taken up at a high rate. At the peak usage, this suggests that the rate at which people experienced weakness was 5 percentage points (27 percent) lower in treatment group than in control.

Even if it did improve stamina, however, the program did not increase the number of days of work, neither for men nor for women. The number of days worked was not higher during the treated period in treated villages,

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**Table 10.8** Effect on health and work outcomes: continuous household survey

|   | Any symptom (1)      | Diarrhea (2)         | Vomiting (3)         | Weakness/fatigue (4) | Other symptoms (5) | Self-reported health (6) | Days of work activity (any work) (7) |
|---|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| <i>A All adults</i>                             |                      |                      |                      |                      |                    |                          |                                      |
| Treatment village                               | -0.003<br>(0.035)    | -0.028*<br>(0.015)   | -0.010<br>(0.010)    | 0.018<br>(0.030)     | 0.016<br>(0.032)   | 0.067<br>(0.156)         | 0.045<br>(0.104)                     |
| Treatment village*treated period                | -0.029<br>(0.026)    | -0.012<br>(0.013)    | -0.006<br>(0.011)    | -0.027<br>(0.027)    | -0.023<br>(0.022)  | 0.123<br>(0.118)         | -0.036<br>(0.085)                    |
| Treated period                                  | -0.051***<br>(0.019) | -0.054***<br>(0.009) | -0.036***<br>(0.007) | -0.032<br>(0.022)    | -0.021<br>(0.017)  | 0.097<br>(0.086)         | 0.185***<br>(0.054)                  |
| N   | 399,050              | 398,883              | 398,750              | 398,573              | 398,664            | 395,885                  | 398,925                              |
| Treatment village                               | -0.004<br>(0.035)    | -0.028*<br>(0.015)   | -0.010<br>(0.010)    | 0.018<br>(0.030)     | 0.016<br>(0.032)   | 0.070<br>(0.155)         | 0.044<br>(0.104)                     |
| Treatment village*treated period                | 0.016<br>(0.032)     | -0.012<br>(0.022)    | 0.003<br>(0.012)     | 0.025<br>(0.030)     | -0.003<br>(0.024)  | 0.001<br>(0.131)         | 0.002<br>(0.107)                     |
| Treatment village*slope all months (spline)     | -0.010*<br>(0.006)   | -0.001<br>(0.004)    | -0.003<br>(0.002)    | -0.012**<br>(0.006)  | -0.004<br>(0.005)  | 0.031<br>(0.020)         | 0.001<br>(0.018)                     |
| Treatment village*slope month 7 to end (spline) | 0.012<br>(0.009)     | 0.002<br>(0.005)     | 0.004<br>(0.003)     | 0.013*<br>(0.007)    | 0.005<br>(0.007)   | -0.039<br>(0.029)        | -0.009<br>(0.024)                    |
| Treated period                                  | -0.051**<br>(0.024)  | -0.040*<br>(0.021)   | -0.041***<br>(0.008) | -0.038*<br>(0.023)   | -0.013<br>(0.018)  | 0.017<br>(0.099)         | 0.200**<br>(0.089)                   |
| Slope all months (spline)                       | 0.000<br>(0.004)     | -0.002<br>(0.004)    | 0.001<br>(0.001)     | 0.002<br>(0.004)     | -0.002<br>(0.004)  | 0.009<br>(0.014)         | -0.018<br>(0.012)                    |
| Slope month 7 to end (spline)                   | 0.000<br>(0.005)     | 0.002<br>(0.004)     | -0.001<br>(0.002)    | -0.003<br>(0.005)    | 0.002<br>(0.005)   | -0.001<br>(0.019)        | 0.034**<br>(0.016)                   |
| N   | 398,310              | 398,144              | 398,010              | 397,834              | 397,926            | 395,189                  | 398,176                              |
| Mean control group                              | 0.419                | 0.120                | 0.072                | 0.206                | 0.304              | 6.140                    | 5.840                                |

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|   | <i>B Male adults</i> |                      |                   |                    |
|---|----------------------|----------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Treatment village                               | -0.006<br>(0.033)    | -0.022<br>(0.014)    | 0.017<br>(0.027)  | 0.097<br>(0.164)   |
| Treatment village*treated period                | -0.027<br>(0.026)    | -0.010<br>(0.012)    | -0.028<br>(0.026) | 0.131<br>(0.118)   |
| Treated period                                  | -0.052***<br>(0.020) | -0.052***<br>(0.009) | -0.028<br>(0.022) | 0.106<br>(0.087)   |
| N   | 188,307              | 188,248              | 188,106           | 187,183            |
| Treatment village                               | -0.006<br>(0.033)    | -0.022<br>(0.014)    | 0.016<br>(0.027)  | 0.100<br>(0.164)   |
| Treatment village*treated period                | 0.002<br>(0.031)     | -0.011<br>(0.021)    | 0.009<br>(0.028)  | 0.055<br>(0.138)   |
| Treatment village*slope all months (spline)     | -0.007<br>(0.006)    | -0.002<br>(0.003)    | -0.008<br>(0.005) | 0.019<br>(0.022)   |
| Treatment village*slope month 7 to end (spline) | 0.008<br>(0.009)     | 0.003<br>(0.004)     | 0.010<br>(0.007)  | -0.024<br>(0.031)  |
| Treated period                                  | -0.043*<br>(0.025)   | -0.036*<br>(0.020)   | -0.026<br>(0.023) | 0.025<br>(0.104)   |
| Slope all months (spline)                       | -0.001<br>(0.004)    | -0.002<br>(0.003)    | 0.000<br>(0.004)  | -0.024<br>(0.015)  |
| Slope month 7 to end (spline)                   | 0.001<br>(0.005)     | 0.001<br>(0.003)     | 0.000<br>(0.005)  | 0.039**<br>(0.020) |
| N   | 188,025              | 187,967              | 187,824           | 187,962            |
| Mean control group                              | 0.372                | 0.103                | 0.180             | 6.454              |

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**Table 10.8** (continued)

|   | Any symptom (1)     | Diarrhea (2)         | Vomiting (3)         | Weakness/fatigue (4) | Other symptoms (5) | Self-reported health (6) | Days of work activity (any work) (7) |
|---|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| <i>C Female adults</i>                          |                     |                      |                      |                      |                    |                          |                                      |
| Treatment village                               | -0.001<br>(0.037)   | -0.032**<br>(0.016)  | -0.011<br>(0.012)    | 0.020<br>(0.033)     | 0.021<br>(0.034)   | 0.043<br>(0.153)         | 0.119<br>(0.103)                     |
| Treatment village*treated period                | -0.030<br>(0.028)   | -0.012<br>(0.015)    | -0.007<br>(0.012)    | -0.025<br>(0.029)    | -0.031<br>(0.023)  | 0.114<br>(0.124)         | -0.077<br>(0.078)                    |
| Treated period                                  | -0.049**<br>(0.020) | -0.056***<br>(0.011) | -0.042***<br>(0.008) | -0.035<br>(0.023)    | -0.015<br>(0.017)  | 0.073<br>(0.089)         | 0.162***<br>(0.043)                  |
| N   | 209,351             | 209,243              | 209,166              | 209,077              | 209,152            | 207,314                  | 209,279                              |
| Treatment village                               | -0.001<br>(0.037)   | -0.033**<br>(0.015)  | -0.012<br>(0.012)    | 0.020<br>(0.033)     | 0.021<br>(0.034)   | 0.046<br>(0.153)         | 0.119<br>(0.103)                     |
| Treatment village*treated period                | 0.031<br>(0.035)    | -0.013<br>(0.024)    | 0.008<br>(0.014)     | 0.041<br>(0.035)     | 0.002<br>(0.026)   | -0.058<br>(0.135)        | -0.050<br>(0.095)                    |
| Treatment village*slope all months (spline)     | -0.014**<br>(0.007) | 0.000<br>(0.005)     | -0.004<br>(0.002)    | -0.015**<br>(0.007)  | -0.007<br>(0.006)  | 0.043**<br>(0.021)       | 0.002<br>(0.020)                     |
| Treatment village*slope month 7 to end (spline) | 0.016*<br>(0.009)   | 0.000<br>(0.006)     | 0.005<br>(0.003)     | 0.017**<br>(0.009)   | 0.008<br>(0.008)   | -0.053*<br>(0.030)       | -0.008<br>(0.026)                    |
| Treated period                                  | -0.058**<br>(0.025) | -0.043**<br>(0.022)  | -0.046***<br>(0.009) | -0.049**<br>(0.024)  | -0.013<br>(0.019)  | 0.011<br>(0.102)         | 0.134*<br>(0.079)                    |
| Slope all months (spline)                       | 0.002<br>(0.004)    | -0.003<br>(0.004)    | 0.001<br>(0.002)     | 0.004<br>(0.005)     | -0.001<br>(0.003)  | 0.005<br>(0.015)         | -0.010<br>(0.013)                    |
| Slope month 7 to end (spline)                   | -0.002<br>(0.006)   | 0.003<br>(0.005)     | -0.001<br>(0.002)    | -0.006<br>(0.006)    | 0.002<br>(0.005)   | 0.004<br>(0.019)         | 0.027<br>(0.017)                     |
| N   | 208,894             | 208,786              | 208,709              | 208,621              | 208,697            | 206,885                  | 208,822                              |
| Mean control group                              | 0.461               | 0.136                | 0.087                | 0.229                | 0.338              | 5.855                    | 6.094                                |


*Notes:* Each column presents the results of a separate regression. Standard errors (corrected for clustering at the village level) are presented in parentheses.

\*\*\*Significant at the 1 percent level.

\*\*Significant at the 5 percent level.

\*Significant at the 10 percent level.

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19 **Fig. 10.4 Weakness: Difference between treatment and control**

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22 and days of work did not increase and decrease in treatment villages with  
23 the take up of the program. Thus, even though people felt less weak, they did  
24 not use this energy to work more (or the effects were too low to be detected).  
25 This lack of effect is consistent with Edgerton et al. (1979), who found very  
26 small effects of iron supplementation on productivity of tea pickers in Indo-  
27 nesia; and Li et al. (1994), who found small increases in output of female  
28 cotton mill workers in China. In the latter case, energy efficiency among  
29 these workers did increase significantly, but technology impeded productiv-  
30 ity improvements at the cotton mills. It is also possible that, in this case  
31 as well, the ability to work at any given time is primarily a function of the  
32 environment (they have to be able to find work). Another possibility is that  
33 the effect would be small.

### 34 10.5 Conclusion

35 Iron deficiency anemia affects millions of people worldwide, affecting  
36 their health and productivity. While field trials have shown that iron supple-  
37 mentation through pills can reduce anemia, improve strength, and, in some  
38 cases, lead to increase in labor supply and productivity, the systematic distri-  
39 bution of iron supplementation pills to the entire population is not a practi-  
40 cal solution. Food fortification is an alternative, but centralized fortification  
41 will leave out the poorest, who are not purchasing fortified foods.

42 This innovative program, developed from the ground up by an NGO,  
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1 tried to solve this problem by introducing fortification at the local level.  
2 The program was designed to be easy and safe to implement by illiterate  
3 millers, and to not require many extra steps for the consumers (they had to  
4 agree once, and would then be considered as part of the program until they  
5 refused). Nevertheless, the program ran into a number of issues, which, taken  
6 together, reduced its effectiveness: first, despite instructions to the contrary,  
7 they switched away from the initial fortification default decision, asking the  
8 person whether they should fortify each visit; second, households did not  
9 value the program sufficiently to walk slightly further to get fortification.

10 These two factors combined explain why the take up of the program fal-  
11 tered over time. We interviewed a number of chakkis and households after the  
12 end of the program. From the point of view of the chakki, fortifying was an  
13 extra step, and since they were not paid by the quantity fortified, they chose  
14 not to take this step unless the household explicitly demanded it. Most house-  
15 holds were happy to fortify their flour as long as the chakki did it for them, but  
16 in most cases, did not stay during the milling to check whether he was doing  
17 it. When the chakkis stopped mixing the iron, most households believed that  
18 the program must have stopped, and few bothered insisting on fortification.  
19 Ultimately, low demand from the households seems to be at the root of the  
20 decay of the program. This is despite some positive impact on symptoms of  
21 weakness in the program's initial phase, and impacts on self-reported health  
22 and happiness by the end line (which may have been placebo or reporting  
23 effects, however). It is possible that the low demand stems from the lack of  
24 any life-changing effect: the extra stamina did not allow those individuals to  
25 work more days (there may not be that much more work to be had), and it is  
26 not clear that being slightly less likely to experience weakness symptoms was  
27 enough to be convinced to do anything different than the usual.

28 From a policy perspective, this experience thus suggests that iron for-  
29 tification may need to be even less painful for the individuals for them to  
30 take it up consistently: fortification of salt (which even poor households do  
31 purchase) seems to be a promising avenue. An alternative, which we are cur-  
32 rently exploring in Udaipur, is to make the fortification process even easier,  
33 for example, by mixing the iron premix with the grain at the moment it is  
34 milled, thus removing the extra step. This raises the issue of whether and why  
35 such a policy is justified if households' willingness to pay for the program  
36 is so low that they will not bother to ask the chakki to do something free  
37 for them. Unlike immunization, bed nets, or TB pills, there are no obvious  
38 externalities to iron deficiency anemia, so one could argue that individuals  
39 should be left alone to deal with this problem. This question leads to a more  
40 speculative, and possibly more interesting, economic argument: individuals  
41 may have little interest in any action, however small, that brings about incre-  
42 mental changes to their lives, perhaps because they do not really see the point  
S today of feeling just slightly better tomorrow (Banerjee and Mullainathan  
N 2008). Even if the action is just to ask for a service, or to walk a little further,  
L the simple fact to consider is that it still requires the individual to project

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1 themselves into this future, which is rather depressing to consider: a future  
2 where, whether with iron fortification or not, they will still be sick often and  
3 not have much work to do. This may be why people give up so easily.

4 Despite this, ex post, the individual would still enjoy being a little stronger,  
5 if this was just offered to him. This underscores the importance of the status  
6 quo, or default (Madrian and Shea 2001; Choi et al.; Thaler; Kahneman,  
7 Knetsch, and Thaler 1991). This program was meant to be in part a “default”  
8 program, but this would have relied on the cooperation of the chakkis, who  
9 prefer, like everyone, to do a little less extra work. Selling fortified salt in  
10 PDS would address this issue, but the question that will arise is the follow-  
11 ing: should the only double fortified salt be available? This would curtail the  
12 individual’s freedom (some people may not *want* to get their salt fortified),  
13 but having both kinds of salt reintroduces a choice. Perhaps the best option  
14 is to have both types available, but to sell the double fortified salt at a small  
15 discount over the regular price. Take up may then be high, since comparing  
16 prices and taking the cheaper good is easy to do and to justify to oneself  
17 without considering the future.  
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## 21 Appendix

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


Fig. 10A.1 The fortification machine is on the left, and the milling machine is on the right

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## Comment Amitabh Chandra and Heidi Williams

Morbidity and mortality from preventable diseases represent substantial global health burdens. For example, the World Health Organization (WHO) estimated that in 2002 there were over 1.5 million deaths globally from dis-

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