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Working Paper 16-094



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# Increasing the Electoral Participation of Immigrants: Experimental Evidence from France\*

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## Abstract

Improving the political participation of immigrants could advance their interests and foster their integration into receiving countries. In this study, 23,800 citizens were randomly assigned to receive visits from political activists during the lead-up of the 2010 French regional elections. Treatment increased the turnout of immigrants without affecting non-immigrants, while turnout was roughly equal in the control group. A postelectoral survey reveals that immigrants initially had less political information, which could explain the heterogeneous impact. Although the effect fades quickly over subsequent elections, our findings suggest that voter outreach efforts can successfully increase immigrants' political participation, even when they do not specifically target their communities and concerns.

Keywords: immigrants, integration, experiment, elections, France, impact heterogeneity

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# 1 Introduction

As the number of first- and later-generation immigrants continues to increase among the population of the United States and Europe (Segal, Elliot and Mayadas, 2010; Eurostat, 2011; Homeland Security, 2012), the question of their integration gains ever more importance. Immigrants are more likely than other citizens to be uneducated and unemployed, their median income is lower, and they are often segregated in suburbs dominated by social housing (e.g, Beauchemin, Hamelle and Simon, 2010; Eurostat, 2011; Alba and Foner, 2015). Immigrants' children remain disadvantaged and their situation is sometimes even worse than that of their parents (Maxwell, 2009). Perhaps reflecting these poor economic conditions, the sense of national belonging of citizens of immigrant origin remains low. In France, for instance, less than half of naturalized immigrants and only 63% of their descendants say that they strongly feel French (Simon, 2012). Low integration of immigrants affects not only their own well-being but also the overall social cohesion in the receiving societies (Givens, 2007; Bloemraad, Korteweg and Yurdakul, 2008). In the last decade, growing tensions between an estranged youth population of immigrant origin and the police and other institutions manifested themselves in major suburban revolts in several European countries (e.g, Duprez, 2009; Dancygier, 2010). More recently and tragically, marginalization may have catalyzed the radicalization of citizens of immigrant origin turning to terrorism or joining ISIS as foreign combatants (Kepel and Jardin, 2015).

Policies implemented to foster immigrants' integration fall into three groups, broadly speaking. Citizenship tests and related civic integration policies seek to enhance immigrants' efforts and aptitude to integrate, while anti-discrimination laws address stigmatization and discrimination by the mainstream population. Finally, a range of labor market and housing policies seek to improve immigrants' socioeconomic status (e.g, Joppke, 2007). Increasing immigrants' political participation may be an important complementary tool. While a growing number of immigrants become citizens and obtain the right to vote, they often remain less likely to participate in the elections than others (Jiménez, 2011; Niel and Lincot, 2012; United States Census Bureau, 2012). Enhanced participation would make it more likely that their preferences are taken into account in policy choices, thus affecting their ability to improve their well-being by

advancing political claims (e.g, Miller, 2008; Fujiwara, 2015). In addition, electoral campaigns and elections are important moments to develop an identity as a full-fledged member of one's civic community. The difficulty is that low integration and tensions with the rest of the society and its institutions may make it difficult to mobilize immigrants politically, perhaps requiring that voter outreach appeals be specifically tailored to their concerns to be successful. In the United States, for instance, political parties, which long neglected immigrants and focused on courting the votes of groups with higher participation, are increasingly adopting this strategy (e.g, Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995; Leighley, 2001). They target mobilization efforts at groups of citizens of immigrant origin deemed close to their ideological platform, hoping to win votes by increasing their participation. Non-partisan local community-based organizations, too, increasingly engage in field campaigns targeting immigrants (e.g, Barreto, 2005; Garcia Bedolla and Michelson, 2012). In an attempt to boost the impact of these drives, the message is typically tailored to the targeted communities, conveyed in their native language, and delivered by coethnic political activists.

This strategy may not be generalizable to all contexts, however. Where the immigrants are geographically dispersed, targeting specific communities can be challenging and costly. In addition, while tenants of the multiculturalist model are certainly sympathetic to initiatives that allow immigrants to root their participation in society within their own community, champions of the assimilationist model believe that their full integration requires overcoming cultural, religious, and ethnic divides (e.g., Kymlicka and Norman, 1994; Koopmans et al., 2005; Howard, 2009; Koopmans, 2010). In the many countries where the latter model is dominant, voter appeals that explicitly target specific ethnic groups and contain ethnic cues may simply not be politically acceptable.

In this paper, we examine whether a voter outreach effort can successfully increase the participation of immigrants even when it neither targets nor crafts its appeal to any specific immigrant community, and whether the effect on citizens of immigrant origin is as large as on native-born citizens.

In the four weeks leading to the French 2010 regional elections, activists from the Parti Socialiste (PS) canvassed eight cities of the Ile-de-France region to encourage registered citizens to vote. Ethnic diversity in these cities is wide: immigrants contribute to a larger share of the

population than in the country as a whole and they come from over 100 different countries. The campaign did not target any one group. Instead, the experimental sample of 1,347 addresses and 23,773 citizens includes immigrants of all origins as well as citizens born in France. From this sample, 678 addresses were randomly allocated to the treatment group, which received the visits of the canvassers, and the remaining 669 addresses to the control group, which did not receive any visit. In our analysis we use “immigrant” to refer to citizens of foreign birth (the “first generation”) and their French-born children living with them (who belong to the “second generation”).

Our results are surprising. Not only were immigrants successfully mobilized by the intervention, but their response was also significantly larger. Using administrative voter rolls and turnout data, we find that the canvassers’ visits increased the turnout of immigrants and children of voting age living with them by 3.4 percentage points in the first round and 2.8 percentage points in the second round without significantly affecting other citizens. These impacts correspond to persuasion rates of 10.6% and 9.3% respectively. Immigrants’ participation increased whether they were first or second generation, and whether they were originally from Magreb, Sub-Saharan Africa, or Asia, which are the three main regions of origin in the sample.

The heterogeneous impact of the visits is all the more striking as contact rate was similar among immigrants and others, and turnout levels were comparable in both populations in the control group, once other characteristics are controlled for. We are able to verify that immigrant origin, rather than observed factors correlated with it, is responsible for treatment effect heterogeneity. To further shed light on underlying mechanisms, we administered a postelectoral survey to 900 respondents within two months after the regional elections. We first find that immigrants had significantly less political information than non-immigrants, which may have contributed to make the information conveyed by the political activists more impactful for them. In addition, immigrants may have been more receptive to the PS activists as their opinions on the policies implemented by Nicolas Sarkozy’s center-right government – as well as their actual reported voting – suggest they are more left-leaning than other citizens.

While the short-run impact of the visits on immigrants compares favorably with the impact of door-to-door canvassing measured in other settings (DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2010), it

diminishes over time: it is smaller and non-significant in the two rounds of the cantonal elections that were organized one year later. Overall, the results suggest that voter outreach efforts can successfully increase the political participation and integration of immigrants even if they are not specifically tailored to them, but that one-shot contacts will not produce durable impacts.

## 1.1 Contribution to the Literature

A large literature shows a negative correlation between ethnic diversity and public goods provision (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999; and Miguel and Gugerty, 2005, among others). In a recent study in France, Algan, Hémet and Laitin (2016) find that ethnic diversity decreases the quality of public goods, such as local public spaces. Our study focuses on similar neighborhoods, characterized by large ethnic diversity and prevalent social housing. Consistent with previous findings, political participation – a particular form of public good, since it does not generate any direct private return – is very low on average in our sample. Building on the existing literature, we test whether it can successfully be increased by a get-out-the-vote effort.

Methodologically, we draw on the randomized controlled trials conducted by Gosnell (1930) and Gerber and Green (2000). While most following get-out-the-vote experiments were conducted in the United States, in partnership with nonpartisan organizations, our study completes the smaller number of experiments evaluating a partisan effort (e.g., Arceneaux and Nickerson, 2010; Gerber, Green and Green, 2003; Nickerson, Friedrichs and King, 2006; Pons, 2016), and it is the first organized in France. The most distinctive feature of our field experiment is as follows. A few studies have estimated the impact of get-out-the-vote campaigns targeting immigrants, and found large effects of phone banks and door-to-door canvassing (e.g, Michelson, 2005; Wong, 2004; Garcia Bedolla and Michelson, 2012). In many of these studies, ethnic cues, explicitly present in the script or resulting from the very presence of coethnic canvassers and the use of voters' native languages, may have increased voters' receptiveness and contributed to the results. By contrast, the content of our intervention was not tailored to

any specific group of voters: immigrants were actually underrepresented among the canvassers, who did not target coethnics and conveyed an ethnic-neutral message.

In addition, the fact that canvassers contacted both immigrants and non-immigrants allows us to compare the impact of an identical voter outreach effort on both groups. While many studies compare the *levels* of registration, participation, or the political preferences of different groups of citizens defined by ethnicity or place of birth (e.g, Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995; Cho, 1999; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, 2001; Jackson, 2003; Xu, 2005; Bevelander and Pendakur, 2011; Maxwell, 2010), few get-out-the-vote experiments compares treatment *effects* across different groups of the population (Arceneaux and Nickerson, 2009; Fieldhouse et al., 2014; Braconnier, Dormagen and Pons, 2015). But this evidence is required to assess the impact of voter mobilization campaigns on the demographic composition and partisan balance of the electorate, both outcomes which are at least equally important as overall participation. The difficulty is that any sociodemographic characteristic, such as immigrant origin, correlates with many other variables. As a result, treatment effect heterogeneity measured along one dimension may capture the influence of correlated factors. Contributing to the literature which proposes statistical methods to improve this type of analysis (e.g, Horiuchi, Imai and Taniguchi, 2007; Imai and Strauss, 2011; Green and Kern, 2012), we show how treatment effect heterogeneity along a particular variable can be disentangled from heterogeneity along other dimensions by including other observed variables interacted with the treatment dummy in the same regression.

Finally, we not only measure the short-run impact of door-to-door canvassing, but also the persistence of the effect. Unlike experimental (Gerber, Green and Shachar, 2003; Davenport et al., 2010; Garcia Bedolla and Michelson, 2012) and nonexperimental work (Meredith, 2009; Fujiwara, Meng and Vogl, 2015) showing that voting can be habit forming, the impact remains positive but decreases substantially and is no longer statistically significant in the follow-up elections.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the context of the experiment and its design. Section 3 presents the results and Section 4 investigates underlying mechanisms. Section 5 concludes.



## 2 Experimental Setting and Data

### 2.1 The 2010 French Regional Elections

The intervention took place during the campaign for the 2010 regional elections in Ile-de-France, the region that includes Paris and surrounding areas. French regions were created in 1982 to decentralize some of the power concentrated in Paris, and were allocated authority over social housing, high schools, transportation, environment, town and country planning, business support, adult skills training, and research. Each region is headed by a president and has a regional assembly, both elected for six years. Regional elections take the form of list polls with two rounds. The list that receives the largest vote share in the second round receives 25% of the seats at the regional assembly, while the remaining 75% are divided proportionally between all lists that made it to the second round.

Turnout at the 2010 elections was relatively low: only 46% and 51% of the registered citizens participated in the first and second rounds, on 14 and 21 March. The Parti Socialiste won 21 of the 22 metropolitan regions. In Ile-de-France the participation was also low. The PS gathered 25% of the votes in the first round and merged its list with two other left-wing lists in the second round. The merged list received 57% of the votes, enabling Jean-Paul Huchon to be reelected as president of the region.<sup>1</sup> Cantonal elections took place one year later, in March 2011,<sup>2</sup> in half of the cities of the sample, accounting for 68% of registered citizens. Similarly to the 2010 elections, they were characterized by a low turnout (45% in both rounds) and by the overall domination by left-wing parties. We use these elections to estimate the medium-run impact of the intervention.

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<sup>1</sup>Despite this clear-cut victory, the outcome of the election in Ile-de-France had been uncertain during most of the campaign: on the left of the political spectrum, “the Greens” emerged before the first round as a powerful third force and threatened to receive a larger vote share than the PS. On the right, Valérie Pécresse was a serious contender. The Minister for Higher Education and Research minister at that time, she was heading the list of the “UMP”, the party of President Nicolas Sarkozy, which held more than half the seats at the National Assembly.

<sup>2</sup>The general councils of departments (the administrative unit below the region) whose members are chosen by these elections, have fewer responsibilities than the regional councils. They oversee middle schools, solidarity programs, leisure, and town and country planning, and a few other areas of government. Until 2015, council members were elected for six years; every three years, half of the cantons of each department came up for election.

## 2.2 The Intervention

A total of 1,347 buildings with 23,773 citizens were included in the experiment: 678 addresses were randomly allocated to the treatment group, which received the visits of the canvassers, and the remaining 669 addresses to the control group, which did not receive any visit. All citizens living in the same building thus belonged to the same group by design.<sup>3</sup> Before randomly allocating the buildings between the treatment and control groups, we stratified them by street and size to ensure balance of the two groups.<sup>4</sup>

The door-to-door visits took place on evenings and Saturdays during the four weeks before the first round of the 2010 election. Between the first and second rounds, in one city, Montrouge, canvassers continued to cover treatment group buildings that they had not covered before the first round.<sup>5</sup> Canvassers knocked on doors in groups of two. They were active members of the PS and were not compensated for their participation in the experiment. Only a few of them had previous experience of door-to-door canvassing, and all received a training course that included role-playing.

To ensure that the intervention would be administered uniformly across canvassers, the training course was identical in all cities, and all canvassers received a toolkit with detailed instructions and advice on how to start and lead the conversations. The full toolkit is available in the Appendix in both the original and English versions (Figures A3 and A4). Canvassers were instructed to provide basic information systematically about the date of the election and the location and opening times of the poll office. They urged people to vote, using general arguments about the importance of voting and of the forthcoming elections as well as personal examples and stories. They further encouraged people to vote for the PS, as the campaign sought to increase both overall turnout and voter support. At the end of the discussion, the canvassers gave their interlocutor a leaflet summarizing the platform of this list. When no one

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<sup>3</sup>Conducting the randomization at the apartment level would have increased our statistical power, but proved infeasible. Indeed, registered citizens usually do not indicate their apartment number on the voter rolls.

<sup>4</sup>The size of a building, proxied by the number of registered citizens living in it, is a good indicator of socioeconomic status: in the areas included in the sample, big buildings often contain social housing, and households there are poorer, on average, than those in residential areas.

<sup>5</sup>Some buildings were cross-randomized to receive a second visit between the two rounds. Unfortunately, only 84 buildings housing 2,145 registered citizens could be integrated in this second randomization, since the two rounds were separated by one week only. This very small sample limits the precision of the comparisons we can draw between the impact of one versus two visits, and one visit before the first round versus one visit between the two rounds; thus, we do not report these estimates.

opened, this leaflet was left at the door.

### 2.3 Sampling Frame

The experimental sample spans eight cities in Ile-de-France, mapped in Figure A1 in the Appendix. The cities were chosen based on two criteria: low political turnout in previous elections, and interest in the experiment shown by the Parti Socialiste’s local unit.<sup>6</sup> In each city, the sample includes polling stations characterized by low historical electoral participation.

The sample population primarily lives in the “banlieues,” suburban neighborhoods which face an important set of interrelated economic and social challenges, including poverty, housing decay, low employment rates, high criminality, and poor educational achievement. These neighborhoods are marked by increased internal tensions, notably between the youth and the police, and a widening gap with the rest of the country.

France has Europe’s second-largest foreign-born population, and immigrants contribute to a larger share of the population in the sample cities than in the country as a whole. They come from over 100 different countries, mostly former French colonies in Maghreb, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia, resulting in large ethnic diversity.<sup>7</sup> Importantly, the door-to-door campaign targeted neither any one group nor immigrants as a whole, and it did not tailor its message to speak to their particular concerns. All the interactions were in French, and ethnic minorities were actually underrepresented among the canvassers, as they are in general among members of the PS (Dargent and Rey, 2014).

### 2.4 The Data

#### *Voter rolls*

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<sup>6</sup>Cities in the experiment are: Sevran, Villetaneuse, Pierrefitte (in the department Seine-Saint-Denis), Montrouge, Bagneux, Malakoff (in the department Hauts-de-Seine), Domont (in the department Val d’Oise), and the 11th arrondissement of Paris.

<sup>7</sup>Before World War II, immigrants to France came primarily from other European countries. Afterwards, the majority came from outside Europe, primarily former French colonies in Maghreb, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia. Most of them belong to ethnic minorities (Weil, 2005).

To define our sample, we use the lists of registered citizens that are maintained at the municipality level.<sup>8</sup> The voter rolls include the addresses of all registered citizens, as well as their gender and date and place of birth. This last variable enables us to identify immigrants, following the United Nations' definition of people born abroad. Since we know neither the citizenship at birth nor the ethnicity of registered citizens, we cannot disentangle citizens born abroad with a foreign citizenship (and who mostly belong to visible ethnic minorities) from those who were born French (and are mostly white), but the latter constitute a small minority in the sample neighborhoods.

The voter rolls further enable us to reconstruct households and identify descendants of immigrants born in France. We assume that citizens sharing the same last name (either as their birth name or married name) and living at the same address belong to the same household,<sup>9</sup> and that two individuals of the same household who were born more than 15 years apart are from different generations. This method allows us to identify the subset of immigrants' descendants registered to vote who live with their parents and whose parents are registered. It misses those who do not live with their parents or whose parents are not French citizens or not registered.

#### *Monitoring spreadsheets*

Canvassers were asked to report the date and number of doors knocked and opened in each building. Overall, they knocked on 9,070 doors and 4,432 (48.9%) opened. Although it is difficult to precisely evaluate the relative importance of the different reasons why doors do not open, the major reason by far is that no one was at home during the canvassers' visit. Other reasons include distrust of strangers, and children being temporarily alone at home. The percentage of doors opened was slightly higher in buildings with a larger fraction of immigrants: from a bivariate regression, we find that the door opening rate increases by 0.1 percentage points when the fraction of immigrants increases by 1 percentage point. This suggests that immigrants were slightly more likely than other citizens to open their door to the canvassers, but that the difference was small.

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<sup>8</sup>Since the door-to-door visits took place after the registration deadline, they did not effect registration, and the administrative voter rolls that each municipality collates every year are an accurate description of the sample population.

<sup>9</sup>Although imperfect, this method is relatively satisfying: we obtain an average number of registered citizens per household of 1.9, when respondents to the post-electoral survey report an average of 2.1.

### *Individual turnout*

In France, each voter who participates in an election signs an attendance sheet (see an example in Figure A2). These sheets are available for public review up to ten days after the election. We took pictures of attendance sheets for the two rounds of the 2010 regional and the two rounds of the 2011 cantonal elections and digitized them. This administrative data enables us to measure the actual voting behavior of all registered citizens in our sample without bias, unlike self-reports of voter turnout, which are often unreliable (Ansolabehere and Hersh, 2012). Altogether, our analysis is based on approximately 78,000 individual turnout observations.

### *Post-electoral survey*

A post-electoral survey was administered over the phone on a subsample of registered citizens whose numbers could be found in the phonebook. All respondents were surveyed within two months after the regional elections. The questionnaire included questions about socioeconomic status, information on the elections, and political preferences.

Of the people we called, 892 (24%) responded, and of those 839 completed the entire survey. The pool of people who were called, and the pool of respondents, was not randomly drawn from the entire pool of registered voters: their participation is higher, and they live disproportionately in Sevran (46%, compared to 31% for the entire sample).<sup>10</sup>

### *Additional sources of data*

Using Google Maps, we measure and control for the distance between a person's home and polling station. In addition, we obtained housing price data at the building level from the real estate company [www.MeilleursAgents.com](http://www.MeilleursAgents.com), which we use as a proxy for income. Finally, we identified all sample buildings included in a ZUS (zone urbaine sensible, the government's designation for underprivileged areas), using the atlas available at <http://sig.ville.gouv.fr/Atlas/ZUS/>.

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<sup>10</sup>Conversely, Montrouge and Villetaneuse are underrepresented among the respondents to the survey due to the order in which the surveyors received the lists of phone numbers to call in the different cities. They were asked to conduct 900 surveys and stopped when they achieved this goal.

## 3 Results

### 3.1 Verifying Randomization

Randomization ensures that all observable and unobservable characteristics should be symmetrically distributed between the treatment and control groups. Table 1 verifies this for a series of observed characteristics. It presents summary statistics for registered citizens in the sample, separately for the control and treatment groups. We also show the difference between the means of the two groups and report the p-value of a test of the null hypothesis that they cannot be distinguished from each other. Overall, registered citizens in the two groups are extremely similar. Out of 37 differences shown in Table 1, only two are significant at the 5% level, and four at the 10% level, which is in line with what would be expected.<sup>11</sup>

Slightly more than half of the registered citizens in our sample live in three cities of the department Seine-Saint-Denis (Sevran, Villetaneuse, and Pierrefitte-sur-Seine) that are known for their underprivileged neighborhoods and high crime rates. Overall, more than a third live in a ZUS. The average housing price, 3400 euros per square meter, is nonetheless relatively high, due to the proximity of Paris.

The average registered citizen lives only 270 meters away from his polling station and is 44 years old. Of the registered citizens, 45% are males and 30% are immigrants. Among immigrants, 87% come from one of three broad regions: Maghreb (39%), Sub-Saharan Africa (29%), or Asia (20%).

The reply and survey completion rates of the post-electoral survey in the control and treatment groups are very similar. Among the respondents, 45% do not have a high school diploma, 59% are employed workers, and 9% report being unemployed. Middle-tier professions and office workers largely dominate other types of activities.

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<sup>11</sup>Education indicates the highest diploma obtained by the respondent and originally takes nine possible values. For brevity, we grouped them into four categories. Socioprofessional category indicates the current occupation or most recent occupation, disentangled into 22 possible responses. We group them into categories, following the French nomenclature of occupation types (Insee, 2003).

### 3.2 Overall Impact of the Visits

We first estimate the average impact of the visits on all citizens using the following IV regression:

$$Y_{i,b} = \alpha_1 + \beta_1 \text{Visited}_b + X_b' \gamma_1 + Z_{i,b}' \delta_1 + \sum_s \lambda_b^s + \epsilon_{i,b} \quad (1)$$

where  $Y_{i,b}$  is turnout of individual  $i$  living in building  $b$ ,  $\text{Visited}_b$  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if building  $b$  received the visit of canvassers,  $X_b$  is a vector of building characteristics (its housing price, distance to the polling station, and whether it is located in a ZUS),  $Z_{i,b}$  is a vector of individual characteristics (age, age<sup>2</sup>, gender, and whether the individual was born in the region Ile-de-France), and  $\lambda_b^s$  are strata fixed effects.  $\text{Visited}_b$  is instrumented with  $T_b$ , a dummy equal to 1 if the building was allocated to the treatment group. Due to time constraints, the canvassers did not cover some buildings in the treatment group, and a few buildings in the control group were covered by mistake, with a first stage of 0.86. These two sources of difference between treatment group and actual treatment received are not particularly interesting, so that the “intention to treat” effect does not have any interest per se in this case and we only report the “treatment-on-the-treated” effect (Angrist, Imbens and Rubin, 1996). In this and all remaining regressions, we adjust the standard errors for clustering at the level of the building since randomization was conducted at this level. Failure to do this would result in an underestimate of the standard errors.

The results are shown in Table 2, Panel A. Average participation was low in the control group in the first round: 34.2%. This turnout rate is ten percentage points lower than the regional average (43.8%), consistent with the choice of polling stations with a low turnout history. Participation in the second round was slightly higher than the first (37.8%), but still nine percentage points lower than the regional average (47.1%).

The impact of the visits on overall participation was positive but small and significant neither in the first round (column 1) nor in the second round of the 2010 elections (column 3). This finding is robust to the inclusion of individual and building controls (columns 2 and 4).

### 3.3 Impact on Immigrants and Non-Immigrants

We then use specifications of the form in Equation [2] to estimate the treatment effects separately for immigrants and non-immigrants:

$$Y_{i,b} = \alpha_2 + \beta_2 \text{Visited}_b + \theta_2 I_{i,b} + \lambda_2 \text{Visited}_b \times I_{i,b} + X'_b \gamma_2 + Z'_{i,b} \delta_2 + \sum_s \lambda_b^s + \epsilon_{i,b} \quad (2)$$

where  $I_{i,b}$  is a dummy equal to 1 if the person is an immigrant.  $\text{Visited}_b$  and  $\text{Visited}_b \times I_{i,b}$  are instrumented by  $T_b$  and  $T_b \times I_{i,b}$ . In this equation,  $\theta_2$  estimates the differential participation of immigrants in the control group.  $\beta_2$  and  $\beta_2 + \lambda_2$  estimate the impact of receiving the visit of canvassers for non-immigrants and immigrants respectively, and  $\lambda_2$  estimates the differential impact of the visits for immigrants. The results are shown in Table 2, Panel B.

The participation of immigrants at the first round of the 2010 regional elections did not significantly differ from non-immigrants (column 1), a finding robust to including individual and building controls (column 2). Similarly, the participation of immigrants in the second round of the elections did not significantly differ from non-immigrants (columns 3 and 4). While immigrant origin is not associated with a different turnout level, it accounts for an important share of treatment effect heterogeneity.

As shown in columns 1 and 2, the visits had a significantly larger impact on immigrants than non-immigrants in the first round. The difference, 4.4 percentage points, is significant at the 1% level in the specification with individual and building controls. The participation of non-immigrants was not affected: the coefficient on Visited is actually negative, although small and not significant at the standard levels. However, adding the coefficients on Visited and Immigrant x Visited, we find that the visits increased the participation of immigrants by 3.4 (= 4.4 - 1.1) percentage points, which is significant at the 5% level. Scaling this estimate by the inverse of the fraction of doors opened (48.9%), we obtain that the visits increased the first round participation of immigrants who live in an apartment which opened its door by approximately 7.0 percentage points ( $3.4 * 1/0.489$ ).<sup>12</sup> Our estimate can be compared to the

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<sup>12</sup>This result is derived under two assumptions. First, we assume that the impact of the visits on households that did not open their door is negligible. This assumption is supported by Sinclair, McConnell and Green (2012) finding that voter mobilization does not yield spillovers across households. Second, we assume that the number of citizens living in households that opened their door is equal on average to the number of citizens living in households that did not, so that we can proxy the fraction of citizens living in households that opened



existing literature using the method proposed by DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007). We divide the treatment effects by the proportion of immigrants that could potentially be mobilized to vote by the treatment (i.e., 1 minus the fraction of nonvoters in the control group among immigrants). We obtain a persuasion rate of  $0.034 / [0.489 \times (1 - (0.354 - 0.010))] = 10.6\%$ . This is of the same order of magnitude as persuasion rates measured by previous studies examining the impact of door-to-door canvassing on participation. For instance, Gerber and Green (2000) and Green, Gerber and Nickerson (2003) find persuasion rates of door-to-door canvassing of 15.6% and 11.5% respectively.

In the second round, the impact of the visits on immigrants was larger again than on non-immigrants (columns 3 and 4). The difference, 3.6 percentage points, is significant at the 5% level. While the participation of non-immigrants was not significantly affected, the participation of immigrants increased by 2.8 (= 3.6 - 0.8) percentage points, an effect significant at the 10% level. This corresponds to a persuasion rate of  $0.028 / [0.489 \times (1 - (0.384 + 0.002))] = 9.3\%$ . Averaging over both rounds, the impact of the intervention on immigrants was 3.1 percentage points, and significant at the 5% level.

Finally, we distinguish between different groups of citizens of immigrant origin. First, we separate citizens born abroad from their children, identified based on the voter rolls as individuals living in the same household and 15 years younger or more. The results are presented in Table 3, Panel A. The impact of the visits was positive on both subgroups in both rounds, but the interaction with the treatment is significant only for citizens born abroad, which constitute a larger group. Second, in Panel B, we separate immigrants by broad origin, Maghreb, Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia and compare the impact of the visits across them. The impact on turnout at the first and second rounds was large for citizens born in the three regions. Even though the small sample size limits the statistical precision of this comparison, we do find that Maghreb origin and, averaged over both rounds, Sub-Saharan African origin are significant when interacted with the treatment dummy.

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their door by the fraction of doors opened. Note that in the postelectoral survey, members of larger households were more likely to say that their household did not receive the canvassers' visit during the campaign. Thus, if anything, the fraction of doors opened provides an upper bound to the fraction of citizens living in households which opened their door, and taking the inverse provides a lower bound to the true impact of the visits on citizens living in an apartment which opened its door.

### 3.4 Small and insignificant persistence

To evaluate the impact of the visits at the 2011 cantonal elections, one year later, we restrict the sample to the four cities in which cantonal elections were held in 2011: Montrouge, Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, Sevran and Villetaneuse. These four cities account for 68% of the entire sample.

The results are shown in Table 4. As for the regional elections, we find that the impact of the canvassers' visits on overall participation at the cantonal elections is small and significant neither in the first round nor in the second round (Panel A). Similarly, we do not find any significant impact on non-immigrants (Panel B). The important difference is that the impact on immigrants, while positive, is smaller than at the regional elections, and not significant. Table A1 disentangles between different groups of citizens of immigrant origin. Unlike the regional elections, the impact is significant neither for citizens born abroad nor for their children (Panel A), and it is only significant (at the 5% level) for immigrants of Maghreb origin in the second round (Panel B). These results suggest that the effect of the short interaction that mobilized some immigrants for the elections immediately following the intervention decays over time. Previous studies investigating whether mobilization effects persist in subsequent elections have also found that they decay over time (e.g, Davenport et al., 2010), but unlike this study they nonetheless typically found large and significant persistent treatment effects (see also Gerber, Green and Shachar, 2003; Garcia Bedolla and Michelson, 2012).

## 4 Mechanisms Explaining the Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

The fact that the visits successfully increased the participation of immigrants in the 2010 regional elections answers our main question: voter outreach efforts which are not tailored to specific immigrant communities can nonetheless improve their participation. The significantly larger impact among immigrants is, however, unexpected and puzzling. We now investigate underlying mechanisms which may explain this treatment effect heterogeneity. Purely mechanical explanations are unlikely to account for it: the door-opening rate was not much larger in buildings with a larger fraction of immigrants, and their participation is not lower than

other citizens in the control group, so that the effect cannot be interpreted as a mere catch-up effect. Instead we first examine whether treatment effect heterogeneity along immigrant origin captures the influence of correlated sociodemographic factors. We then turn to differences in political attitudes, namely political knowledgeability and ideological closeness to the PS, as potential drivers of the large impact of the visits among immigrants.

#### **4.1 Isolating the Influence of Immigrant Origin on Treatment Effect Heterogeneity**

We now address the possibility, inherent to subgroup analysis, that treatment effect heterogeneity measured along one dimension – here, immigrant origin – may capture the influence of other correlated factors. Immigrant origin is indeed correlated with multiple sociodemographic variables, as shown in Table 5. Panel A focuses on sociodemographic variables observed on the entire sample and presents summary statistics separately for immigrants and other citizens. We show the difference between the means of the two groups and report the p-value of a test of the null hypothesis that they cannot be distinguished from each other. Immigrants are significantly more likely than others to live in a ZUS, they are slightly younger on average and they live in buildings where housing price is lower. Among immigrants, a larger share are males, and they are of course more likely to be born outside of the region Ile-de-France. Heterogeneous treatment effects along immigrant origin may actually come from differences in these correlated characteristics. For instance, the treatment may have affected all citizens born outside of the region, not just immigrants, by helping them to bridge a knowledge gap. Alternatively, what mattered was perhaps not being of immigrant origin, but standard of living, proxied by housing price.

To disentangle the influence of immigrant origin on treatment impact from the influence of correlated variables, we allow for heterogeneity in the treatment effects by other dimensions than place of birth. Specifically, we include interaction terms between the treatment indicator and each of these variables in a unique regression:

$$Y_{i,b} = \alpha_4 + \beta_4 \textit{Visited}_b + \theta_4 I_{i,b} + \lambda_4 \textit{Visited}_b \times I_{i,b} + W'_{i,b} \rho_4 + \textit{Visited}_b \times W'_{i,b} \tau_4 + X'_b \gamma_4 + Z'_{i,b} \delta_4 + \epsilon_{i,b} \quad (3)$$

where  $W_{i,b}$  is the vector of characteristics along which we allow for heterogeneity in the treatment effects.  $\textit{Visited}_b$ ,  $\textit{Visited}_b \times I_{i,b}$  and  $\textit{Visited}_b \times W'_{i,b}$  are instrumented by  $T_b$ ,  $T_b \times I_{i,b}$  and  $T_b \times W'_{i,b}$ .

In columns 2 through 7 of Table 6, Panel A, we allow the treatment effect in the first round of the 2010 regional elections to be heterogeneous along the following dimensions successively: gender, age, born in the region Ile-de-France, ZUS, housing price, and distance to the polling station. The differential effect obtained on immigrants is remarkably consistent across all specifications, both in magnitude (between 4.1 and 4.5 percentage points) and in statistical significance (at the 5 or 1% level). In column 8, we allow for heterogeneity by all these dimensions simultaneously, and measure a consistent differential effect of 4.0 percentage points, significant at the 5% level. The estimate of the differential effect of canvassing on the participation of immigrants in the second round is also consistent with allowing for heterogeneity of the treatment effect along these dimensions, as shown in Table 6, Panel B. In all specifications, the estimate of this differential effect lies between 3.4 and 3.8 percentage points, and it is significant at the 5 or 10% level.

While these results suggest that immigrant origin is the key factor responsible for treatment effect heterogeneity, we cannot exclude that other unobserved sociodemographic factors correlated with immigrant status contributed to it. In particular, occupation, education, and income are commonly considered important determinants of voter turnout levels (e.g., Campbell et al., 1960; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). We do not observe these variables in our entire sample but collected them on the subsample of respondents to the postelectoral survey.<sup>13</sup> Panel B of Table 5 shows differences between immigrants and other citizens for values taken by the three variables. We also run chi-square tests of homogeneity to determine whether immigrants and non-immigrants have the same distribution of each of these variables. Table

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<sup>13</sup>Education indicates the highest diploma obtained by the respondent and takes nine possible values, starting with no diploma. Employment status takes five values: employed worker, unemployed worker, student, retired worker, and other inactivity. Socioprofessional category indicates the current occupation or most recent occupation, disentangled into 22 categories.

A2 reports the test statistics and p-values of Pearson’s chi-squared test and the likelihood-ratio chi-square test. We fail to reject the hypothesis that immigrants and non-immigrants have the same distribution of socioprofessional categories: for this variable, the p-values of the Pearson’s and likelihood-ratio chi-squared test statistics are respectively 0.469 and 0.386. However, we reject the hypothesis that both groups have the same distribution of education levels and the same type of employment status at the 1% level: as shown in Table 5, immigrants are more likely to not have a high school diploma and they are less likely to be retired workers. As a result, we cannot exclude that education and employment status contributed to the estimated influence of being an immigrant on the effect of the treatment. In fact, the lower education of immigrants may have affected their level of political information. We now discuss whether differences in political knowledgeability and partisanship may have contributed to the large impact of the visits among immigrants.

## 4.2 Knowledgeability and Partisanship

### Provision of Information

An important part of the canvassers’ visits was to provide information about the date of the election, the location and opening times of the poll office, and the political agenda of their candidate. Information on the whereabouts of the election can significantly reduce the logistical costs of voting (e.g, Wolfinger, Highton and Mullin, 2005), while information on political platforms can help formulate political opinions, reducing the cognitive costs of becoming engaged with and informed about the political world, which may be an even greater barrier to voter turnout (Berinsky, 2005). In the present study, the larger impact of the visits on immigrants may simply come from the fact that the information provided by the canvassers was more impactful for them, as they were originally less informed about French politics and about the regional elections as a result of being born in a foreign country, for the most part, and having on average fewer contacts with other citizens than native-borns do.

Panel C of Table 5 compares levels of political information among immigrants and other citizens along several dimensions, measured in the postelectoral survey: whether the respon-

dent knows that she is registered,<sup>14</sup> who was elected as president of the region, and what the responsibilities of the regional council are (in terms of programs overseen). We restrict the sample to citizens in the control group to avoid contaminating the estimation with the effect of the treatment. Immigrants are less informed on all three dimensions although these differences, while sizable, are not statistically significant. To summarize all differences in a unique measure, we then group all four outcomes into a global index, defined to be the equally weighted average of the z-scores of its components, following Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007).<sup>15</sup> The difference between immigrants and non-immigrants is 0.13 standard deviation on average and it is significant at the 10% level. This gives some empirical support to the interpretation that the larger impact of the visits on immigrants came from the fact that these had less information.

We then investigate whether the visits actually increased information by using specifications of the form in Equations [1] and [2], where we replace turnout by information as the outcome  $Y_{i,b}$ . The results are shown in Table A3. Both the overall impact (Panel A) and the impact on non-immigrants (Panel B) are small and non-significant. The impact on immigrants' informedness is larger and of the same magnitude as the impact on their participation. This suggests that simple information on voter registration status and eligibility to participate as well as on the candidates and the election helped increase immigrants' voter turnout. However, due to the small sample size and related low statistical power, the effects are non-statistically significant, forbidding any firm conclusion on the impact of the visits on political informedness.

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<sup>14</sup>We asked each respondent whether he or she was registered and compare their answers to actual status, which is registered for all, since we only surveyed citizens registered on the voter rolls.

<sup>15</sup>The z-scores are calculated by subtracting the mean among non-immigrants in the control group and dividing by the standard deviation among them. Some outcomes are missing for some citizens, who used their right to refuse to answer. Following Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007), if an individual's response is known for at least one of the four outcomes, then any missing values for the other outcomes are imputed at the mean of the relevant group so that the estimates are the same as the average of those that would be obtained for the components of the index.

## Political Closeness to the Parti Socialiste

A complementary explanation for the heterogeneous impact of the visits is that the discussions with the canvassers resonated differently for those with political views closest to the ideological platform of the Parti Socialiste (PS). Like other European progressive parties, the PS is perceived as more sensitive to immigrants' interests than right-wing parties (Givens and Luedtke, 2005). It promotes immigrant naturalization, anti-discrimination policies, and the right to vote in local elections for non-naturalized immigrants. Unsurprisingly then, immigrants in France are generally more to the left, ideologically (Brouard and Tiberj, 2011). Self-reported voter choice measured in the post-electoral survey suggests that this is true in the sample as well. While a large majority of citizens in the sample are on the left, immigrants who voted and disclosed whom they voted for were even more likely to vote for the PS than non-immigrants (Table 5, Panel C). At the second round, the difference was particularly large (17 percentage points) and significant at the 1% level. Immigrants' stronger ideological closeness to the PS may have contributed to the differential impact of the visits.

## Conclusion

This paper examines whether voter outreach efforts can successfully increase the participation of immigrants, and whether the effect on immigrants is larger or smaller than on other citizens. In the four weeks leading up to the French 2010 regional elections, members of the Parti Socialiste canvassed eight cities of the region surrounding Paris to encourage citizens to vote. The 23,773 citizens in the sample included immigrants from over 100 different countries in Maghreb, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia, as well as native-born citizens. The door-to-door campaign targeted neither any one group nor immigrants as a whole. Initially, immigrants' turnout level did not greatly differ from native-born citizens. However, the door-to-door visits increased immigrant turnout by 3.4 percentage points in the first round and 2.8 percentage points in the second, without significantly affecting non-immigrant turnout. The effect in the cantonal elections that were organized one year later was still positive but smaller and non-

significant. These results are robust to controlling for treatment effect heterogeneity along other sociodemographic variables.

What makes our results particularly striking is that the economic scarcity and lack of immigrant electoral power that characterize the French suburbs have typically generated conflicts between immigrant communities and the state (Lagrange and Oberti, 2006; Duprez, 2009; Dancygier, 2010). The large impact of the visits suggests that current tensions, rather than dampening the mobilization of immigrants, actually may have made the intervention particularly noticeable and impactful. Many citizens of immigrant origin share a feeling of being stigmatized and rejected by the mainstream population: in France, 59% of immigrants believe that French society does not give people of different origin the means to integrate (Brouard and Tiberj, 2011) and 45% feel that natives do not regard them as French (Simon, 2012). Immigrants may have seen the canvassers' visit as a break with everyday experience – a signal that they were perceived and treated as full citizens whose votes mattered. This effect – together with immigrants' lower baseline level of information about the elections and their political views closer to the Parti Socialiste, measured by our survey – could explain why the impact of the visits was significantly larger among immigrant citizens than the mainstream population.

This study shows that voter outreach efforts do not need to be tailored to any community or target any one group to successfully increase the participation of citizens of immigrant origin. This result is particularly relevant for countries with an assimilationist model of integration, which expects citizens to overcome cultural and ethnic divides. In contrast to the idea that immigrants are unwilling to advance their integration in the receiving societies, our findings suggest that proactively extending a hand to them could complement existing policies and advance the integration of new arrivals. Future research will hopefully identify additional ways in which political parties, nonpartisan organizations, and public institutions can use direct and personal contacts to improve immigrants' integration and participation. A one-time visit in the context of an election, with effects rapidly decaying over time, will obviously not suffice.



**Table 1: Summary Statistics**

	Control group		Treatment group		<i>P-value</i>	Number
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Treatment = Control	of obs.
<b>Panel A. Building characteristics</b>						
City where building is located						
Paris, 11th arrondissement	0.056	0.230	0.046	0.210	0.668	23,773
Bagneux	0.098	0.297	0.104	0.306	0.788	23,773
Domont	0.049	0.216	0.049	0.216	0.978	23,773
Malakoff	0.116	0.320	0.118	0.322	0.960	23,773
Montrouge	0.169	0.375	0.162	0.369	0.865	23,773
Pierrefitte-sur-Seine	0.065	0.247	0.061	0.240	0.810	23,773
Sevran	0.300	0.458	0.315	0.465	0.699	23,773
Villetaneuse	0.146	0.353	0.144	0.351	0.933	23,773
Based in a ZUS	0.344	0.475	0.354	0.478	0.812	23,773
Housing price	3447	1423	3394	1401	0.706	23,773
Distance to the polling station	0.272	0.243	0.268	0.248	0.867	23,773
<b>Panel B. Individual characteristics (voter rolls, whole sample)</b>						
Gender	0.449	0.497	0.461	0.498	0.069	23,773
Age	44.2	17.9	44.2	17.8	0.935	23,773
Immigrant	0.291	0.454	0.301	0.459	0.476	23,760
Maghreb origin	0.112	0.316	0.116	0.320	0.683	23,760
Sub-Saharan African origin	0.085	0.279	0.087	0.282	0.858	23,760
Asian origin	0.056	0.231	0.063	0.243	0.387	23,760
Other origin	0.039	0.193	0.037	0.190	0.746	23,760
Born in Ile-de-France	0.520	0.500	0.504	0.500	0.126	23,760
<b>Panel C. Individual characteristics (postelectoral survey)</b>						
Called for a survey	0.154	0.361	0.163	0.369	0.467	23,773
Survey conducted	0.242	0.428	0.232	0.422	0.508	3,766
Education						
No diploma	0.144	0.352	0.137	0.344	0.784	817
Diploma below end-of-high-school	0.322	0.468	0.287	0.453	0.272	817
End-of-high-school diploma	0.227	0.419	0.254	0.436	0.403	817
Higher education diploma	0.307	0.462	0.322	0.468	0.664	817
Employment status						
Employed worker	0.588	0.493	0.583	0.494	0.885	804
Unemployed worker	0.109	0.312	0.077	0.266	0.126	804
Student	0.070	0.256	0.105	0.307	0.076	804
Retired worker	0.179	0.384	0.169	0.375	0.715	804
Other inactivity	0.053	0.225	0.066	0.249	0.452	804
Socioprofessional category						
Category 1 (farmers)	0.005	0.070	0.003	0.051	0.592	792
Category 2 (craftsmen, retail traders)	0.037	0.188	0.029	0.167	0.504	792
Category 3 (executives)	0.098	0.298	0.148	0.356	0.028	792
Category 4 (middle-tier professions)	0.314	0.465	0.266	0.442	0.132	792
Category 5 (office workers)	0.353	0.478	0.302	0.460	0.121	792
Category 6 (laborers)	0.086	0.280	0.089	0.284	0.890	792
Category 8 (no activity)	0.108	0.311	0.164	0.371	0.026	792

Notes : For each variable, we report the means and standard deviations in both the control group and the treatment group and indicate the p-value of the difference. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the building level. "Immigrant" refers to citizens of foreign birth and their French-born children living with them.

**Table 2: Impact of the visits on participation in the 2010 regional elections**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A. Overall impact	First round		Second round		Average of first and second rounds	
Visited	0.004 (0.008)	0.003 (0.008)	0.006 (0.008)	0.003 (0.008)	0.005 (0.007)	0.003 (0.007)
Strata fixed effects	x	x	x	x	x	x
Building and individual controls		x		x		x
Observations	23773	23760	23773	23760	23773	23760
R-squared	0.06	0.10	0.05	0.10	0.06	0.11
Mean in Control Group	0.342	0.342	0.378	0.378	0.360	0.360
<b>Panel B. Impact on immigrants and non-immigrants</b>						
Visited	-0.008 (0.009)	-0.011 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.010)	-0.008 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.008)
Immigrant * Visited	0.041** (0.017)	0.044*** (0.017)	0.032* (0.019)	0.036** (0.018)	0.037** (0.017)	0.040** (0.016)
Immigrant	0.003 (0.011)	-0.010 (0.012)	0.017 (0.012)	0.002 (0.012)	0.010 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.011)
Strata fixed effects	x	x	x	x	x	x
Building and individual controls		x		x		x
Observations	23760	23760	23760	23760	23760	23760
R-squared	0.06	0.10	0.06	0.10	0.07	0.11
Mean in Control Group, Non-immigrants	0.354	0.354	0.385	0.385	0.369	0.369

*Notes* : The unit of observation is the individual. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the building level and reported in parentheses. In Panel A, we estimate the overall impact of the visits. In Panel B, we estimate their impact for immigrants and non-immigrants separately.

Visited is instrumented with Treatment and Immigrant \* Visited with Immigrant \* Treatment. Building controls include: housing price, distance to the polling station, and whether it is located in a ZUS. Individual controls include: age, age<sup>2</sup>, gender, and whether the individual was born in Ile-de-France.

**Table 3: Impact of the visits on participation in the 2010 regional elections for different groups of immigrants**

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A. Immigrants born abroad vs. Children	First round	Second round	Average of first and second rounds
Visited	-0.011 (0.009)	-0.008 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.008)
Immigrants born abroad * Visited	0.057*** (0.018)	0.036* (0.019)	0.046*** (0.017)
Immigrants' children * Visited	0.007 (0.031)	0.037 (0.033)	0.022 (0.030)
Immigrants born abroad	-0.028** (0.014)	-0.008 (0.013)	-0.018 (0.012)
Immigrants' children	0.034* (0.020)	0.023 (0.021)	0.028 (0.019)
Strata fixed effects	x	x	x
Building and individual controls	x	x	x
Observations	23760	23760	23760
R-squared	0.10	0.10	0.11
Mean in Control Group, Non-immigran	0.354	0.385	0.369
<b>Panel B. Immigrants of different origins</b>			
Visited	-0.012 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.010 (0.008)
Maghreb origin * Visited	0.064** (0.025)	0.056** (0.027)	0.060** (0.024)
Sub-Saharan African origin * Visited	0.045 (0.029)	0.045 (0.029)	0.045* (0.027)
Asian origin * Visited	0.036 (0.036)	0.017 (0.035)	0.027 (0.033)
Other origin * Visited	0.020 (0.044)	0.008 (0.047)	0.014 (0.042)
Maghreb origin	-0.039** (0.016)	-0.019 (0.017)	-0.029* (0.015)
Sub-Saharan African origin	0.046** (0.020)	0.039** (0.019)	0.043** (0.018)
Asian origin	-0.030 (0.026)	0.000 (0.025)	-0.015 (0.024)
Other origin	-0.023 (0.026)	-0.021 (0.029)	-0.022 (0.026)
Strata fixed effects	x	x	x
Building and individual controls	x	x	x
Observations	23760	23760	23760
R-squared	0.10	0.10	0.12
Mean in Control Group, Non-immigran	0.354	0.385	0.369

Notes : The unit of observation is the individual. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the building level and reported in parentheses.

In Panel A, we estimate the impact of the visits for non-immigrants, immigrants born abroad, and their French-born children living with them, separately. Visited is instrumented with Treatment, Immigrant born abroad \* Visited with Immigrant born abroad \* Treatment, and Immigrants' children \* Visited with Immigrants' Children \* Treatment. In Panel B, we estimate the impact of the visits for non-immigrants and immigrants of different origins separately. Visited is instrumented with Treatment, Maghreb origin \* Visited with Maghreb origin \* Treatment, Sub-Saharan African origin \* Visited with Sub-Saharan African origin \* Treatment, Asian origin \* Visited with Asian origin \* Treatment, and Other origin \* Visited with Other origin \* Treatment.

Building controls include: housing price, distance to the polling station, and whether it is located in a ZUS. Individual controls include: age, age<sup>2</sup>, gender, and whether the individual was born in Ile-de-France.

**Table 4: Impact of the visits on participation in the 2011 cantonal elections**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A. Overall impact	First round		Second round		Average of first and second rounds	
Visited	0.004 (0.009)	0.003 (0.009)	0.001 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.009)	0.003 (0.009)	0.001 (0.008)
Strata fixed effects	x	x	x	x	x	x
Building and individual controls		x		x		x
Observations	15416	15405	15410	15399	15410	15399
R-squared	0.06	0.11	0.05	0.10	0.06	0.12
Mean in Control Group	0.262	0.262	0.291	0.291	0.277	0.277
<b>Panel B. Impact on immigrants and non-immigrants</b>						
Visited	-0.003 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.012)	-0.011 (0.011)	-0.006 (0.011)	-0.007 (0.010)
Immigrant * Visited	0.019 (0.021)	0.020 (0.020)	0.028 (0.021)	0.029 (0.021)	0.024 (0.019)	0.025 (0.019)
Immigrant	-0.012 (0.014)	-0.016 (0.014)	0.020 (0.014)	0.015 (0.015)	0.004 (0.013)	0.000 (0.013)
Strata fixed effects	x	x	x	x	x	x
Building and individual controls		x		x		x
Observations	15405	15405	15399	15399	15399	15399
R-squared	0.06	0.11	0.05	0.10	0.06	0.12
Mean in Control Group, Non-immigrants	0.274	0.274	0.293	0.293	0.283	0.283

*Notes* : The unit of observation is the individual. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the building level and reported in parentheses. In Panel A, we estimate the overall impact of the visits. In Panel B, we estimate their impact for immigrants and non-immigrants separately.

Visited is instrumented with Treatment and Immigrant \* Visited with Immigrant \* Treatment. Building controls include: housing price, distance to the polling station, and whether it is located in a ZUS.

Individual controls include: age, age<sup>2</sup>, gender, and whether the individual was born in Ile-de-France.

**Table 5: Differences between the characteristics of immigrants and non-immigrants**

	Non-immigrants		Immigrants		<i>P-value</i> Native- borns =	Number of obs.
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD		
<b>Panel A. Characteristics known for the entire sample</b>						
Gender	0.437	<i>0.496</i>	0.497	<i>0.500</i>	0.000	23,760
Age	44.424	<i>18.348</i>	43.600	<i>16.629</i>	0.008	23,760
Born in Ile-de-France	0.634	<i>0.482</i>	0.222	<i>0.416</i>	0.000	23,760
Based in a ZUS	0.296	<i>0.456</i>	0.476	<i>0.499</i>	0.000	23,760
Housing price	3594	<i>1456</i>	3010	<i>1208</i>	0.000	23,760
Distance to the polling station	0.273	<i>0.243</i>	0.263	<i>0.250</i>	0.188	23,760
<b>Panel B. Characteristics known for respondents to the postelectoral survey</b>						
Education						
No diploma	0.116	<i>0.320</i>	0.194	<i>0.396</i>	0.004	816
Diploma below end-of-high-school	0.335	<i>0.472</i>	0.240	<i>0.428</i>	0.003	816
End-of-high-school diploma	0.228	<i>0.420</i>	0.266	<i>0.443</i>	0.258	816
Higher education diploma	0.322	<i>0.468</i>	0.300	<i>0.459</i>	0.563	816
Employment status						
Employed worker	0.575	<i>0.495</i>	0.612	<i>0.488</i>	0.298	803
Unemployed worker	0.086	<i>0.280</i>	0.110	<i>0.313</i>	0.299	803
Student	0.075	<i>0.263</i>	0.114	<i>0.318</i>	0.074	803
Retired worker	0.212	<i>0.409</i>	0.090	<i>0.287</i>	0.000	803
Other inactivity	0.053	<i>0.224</i>	0.075	<i>0.263</i>	0.228	803
Socioprofessional category						
Category 1 (farmers)	0.006	<i>0.075</i>	0.000	<i>0.000</i>	0.079	791
Category 2 (craftsmen, retail traders)	0.028	<i>0.165</i>	0.043	<i>0.204</i>	0.296	791
Category 3 (executives)	0.128	<i>0.335</i>	0.110	<i>0.314</i>	0.454	791
Category 4 (middle-tier professions)	0.315	<i>0.465</i>	0.240	<i>0.428</i>	0.031	791
Category 5 (office workers)	0.324	<i>0.468</i>	0.335	<i>0.473</i>	0.774	791
Category 6 (laborers)	0.082	<i>0.275</i>	0.098	<i>0.298</i>	0.444	791
Category 8 (no activity)	0.117	<i>0.322</i>	0.173	<i>0.379</i>	0.041	791
<b>Panel C. Knowledgeability and partisanship</b>						
Political information						
Knows that he/she is registered	0.845	<i>0.363</i>	0.796	<i>0.404</i>	0.204	456
Knows who was elected pres. of the regic	0.517	<i>0.501</i>	0.443	<i>0.499</i>	0.172	440
Able to cite responsibilities of the region	0.332	<i>0.472</i>	0.281	<i>0.451</i>	0.280	440
Overall information index	0.000	<i>0.708</i>	-0.132	<i>0.710</i>	0.081	458
Political preferences						
Voted for PS at first round	0.459	<i>0.501</i>	0.500	<i>0.506</i>	0.647	127
Voted for PS at second round	0.727	<i>0.448</i>	0.900	<i>0.304</i>	0.009	139

*Notes* : For each variable, we report the means and standard deviations both for non-immigrants and for immigrants and indicate the p-value of the difference. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the building level. In Panel C, the sample is restricted to individuals in the control group.

**Table 6: Impact of the visits on participation in the 2010 regional elections, allowing for heterogeneous treatment effects along other dimensions than immigrant**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Heterogenous effects allowed along		Gender	Age	Born in Ile-de-France	Based in a ZUS	Housing price	Distance to the polling	All ((2) - (7))
Panel A. First round								
Immigrant * Visited	0.044*** (0.017)	0.043** (0.017)	0.044*** (0.017)	0.042** (0.019)	0.041** (0.017)	0.045*** (0.017)	0.044** (0.017)	0.040** (0.019)
Strata fixed effects	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Building and individual controls	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Observations	23760	23760	23760	23760	23760	23760	23760	23760
R-squared	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
Panel B. Second round								
Immigrant * Visited	0.036** (0.018)	0.034* (0.018)	0.036** (0.018)	0.035* (0.020)	0.035* (0.018)	0.038** (0.018)	0.036** (0.018)	0.034* (0.020)
Strata fixed effects	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Building and individual controls	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Observations	23760	23760	23760	23760	23760	23760	23760	23760
R-squared	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10

Notes : The unit of observation is the individual. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the building level and reported in parentheses. We estimate the impact of the visits for immigrants and non-immigrants separately and allow for heterogeneous treatment effects along other dimensions: gender, age, whether the individual was born in Ile-de-France, housing price, distance to the polling station, whether it is located in a ZUS, and, in column 8, all these variables. Each of these variables is interacted with Visited and the interaction is instrumented by the interaction of the same variable with Treatment. Building controls include: housing price, distance to the polling station, and whether it is located in a ZUS. Individual controls include: age, age<sup>2</sup>, gender, and whether the individual was born in Ile-de-France.

## Appendix

**Table A1: Impact of the visits on participation in the 2011 cantonal elections for different groups of immigrants**

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A. Immigrants born abroad vs. Children	First round	Second round	Average of first and second rounds
Visited	-0.004 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.011)	-0.007 (0.010)
Immigrants born abroad * Visited	0.022 (0.021)	0.025 (0.021)	0.023 (0.019)
Immigrants' children * Visited	0.017 (0.033)	0.046 (0.034)	0.031 (0.030)
Immigrants born abroad	-0.033** (0.015)	0.007 (0.016)	-0.014 (0.015)
Immigrants' children	0.018 (0.023)	0.028 (0.023)	0.023 (0.021)
Strata fixed effects	x	x	x
Building and individual controls	x	x	x
Observations	15405	15399	15399
R-squared	0.11	0.10	0.12
Mean in Control Group, Non-immigran	0.274	0.293	0.283
Panel B. Immigrants of different origins			
Visited	-0.003 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.011)	-0.007 (0.010)
Maghreb origin * Visited	0.039 (0.030)	0.065** (0.032)	0.052* (0.028)
Sub-Saharan African origin * Visited	-0.006 (0.032)	0.007 (0.032)	0.000 (0.030)
Asian origin * Visited	0.048 (0.036)	0.015 (0.037)	0.031 (0.034)
Other origin * Visited	-0.050 (0.051)	-0.009 (0.052)	-0.029 (0.047)
Maghreb origin	-0.032* (0.017)	0.020 (0.020)	-0.006 (0.017)
Sub-Saharan African origin	0.019 (0.023)	0.045** (0.021)	0.032 (0.021)
Asian origin	-0.039 (0.025)	-0.018 (0.029)	-0.028 (0.025)
Other origin	0.000 (0.034)	-0.017 (0.033)	-0.009 (0.031)
Strata fixed effects	x	x	x
Building and individual controls	x	x	x
Observations	15405	15399	15399
R-squared	0.11	0.10	0.12
Mean in Control Group, Non-immigran	0.274	0.293	0.283

*Notes* : The unit of observation is the individual. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the building level and reported in parentheses.

In Panel A, we estimate the impact of the visits for non-immigrants, immigrants born abroad, and their French-born children living with them, separately. Visited is instrumented with Treatment, Immigrant born abroad \* Visited with Immigrant born abroad \* Treatment, and Immigrants' children \* Visited with Immigrants' Children \* Treatment. In Panel B, we estimate the impact of the visits for non-immigrants and immigrants of different origins separately. Visited is instrumented with Treatment, Maghreb origin \* Visited with Maghreb origin \* Treatment, Sub-Saharan African origin \* Visited with Sub-Saharan African origin \* Treatment, Asian origin \* Visited with Asian origin \* Treatment, and Other origin \* Visited with Other origin \* Treatment.

Building controls include: housing price, distance to the polling station, and whether it is located in a ZUS. Individual controls include: age, age<sup>2</sup>, gender, and whether the individual was born in Ile-de-France.

**Table A2: Tests of the homogeneity of the distribution of sociodemographic characteristics among immigrants and non-immigrants**

Characteristic	Number of categories	Degrees of freedom	Number of obs.	Pearson's chi-squared test		Likelihood-ratio chi-squared test	
				Test statistic	<i>P-value</i>	Test statistic	<i>P-value</i>
Education	9	8	816	20.9	0.007	21.7	0.005
Employment status	5	4	803	20.7	0.000	22.3	0.000
Socioprofessional category	22	21	791	20.8	0.469	22.2	0.386

*Notes :* We test the null hypothesis that the distribution of, respectively, education level, employment status, and socioprofessional category, is identical between immigrants and non-immigrants. We report both the Pearson's chi-squared test statistic and p-value and the likelihood-ratio chi-squared test statistic and p-value.



**Table A3: Impact of the visits on political informedness**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A. Overall impact	Knows that he/she is registered		Knows who was elected president of the region		Able to cite responsibilities of the region		Overall information index	
Visited	-0.005 (0.025)	-0.004 (0.025)	0.019 (0.034)	0.017 (0.032)	0.004 (0.032)	0.003 (0.031)	0.012 (0.049)	0.014 (0.045)
Building and individual controls		x		x		x		x
Observations	890	889	850	849	851	850	892	891
R-squared	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.07
Mean in Control Group	0.829	0.829	0.492	0.492	0.315	0.315	0.000	0.000
Panel B. Impact on immigrants and non-immigrants								
Visited	-0.019 (0.030)	-0.022 (0.029)	0.010 (0.041)	0.006 (0.039)	0.008 (0.040)	0.004 (0.037)	-0.004 (0.060)	-0.010 (0.055)
Immigrant * Visited	0.044 (0.054)	0.054 (0.054)	0.024 (0.072)	0.034 (0.070)	-0.014 (0.067)	-0.002 (0.066)	0.047 (0.103)	0.072 (0.100)
Immigrant	-0.049 (0.038)	-0.048 (0.040)	-0.074 (0.054)	-0.076 (0.058)	-0.052 (0.048)	-0.039 (0.050)	-0.132* (0.076)	-0.122 (0.079)
Building and individual controls		x		x		x		x
Observations	889	889	849	849	850	850	891	891
R-squared	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.05	0.01	0.07
Mean in Control Gr., Non-immigrar	0.845	0.845	0.517	0.517	0.332	0.332	0.000	0.000

Notes : The unit of observation is the individual. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the building level and reported in parentheses. In Panel A, we estimate the overall impact of the visits. In Panel B, we estimate their impact for immigrants and non-immigrants separately.

Visited is instrumented with Treatment and Immigrant \* Visited with Immigrant \* Treatment. Building controls include: housing price, distance to the polling station, and whether it is located in a ZUS. Individual controls include: age, age<sup>2</sup>, gender, and whether the individual was born in Ile-de-France.

Figure A1. Localization of the eight cities included in the sample.




Figure A2. Example of French electoral turnout data

MALAKOFF  
Canton : 25  
Circonscription : 11

**LISTE EMARGEMENT**  
**(Liste principale)**

Edité le : 11/03/2010 Page : 2  
BV 4 MAISON DE LA VIE ASSOCIATIVE  
28 RUE VICTOR HUGO

Noms et Prénoms	Date et Lieu de Naissance	Adresse	N°	2ème Tour	1er Tour
[REDACTED]	19 TRAPPIES	92240 MALAKOFF	1 6		[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	32 MALAKOFF	92240 MALAKOFF	2 25		[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	TUNISIE GRAN	92240 MALAKOFF	3 26		[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	92 CHATILLON	92240 MALAKOFF	4 34		[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	ALGERIE TIZI OUZOU	92240 MALAKOFF	5 72	[Signature]	[Signature]
[REDACTED]	14 EQUEMUVILLE	92240 MALAKOFF	6 77		[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	75 PARIS 12	92240 MALAKOFF	7 82	[Signature]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	63 CLERMONT-FERRAND	92240 MALAKOFF	8 243	[Signature]	[Signature]
[REDACTED]	92 FONTENAY-AUX-ROSES	92240 MALAKOFF	9 268	[Signature]	[Signature]

4

Figure A3. Practical guide to door-to-door canvassing (English version).

Campaign for the 2010 regional elections, Ile-de-France  
Electoral mobilization project  
Door-to-door guide

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## Practical guide to door-to-door canvassing (Activists)

In this guide, you will find ways to introduce yourself and answer the voters' questions that have been used in many door-to-door campaigns in France and the USA. However, feel free to adapt them to your own door-to-door experience. Good luck !

### 1. How to introduce yourself ?

Here's a selection of introductory sentences generally used during door-to-door campaigns :

1. « *Good morning, are you aware of a regional election on 14 and 21 March (or in X weeks/Y days) ?* »
2. « *Are you registered to vote ?* »
3. « *I work in Jean-Paul Huchon's campaign team, for the Socialist Party, and I'm here because I think that it is important to vote on 14 March* ».
  - Smile ! (preferably a sincere smile ☺)
  - From the very beginning, ask the people if they're registered on the voter rolls. If they aren't, quickly explain to them how to proceed for the next election (see paragraph 3).
  - At first, you should rather say that it's important to vote in general, *not specifically for Jean-Paul Huchon*.
  - Try not to spend more than ten minutes at each door.

### 2. Argumentative strategies

#### General instructions

- Do not hesitate to talk about your own political commitment, a personal story is often better accepted than the most sophisticated logical arguments.
- **If you come across disillusioned voters, show some empathy!** If you too have had doubts in the past, say so, and explain how you moved beyond that acknowledgment and committed to the campaign. Do not hesitate to explain how our party is changing, this door-to-door campaign being a good example. You can also mention some examples of concrete achievements in the region or in the country.

#### If you don't know how to answer a question...

- Remember that you're not supposed to have all the answers to all the questions you might be asked. It's no big deal ! When this happens, do not hesitate to say : « **Please tell me how to reach you and I'll contact you to answer your question.** »
- If you promise this, it is important : 1) to keep your word and answer ! 2) to do it personally. Make sure that you make a note of their phone number or e-mail address and get back to them as quickly as possible.
  - ⇒ You can note this information on the « Voters contacts » form.

#### Why vote ?

- Regional politics affect everyday life → « *General information* » sheet, « *Regional authorities* » section.

- It's a mean to make one's voice heard and to defend one's interests : « *I think that if we don't vote, only the interests of others will be taken into consideration and this will have direct consequences on [voter's city/neighborhood] daily life* » and those of one's neighborhood or city : « *I believe that it is the right way to have [voter's city/neighborhood] voice heard* ». Indeed, a strong participation in the city or neighborhood is a way to draw the politicians' attention to local issues.
- If the voter tells you that he/she doesn't really care, that politics are useless, « *I can understand your opinion, but sometimes it's because we don't really know what politics can do for us : [give an example of concrete achievement in the city/neighborhood]* »
- If the voter tells you that political parties or the Socialist Party do not care about people :
  - State an achievement of the Socialist Party in your city.
  - Talk about your own experience : « *You know, I'm working too, I've got a family, and I've taken my evening/my day-off to come and see you because I think it's really important to vote on 14 March* »

#### **Why vote on 14 and 21 March ?**

- Polls predict close results both in the first and second rounds. Everyone's vote will count and can make a difference (do not hesitate to quote the example of Argenteuil where, in 2008, the Left-wing party won with a difference of 355 voices).
- Even if the results seem assured, surprises during the 2<sup>nd</sup> round are more frequent than one might think.
- Nowadays, the right to vote seems to be quite natural in France, but we mustn't forget that many generations fought for it. Many recent events remind us that this right is still violated in many countries (Orange Revolution in Ukraine, protests after Ahmadinejad's re-election in Iran).

#### **Why vote for Jean-Paul Huchon's list in 2010 ?**

- We must give Jean-Paul Huchon and his team the means to carry on with the political action pursued over the last five years → « *Local information* » sheet, « *Recent local achievements in the region* » section.
- Strengthen the actions taken by the Socialist Party at the local level → « *Local information* » sheet, « *City council actions* » section.
- Talk about Jean-Paul Huchon's program to tackle the crisis → « *General information* » sheet, « *Jean-Paul Huchon's program to tackle the crisis* » section.

#### **Which strategy should I use to contact young voters ?**

- Young voters are one of the hardest-to-reach populations : therefore, they are not our priority for this election. Do not spend too long with them.
- To be able to approach them, it's important that there is a young activist from their neighborhood in your two-person team.
- Start by asking them if they're registered on the voter rolls and if they are used to voting. Then talk to them about the regional elections to come, about your own political commitment, about your personal perception of politics and about the reasons why you get involved in Jean-Paul Huchon's rally campaign.
- Do not hesitate to mention the driving license financed by the General Council.

### 3. What if ...

#### ... the access to a building is blocked (code, key) ?

There are many solutions :

- First check if one of the activists of your division owns a mailman or fireman key.
- If this is not the case, don't panic ! Find out if any activist or sympathizer lives in the building.
- If any of those two options do not work, be patient. During door-to-door canvassing hours (early-evening from Monday to Friday and week-ends), a lot of people go in and out of the buildings. You just need to wait at the front door and when a resident arrives, ask them if you can enter too and explain the reason why.

#### ... the person is not registered on the voter rolls ?

- One of the first things to ask is whether the person is registered or not.
- If they're not, give them a card with all the instructions to register and leave without wasting any more time.

#### ... the person says he/she is Left-wing but doesn't want to vote for Jean-Paul Huchon 2010's list (preferring the Communist Party, the New Anticapitalist Party or Europe Ecology) ?

- Don't panic ! Personal contact is the best way to persuade a voter to vote for the Socialist Party.
- Talk about your own experience, your own motivations to work for Jean-Paul Huchon rather than for other candidates.
- Explain how Jean-Paul Huchon's team is interested in working-class neighborhoods and the specific achievements/projects in these neighborhoods.
- ***« I perfectly understand your point of view and to tell the truth I've not always voted for the Socialist Party myself, but here I'm sure Jean-Paul Huchon is the best suited candidate to defend the inhabitants' interests of a working-class neighborhood/city like X. »***
- ***« My presence here to talk to you proves that the Socialist Party has decided to make working-class neighborhoods a priority in its campaign and that the party is renewing itself ».*** Explain that the door-to-door campaign you're involved in illustrates this interest for the working-class neighborhoods and the activist renewal of the Socialist Party.
- ***« Jean-Paul Huchon's list already crosses the Socialist Party lines to rally members, as evidenced by the presence of Robert Hue on the list. »***

#### ... the person has many arguments against Jean-Paul Huchon ?

- If they identify as Right-wing voter, leave quickly (the chances to convince them to vote for Jean-Paul Huchon are very low.)
- **If they identify themselves as Left-wing voters, ask yourself if there's a chance to convince them.** Do not denigrate their arguments and instead of trying to prove them wrong, adopt a positive view : talk about the reasons for your political commitment with Jean-Paul Huchon and with your section. No politician is perfect ! **Gently insist on the fact that you believe that Jean-Paul Huchon is the best suited candidate for the region, the city and the neighborhood in which you are located.**

**... the person holds you back and would like to talk longer ?**

- Although it is not the rule, you will certainly come across voters willing to get you into a long conversation-debate
- Try not to leave too abruptly : **you can say you would really like to keep on talking but you must carry on with your tour.** Offer to write down their most important questions and ask their contact information (e-mail address) to send them Jean-Paul Huchon's program documentation.

**... the person doesn't speak French ?**

- Ask if anybody speaks French in the home. If note, write down the address and ask an activist who speaks the language to come back later on another tour.
- Ask if you can talk to the children.

**... the person tells you that the Socialist Party is only interested in them during the course of the election and will forget afterwards ?**

- Give an example of achievement made by a socialist executive (city, General Council, region) in their city.
- Mention the neighborhood committees in your city if there are any.
- Indicate the deputy (or any other executive from the Socialist Party) headquarters in their city.

**... the person tells you that the region is useless and that its action is not visible ?**

- Provide them with the budget of the region (more than 4,5 billions euros in 2009, that is a 4.3% increase compared with 2008)
- Underline the authorities of the region (see the corresponding sheet) and give them an example of concrete regional achievement in the neighborhood (see « Local information » sheet).

**... the person mentions personal problems (housing/unemployment, etc.) ?**

- **Show some empathy** : what steps have they taken so far ? : « *A friend of mine/A person I know is in the same situation, it's difficult of course* »
- If you can provide information about the steps to take to solve the problem (contact of an association, a program they may be entitled to).  
⇒ *For this purpose you can write down this information on the « Voters contacts » sheet.*
- If you don't know, just say you can find out some information and ask their contact information to send them an answer.
- Make sure it doesn't sound like you're able to solve directly the problem right now ; it's however the kind of issues the Socialist Party tries to deal with in its regions and towns.
- To propose a more concrete solution, offer to come back and give the contact information of a person who'll be able to help them (town council, General Council, local association).
- Ask your section secretary to give you the appropriate information (Community Centre for Social Action address, etc.)

**... the person responds angrily ?**

- Just leave quickly and politely.
- Don't panic : you're a two-person team and the other activists are not far away.

**4. Before you leave**

Don't forget to ask if :

- **There are children of voting age in the home ?** If so, ask their parents to encourage them to vote.
- The person still has questions about the campaign, the program, the Socialist Party, etc. ?
- The person knows where is their polling station, and its opening hours ? If not, give the information as well as the leaflet where it is indicated.
- You can rely on them and on their vote ?
- They agree to give you their phone number so that we can call them back on the election day to remind them of voting ? (Make it clear that the phone number won't be used for any other purpose and won't neither be recorded in a database.)  
⇒ *You can write this information down in the « Voters contacts » form.*

**5. Information gathering**

**Do not forget to complete the following documents :**

- **Feedback form :** to gather your comments and suggestions about the course of the campaign.
- **Voters contacts:** to write down which voters need to be contacted again (to answer any question or to send them information).
- **Team report sheet :** to record the number of doors knocked at and how many opened for each building. While canvassing, write down the number of doors you knock at and the number of doors that were opened. The definition of « opened door » is broad : it includes all cases where the resident answers after you've knocked or rang. Even if the door is immediately slammed on your face it's considered as « opened ». Similarly, if the person tells you to move on through the door (even if the door remains closed), it's an « opened door ». This aims at establishing a contact rate for each building.
- **If you don't knock at all the doors of a building,** do not forget to indicate in the « comments » column where you stopped. It will be useful to remember from where you must start canvassing again, be it your team or another team that will cover the rest of the building.
- **Do not hesitate to write in this « comments » column information you may find useful** (such as the particularly strong absentee or non-registrants rate of a building).

Of course, you can also record all this information in a notebook. In short, the useful information are :

- phone numbers and any phone numbers you have been given:
  - voters at risk of forgetting to vote and who should be called back on the election day.
  - potentials sympathizers.
  - persons to contact later to provide answers to their questions.
- a question asked to which one we must be able to answer on the next visit.



Figure A4. Practical guide to door-to-door canvassing (Original version).

Campagne Régionales 2010, Ile-de-France  
Projet de Mobilisation électorale  
Kit pour le porte-à-porte

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## Guide pratique pour le porte-à-porte (Militants)

Nous proposons dans ce guide des formules pour vous présenter ou répondre aux questions des électeurs. Celles-ci ont été utilisées dans de nombreuses campagnes de porte-à-porte en France et aux Etats-Unis. Toutefois, n'hésitez pas à les adapter en fonction de votre propre expérience de porte-à-porte. Bonne chance !

### 1. Comment se présenter ?

Voici une séquence de phrases d'introduction utilisées en général dans les campagnes de porte-à-porte :

1. **« Bonjour, savez-vous qu'il y a une élection régionale les 14 et 21 mars prochain (ou dans X semaines / Y jours) ? »**
2. **« Etes-vous inscrits pour aller voter ? »**
3. **« Je travaille dans l'équipe de campagne de Jean-Paul Huchon, du Parti Socialiste, et je viens vous voir parce que je pense qu'il est important d'aller voter le 14 mars »**
  - Souriez ! (un sourire sincère ☺)
  - Dès le début, demandez à votre interlocuteur s'il est inscrit sur les listes électorales. S'il ne l'est pas, expliquez lui rapidement comment le faire pour la prochaine élection (voir au paragraphe 3).
  - Au début, dites plutôt à votre interlocuteur qu'il est important d'aller voter en général, *non pas d'aller voter pour Jean-Paul Huchon*.
  - Essayez de ne pas passer plus de dix minutes par porte.

### 2. Stratégies d'argumentation

#### Généralités

- N'hésitez jamais à parler de votre propre engagement en politique, une histoire personnelle est souvent mieux reçue que le plus sophistiqué des arguments logiques.
- **Si vous rencontrez des électeurs désabusés, faites preuve d'empathie.** Si vous-même avez eu des doutes, mentionnez le et expliquez comment vous avez dépassé ce constat et vous êtes engagé. N'hésitez pas à dire que notre parti est en train de changer, cette campagne de porte-à-porte en est un bon exemple. Vous pouvez également citer des exemples de réalisations concrètes de la région dans le quartier.

#### Si vous ne savez pas quoi répondre à une question...

- N'oubliez pas que vous n'êtes pas censé avoir la réponse à toutes les questions que l'on pourrait vous poser. Ce n'est pas grave ! Lorsque ce cas se présente, n'hésitez pas à dire **« Si vous voulez bien me dire comment je peux vous joindre, je vous recontacterai pour vous répondre »**
- Si vous dites cela à un électeur, il est important 1) de tenir parole et de lui répondre ! 2) que cela soit vous-même qui lui répondiez. Assurez-vous de noter son numéro de téléphone ou son adresse email et recontactez le rapidement avec la réponse  
⇒ *Vous pouvez pour cela noter ces informations sur la fiche « Contacts électeurs »*

#### **Pourquoi aller voter ?**

- La politique menée par la région touche à la vie de tous les jours → *Fiche « Infos d'ensemble », partie « Compétences de la région »*
- C'est un moyen de faire entendre sa voix et de défendre ses intérêts : **« Je pense que si on ne va pas voter, ce sont seulement les intérêts des autres qui vont être pris en compte et ça aura des conséquences directes sur la vie de tous les jours ici à [sa commune / son quartier] »** et ceux de son quartier ou de sa commune : **« Je pense que c'est la meilleure manière de faire entendre la voix de [sa commune / son quartier] »**. En effet, une forte participation dans la commune ou dans le quartier est un moyen d'attirer l'attention des hommes politiques sur les problèmes locaux
- Si l'électeur vous dit qu'il s'en fiche, que la politique ne sert à rien, **« je peux comprendre votre point de vue, mais c'est aussi que parfois on ne sait pas bien ce que la politique peut faire pour vous : [citer un exemple de réalisation concrète dans la ville / le quartier] »**
- Si on vous dit que les partis politiques ou le PS ne s'intéressent pas aux gens :
  - Citer une réalisation du PS dans votre ville
  - Parlez de votre propre expérience : **« Vous savez, moi aussi je travaille, j'ai une famille, eh bien j'ai pris ma soirée / ma journée pour venir vous parler parce que je pense que c'est vraiment important de voter le 14 mars »**

#### **Pourquoi aller voter les 14 et 21 mars ?**

- Les sondages indiquent que le résultat sera serré, au 1<sup>er</sup> comme au 2<sup>nd</sup> tour. Chaque voix compte et peut faire la différence (n'hésitez pas à donner l'exemple d'Argenteuil où la gauche a gagné en 2008 avec 355 voix de différence)
- Même si le résultat semble acquis d'avance, les surprises au 2<sup>nd</sup> tour sont plus courantes que ce que l'on pense.
- Le droit de vote est un droit qui paraît désormais naturel en France. N'oubliez pas que de nombreuses générations se sont battues pour celui-ci. De nombreux exemples récents nous rappellent que dans de nombreux pays, ce droit est encore bafoué (Révolution Orange en Ukraine, manifestations en Iran suite à la réélection d'Ahmadinejad).

#### **Pourquoi voter pour la liste Huchon 2010 ?**

- Il faut donner à Jean-Paul Huchon et son équipe les moyens de poursuivre la politique menée pendant ces 5 années → *Fiche « Infos locales », partie « Réalisation locales récentes de la région »*
- Renforcer les actions menées par le PS à l'échelon municipal → *Fiche « Infos locales », partie « Actions de la mairie »*
- Mentionnez le programme de JP Huchon face à la crise → *Fiche « Infos d'ensemble », partie « Le programme de Jean-Paul Huchon face à la crise »*

#### **Quelle stratégie pour entrer en contact avec de jeunes électeurs ?**

- Les jeunes électeurs sont une des populations les plus difficiles à toucher : ils ne sont donc pas prioritaires pour nous à cette élection. Ne leur consacrez pas trop de temps.
- Pour les aborder, il est important qu'il y ait au moins un jeune militant du quartier dans le binôme

- Commencez par leur demander s'ils sont inscrits sur les listes électorales et s'ils votent régulièrement. Parlez-leur ensuite des élections régionales à venir, et de votre propre engagement en politique, de votre propre perception de la politique et des raisons qui vous ont mobilisés pour travailler pour la campagne de Jean-Paul Huchon
- Pour les jeunes, mentionnez : le permis de conduire financé par le conseil général.

### 3. Que faire si ...

#### ... l'accès à l'immeuble est bloqué (digicode, clé) ?

Il y a de nombreuses solutions pour contourner le problème d'accès :

- Commencez par vérifier si l'un des militants de la section dispose d'une clé de facteur ou d'une clé de pompier
- Si ce n'est pas le cas, pas de panique ! Renseignez vous pour savoir si des militants ou des sympathisants habitent dans l'immeuble.
- Si ces deux premières solutions ne marchent pas, soyez patients. Aux heures de porte-à-porte (début de soirée en semaine, week-ends), il y a beaucoup de passage dans les immeubles. Attendez devant la porte et lorsqu'un résident entre dans l'immeuble, demandez lui si vous pouvez lui emboîter le pas en lui expliquant la raison de votre présence.

#### ... l'interlocuteur n'est pas inscrit sur les listes électorales ?

- Une des premières choses à faire est de demander si votre interlocuteur est inscrit sur les listes.
- S'il n'est pas inscrit, remettez-lui une carte avec les instructions pour s'inscrire et prenez rapidement congé

#### ... l'interlocuteur se dit de gauche mais ne veut pas voter pour la liste Huchon 2010 (il dit préférer la liste du PC, du NPA ou d'Europe Ecologie) ?

- Pas de panique ! Le contact personnel est le meilleur moyen de persuader un électeur de voter pour le PS
- Parlez de votre propre expérience, de vos propres motivations à travailler pour Jean-Paul Huchon plutôt que pour d'autres candidats
- Expliquez l'intérêt de l'équipe de Jean-Paul Huchon pour les quartiers populaires et les réalisations/projets spécifiques à ces quartiers
- **« Je comprends tout à fait votre point de vue, et pour tout vous dire je n'ai pas toujours voté PS à toutes les élections, mais là je suis convaincu que Jean-Paul Huchon est le mieux placé pour défendre les intérêts des habitants d'un quartier/d'une ville populaire comme X.**
- **« Le fait que je sois venu aujourd'hui pour vous parler montre que le parti socialiste a décidé de faire des quartiers populaires une priorité de son programme et qu'il est en train de se renouveler »** Expliquez que le porte-à-porte que vous êtes en train de mener illustre cet intérêt pour les quartiers populaires et le renouveau militant du PS
- **« La liste de Jean-Paul Huchon rassemble déjà au-delà du Parti Socialiste, comme en témoigne la présence sur la liste de Robert Hue »**

**... l'interlocuteur a de nombreux arguments contre Jean-Paul Huchon ?**

- S'il s'identifie comme électeur de droite, prenez congé rapidement (les chances de le convaincre de voter pour Jean-Paul Huchon sont très faibles)
- **S'il s'identifie comme électeur de gauche, posez-vous d'abord la question si l'électeur a une chance d'être convaincu.** Ne dénigrez pas ses arguments et plutôt que de tenter de les contredire point par point, adoptez un discours positif : mentionnez les raisons de votre engagement politique auprès de Jean-Paul Huchon, auprès de votre section. Aucun homme politique n'est parfait ! **Insistez simplement sur votre conviction que Jean-Paul Huchon est le mieux placé pour la région, pour la ville et pour le quartier dans lequel vous vous trouvez**

**... l'interlocuteur vous retient et souhaiterait discuter plus longtemps?**

- Même si ce cas n'est pas la règle, vous rencontrerez certainement des électeurs désirant engager une longue conversation-débat
- Evitez de prendre congé trop brutalement : **vous pouvez dire que vous aimeriez beaucoup continuer cette conversation mais que vous devez continuer votre tournée.** Proposez à votre interlocuteur de noter les questions les plus importantes pour lui et demandez lui de vous laisser ses coordonnées (adresse email) afin de lui envoyer de la documentation sur le programme de Jean-Paul Huchon

**... l'interlocuteur ne parle pas français ?**

- Commencez par demander si quelqu'un d'autre dans le foyer parle français. Si ce n'est pas le cas, notez l'adresse et demandez à un militant parlant la langue de revenir lors d'une prochaine tournée
- Demandez à parler aux enfants

**... l'interlocuteur vous dit que le PS ne s'intéresse à eux qu'au moment des élections et qu'il oubliera ensuite ?**

- Mentionnez un exemple de réalisation d'un exécutif socialiste (ville, conseil général, région) dans sa ville.
- Mentionnez les comités de quartiers s'il y en a dans votre ville
- Indiquez la permanence du député / autre exécutif PS dans sa ville

**... l'interlocuteur vous dit que la région ne sert à rien et que son action n'est pas visible ?**

- Indiquez lui le budget de la région (plus de 4,5 milliards d'euros en 2009, en augmentation de 4.3% par rapport à 2008)
- Insistez sur les compétences de la région (voir fiche correspondante) et donnez un exemple de réalisation concrète de la région dans le quartier (voir fiche informations locales).

**... l'interlocuteur évoque des problèmes personnels (logement / chômage, etc.) ?**

- Montrez de l'empathie : quelles démarches a-t-il fait jusqu'à ce jour ? : **« j'un un ami / je connais quelqu'un dans la même situation, et c'est sûr que c'est difficile »**
- Si vous le pouvez, donnez de l'information sur le type de démarches à entreprendre pour résoudre le problème (contact d'une association, programme auquel il pourrait avoir droit)

⇒ *Vous pouvez pour cela noter ces informations sur la fiche « Contacts électeurs »*

- Si vous ne savez pas, dites que vous pouvez vous renseigner et demandez à la personne de vous donner ses coordonnées pour que vous lui donniez la réponse.
- Ne donnez pas l'impression que vous avez les moyens de résoudre directement et maintenant le problème ; en revanche, c'est un problème auquel le PS essaie de répondre dans les régions et les localités où il est au pouvoir.
- Pour proposer une solution plus concrète, proposez de revenir en fournissant le contact de quelqu'un qui pourra aider votre interlocuteur (mairie, conseil régional, association locale)
- Obtenez de votre secrétaire de section les informations à fournir (adresse du CCAS, etc.)

... **l'interlocuteur devient agressif ?**

- Allez vous-en rapidement et poliment
- Ne paniquez pas : vous êtes en binôme et les autres militants ne sont pas loin

#### 4. Avant de prendre congé

N'oubliez pas de demander si :

- **Il y a des enfants en âge de voter dans le foyer ?** Si c'est le cas, demandez à leurs parents de les encourager à aller voter
- L'interlocuteur a-t-il encore des questions sur la campagne, le programme, le PS, etc. ?
- Sait-il où est son bureau de vote, et quels sont les horaires d'ouverture ? Les lui donner et laisser le tract où ils sont indiqués
- Pouvez-vous compter sur sa participation et sur sa voix ?
- Est-ce qu'il est d'accord pour nous donner son numéro de téléphone, afin qu'on le rappelle le jour de l'élection pour lui rappeler d'aller voter ? (préciser que le numéro ne sera utilisé à aucune autre fin et qu'il ne sera pas stocké dans une base informatique)

⇒ *Vous pouvez pour cela noter ces informations sur la fiche « Contacts électeurs »*

#### 5. Collecte d'information

N'oubliez pas de compléter les documents suivants :

- **Formulaire feedback** : pour collecter vos commentaires et suggestions sur la marche de la campagne
- **Contacts électeurs** : pour bien noter les électeurs à recontacter (pour répondre à une question ou leur transmettre une information)
- **Fiche de suivi binôme** : pour comptabiliser le nombre de porte toquées et le nombre de portes ouvertes par bâtiment. Lorsque vous faites du porte-à-porte, notez le nombre total de porte auxquelles vous avez frappées et le nombre de portes qui se sont ouvertes. La définition de porte ouverte est large : on compte une porte ouverte à partir du moment où un résident nous répond après que nous avons frappé ou sonné à la porte. Même s'il nous ferme immédiatement la porte au nez, il faut compter cette porte comme ouverte. De même, si un résident vous suggère de passer votre chemin en le disant à

travers la porte (même si celle-ci reste fermée), vous devez considérer cette porte comme ouverte. Nous cherchons à travers cette notion de porte ouverte à savoir quelle est le taux de contact au niveau de chaque bâtiment.

**Si vous ne finissez pas de couvrir toutes les portes d'un immeuble**, indiquez bien dans la colonne « Commentaires » à quelle porte vous vous êtes arrêtés. Cela vous servira pour vous souvenir précisément de l'endroit où le porte-à-porte reprendra, que ce soit votre binôme ou un autre qui terminera de couvrir cet immeuble.

**N'hésitez pas à utiliser cette colonne « Commentaires » pour noter des informations qui vous paraissent utiles** (par exemple, un taux d'absence ou de non-inscrits particulièrement élevé dans un immeuble).

Bien évidemment, vous pouvez également noter ces informations dans un carnet. En résumé, les informations utiles à collecter sont :

- les numéros de téléphone et tous les numéros de tel que vous avez obtenus :
  - les électeurs qui risquent d'oublier d'aller voter et qu'il faudrait rappeler le jour du vote
  - les sympathisants potentiels
  - ceux qu'il faut recontacter pour répondre à une de leurs questions
- une question qu'on vous a posée et à laquelle il faut qu'on puisse répondre à la prochaine visite

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