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# Household Preferences for Female Employment: A Field Experiment in Bangladesh

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## Abstract

Female labor force participation remains lower than male participation in many settings. Can this be explained by households' preference for men's work, and are these preferences malleable? We address this question with a field experiment in a refugee camp setting in Bangladesh, where we randomly offer the same six-week job—under identical conditions—to either the husband or the wife in a household. We find that when women work, their wellbeing improves but their husbands' does not. When men work, both their own and their wives' wellbeing improve, along with the health of the relationship and a greater self-reported sense of purpose for both partners. These findings help shed light on why households favor men working over women, which we document through an incentivized labor supply exercise. However, more than a year later, households where women previously worked for us show significantly stronger preferences for female employment, as men update their beliefs about the costs of women working. These results demonstrate that even brief exposure to women's work can shift household preferences over female employment.

Keywords: Household Preferences, Labor Supply, and Wellbeing

JEL Classification: D91, I31, J22

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# 1 Introduction

Despite widespread policy efforts to increase female labor force participation globally (World Bank, 2023), participation remains persistently low in many parts of the world (Heath et al., 2024). Stated preferences are consistent with this reality: survey data from South and Southeast Asia, North and West Africa, and the Middle East—regions with the lowest levels of female labor supply—show high rates of agreement with the statement that “when jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women” (World Values Survey, 2022).

What explains these patterns? One possibility is that they reflect inequity in employment opportunities – for example, men may earn more than women when employed, or there may simply be more jobs available to men. Another possibility is that these patterns reflect a preference within households for men to be employed over women – all else equal – which may be driven by the fulfillment of gender roles (e.g. the male breadwinner norm) or material concerns (e.g. how time is spent, how childcare is managed). It is important to understand whether such preferences for men’s work persist even when differences in the returns to work are held constant. Indeed, if a husband, a wife, or both individuals prefer that the man work, then efforts to raise female labor force participation sustainably must address the underlying drivers of these choices.

This paper investigates household preferences over who should work, what drives such preferences, and whether these preferences are (and in turn female labor supply is) malleable. To this end, we combine a labor supply elicitation exercise to measure preferences with the randomized provision of actual employment, allowing us to examine what may be driving these preferences. Specifically, we randomly offer either the man or the woman in a household the same employment opportunity in a context of widespread unemployment, enabling us to hold external factors (like the nature of the job or availability of employment) constant. We then measure the well-being of *both* partners, comparing outcomes for both individuals when the husband works relative to when the wife works, which yields insight into the micro-foundations of the stated preferences we observe. We then explore the malleability of such preferences, examining whether the *experience of work itself* can shift long-term preferences around labor force participation in the household. We do so by revisiting each household fifteen months after their initial employment contract ends and offering an unexpected opportunity for work to each partner. We use an incentivized Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) exercise – administered separately to each partner – to elicit their preferences over who should take the job.

We examine these questions in the Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh, the largest refugee settlement in the world, where unemployment is widespread and future job prospects

are scarce. The employment we offer is a six-week surveying task wherein participants document activities transpiring in their camp - a task designed to be amenable to both men and women's skill sets and validated in a previous study (Hussam et al., 2022).<sup>1</sup>

To motivate our analysis, we ask a question similar to that posed in the World Values Survey (WVS) but specific to one's own household: "Imagine we could offer six months of employment to you or your partner. Would you prefer to take the opportunity yourself or have your partner take it?" We ask this to individuals who are already familiar with the employment task we design and in an environment of ubiquitous unemployment. 59% of women prefer that their husband take the job, while 71% of men prefer that they take the job. This aligns fairly closely with the WVS results for Bangladesh, wherein 71% of women and 81% of men believe a man has priority over a scarce job.

Having established an apparent *joint* preference for male work within the household, our analysis then proceeds in three steps. We first use our randomized employment experiment to investigate the potential drivers of these preferences, comparing the effects of male and female employment on the well-being of both partners. We then employ an incentivized labor supply elicitation exercise to examine whether one's preferences around who should work in the household can be shaped by one's experience with work: specifically, whether experiencing women's work in the past alters current preferences for women's work. Finally, we explore the factors that may be driving any shifts in the preferences we observe.

By designing a non-gendered employment task and randomly assigning it to husbands or wives in a context of widespread unemployment and limited future job prospects, we come as close as possible to isolating a household's response to male versus female employment *ceteris paribus*. We consider two measures of wellbeing as our primary focus for the impact of employment: psychosocial wellbeing and relational health. Starting with the employed, we find that employed women gain 0.088 SD ( $p = 0.036$ ) in their psychosocial index, an inverse-covariance-weighted index of depression severity, stress, life satisfaction, sociability, purposefulness, self-worth, locus of control, and stability. They report significant reductions in depression and feelings of greater stability and life-satisfaction. We underscore this finding; *ex ante* it is not obvious that employment would be a source of improved wellbeing for women in our sample, 95% of whom had never been gainfully employed in their previous lives in Myanmar. Employed men gain 0.112 SD ( $p = 0.001$ ) in their psychosocial wellbeing index, which is statistically indistinguishable from the effect for women. They report significant reductions in depression and improvements in purposefulness, life-satisfaction, sociability, and locus of control.

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<sup>1</sup>In a companion paper, we disentangle the impact of employment into those of working without pay (volunteering), and receiving an unconditional cash transfer (Hsu et al., 2025).

Both men and women experience psychosocial benefits from working, but whether their spouse benefits depends on their gender. We find that the wives of employed men experience large and statistically significant psychosocial gains (0.104 SD,  $p = 0.023$ ) from their husband being employed, driven by reductions in depression severity and improvements in purposefulness and self-worth. These gains are statistically equivalent both to those of their employed husbands and their employed female counterparts. In contrast, we find that the husbands of employed women exhibit no detectable change in their wellbeing (-0.007 SD,  $p = 0.833$ ). This is true despite no meaningful change in how these husbands spend their days, and a significant improvement in their financial health.

Next, we examine the impact of employment on the relational health between partners, as proxied by intimate partner violence (IPV). We find that neither employed men nor women experience a detectable change in IPV (employed women exhibit a small but statistically insignificant reduction). Reassuringly, we can also reject violent backlash by unemployed husbands against their employed female partners, a phenomenon documented in recent literature (Bergvall, 2024; Perova, Reynolds, and Schmutte, 2023), with some exceptions (Kotsadam and Villanger, 2022). While neither men nor women experience meaningful IPV reductions from employment, whether their spouse is affected once again depends on their identity. We observe large and statistically significant reductions in the IPV index of wives of employed men (-0.133 SD,  $p = 0.068$ ), amounting to a 30% reduction in the likelihood of a physical threat by their husband in the previous month. In contrast, we do not find that the husbands of employed women experience a significant change in IPV.

In sum, we document that gainful employment benefits both employed men and employed women similarly, but the wives of employed men experience significant improvements in both their psychosocial and relational health, while the husbands of employed women do not. In other words, partnerships in which men are employed appear to fare better than those in which women are employed. The absence of positive spillovers from employed women onto their partners, especially when male employment significantly improves the well-being of both partners, offers insight into why households may exhibit a preference for men's work.

We consider several potential explanations for the asymmetric spillovers we document. Our findings appear most consistent with the idea that employment can either reinforce or challenge the fulfillment of gender roles. When men work and women remain at home, both fulfill locally accepted norms of men as breadwinners and women as homemakers.<sup>2</sup> This interpretation is supported by evidence that men experience large increases in their sense of

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<sup>2</sup>When asked to choose the most important personal attribute, 69% of men select “financial stability” or “good work ethic.” Similarly, 68% of women choose one of these two traits as most important for their husbands.

purpose (0.141 SD,  $q$ -value = 0.135) and control over their lives (0.192 SD,  $q$ -value = 0.076) when they work, while women experience large increases in their sense of purpose (0.135 SD,  $q$ -value = 0.131) and self-worth (0.198 SD,  $q$ -value = 0.037) when they remain at home as the partner of an employed husband.<sup>3</sup>

We can also rule out that these asymmetric results are driven by material concerns. First, we consider differences in spending: perhaps women are more likely to use their income on items that men do not fully value for their own well-being (e.g. children's expenditure), whereas men may be more likely to spend on common household items that bring benefits to both partners. The data does not support this hypothesis. We see no meaningful differences in quantity or type of consumption expenditures between employed men and women that could explain the asymmetric patterns we observe. Rather, both groups increase savings and reduce their debt.<sup>4</sup> Next, we examine differences in time use: perhaps men have to take on more childcare responsibilities when women work – which could affect their well-being – whereas women's time-use remains relatively stable when men work. We do not find any evidence for meaningful differences in time-use that could explain the asymmetry we observe. Both employed men and employed women increase their time spent in productive activity and reduce their time spent in leisure by comparable amounts. Likewise, neither partner men nor partner women exhibit meaningful changes in their time use when their spouse works – if anything, both report increases in their leisure time. Finally, we look at whether measures of household power dynamics (or “agency”) might explain the asymmetry: perhaps when women work, they gain bargaining power at the expense of men. We examine a large set of both revealed and self-reported measures of agency (bargaining, actions and norms) and aspirations for children. We find null effects across most of these outcomes.

Having documented how employment impacts the wellbeing of one's self and one's partnership, we explore whether the experience of such employment can alter long run preferences over women's labor supply. We capture individuals' revealed preferences for who should work in a labor supply elicitation exercise. We present each member with the opportunity to take a one-week paid job for themselves or pass it on to their partner. We then progressively raise the wage of their non-preferred option until indifference, enabling us to price each partner's gendered preference for work.

We find that the experience of a woman having worked in the past significantly increases both men and women's preference to have the woman work today. Specifically, women

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<sup>3</sup>We report  $q$ -values based on the sharpened False Discovery Rate following Anderson (2008). Note, when reporting significance for inverse-covariance weighted indices (as above for the psychosocial index and IPV index), we instead report  $p$ -values.

<sup>4</sup>Participants appear to share their payment with their spouses, as both treated participants and their spouses mostly report similar (statistically indistinguishable) effects on financial outcomes.

who were formerly employed are 19.1 percentage points (30%) more likely than the wives of formerly employed men to prefer taking the job themselves ( $q = 0.005$ ). The husbands of formerly employed women are 25.8 percentage points (103%) more likely than formerly employed men to prefer giving the opportunity to their wives ( $q = 0.001$ ). This is a large effect: while the average man who was formerly employed prefers taking the job himself unless his wife earns a daily wage that is 63% greater than his own, the average man whose wife had been formerly employed prefers that *she* take the job, and he is willing to give up 28% of his wage to do so. In other words, the experience of a woman working for a mere six weeks appears sufficient to meaningfully shift both the woman and her husbands' revealed preferences towards the woman working more than one year later.

Finally, we examine what might be driving these shifts in preferences. Perhaps exposure to female employment enables individuals to update incorrect beliefs about the costs to women working. Indeed, we find that male partners become significantly less likely to report negative consequences to women's employment: relative to partnerships in which the man was formerly employed, these husbands are 9 percentage points (38%,  $q$ -value = 0.080) less likely to believe that employed women will have less time for household tasks; 7 percentage points (30%,  $q$ -value = 0.093) less likely to say it changes women's attitudes; 7 percentage points (44%,  $q$ -value = 0.043) less likely to say it creates household tension; and 10 percentage points (23%,  $q$ -value = 0.043) more likely to report that there are *no costs* associated with women working. These changes in men's beliefs are consistent with the null effects on their time use, financial outcomes, and bargaining power, documented in the randomized experiment when their wives worked. Interestingly, for women, no such evidence of learning appears: women seem to be aware of the consequences (or lack thereof) of their employment as they relate to the household.

This paper contributes to four related but distinct literatures. First, our results contribute to an active literature on labor supply preferences within the household. Much of this research focuses on relative income preferences in high-income countries, and findings are mixed. Bertrand, Kamenica, and Pan (2015) find a sharp decline in the proportion of couples in high-income countries when the wife begins to earn more than the husband, interpreted as evidence of gender identity norms that discourage women from out-earning their husbands. However, Binder and Lam (2022) do not find support for this breadwinner norm and argue that results in Bertrand, Kamenica, and Pan (2015) reflect a large point mass of couples earning exactly the same income, an issue which is further explored by Kühnle, Oberfichtner, and Ostermann (2021). Similarly, Zinovyeva and Tverdostup (2021) observe a discontinuity only among couples where both partners work in the same firm, but find no such pattern among others, suggesting these patterns may arise due to tax or

other institutional considerations. Unlike prior work that focuses on relative income, we examine preferences for actual employment. To our knowledge, ours is the first paper to elicit incentive-compatible preferences over which partner should work in a context of scarce work. We find that households, on average, prefer men to be employed.<sup>5</sup> Crucially, we go further to explore what drives these preferences by measuring psychosocial well-being and relational health, documenting that households in our context appear to fare better - at least in the short run - when the man is employed. We use our rich survey data to probe this further and provide some evidence to suggest this is due to the maintenance of traditional gender roles, consistent with the breadwinner norm.

Second, we contribute to a growing body of research on the impacts of women's employment in settings where female labor force participation is not the norm.<sup>6</sup> While existing studies focus on the benefits (Jensen, 2012; Heath and Mushfiq Mobarak, 2015; Anderson and Eswaran, 2009; Majlesi, 2016; Sanin, 2023) and costs (McKelway, 2024) to women themselves, they largely overlook spillover effects to other household members. This is a question of value in and of itself, as the impacts of employment are unlikely to be restricted to the employed alone. To our knowledge, ours is the first paper to explicitly document husbands' financial outcomes, psychosocial wellbeing, bargaining power and social preferences when their wife becomes exogenously employed.

Third, we contribute to an active literature that investigates ways of increasing female labor supply (Field et al., 2021; McKelway, 2020). Our contribution centers on the transformative power of *work* itself, highlighting how exposure to employment can shift *both* men and women's beliefs about employment and, in turn, actual labor supply. Recent work by Ho, Jalota, and Karandikar (2024) document this value of exposure, showing that offering women flexible work arrangements increases their willingness to accept less-flexible jobs thereafter. Our study builds on this work by examining how women *and* men's preferences evolve in response to women's employment. We find that among couples where the woman was previously employed by us, husband support for women's employment doubles. This shift reflects a decline in the perceived household costs of female work—reported by men but not by women. By capturing both perspectives, our evidence suggests that what constrains

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<sup>5</sup>This finding is consistent with Field et al. (2021), which combines a model with survey data and finds that women's receipt of cash improves her bargaining power allowing her to overcome restrictive gender norms and improve her labor supply. It also speaks to a growing literature (Subramanian, 2024; Lowe and McKelway, 2025) documenting that women reduce their willingness to supply labor when prompted to consider other household member's opinions (real or perceived), suggesting women feel some social pressure not to work. We provide insight into why this may be the case: husbands' psychological wellbeing appears to be directly impacted by their wives working.

<sup>6</sup>This line of research also complements a broader literature focused on randomly targeting financial support—such as cash transfers, assets, or bank accounts—to women ((Field et al., 2021; Armand et al., 2020; Haushofer and Shapiro, 2016; Duflo and Udry, 2004; Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales, 1997)).

women’s labor supply is not their own preferences, but their husbands’ opposition. As a result, women’s labor supply *and* her happiness improve when she works. This result is not obvious: if women initially prefer to stay at home and employment simply leads them to update their preferences (as they realize the costs are lower than anticipated for example), their labor supply may increase without a corresponding rise in their psychological wellbeing or welfare. Distinguishing between these two scenarios is essential for understanding how employment affects women’s welfare.

The fact that men’s preferences change also complements the work of Bursztyn, González, and Yanagizawa-Drott (2020), who find that providing information on the social acceptability of women’s work can shift husbands’ preferences around female work. However, while such information interventions may help correct misperceptions about social norms (what Jalota and Ho (2024) define as “domesticity” constraints), only exposure to work can address misperceptions around practical, or material, consequences to female employment, such as women spending less time on household chores. As such, we might view exposure to female employment - in small doses that enable a household to adjust beliefs over time - as initiating a potentially virtuous cycle to greater female labor force participation.

Finally, we contribute to an active discussion on the optimal delivery of aid. Many assistance programs include a work component—often referred to as “cash-for-work” or “public works” and frequently target women in an effort to promote women’s empowerment (FAO, 2018). We show that employing women through these programs can shift household preferences around female labor. However, this comes with tradeoffs: targeting men instead leads to greater short-term gains in psychosocial wellbeing for both spouses and a larger reduction in intimate partner violence compared to targeting women. This complements recent work by (Christian et al., 2025), which shows that public works programs targeting women can enhance their agency, but also leads to an increase IPV. Policymakers aiming to promote both gender norm change and household welfare must carefully consider this when designing their assistance packages.

We qualify this work with a note on our field context. This study takes place in the Rohingya refugee camps of Bangladesh. Refugees face trauma, food insecurity, limited access to formal or informal work and gender norms are conservative – 75% of women in our sample believe wife-beating is at least sometimes justified. These conditions shape the interpretation of our findings. On the one hand, the household-level psychosocial gains we observe to male employment relative to female employment may be a lower bound if stigma surrounding female work is less pronounced under the dire circumstances of refugee camp life. Alternatively, these relative effects may be an upper bound if the stress and uncertain circumstances faced by refugees trigger stronger reactions to shifting norms. These are em-

pirical questions worthy of future study when assessing the generalizability of our results. We view our findings as offering a proof-of-concept into how labor supply is shaped by - and in turn shapes - preferences within the household around female employment.

## 2 Research Context

### 2.1 Recent Events

In August of 2017, the Myanmar military executed a series of “Clearance Operations” in Rakhine State, Myanmar. The operations were targeted at the Rohingya ethnic minority, who have been denied citizenship in Myanmar since 1982 and are now the world’s largest stateless population. Over the course of four months, gang rapes and sexual violence were perpetrated against an estimated 18,000 women and girls, an estimated 36,000 Rohingya were thrown into fires, and at least 25,000 Rohingya were killed. Among those who survived, over 750,000 entered Bangladesh, building and settling into what is now the largest refugee camp in the world (Habib et al., 2018). They joined several hundred thousand Rohingya refugees from earlier episodes of ethnic violence, with the current population in the camps exceeding 900,000 individuals (Hussam et al., 2022).

### 2.2 Camp Life

There are currently 34 Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh, with each camp divided into blocks containing 60 to 130 households. As shown in Table A1, the average female refugee in our study is 28 years old; 76% of women in our sample have never received formal education. The average male refugee in our study is 32 years old, and 61% have had no formal education.<sup>7</sup>

**Employment** Because of legal restrictions on refugee employment (Bhatia et al., 2018), many refugees find themselves without work opportunities. Some seek employment in the informal sector outside the camps, a risky endeavor. Among their limited job prospects are roles as agricultural workers, construction day laborers, or street stall operators, with the primary source of employment for refugees coming from NGOs (Mree, 2019). Refugees are engaged in work by these NGOs in two ways. The first is through cash-for-work programs, where they (officially) receive a flat daily rate of 350 taka (3.50 USD) for 32 days of work spread over a quarter. The second is through unskilled “volunteering”, where refugees

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<sup>7</sup>Women in our sample are younger than men because recruitment was at the level of married couples, rather than individuals.

are typically paid 50 taka (0.50 USD) per hour to assist with ad-hoc operational tasks (Refugee Relief, 2018).

**Time-use** A typical day for a woman, as captured by asking time spent on various activities the previous day (Table A2), involves 8.5 hours sleeping, 0.4 hours engaged in wage work, 2.9 hours doing chores outside the house, 3.0 hours doing chores inside the house, 2.8 hours actively taking care of elders, children, and the sick, 2.0 hours actively taking care of oneself, and 3.4 hours resting, relaxing, or in religious activities. A typical day for a male participant consists of 8.6 hours sleeping, 0.8 hours engaged in wage work, 2.6 hours doing chores outside the house, 1.6 hours doing chores inside the house, 2.3 hours actively taking care of elders, children, and the sick, 2.0 hours actively taking care of oneself, and 5.2 hours resting, relaxing, or in religious activities.

**Consumption and Savings** Having left the bulk of their possessions in Myanmar and having been in the camps, where income-generating opportunities remain scarce, for five years at the time of our study, most refugees possess few economically valuable assets and minimal savings. The average participant in our study reports savings at baseline of 302 taka (USD \$3), with the median participant reporting zero savings.

Every refugee in the camps receives a monthly e-voucher of 1050 taka (10 USD) through the Bangladeshi government and the World Food Programme. This voucher allows them to purchase a limited quantity of food staples, including a maximum of thirteen kilograms of rice, two kilograms of lentils, one liter of oil, and ten eggs. Despite the common grievance that these rations are insufficient, refugees often resell portions of these staples to neighbors in the Bangladeshi host community at discounted rates in order to secure the cash required to purchase other basic foods which the e-voucher does not qualify for, such as salt or vegetables. This e-voucher remains the only reliable source of income for refugees.

**Mental Health** We see that 22% of women and 18% of men in our sample qualify as at least moderately depressed according to the PHQ-9 screening tool. 44% (54%) report thinking of themselves as having little worth, and 22% (18%) report having had suicidal ideation in the week before our baseline survey.

## 3 Experimental Design

### 3.1 Sampling Strategy

We recruit 1080 households from 10 camps.<sup>8</sup> Each camp is divided into 4 to 7 blocks, and within each block, there are 14 to 42 sub-blocks, which serve as our unit of randomization. We select nine households per sub-block.

Recruitment follows a random walk procedure. Beginning near the center of a sub-block, the field team randomly identifies a direction along which they approach households door-to-door. Each household is informed that our partner organization (RTM International) may have an opportunity for them to work for up to four hours per day for four days a week over six weeks. We clarify at this point that we have not yet secured funds for this activity and will not have enough work opportunities for everyone. Our objective is to determine whether both members of the married couple will be able and interested in working for us and whether they will be willing to meet with us for ten minutes every week for six weeks to answer survey questions (with compensation of 50 taka weekly) in the case that we cannot offer them paid work. If a household voices interest, the field team confirms that there exists a married couple in the household who satisfies the following eligibility criteria: both members are between the ages of 18 and 45, are able and willing to work, and have not worked for more than 10 hours in the past two weeks. We also verify that they are recent arrivals and not relatives of the *majhi*, the politically most powerful individual within each camp who serves as the liaison with humanitarian groups on humanitarian aid distribution. Prior to all field work, the research team secured permission from government authorities to operate in the camps and offer the interventions through our NGO partner, RTM International.

### 3.2 Experimental Design

We randomly assign 80 sub-blocks to “work” and 40 sub-blocks to “control” (Figure 1). We then further randomized, at the household level, whether to engage the man or the woman. In control sub-blocks, participants receive 50 taka (USD \$0.50) per weekly survey. In control households assigned to engage the woman, she was the designated survey respondent. In control households assigned to engage the man, he participated in the survey instead.

In work sub-blocks, participants are offered work for four days per week, earning 300 taka (USD \$3) per day, totaling 1200 taka weekly. We further randomized whether the husband or the wife receive the work assignment. In our companion paper (Hsu et al., 2025), we benchmark the work intervention against two alternative treatments: cash and

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<sup>8</sup>We also recruit additional households for different treatment arms, which we report in (Hsu et al., 2025).

volunteering. In cash sub-blocks, participants receive the same 1200 taka (USD \$12) weekly as an unconditional cash transfer. In volunteering (unpaid work) sub-blocks, participants have the opportunity to engage in the same activity as those in the work group for no pay, with the exception of the 50 taka received for completing weekly surveys. This paper focuses on comparing the impact of employment targeting men versus women, so we exclude the sample randomized into the cash and volunteering groups.<sup>9</sup>

All households are informed of the six-week study duration, with surveyors returning weekly to conduct brief surveys and provide compensation. We make the randomized treatment allocation known to each participant by explaining the randomization process and displaying their randomized treatment status on the surveyors' tablet screens. Our sample is balanced across arms (Appendix Table A3).

**Employment intervention details** Our employment task broadly replicates that of Hussam et al. (2022).<sup>10</sup> Workers are assigned four workdays per week over six weeks, for a total of 24 days of work. All work days were predetermined and noted on a calendar given to all participants. Workers receive 300 taka per day of work. Relative to the WFP's e-voucher of 1050 taka per month, our intervention almost quadruples potential monthly consumption. This wage is also comparable to that of other paid work opportunities that refugees have access to: among those who worked within our study sample, reported past wages vary from 300 taka per day for unskilled work with NGOs to 700 taka for skilled work. 85% (99%) of men (women) report no work in the past month (Table A1).

Individuals assigned to the work opportunity first watch an instructional video that describes the work task. Enumerators then explain the task verbally. The task involves selecting fifteen same-sex neighbors and marking these individuals' activities four times per day on a set of illustrated time-use worksheets (Figure 2). We inform participants that we are interested in understanding the typical daily activities of camp residents and that neighbors' identities, which we never ask for, will remain anonymous to both the surveyors and the research team.

Participants drop off their worksheets at the end of the workday in a tamper-proof box at the home of a pre-assigned refugee neighbor within each sub-block (the 'facilitator'). Facilitators are also members of the work treatment arm and have no access to the contents of the box. They are asked to place a sheet at the end of the workday with the day's date, so that any submission below that sheet is time-stamped to having been submitted on that

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<sup>9</sup>We compensated the unpaid group with the same amounts earned by the work and cash groups upon the conclusion of the study.

<sup>10</sup>The one notable departure from the work activity of Hussam et al. (2022) is that we did not embed an explicit community-centered purpose to the work.

day. The facilitators receive an additional 50 taka per week for providing this assistance.

At the end of the week, each worker comes to the facilitator’s home, where an enumerator checks the participant’s work for any mistakes (eg. no missing sheets, submission made on the correct days; fifteen tick marks per sheet; no replication across days or obvious variation in handwriting suggesting someone else had done their work). To encourage high-quality work, we introduce a pay penalty: mistakes over two consecutive weeks results in no payment for the following week, with penalties starting from the fourth week. However, participants are never at risk of losing their job nor otherwise being punished by the employer (the enumerator). The participant receives their payment after the enumerator verifies the quality of their work and administers the short survey.

We design the work task with several considerations in mind. First, we aim for equal participation between men and women, so we choose a task that does not involve strenuous manual labor but still requires physical and mental effort. Workers perform repetitive movements outdoors, and completing the task requires focus. Additionally, the task is intended to occupy a substantial portion of the day without being a full-time commitment, requiring approximately 4.5 hours each workday. Second, because not all participants are literate, we devise a task that demands no literacy or numeracy skills beyond basic counting. The time-sheet is a visual tool featuring a comprehensive list of activities commonly undertaken by individuals in the camps: for example, eating, napping, going to the market, getting rations, and praying. Workers simply need to place tick marks below the illustrated depictions of the activities they observed their neighbors engaging in. Third, we craft a task that encourages workers to leave their homes and be exposed to others, but does not necessitate socialization. Workers can silently observe their neighbors and complete their worksheets, or they can engage in conversation if they so choose.<sup>11</sup> In sum, we design a work task that is comparable to the non-manual employment opportunities available in the camp through NGOs. It accommodates the constraints of our study population and seeks to be neither too attractive nor unattractive within the refugee camp context.

## 4 Data Collection and Survey Instruments

### 4.1 Timeline and survey instruments

We conducted a baseline survey, administered to both members of each recruited couple, in January of 2023. One week after the survey, enumerators revisited each household to

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<sup>11</sup>Hussam et al. (2022) finds that workers did not engage in additional conversations during workdays, but did on non-work days.

disclose their randomized treatment status and conduct the first midline survey. Thereafter, we met with the participating household member weekly, checked their work if they were assigned to the work arm, conducted a short survey, and then made the relevant payments. We conducted an endline survey five weeks after the start of work: crucially, we wished to perform the endline while treated participants were still engaged with the work. We observe a 3% attrition rate among the treated and 5% among partners at the endline, which does not differ across treatment arms or gender (Appendix Table A4). A follow-up survey took place approximately six weeks after the endline to ensure that participants did not experience any negative effects from the work opportunity.<sup>12</sup> Fifteen months after the conclusion of the intervention, we conducted a final survey in which we elicited labor supply preferences for a one-week employment opportunity.

## 4.2 Outcome variables

All outcomes we describe below are collected via the surveys described above. The questions in these surveys were drawn from previous work in the camps (Hussam et al., 2022) and piloted extensively with households that were not included in the study sample. We describe the outcomes below and refer the reader to Appendix B for the full list of questions.

**Psychosocial wellbeing** We measure eight dimensions of psychosocial wellbeing, including depression (PHQ-9), locus of control (Levenson's Scales), life satisfaction (Diener's Satisfaction With Life Scale), stress (Cohen's Perceived Stress Scale), sociability (positive conversations), stability (Cantril Self-Anchoring Striving Scale), purpose, and self-worth. We standardize all outcomes for comparability.<sup>13</sup> We combine these measures into a single psychosocial (PS) index, using an inverse covariance-weighted average of the standardized outcomes.

**Intimate partner violence (IPV)** We measure intimate partner violence by asking women ten questions about instances of IPV. We draw six questions from the Demographic Health Surveys (DHS), and one from (Field et al., 2021), exploring occurrences of psychological abuse. We include a question from the DHS that examines physical abuse, asking whether the husband has threatened the respondent or someone close to them with harm. Due to cultural sensitivities, we could not directly ask about instances of physical abuse

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<sup>12</sup>Indeed, we find no evidence of any worsening of outcomes in treatment households; results available upon request.

<sup>13</sup>When standardizing outcomes, we standardize by gender of the respondent to account for differences in distribution between men and women. Note that because we present results by gender subgroups (e.g. partner women), control means presented in tables will not be mean zero.

(hitting, slapping, etc.) as done in the DHS. Instead, we included two questions to assess attitudes toward and tolerance of physical abuse perpetrated by men. We combine each set of questions on psychological and physical abuse into summary indices, and then further combine these two measures into an overall IPV index. For men, for whom questions on physical abuse and certain forms of psychological abuse by their female partners would be regarded as culturally dissonant, we ask only about their experiences of psychological abuse using four of the seven questions administered to women.

**Finances and Time-use** We collect three measures of how money is used: consumption, savings, and loans. We rely on a time-use survey module designed by (Field et al., 2022) to categorize time spent on productive activities, sleep/leisure and idle time.

**Agency** We investigate two outcomes that fall under the broad category of agency: 1) household power dynamics; and 2) aspirations for children.

We capture household power dynamics in three ways. First, we play an incentivized bargaining game drawn from McKelway (2020). We invite both members of a couple to decide how to allocate 250 taka (2.50 USD) between themselves and their spouse. Both respondents play this game independently with separate enumerators, and then together. Their responses at each stage are written on chits and placed in a tin alongside a random number. One chit is drawn at random, which corresponds to the amount the respondent receives. Second, we capture household power dynamics by asking respondents about their actions: how they engage in conversation with their partner through a series of questions drawn from IRC (2022); and how decisions over consumption and time-use are made within the household (as in Christian et al. (2025)) Finally we measured household dynamics by asking about gendered norms. As in (Christian et al., 2025), we ask a series of nine questions designed to track how respondents think decisions over consumption and time-use *should* be made within the household. Next, we draw two questions from IRC (2022) to assess the respondent's view of the respectability of a man who consults his wife for important decisions or helps her with chores. We also ask three questions around the appropriateness of women working for pay to assess norms for women in the workplace.

Turning to aspirations for children, we ask respondents their preferred level of education for their oldest daughter and their oldest son. We also adapt a survey module developed by (Field et al., 2021) that asks respondents to choose a hypothetical husband (wife) for a daughter (son) they have (or may have in the future). The respondent must choose between two son-in-laws of equal status, but with one permitting the respondent's daughter to work outside for pay and the other not; likewise, the respondent must choose between two

daughter-in-laws of equal status, but one wishes to work outside the home for pay.

**Labor Market Preferences** To capture long-term labor market preferences across partners, we design and perform an incentivized labor supply elicitation exercise fifteen months after the conclusion of the experiment with households assigned to the work treatment. We privately present each partner in the household with a surprise offer of a one-week work opportunity funded by a surplus budget. We inform each respondent that this will be their final opportunity to work with us and clarify that, due to limited funding, only one member - either the respondent or their partner - will be permitted to participate. We then ask respondents to indicate whether, at 200 taka per day, they prefer to work themselves or give the opportunity to their partner. Progressively raising the wage for the non-preferred individual, we assess the strength of their preference, determined by how much money is required to convince the respondent to switch their choice to the non-preferred partner. Respondents are aware that the computer will then randomly assign the task to either (i) the preferred worker at 200 taka, (ii) the non-preferred partner at their switching wage, (iii) the preferred worker at a “secret-keeping wage” of 220 taka (the amount unknown beforehand to the respondent and included to protect anonymity of the partner’s responses), or (iv) one of these three options from the partner’s survey, which is conducted in parallel. The full script is presented in Appendix E.

To understand changes in labor market preferences for women, we also ask respondents about the perceived negative and positive consequences of women working outside the home. These questions are unprompted, and enumerators are trained to code everything that the respondent mentions within the following categories. Negative categories include: (i) less time to spend on household tasks, (ii) less time to care for the family, (iii) changes in attitude, (iv) increased tension in the household, (v) that work is not her familial role, and (vi) that work is not appropriate for her in this society. Respondents also have the option of answering that there is no negative outcome. Positive categories include: (i) bring in money, (ii) make friends outside the house, (iii) do other activities, and (iv) learn new skills. Again, respondents can answer that there is no positive outcome. For completeness, we also ask perceived negative and positive consequences of *men* working outside the home, which is the status quo arrangement in this setting. Negative outcome options are the same as above, except that familial role and societal role are not offered as options because they are not realistic responses in this context. Positive outcomes are the same, except that familial role and societal role *are* offered as options.

**Multiple hypothesis testing (MHT)** We use two strategies to account for the range of hypotheses we test. First, we report our primary outcomes, psychosocial wellbeing and intimate partner violence, as inverse-covariance weighted index variables following Anderson (2008). Second, with each table, we calculate the sharpened False Discovery Rate (FDR) q-values to control for the expected proportion of individual rejections that are type I errors (Anderson, 2008).

**Pre-analysis plan (PAP)** This study was pre-registered on the AEA Registry. The main deviation from the PAP is that, in order to focus on employment’s impact on oneself and one’s spouse, the analysis of the cash and volunteering treatment arms has been moved to a companion paper Hsu et al. (2025). As a result of this decision, we also significantly reorganized the outcomes from how they are presented in the PAP, though our main outcomes are all presented here. These deviations from the PAP are described in detail in Appendix Section C.

## 5 Experimental Results

To motivate our analysis, we sought to measure preferences for men versus women’s work. To this end, we ask a question similar to that posed in the World Values Survey (WVS) but specific to one’s own household: “Imagine we could offer six months of employment to you or your partner. Would you prefer to take the opportunity yourself or have your partner take it?” Respondents answer this after gaining familiarity with the nature of the employment task and in a context of widespread joblessness. Table A11 shows that among women, 59% express a preference for their husband to take the job, while 71% of men prefer to take it themselves. These patterns closely resemble the WVS findings for Bangladesh, where 71% of women and 81% of men agree that men should have priority in job access when opportunities are scarce. Having established an apparent joint preference for male work within the household, our experimental results seek to establish what drives these preferences and whether these preferences are malleable.

### 5.1 Empirical Framework

We now estimate the effects of work using the following specification:

$$Y_{ibc}^1 = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Work_{ibc} + \gamma_c + \delta_e + Y_{ibc}^0 + X_{ibc} + \varepsilon_{ibc} \quad (1)$$

where  $Y_{ibc}^1$  represents the relevant outcome for individual  $i$  in sub-block  $b$  and camp  $c$ ,

$X_{ibc}$  is a vector of sociodemographic controls selected via double-selection LASSO following Belloni, Chernozhukov, and Hansen (2014), and  $\varepsilon_{ibc}$  is an error term which we cluster at the block level. We include fixed effects for camp  $\gamma_c$  and enumerator  $\delta_e$ .<sup>14</sup> We control for the baseline value of the outcome variable  $Y_{ibc}^0$ , when available, in an ANCOVA specification following McKenzie (2012). Our coefficient of interest is  $\beta_1$ , the impact of employment.

We estimate this equation separately for four groups: treated women, their male partners, treated men, and their female partners. In each case, the reference group consists of individuals of the same gender whose households were assigned to the control group. For example, when estimating the effect of the work treatment on partner men, we compare men whose spouses received the work treatment to men whose spouses were in the control group and only completed short weekly surveys.

We first establish that treated participants engage in the work. Figure 3 exhibits the fraction of individuals assigned to the data-collection task who completed their work in each week. Participants consistently exhibit greater than 90% completion rates. We withheld payment for incomplete or poorly completed work on only two occasions.

## 5.2 The gendered impacts of labor supply

### 5.2.1 Impacts on Wellbeing

**Psychosocial Wellbeing** We next examine the impact of employment on psychosocial wellbeing. Table 1 presents impacts on treated women and their partners. Employed women experience a 0.088 SD improvement ( $p = 0.036$ ) in their psychosocial wellbeing (Panel A, Column 1). This effect is relatively large. Ridley et al. (2020) conducted a meta-analysis on the mental health impacts of multi-faceted anti-poverty interventions—including livestock transfers, business training, and employment—finding an average effect of 0.1 SD per \$1,000 PPP in cash transfers. Our intervention achieves the same effect size with a fraction of the transfer amount. This result is driven by a substantial reduction in depressive symptoms (0.203 SD) and a greater sense of stability (0.108 SD) and life satisfaction (0.125 SD). Panel B turns to the husbands of treated women. We document no meaningful impacts of women's employment on husbands' wellbeing, with an index effect size of -0.007 SD.

We then consider male beneficiaries in Table 2. Like women, employed men experience significant improvements in their psychosocial wellbeing, exhibiting a 0.112 SD increase in their index ( $p = 0.001$ ), driven by reductions in depression severity (0.139 SD) and improvements in their life satisfaction (0.127 SD), sociability (0.100 SD), feeling of purposefulness

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<sup>14</sup>We include enumerator fixed effects following Di Maio and Fiala (2019) in order to account for the fact that respondents' answers to sensitive questions may be influenced by the specific enumerator.

(0.141 SD), and sense of control over their lives (0.192 SD). Importantly, we cannot reject equality between the impacts of employment on treated men and treated women ( $p = 0.233$ ). Although few women in our context have ever worked for pay, they appear to benefit just as much as men from the employment opportunity.

What of these men’s wives? Panel B presents the psychosocial impacts of employment on a male beneficiary’s wife. Offering an employment opportunity to a husband leads to significant improvements in a wife’s psychosocial wellbeing (0.104 SD,  $p = 0.023$ ). Notably, we cannot reject that an employed woman and the wife of an employed man experience equivalent gains in psychosocial wellbeing ( $p = 0.931$ ). Among these wives, effects manifest in a reduction in depression severity (0.200 SD) and stress (0.177 SD) and a greater sense of purposefulness (0.135 SD) and self-worth (0.198 SD).

In sum, while we observe comparable impacts of employment on the psychosocial wellbeing of working men and women, we observe significant differences in spillovers onto beneficiaries’ spouses: husbands of treated women show little to no reaction, while wives of treated men exhibit substantial improvements in their wellbeing. This spillover pattern suggests that a *household’s* overall mental health improves relatively more when the man receives the work opportunity.

**Relational Wellbeing** We now turn to our outcome of intimate partner violence to directly examine how employment affects relational health within a household. Table 3 presents the impact of employment on the IPV index – an index of experiences of psychological abuse and physical abuse – within the households of treated women.<sup>15</sup> We observe moderate but statistically insignificant reductions in IPV experienced both by employed women (Panel A) and the husbands of these women (Panel B). Table A7 disaggregates the psychological and physical abuse indices and presents outcomes as binary variables for whether the action ever occurred within the past month or whether the behavior was tolerated/accepted.

We next turn to the impact of employment on IPV within the households of treated men (Table 4). Employed men (Panel A) report experiencing a moderate but statistically insignificant increase in psychological abuse from their wives, driven by a 21% increase in reported jealousy (Table A8). What of the wives of employed husbands? Offering employment to husbands (Panel B) yields large and statistically significant reductions in IPV reported by their wives (0.133 SD,  $p$ -value = 0.068). This is driven by a reduction in the index of physical abuse (0.158 SD). Though the individual (sub-index) effects are imprecise when applying MHT, all the sub-components are negative and we see a 30% reduction in the probability

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<sup>15</sup>Due to cultural sensitivity, we only ask the physical abuse questions to women. Therefore, we cannot create the IPV index for men.

of women reporting their husbands threatened to harm them or someone close to them, a 5% reduction in the probability they say a wife should ever tolerate being beaten by her husband, and a 23% reduction in the probability of the woman reporting that her husband restricted visits with friends.

Taken together, the psychosocial and IPV results we document across both individuals and their spouses offer valuable insights into how employment affects not only those who are employed but also their partners. We document that partnerships in which men receive an employment opportunity experience better mental health outcomes and lower rates of abuse than those in which women receive the opportunity. This finding can help explain why we observe men and women expressing a preference for men’s work in our context and beyond. This, in turn, offers a potential explanation for the persistently low rates of female labor force participation documented in the literature. If having the woman work offers little benefit to the man — while having the man work yields clear gains — the couple may jointly prefer that the man take the job, and may explain why we mostly observe an equilibrium where men, rather than women, are the ones to take on paid work. This also suggests that the success of policy efforts to promote women’s employment will necessitate the recognition of the underlying mechanisms generating this asymmetry in benefits, which we turn to next.

### 5.2.2 Mechanisms

What might account for these asymmetric spillovers—and, in turn, the preference for men’s work? We focus first on gender norms that may be fulfilled in male-employed households but not in female-employed households. We then consider whether material considerations could explain the asymmetry we observe: whether men and women who work differ in how they spend their earnings, how they allocate their time, or how household bargaining dynamics shift as a consequence of gendered employment. We find no evidence for these latter three mechanisms.

**Identity:** Female employment may conflict with prevailing gender norms, leading husbands to experience wives’ work more negatively than wives experience husbands’ work. Indeed, the norm of men as breadwinners appears strong in our setting: given several options for attributes considered most important in *themselves* as a spouse, 69% of men in our sample report “financial stability” or “good work ethic” at baseline.<sup>16</sup> 68% of women consider one of these two attributes most important in an ideal *husband*. Conversely, 76% of men rank “taking good care of children and others” as among the top two most desirable qualities, or

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<sup>16</sup>Other options are “taking good care of children and other family members”, “being admired and respected by the community”, and “putting others’ needs before one’s own”.

roles, in a wife. 69% of women rank this trait as among the top two most desirable traits in herself. As such, when a wife becomes employed while the husband remains unemployed, preferred roles may be challenged. This interpretation is supported by evidence that men experience large improvements in their sense of purpose (0.141 SD,  $q$ -value = 0.135) and control over their lives (0.192 SD,  $q$ -value = 0.076) when they work, while women experience the largest increases in their sense of purpose (0.135 SD,  $q$ -value = 0.131) and self-worth (0.198 SD,  $q$ -value = 0.037) when they remain at home as the partner of an employed husband (Table 2).

We explore other explanations for the asymmetric spillovers below, but do not find strong evidence for these other pathways.

**Expenditures:** We consider whether men and women spend their earned income differently. Tables 5 and 6 explore the impact of the treatments on financial behavior. We find no significant changes in overall household consumption, regardless of whether the man or the woman is employed. We further investigate whether men and women exhibit different consumption patterns across the full set of products we ask about (Appendix Tables A6 and A5). While treated men are more likely to spend on education and treated women are more likely to spend on luxury goods (paan, cigarettes, tea and coffee) and small household items, the differences between both groups are small.

The work treatment increases savings by similar magnitudes for women (634 taka, or 6.34 USD) and men (512 taka, or 5.12 USD), with the difference borderline significant ( $p$ -value = 0.100). We also observe substantial reductions in borrowing, for women (956 taka, or 9.56 USD) and men (390 taka, or 3.90 USD), though these differences are not statistically significant ( $p$ -value = 0.201). We also observe that both treated sexes share their additional income with their spouses, as evidenced by significant improvements in both partner husbands' and partner wives' savings and sense of financial stability as well as a reduction in their outstanding debt. In sum, while small differences in financial behavior exist according to the gender of the employed, they do not mirror the asymmetry we see in psychosocial and relational health.

**Time-use:** We then consider whether the employment opportunity meaningfully altered individuals' use of time. Tables 7 and 8 (Panel A) demonstrate that both working men and women shift time away from caring for family, self, relaxing, sleeping and doing both indoor and outdoor chores in order to perform the work, which takes approximately 4.5 hours. The magnitude of these shifts is broadly similar across genders, with some differences: women reduce their time spent on indoor chores by approximately 30 minutes more than men ( $p$ -

value  $<0.001$ ). Women also reduce family care by 13 minutes more than men ( $p$ -value = 0.085). Meanwhile, employed men reduce time spent on self-employment activities and relaxation by 13 minutes ( $p$ -value = 0.086) and 34 minutes ( $p$ -value = 0.005) more than women respectively. However, these differences remain small in aggregate, and the pattern of time substitution towards work (and away from leisure, chores, and self-care) is strikingly similar across genders.

We then examine how employment affected the time use of partners (Panel B). We find few significant changes in either partner wives' or partner husbands' time use. Partner men report a slight decrease in time spent on daily wage work (21 minutes), possibly indicating reduced effort toward income generation now that their wives are earning wages. We observe no other significant change in how partner men allocate their time. Similarly, we observe minimal changes in partner women's time use, with the only significant shifts being a 22 minute reduction in sleep and a corresponding 20 minute increase in relaxation. In sum, both men and women—and their spouses—adjust their time use when they take up work, and they do so in broadly similar ways. Although there are slight differences in the magnitude of these shifts, they are small and unlikely to explain the asymmetric effects on well-being that we observe.

**Household dynamics:** Finally, we examine whether asymmetric changes in household dynamics may explain the patterns we observe in psychosocial well-being and intimate partner violence (IPV). Perhaps when women work, they gain bargaining power at the expense of men.

We first capture household dynamics by measuring bargaining power within the household. Tables 9 and 10 (Column 1 and 2) present evidence from an incentivized bargaining game modeled after McKelway (2020) that measures the power exerted by each member of a couple when bargaining over the allocation of a finite budget. Column 1 estimates the treatment effect on whether the wife participated (i.e. spoke up) in the bargaining process at all, as observed by the enumerator; and Column 2 reports whether the respondent successfully obtained, during negotiation, at least the amount that they stated they privately desired. Neither employment nor being the partner of an employed person has meaningful impacts on the dynamics of the bargaining game in female or male-treated household.

Next, we analyze household power dynamics by asking about the actions of each partner. Column 3 reports impacts on respondents' self-perceived ability to alter their partner's position in the case of disagreement. We find no evidence that employed women exert greater influence (Table 9, Panel A), nor do we observe a retrenchment of power among employed men (Table 10, Panel A): if anything, working men report being significantly less able to

influence their partner's decisions. Turning to the partners of employed men and women (Table 9 and Table 10 Panel B), neither group reports a change in their ability to affect their partners' decisions. Column 4 reports an index of questions around how consumption and time-use decisions are made within the household. Neither employed women (Table 9, Panel A) nor employed men (Table 10, Panel A) experience greater decision-making power. The wives of employed men (Panel B) do report a 0.9 SD reduction in the extent to which they make decisions in the household over consumption and time-use, but this coefficient loses significance upon correction for multiple hypothesis testing.

Finally, we evaluate household power dynamics by examining a series of questions about norms and beliefs. Column 5 reports respondents' answers to how they believe decisions about consumption and time-use *should* be made in the household. Neither employed women (Table 9, Panel A), employed men (Table 10, Panel A), nor their spouses (Panel B) experience any significant change in their beliefs about who should hold power. Columns 6 and 7 report respondents' agreement with non-traditional gender norms: whether men should help within the household, whether women should be able to work outside the home. We do not find that employed women are any more likely to state that women should be able to work outside the home, nor do the beliefs of their partners change with regard to men in the household, women working, or the acceptability of IPV. Likewise, neither employed men nor their wives update their beliefs across any of these three measures (Table 10). These findings align with a broad literature showing that shifting deeply held social norms is challenging (Jayachandran, 2021).

While we also collected a set of outcomes about expectations for the future generation, we present these tables in the appendix and only briefly summarize the conclusions here as they are largely consistent with what we document above. Treated women (Panel A, Table A9) report no meaningful change in educational aspirations for their sons or daughters, though they are significantly more likely to prefer a daughter-in-law who wishes to work for pay outside the home ( $q = 0.027$ ). While the husbands of treated women (Panel B, Table A9) exhibit statistically significant increases in the educational aspirations they have for their daughters, they do not differentially prefer daughter-in-laws who wish to work for pay, nor son-in-laws who permit their wives to work for pay. Turning to treated men and their wives (Table A10), we observe little movement along any of the outcomes for men, although their wives state a greater desire for both daughters and sons to become educated and a preference for a son-in-law who allows her daughter to work outside the home.

In sum, across a wide range of outcomes that seek to capture household dynamics in actions, norms, and aspirations, we see little movement and no mirroring of the asymmetry we document in psychosocial and relational health. These findings are consistent with our

preferred mechanism of gender identity as the key explanation of the asymmetry we find: if norms do not shift in the short term while women are working, then female employment constitutes a norm violation – one that could negatively affect men’s well-being.

## 5.3 The malleability of labor supply

### 5.3.1 Labor Supply

We find that men report greater well-being when they themselves are employed relative to when their wives work. Our exploration of mechanisms suggests that this effect arises because male employment aligns with prevailing norms of men as the primary breadwinners in a partnership. In contrast, women experience similar improvements in overall psychosocial well-being whether they or their husbands are employed, but they report greater self-worth and lower levels of intimate partner violence when their husbands work. These patterns offer a potential explanation for the stated preferences for men’s work (that we find both in own surveys and in the World Values Survey) and potentially the persistently low female labor supply we observe in such settings: if households face a choice around who will work, as they often do when work is scarce, our results suggest they will be more likely to choose the man to maximize aggregate wellbeing.

But does persistence imply permanence? We now explore whether [past] exposure to women’s employment can shift preferences around who, within a partnership, should take on new work opportunities.

We revisit households fifteen months after the conclusion of the experiment and therefore interpret our results as a measure of *long-term* changes in preferences from a fairly brief intervention. We design a choice experiment to elicit individuals’ preferences for their own relative to their partner’s employment. We return to households in which one partner had previously received an employment opportunity in our experiment. Privately, we inform each member of the couple (i.e. both the formerly employed and their spouse) that we have a budget surplus with which we can offer one week of work, but the surplus only permits us to hire one member of the couple. We first ask each respondent to indicate, at a daily wage rate of 200 taka, who they prefer take the job. Conditional on their preference (self or partner), we then progressively raise the proposed wage for the non-preferred partner (keeping the preferred person’s wage at 200 taka) until the respondent decides to shift their choice to the non-preferred. We use the switching point as a measure of the strength of their preference for their own versus their partner’s employment. For example, if a female respondent prefers that her husband take the work opportunity at the base wage of 200 Tk and requires 300 Tk to switch to working herself, we define her value of female work as -100 Tk. Conversely, if

she herself prefers to work at the base wage of 200 Tk and requires 300 Tk in order to pass the opportunity to her husband, her value of female work is +100 Tk. The analog follows for men.

We then compare respondents in households in which the woman was formerly assigned to work (in our initial experiment fifteen months prior) to households in which the man was assigned to work (the latter serving as our comparison group in reported results). Results are presented in Table 11. Panel A presents women's responses, and Panel B presents men's. Column 1 presents the proportion of respondents who prefer the woman to work at parity (200 Tk/day). In households where men were formerly employed by our experiment, 62.7% of women prefer taking the one-week job over giving it to their husband. However, households where *women* were previously employed, 81.8% of women prefer taking the job themselves, a 19.1 percentage point (30%) increase in their preference for female employment. Column 2 reports the value of the woman working, which is the additional daily wage required to incentivize the respondent to choose that the man take the work opportunity. In households where men were formerly employed, women price the value of the woman working at 12.5 Tk, a small premium to pass the opportunity to the man. However, for women who were previously employed, the premium required to give up the work opportunity increases by 127 Tk, reaching a total of 139 Tk, which is equivalent to 70% of the base wage rate of 200 Tk.

This pattern is echoed among male respondents (Panel B). Among households where men were formerly employed, 25% of men prefer that their wife take the one-week job. Among households where *women* were formerly employed, this fraction jumps to 50.8%, a 25.8 percentage point (103%) increase, in preference for female employment. The differential strength of this preference is large. Among formerly employed men, we observe a negative value of women working of -126 Tk, indicating that they would require an additional 126 Tk in wages if their wife were to take the employment opportunity. Conversely, men whose wives were formerly employed are willing to *give up* 56 (-126 + 182 Tk) to have their wife take the employment opportunity. In other words, they are willing to give up 28% of the base wage rate to have their wives work instead of themselves.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>17</sup>There are several possible reasons why men might prefer their wives to work—even to the point of giving up part of their own wages—rather than being indifferent. While a full exploration is beyond the scope of this paper, we offer a few potential explanations. First, if men face higher opportunity costs of time, they may prefer their wives to take the job, especially if they believe they can earn income more efficiently elsewhere. Second, men may have seen that their wives enjoyed the previous work experience and, out of altruism, want them to have that opportunity again.

### 5.3.2 Mechanisms

Why do preferences for women's work shift? We investigate this by analyzing households' responses to a series of questions around the consequences of employment as shown in Table 12. Each column shows the proportion of respondents who cited the given negative outcome from female employment indicated in the column label. Men in households where the man is employed (Panel B, Man Assigned Work Mean) are very likely to express negative consequences to female work: a significant fraction fear that work will reduce their wives' engagement in the home, change their wives attitudes, and create tension in the household. The experience of a wife engaged in our work task, however, significantly reduces their perceptions of the costs associated with women's work. Husbands of women who were formerly employed by us are 9 percentage points (38%) less likely to report concerns about women having reduced time for performing household tasks or caring for the family and 7 percentage points (30%) less likely to report concerns about changes in women's attitude. They are 7 percentage points (44%) less likely to report household tension from women's work and 10 percentage points (23%) more likely to respond that there are no negative outcomes to women's work at all.<sup>18</sup> These changes in men's beliefs are consistent with the null effects on men's time use, financial outcomes, and bargaining power that we find in the randomized experiment when their wives are employed.

Women, by contrast, appear confident that female employment will not reduce their ability to dedicate time to household activities, alter attitudes, nor lead to relational difficulties within the household. The proportion of women who believe there are negative outcomes to female work is small (under 5% – see control group mean in Table 12 Panel A). These beliefs remain largely *unaffected* by being assigned to work. While some women recognize reduced time to complete household tasks, others are significantly less likely to report that their employment is misaligned with their societal role (although these individual effects do not survive multiple hypothesis testing).

Notably, beliefs about the benefits and drawbacks to *men's* work outside the home remain largely unchanged for both women and men. This is unsurprising; most of our sample is accustomed to this household arrangement, as 66% of the men worked for a wage in Myanmar prior to the genocide. Women report no negative consequences to their husband being employed and their own work experience does not alter these beliefs (Panel A, Table A14). Men in households where their wives received the work opportunity also do not alter their beliefs about potential negative consequences to their own employment. Neither do men nor

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<sup>18</sup>We also ask men and women about the positive outcomes associated with women's work. Interestingly, men are 11 percentage points more likely to recognize at least some positive value to women's employment (Panel B, Table A13).

women report changes to their beliefs about the benefits of men’s work (Table A15).

We caveat this exercise in several ways. First, our offer is for only one week’s worth of work. Perhaps gender preferences over employment would differ were the work of a longer duration. While we do not provide incentivized offers for long-term work, we do ask respondents who they prefer take the work were their employment contract extended to six months. Results remain robust: both formerly-employed women and the husbands of formerly employed women continue to express significantly stronger preferences to work (Appendix Table A11) than those households who have not experienced the woman working for pay.

Second, we note that the context that a respondent anchors upon matters. We operate in a setting of ubiquitous unemployment: both husbands and wives have been largely unemployed for years. To shift from dual unemployment to a wife’s employment may be a substantively different experience than shifting from a husband’s employment to a wife’s employment. We also note that our experiment does not test the impact of both individuals being employed. We refrain from this in order to keep income effects constant across treatment groups - both at the partner and individual level - and because aid organizations typically identify an individual, not a partnership, to be the beneficiary of cash or employment programs. Both dimensions suggest important avenues for future work.

## 6 Conclusion

Despite widespread efforts to increase female labor supply, women’s participation in the labor market remains low in many parts of the world. This paper explores the possibility that these patterns are not only due to unequal opportunities or pay, but also reflect a preference for male employment—even when opportunities are equalized. Establishing this is important: if underlying preferences help sustain gender gaps in labor supply, then policies seeking to increase women’s labor force participation must address the underlying determinants of these preferences.

This study is motivated by evidence from our context, and others, that men and women both have a preference for men’s work. We design a targeted experiment to explore what may drive these preferences: we randomly offer the same job, under identical conditions, to men and women, and compare key outcomes when the woman works to when the man works. We find that the psychosocial benefits of employment are similarly large for both men and women. However, we find asymmetry in spillovers to one’s spouse: husbands of employed women experience no change in well-being, while wives of employed men show substantial improvements in both psychosocial health and relationship quality, including reductions in

intimate partner violence. We offer suggestive evidence that these asymmetric responses stem from prevailing gender norms around employment: when men work, they fulfill the breadwinner role, while women fulfill societal expectations by managing the household. We find no evidence that other material constraints, such as time use, finances, or household bargaining power exhibit a comparable asymmetry. These findings help explain households' preferences for men's work, which may be a driver of persistently low female labor supply—if households must choose who works when work opportunities are scarce, and only male employment generates broader household benefits, they may consistently favor men for work opportunities.

While our study suggests that households prefer men to work, we find that these preferences are malleable. We observe labor supply preferences more than one year later that suggest that households update their gender preferences substantially based on their past experience, despite such experience having lasted only six weeks, fifteen months prior. Men, specifically, become significantly more supportive of women's employment in general and significantly more likely to prefer their wife work in particular. Our evidence suggests that experiencing their wife's employment firsthand help ease anticipated concerns to such an arrangement. This is reflected both in their material outcomes from the randomized experiment—where we see no negative changes in finances, time use, or consumption—and in men's own reported concerns, which decline after the experience.

The results present a complex trade-off for policymakers: households appear to feel happier and safer when the man works, but they are more likely to prefer that the woman work if she has had prior experience doing so. How might we reconcile these? While speculative and an avenue for further work, our findings suggest that policymakers might facilitate learning opportunities that enable both members to experiment with employment, and then enable beneficiaries themselves to determine who in the household should be targeted - a decision that necessarily considers the full set of impacts they experience, many of which the policymaker herself may not be able to observe.

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## Tables

Table 1: Psychosocial wellbeing, female-treated households

Panel A: Treated Women									Individual Components of PS Index								
PS Index	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	Stability								
	PHQ	Stress	Life Sat.	Social	Purpose	SelfWorth	Control	(9)									
Work	0.088** (0.042)	0.203* (0.081)	0.132 (0.089)	0.125* (0.064)	-0.063 (0.086)	0.054 (0.077)	0.086 (0.078)	-0.036 (0.074)	0.108* (0.060)								
Control Mean	0.047	0.033	0.026	0.034	0.133	0.061	0.070	0.020	0.036								
Shrp. q-val Work	-	0.112	0.239	0.203	0.389	0.389	0.366	0.452	0.203								
Observations	518	518	518	518	518	518	518	518	518								

Panel B: Partner Men									Individual Components of PS Index								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)								
Work	-0.007 (0.035)	-0.012 (0.082)	0.004 (0.085)	-0.042 (0.073)	-0.000 (0.074)	0.068 (0.086)	0.016 (0.094)	-0.094 (0.073)	0.065 (0.098)								
Control Mean	0.027	-0.030	-0.026	0.069	0.058	0.013	0.020	0.040	-0.068								
Shrp. q-val Work	-	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000								
Observations	505	505	505	505	505	505	505	505	505								

**Notes:** All outcomes have been standardized against the respondent's gender. (2) is an index created from the nine-question PHQ-9 (inversely coded so a higher score indicates less depression). (3) is an index of three questions inspired by Cohen's Perceived Stress scale (inversely coded so a higher score indicates less stress). (4) is an index created from Diener's Satisfaction With Life Scale. (5) is how many people the respondent had conversations with yesterday. (6) is an index of the respondent's self rating of relative to the person who does the most in their family and community. (7) is similar to (6), but relative to the person who is respected the most. (8) is an index created from Levenson's Multidimensional Internal Locus of Control Scales. (9) is an index assessing stability by asking respondents how secure they feel at the moment and expect to feel in the future. The overall index (1) is an inverse covariance weighted sum of the previous seven outcomes. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table 2: Psychosocial wellbeing, male-treated households

Panel A: Treated Men									
PS Index	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		Individual Components of PS Index
	PHQ	Stress	Life Sat.	Social	Purpose	Self-Worth	Control	Stability	(9)
Work	0.112*** (0.033)	0.139* (0.074)	0.094 (0.083)	0.127** (0.064)	0.100* (0.061)	0.141* (0.077)	0.069 (0.091)	0.192*** (0.073)	-0.009 (0.077)
Control Mean	-0.018	0.030	0.026	-0.069	-0.058	-0.013	-0.020	-0.040	0.068
Shrp. q-val Work	-	0.135	0.191	0.135	0.157	0.135	0.240	0.076	0.520
Observations	525	525	524	524	524	524	524	524	524

Panel B: Partner Women									
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		Individual Components of PS Index
									(9)
Work	0.104** (0.046)	0.200* (0.103)	0.177* (0.096)	0.056 (0.076)	-0.093 (0.085)	0.135** (0.064)	0.198*** (0.069)	-0.010 (0.074)	0.154* (0.092)
Control Mean	-0.043	-0.024	-0.029	-0.052	-0.134	-0.041	-0.058	0.004	-0.035
Shrp. q-val Work	-	0.131	0.131	0.247	0.180	0.131	0.037	0.503	0.152
Observations	518	518	518	518	518	518	518	518	518

**Notes:** All outcomes have been standardized against the respondent's gender. (2) is an index created from the nine-question PHQ-9 (inversely coded so a higher score indicates less depression). (3) is an index of three questions inspired by Cohen's Perceived Stress scale (inversely coded so a higher score indicates less stress). (4) is an index created from Diener's Satisfaction With Life Scale. (5) is how many people the respondent had conversations with yesterday. (6) is an index of the respondent's self rating of relative to the person who does the most in their family and community. (7) is similar to (6), but relative to the person who is respected the most. (8) is an index created from Levenson's Multidimensional Internal Locus of Control Scales. (9) is an index assessing stability by asking respondents how secure they feel at the moment and expect to feel in the future. The overall index (1) is an inverse covariance weighted sum of the previous seven outcomes. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table 3: Self-reported IPV, female-treated households

	Panel A: Treated Women		Components of IPV Index	
	(1)		(2)	
	IPV Index	Psych Abuse	Phys Abuse	
Work	-0.070 (0.071)	-0.073 (0.095)		-0.066 (0.075)
Control Mean	-0.010	-0.047		0.023
Shrp. q-val Work	-	0.791		0.791
Observations	518	518		518

Panel B: Partner Men	
Psych Abuse	
Work	-0.069 (0.081)
Control Mean	-0.022
Shrp. q-val Work	-
Observations	505

**Notes:** Outcomes in the negative direction indicate a decrease in IPV or its acceptability. All outcomes have been standardized against the respondent's gender. Outcomes lists differ by gender because we asked only a subset of questions to men. (2) is an index of the frequency of seven (four for men) psychological abuse IPV actions, including jealousy, humiliation, and insulting, with a higher score corresponding to higher frequency. (3) is an index of the frequency of one physical abuse action (not included for men) and two questions about the acceptability of physical violence against women. The overall index (1) is an inverse covariance weighted sum of these two outcomes, computed only for women, because the physical abuse questions are asked only with respect to her experience. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table 4: Self-reported IPV, male-treated households

Panel A: Treated Men	
Psych Abuse	
Work	0.112 (0.073)
Control Mean	0.022
Shrp. q-val Work	-
Observations	524

Panel B: Partner Women	Components of IPV Index		
	(1) <b>IPV Index</b>	(2) Psych Abuse	(3) Phys Abuse
Work	-0.133* (0.073)	-0.109 (0.090)	-0.158* (0.084)
Control Mean	0.013	0.052	-0.024
Shrp. q-val Work	-	0.138	0.138
Observations	518	518	518

**Notes:** Outcomes in the negative direction indicate a decrease in IPV or its acceptability. All outcomes have been standardized against the respondent's gender. Outcomes lists differ by gender because we asked only a subset of questions to men. (2) is an index of the frequency of seven (four for men) psychological abuse IPV actions, including jealousy, humiliation, and insulting, with a higher score corresponding to higher frequency. (3) is an index of the frequency of one physical abuse action (not included for men) and two questions about the acceptability of physical violence against women. The overall index (1) is an inverse covariance weighted sum of these two outcomes, computed only for women, because the physical abuse questions are asked only with respect to her experience. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table 5: Financial portfolio, female-treated households

Panel A: Treated Women					
	(1) Total Consumption	(2) Savings	(3) Borrowing	(4) Lending	(5) Can Spend 1000
Work	132.961 (299.615)	633.656*** (80.318)	-956.081*** (303.058)	0.007 (0.015)	0.167*** (0.038)
Control Mean	3833.531	166.800	2285.876	0.028	0.706
Shrp. q-val Work	0.357	0.001	0.002	0.357	0.001
Observations	518	494	518	518	518

Panel B: Partner Men					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Work	-92.650 (301.539)	418.328*** (75.273)	-1066.551*** (358.945)	0.018 (0.018)	0.071** (0.032)
Control Mean	4482.576	422.976	3345.176	0.029	0.759
Shrp. q-val Work	0.436	0.001	0.007	0.186	0.029
Observations	505	469	505	505	505

**Notes:** All outcomes are unstandardized; (1)-(3) are in taka, and (4)-(5) in percentage points. (1) is the total amount of money the respondent has spent in the last two weeks. (2) is the total savings the respondent holds. (3) is the total amount the respondent is currently borrowing. (4) is whether the respondent currently has money lent to anyone. (5) is whether the respondent can currently cover an emergency expense of 1000 taka. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table 6: Financial portfolio, male-treated households

Panel A: Treated Men					
	(1) Total Consumption	(2) Savings	(3) Borrowing	(4) Lending	(5) Can Spend 1000
Work	-139.538 (331.227)	511.670*** (110.683)	-390.823 (346.569)	-0.014 (0.023)	0.099*** (0.032)
Control Mean	4458.772	591.176	2679.532	0.076	0.772
Shrp. q-val Work	0.679	0.001	0.352	0.671	0.004
Observations	525	492	525	525	525

Panel B: Partner Women					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Work	27.942 (278.665)	305.342*** (96.031)	-133.389 (254.314)	0.041*** (0.014)	0.128*** (0.041)
Control Mean	3810.947	286.310	1745.882	0.018	0.747
Shrp. q-val Work	0.583	0.005	0.429	0.005	0.005
Observations	518.000	494.000	518.000	518.000	518.000

**Notes:** All outcomes are unstandardized; (1)-(3) are in taka, and (4)-(5) in percentage points. (1) is the total amount of money the respondent has spent in the last two weeks. (2) is the total savings the respondent holds. (3) is the total amount the respondent is currently borrowing. (4) is whether the respondent currently has money lent to anyone. (5) is whether the respondent can currently cover an emergency expense of 1000 taka. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table 7: Time use components, female-treated households

Panel A: Treated Women							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Sleeping	-0.903*** (0.103)	4.677*** (0.278)	-0.035 (0.087)	-0.583*** (0.072)	-0.690*** (0.079)	-0.647** (0.067)	-0.565*** (0.069)
Work							-1.269*** (0.160)
Control Mean	8.023	0.164	0.508	2.887	3.124	2.989	2.299
Shrp. q-val Work	0.001	0.001	0.094	0.001	0.001	0.001	4.006
Observations	518	518	518	518	518	518	518

Panel B: Partner Men							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Work	-0.026 (0.114)	-0.354* (0.207)	-0.001 (0.086)	0.066 (0.082)	-0.003 (0.069)	0.003 (0.082)	0.074 (0.061)
Control Mean	8.124	1.406	0.882	2.506	1.571	2.379	1.776
Shrp. q-val Work	1.000	0.792	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.792
Observations	505	505	505	505	505	505	505

**Notes:** We ask about the number of hours that respondents engage in the following activities: (1) Sleeping; (2) Income generating work specific to daily/regular wage; (3) Self-employed income generating work; (4) Household chores/unpaid work outside the house; (5) Household chores/unpaid work inside the house; (6) Actively taking care of sick/elderly/children; (7) Actively taking care of oneself; (8) Relaxing/leisure. All outcomes are in hours. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table 8: Time use components, male-treated households

Panel A: Treated Men							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Sleeping	-0.621*** (0.111)	4.219*** (0.321)	-0.274*** (0.076)	-0.420*** (0.084)	-0.157* (0.091)	-0.434** (0.092)	-0.467*** (0.055)
Work							-1.828*** (0.189)
Control Mean	8.147	0.929	0.776	2.579	1.624	2.474	2.006
Shrp. q-val Work	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.011	0.001	0.001
Observations	524	524	524	524	524	524	524

Panel B: Partner Women							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Work	-0.357*** (0.123)	0.057 (0.053)	-0.029 (0.081)	-0.123 (0.077)	0.067 (0.065)	-0.013 (0.064)	0.043 (0.070)
Control Mean	8.335	0.218	0.529	2.853	3.071	2.871	2.253
Shrp. q-val Work	0.032	0.440	0.955	0.279	0.440	0.955	0.809
Observations	518	518	518	518	518	518	518

**Notes:** We ask about the number of hours that respondents engage in the following activities: (1) Sleeping; (2) Income generating work specific to daily/regular wage; (3) Self-employed income generating work; (4) Household chores/unpaid work outside the house; (5) Household chores/unpaid work inside the house; (6) Actively taking care of sick/elderly/children; (7) Actively taking care of oneself; (8) Relaxing/leisure. All outcomes are in hours. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table 9: Household bargaining, female-treated households

Panel A: Treated Women						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Barg Particpate	Barg Success	Act Infl	Act Deci	Norm Action	Norm Men HH
Work	0.010 (0.035)	0.043 (0.046)	-0.008 (0.059)	0.007 (0.073)	-0.024 (0.062)	0.058 (0.060)
Control Mean	0.689	0.696	0.016	0.087	0.064	-0.032
Shrp. q-val Work	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Observations	499	500	518	518	518	518

Panel B: Partner Men						
	Barg Success	Act Infl	Act Deci	Norm Action	Norm Men HH	Norm Women Work
Work	0.045 (0.043)	-0.0633 (0.046)	-0.089 (0.057)	-0.053 (0.057)	0.110 (0.086)	0.051 (0.055)
Control Mean	0.753	-0.017	0.034	0.027	-0.090	0.034
Shrp. q-val Work	0.539	0.539	0.539	0.539	0.539	0.539
Observations	502	505	505	505	505	505

**Notes:** Columns (3)-(7) are standardized. (1) is an indicator of whether the wife participated during the bargaining game. (2) is an indicator of whether the respondent received at least the amount they privately wanted. (3) is an index of how much ability the respondent has to influence their partner in case of disagreement. (4) is an inverse covariance weighted sum of (a) an index of who decides how much to spend on a set of five item types, (b) an index of what percentage of the household's budget they can spend, and (c) an index of who decides who performs a set of four time use categories. A higher index value means that the *respondent* holds greater sway over decision-making. (5) is similar to (4), but of who *should* decide how to spend or do, and how much. (6) is an index of level of disagreement with the statements "A husband who helps his wife with the household chores should not be respected" and "A husband who makes important decisions jointly with his wife is weak". (7) is an inverse covariance weighted sum of hours women should be allowed to work in/outside the block and level of disagreement with the statement "A wife who prioritizes work outside the home over household-chores is not a good wife". Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table 10: Household bargaining, male-treated households

	Panel A: Treated Men					
	Barg Success	Act InfI	Act DecI	Norm Action	Norm Men HH	Norm Women Work
Work	-0.008 (0.038)	-0.124** (0.055)	0.024 (0.053)	0.037 (0.048)	-0.106 (0.078)	0.059 (0.071)
Control Mean	0.786	0.017	-0.034	-0.027	0.090	-0.034
Shrp. q-val Work	1.000	0.174	1.000	1.000	0.769	1.000
Observations	517	524	524	524	524	525

	Panel B: Partner Women					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Barg Participate	Barg Success	Act InfI	Act DecI	Norm Action	Norm Men HH
Work	-0.010 (0.032)	-0.043 (0.042)	-0.029 (0.063)	-0.093** (0.045)	-0.080 (0.056)	-0.009 (0.070)
Control Mean	0.680	0.728	-0.015	-0.522	-0.077	0.023
Shrp. q-val Work	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.378	0.878	1.000
Observations	515	515	518	518	518	518

**Notes:** Columns (3)-(7) are standardized. (1) is an indicator of whether the wife participated during the bargaining game. (2) is an indicator of whether the respondent received at least the amount they privately wanted. (3) is an index of how much ability the respondent has to influence their partner in case of disagreement. (4) is an inverse covariance weighted sum of (a) an index of who decides how much to spend on a set of five item types, (b) an index of what percentage of the household's budget they can spend, and (c) an index of who decides who performs a set of four time use categories. A higher index value means that the *respondent* holds greater sway over decision-making. (5) is similar to (4), but of who *should* decide how to spend or do, and how much. (6) is an index of level of disagreement with the statements "A husband who helps his wife with the household chores should not be respected" and "A husband who makes important decisions jointly with his wife is weak". (7) is an inverse covariance weighted sum of hours women should be allowed to work in/outside the block and level of disagreement with the statement "A wife who prioritizes work outside the home over household-chores is not a good wife". Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table 11: Labor supply: preference for woman to work

Panel A: Women		
	(1) Pref. Women	(2) Value of Woman Working
Woman Assigned Work	19.1*** (7.2)	126.7*** (33.3)
Man Assigned Work Mean	62.7	12.5
Shrp. q-val	0.005	0.001
Observations	196	196

Panel B: Men		
	(1) Pref. Women	(2) Value of Woman Working
Woman Assigned Work	25.8*** (7.1)	182.3*** (43.7)
Man Assigned Work Mean	25.0	-126.2
Shrp. q-val	0.001	0.001
Observations	217	217

**Notes:** Outcomes are unstandardized. (1) is the proportion (in percentage points) of respondents that prefer the woman to work at parity (200 Tk/day). (2) is a measure of the strength of this preference; how much additional daily wage would be required for the man to work. For example, if a respondent prefers the woman to work at a wage of 200 Tk and would require 300 Tk to switch to the man working, we define the value placed on the woman working as +100Tk. Conversely, if the respondent prefers the man to work at a wage of 200 Tk and would require 300 Tk for the woman to work, we define the value placed on the woman working as -100 Tk. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table 12: Negative outcomes from women's work

	Panel A: Women						
	(1) Less tasks	(2) Less family	(3) Attitude	(4) Tension	(5) Familial	(6) Societal	(7) None
Woman Assigned Work	0.04* (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.07** (0.04)	-0.01 (0.05)
Man Assigned Work Mean	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.10	0.85
Shrp. q-val	0.303	0.557	0.343	0.521	0.825	0.303	0.825
Observations	215	215	215	215	215	215	215


  

	Panel B: Men						
	(1) Less tasks	(2) Less family	(3) Attitude	(4) Tension	(5) Familial	(6) Societal	(7) None
Woman Assigned Work	-0.09* (0.05)	-0.12** (0.05)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.07*** (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.10** (0.04)
Man Assigned Work Mean	0.24	0.25	0.23	0.16	0.03	0.12	0.43
Shrp. q-val	0.080	0.046	0.093	0.043	0.188	0.226	0.043
Observations	217	217	217	217	217	217	217

**Notes:** Observations are restricted to men and women who received the work treatment. The columns take the value of 1 if the respondent listed that response (unprompted, multiple choice allowed) to the question "What are the negative outcomes from a woman working outside the home?" (1) is less time to spend on household tasks, (2) is less time to take care of the family, (3) is it will change her attitude, (4) is it will create more tension in the household, (5) is it is not her role in the family, (6) is it is not appropriate in this society, (7) is no negative outcome. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

## Figures

Figure 1: Experimental design



**Notes:** This figure presents the experimental design. We randomly assign 80 sub-blocks to “work” and 40 sub-blocks to “control”. We then randomize which member of the household we engage with. In the treatment group, the assigned household member receives the work, in the control group, the assigned household member receives USD \$0.50 for answering our surveys weekly.

Figure 2: Work task worksheets

(a) Female




(b) Male



**Notes:** This figure presents the time sheets provided to the women (Panel A) and men (Panel B) who were randomized into the employment intervention. Each individual received four identical sheets per work day, with the time of day they were intended to be completed pre-filled on the top right, and space to put tally marks below each picture. Each sheet includes an exhaustive pictorial list of the activities one might be engaged in within the camps. For women, from top left to bottom right: being idle, praying in the tent, cooking in the tent, caring for children, sowing in a women's center, cooking in a cooking center, spending time with friends or family, washing clothes or bathing, going to the market, fetching water, fetching firewood, waiting in line for rations, or napping. For men, from top left to bottom right: being idle, sitting in a tea stall, bathing, going to the market, napping, doing agricultural labor, praying at the mosque, doing construction labor, waiting in line for rations, eating, or feeding children/spending time with children.

Figure 3: Task completion



**Notes:** This figure shows task completion rates for men and women in our sample. Visit number 1 is missing because the respondents received their assigned treatment status at that meeting; they had not yet completed any work at that point.

THE IMPACT OF EMPLOYMENT ON PARTNERSHIPS:  
EVIDENCE FROM A REFUGEE SETTLEMENT  
**Online appendix**

Yueh-ya Hsu, Reshmaan Hussam, Erin Kelley, and Greg Lane

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# A Appendix Tables and Figures

## A.1 Tables

### A.1.1 Descriptives

Table A1: Descriptives, baseline

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Men	Women	All
Age	31.70	28.16	29.94
People in Household	5.44	5.45	5.44
Children (18-) in Household	3.21	3.21	3.21
Formally Educated	0.39	0.24	0.32
Religious Education	0.40	0.63	0.52
Prev. Agricultural Work	0.40	0.00	0.20
Work in Last 30 Days	0.15	0.01	0.08
Worked in Myanmar	0.66	0.01	0.34
Healthy Days in last 30	26.35	23.65	25.00
Moderately or Severely Depressed	0.18	0.22	0.20
Savings (BDT)	360.91	240.84	300.26
Consumption in Last 2 Weeks (BDT)	3960.12	3497.19	3728.98
Observations	1080	1077	2157

**Notes:** This table includes data for all individuals surveyed at baseline, whether treated or partner. Columns (1), (2), and (3) show the average value of the variable for men, women, and everyone, respectively.

Table A2: Time use, baseline

	(1) Men	(2) Women
Sleeping	8.6	8.5
Daily Wage	0.8	0.4
Self-Employment	0.9	1.0
Chores Outside House	2.6	2.9
Chores Inside House	1.6	3.0
Caring for Family	2.3	2.8
Caring for Self	2.0	2.0
Relaxing	5.2	3.4
Observations	1080	1077

**Notes:** This table includes data for all individuals surveyed at baseline, whether treated or partner. Columns (1), (2), and (3) show the **mean** value of the variable for men, and women, respectively.

### A.1.2 Balance

Table A3: Balance in observables across treatment arms

	(1) Control	(2) Work	(3) (1) vs. (2)
Age	29.69	30.10	0.23
People in HH	5.40	5.45	0.94
Pct. Formal Educ.	0.37	0.29	0.02
Math Literacy Index	-0.00	-0.05	0.21
Digit Span Index	-0.00	-0.04	0.43
Life Satisfaction Index	-0.00	-0.11	0.09
Self-Worth Index	0.00	0.12	0.52
Purpose Index	-0.00	0.11	0.87
Work Last 30 Days	0.08	0.07	0.69
Worked Myanmar	0.33	0.33	0.69
Hrs Idle/Day	3.94	3.98	0.49
Locus of Control	15.04	14.90	0.58
Healthy Days	24.84	25.32	0.04
PHQ Index	0.00	0.05	0.62
Stress Index	0.00	0.02	0.53
Diff. Conversations	12.56	12.55	0.80
Savings (BDT)	276.73	251.44	0.93
Consumption 2 Wks (BDT)	3710.52	3645.39	0.84
IPV Verbal Index	0.00	0.08	0.27
IPV Norms Index	-0.00	-0.10	0.05
Men in Home Norms Index	0.00	-0.16	0.00
Women at Work Norms Index	-0.00	0.05	0.45
Aspirations for Working Daughter Index	-0.00	-0.00	0.99
Observations	360	720	
Joint F-Test			0.17

**Notes:** Columns (1) and (2) show the average value of the variable in the respective treatment arm, for individuals who received the treatment. Indices are standardized. Column (3) shows the p-value of the difference in means between the control and work treatment groups.

### A.1.3 Attrition

Table A4: Attrition, endline survey

	(1) Treatment	(2) Partner	(3) Male	(4) Female
Work	0.002 (0.012)	-0.008 (0.014)	-0.010 (0.014)	0.005 (0.012)
Mean in Control	0.033	0.056	0.053	0.036
Observations	1080	1080	1080	1080

**Notes:** This table reports attrition for the endline survey in the treatment arm relative to control. The four columns are different sub-samples: Column (1) reports attrition for treated individuals (both men and women). Column (2) reports attrition for their partners. Column (3) reports attrition of male respondents (both treated and partner). Column (4) reports attrition for female respondents. Standard errors are clustered at the camp level. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

**A.1.4 First Stage**

**A.1.5 Consumption**

Table A5: Selected consumption components, female-treated households

Panel A: Treated Women							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Better Food	82.889 (77.973)	63.007** (30.558)	14.950 (15.098)	36.906 (76.414)	50.060 (61.498)	-96.079 (88.520)	0.702 (11.831)
Work	1525.085	431.441	126.789	828.192	94.914	305.148	130.554
Control Mean	0.938	0.386	0.938	1.000	0.997	0.938	1.000
Shrp. q-val Work	516	517	501	515	498	498	513
Observations							

Panel B: Partner Men							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Work	45.659 (79.185)	-18.821 (27.984)	-24.235 (16.615)	-78.544 (82.107)	17.686 (52.341)	70.088 (149.985)	-0.118 (11.586)
Control Mean	1671.635	578.894	146.746	849.500	165.704	365.976	171.382
Shrp. q-val Work	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Observations	505	505	488	500	484	490	497

**Notes:** All outcomes are in taka and unstandardized. Each column represent the amount of money spent on a particular consumption category:

(1) Food (meat, fish, fruits, vegetables); (2) Paan (paan, cigarettes, tea and coffee); (3) education; (4) giving loans; (6) festivals/dawat (eid, funeral, wedding, ear piercing); (7) bribes/extortion; (8) small/regular (non-food) household expenditures (phone bill, mosquito nets, kitchen materials); (9) ..large household expenditures (home improvement, furniture). Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table A6: Selected consumption components, male-treated households

Panel A: Treated Men						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(7)
Better Food	1.134 (70.884)	-4.237 (30.050)	30.084* (16.342)	8.423 (98.999)	16.324 (37.500)	-109.247 (144.208)
Work	1678.830 1.000 524	553.392 1.000 525	87.895 0.865 508	768.047 1.000 516	66.830 1.000 506	476.520 1.000 508
Control Mean						
Shrp. q-val Work						
Observations						

Panel B: Partner Women						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(7)
Work	-69.677 (58.405)	37.637 (28.367)	16.362 (16.654)	32.026 (70.130)	-40.217 (46.409)	-69.064 (116.119)
Control Mean	1597.235 1.000 514	426.706 1.000 515	104.793 1.000 498	733.471 1.000 515	152.530 1.000 505	314.012 1.000 500
Shrp. q-val Work						
Observations						

**Notes:** All outcomes are in taka and unstandardized. Each column represent the amount of money spent on a particular consumption category: (1) Food (meat, fish, fruits, vegetables); (2) Paan, cigarettes, tea and coffee; (3) education; (4) giving loans; (5) healthcare; (6) festivals/dawat (eid, funeral, wedding, ear piercing); (7) bribes/extortion; (8) small/regular (non-food) household expenditures (phone bill, mosquito nets, kitchen materials); (9) large household expenditures (home improvement, furniture). Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

#### A.1.6 IPV Components

Table A7: Self-reported IPV components, female-treated households

Panel A: Treated Women									
Verbal					Physical				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Work	0.020 (0.037)	-0.035 (0.041)	-0.045 (0.049)	-0.020 (0.039)	-0.073* (0.039)	-0.109** (0.043)	-0.045 (0.037)	-0.028 (0.031)	-0.013 (0.029)
Control Mean	0.734	0.186	0.424	0.294	0.277	0.350	0.215	0.181	0.864
Shrp. q-val Work	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.378	0.125	1.000	1.000	0.814
Observations	518	518	518	518	518	518	518	518	518

Panel B: Partner Men									
Verbal									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)					
Work	0.031 (0.040)	0.027 (0.031)	-0.053 (0.040)	-0.101** (0.040)					
Control Mean	0.665	0.276	0.294	0.424					
Shrp. q-val Work	0.497	0.497	0.385	0.048					
Observations	505	505	505	505					

**Notes:** This table presents the effects for each question in the IPV module. Respondents were asked how often the following occurred in the past month: Their partner became jealous or angry when they talked to others (Column 1); Their partner did not trust them with any money (Column 2); Their partner said or did something to humiliate them in front of others (Column 3); Their partner insulted them or made them feel bad about themselves (Column 4); Their partner accused them of being unfaithful (Column 5); Their partner did not allow them to meet with same-gender friends (Column 6); Their partner tried to limit their contact with family (Column 7); Their partner threatened to harm them or someone close to them (Column 8). Additionally, respondents were asked how often they believe: A wife should tolerate being beaten by her husband to keep the family together (Column 9); A husband should have the right to beat his wife (Column 10). All outcomes have been converted into binary variables for ease of interpretation, where a value of 1 indicates *any* occurrence in the past month (actions) or any acceptability (norms). Outcomes lists differ by gender because we asked only a subset of questions to men. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table A8: Self-reported IPV components, male-treated households

Panel A: Treated Men									
Verbal									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)					
Work	0.135*** (0.039)	0.026 (0.028)	-0.021 (0.042)	0.001 (0.042)					
Control Mean	0.629	0.353	0.359	0.412					
Shrp. q-val	0.002	1.000	1.000	1.000					
Observations	524	524	524	524					

Panel B: Partner Women									
Verbal									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Work	-0.028 (0.036)	-0.054 (0.037)	-0.072 (0.044)	-0.061 (0.040)	-0.025 (0.036)	-0.084** (0.039)	-0.025 (0.044)	-0.063* (0.037)	-0.050* (0.027)
Control Mean	0.753	0.253	0.500	0.359	0.247	0.359	0.241	0.212	0.859
Shrp. q-val	0.307 518	0.307 518	0.307 518	0.307 518	0.307 518	0.307 518	0.307 518	0.307 518	0.753 0.427 518
Observations									

**Notes:** This table presents the effects for each question in the IPV module. Respondents were asked how often the following occurred in the past month: Their partner became jealous or angry when they talked to others (Column 1); Their partner did not trust them with any money (Column 2); Their partner said or did something to humiliate them in front of others (Column 3); Their partner insulted them or made them feel bad about themselves (Column 4); Their partner accused them of being unfaithful (Column 5); Their partner did not allow them to meet with same-gender friends (Column 6); Their partner tried to limit their contact with family (Column 7); Their partner threatened to harm them or someone close to them (Column 8). Additionally, respondents were asked how often they believe: A wife should tolerate being beaten by her husband to keep the family together (Column 9); A husband should have the right to beat his wife (Column 10). All outcomes have been converted into binary variables for ease of interpretation, where a value of 1 indicates *any* occurrence in the past month (actions) or any acceptability (norms). Outcomes lists differ by gender because we asked only a subset of questions to men. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

### A.1.7 Aspirations for Children

Table A9: Aspirations for children, female-treated households

Panel A: Treated Women				
	Eldest Daughter	Eldest Son	Daughter-in-Law	Son-in-Law
Work	0.021 (0.077)	-0.001 (0.081)	0.172** (0.069)	-0.067 (0.072)
Control Mean	0.061	0.032	-0.542	-0.446
Shrp. q-val Work	1.000	1.000	0.027	0.211
Observations	518	518	518	518

Panel B: Partner Men				
	(1) Eldest Daughter	(2) Eldest Son	(3) Daughter-in-Law	(4) Son-in-Law
Work	0.317*** (0.091)	-0.070 (0.079)	-0.105* (0.063)	-0.105 (0.069)
Control Mean	-0.096	-0.051	-0.618	-0.600
Shrp. q-val Work	0.002	0.231	0.146	0.146
Observations	505	505	505	505

**Notes:** All outcomes have been standardized. (1) is the preferred level of education for the oldest daughter. (2) is preferred level of education for the oldest son. The raw score for (1) and (2) are as follows: 0 for no education, 1 for Grades 1-5, religious or vocational education, 2 for Grades 6-10, 3 for Grades 11-12, and 4 for university or higher. (3) is preference for a daughter-in-law who wishes to work outside the home. (4) is preference for a son-in-law who allows his wife to work outside the home. The raw score for (3) and (4) are as follows: -1 for less working freedom for the woman, 0 for no preference, and 1 for more working freedom. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table A10: Aspirations for children, male-treated households

Panel A: Treated Men				
	(1) Eldest Daughter	(2) Eldest Son	(3) Daughter-in-Law	(4) Son-in-Law
Work	-0.050 (0.094)	-0.155* (0.080)	-0.014 (0.045)	-0.046 (0.051)
Control Mean	0.096	0.051	-0.594	-0.588
Shrp. q-val Work	0.423	0.123	1.000	1.000
Observations	524	524	524	524

Panel B: Partner Women				
	(1) Eldest Daughter	(2) Eldest Son	(3) Daughter-in-Law	(4) Son-in-Law
Work	0.153* (0.086)	0.157* (0.084)	0.023 (0.067)	0.160** (0.067)
Control Mean	-0.049	-0.017	-0.524	-0.518
Shrp. q-val Work	0.083	0.083	0.585	0.036
Observations	518	518	518	518

**Notes:** All outcomes have been standardized. (1) is the preferred level of education for the oldest daughter. (2) is preferred level of education for the oldest son. The raw score for (1) and (2) are as follows: 0 for no education, 1 for Grades 1-5, religious or vocational education, 2 for Grades 6-10, 3 for Grades 11-12, and 4 for university or higher. (3) is preference for a daughter-in-law who wishes to work outside the home. (4) is preference for a son-in-law who allows his wife to work outside the home. The raw score for (3) and (4) are as follows: -1 for less working freedom for the woman, 0 for no preference, and 1 for more working freedom. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table A11: Preference for woman to work for 6 months

Panel A: Women	
	(1)
	Pref. Women
Woman Assigned Work	28.9*** (7.4)
Man Assigned Work Mean	40.7
Shrp. q-val	0.001
Observations	175

Panel B: Men	
	(1)
	Pref. Women
Woman Assigned Work	21.4*** (7.3)
Man Assigned Work Mean	29.0
Shrp. q-val	0.004
Observations	177

**Notes:** Outcomes are unstandardized. (1) is the proportion (in percentage points) of respondents that prefer the woman to work at parity (200 Tk/day), if the work task were to last six months. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table A12: Women's education and workforce participation

Panel A: Women			
	(1) Daughter Educated	(2) Daughter Work	
Woman Assigned Work	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.04 (0.05)	
Man Assigned Work Mean	1.00	0.84	
Shrp. q-val	0.118	0.312	
Observations	192	192	

Panel B: Men				
	(1) Daughter Educated	(2) Daughter Work	(3) Wife Educated	(4) Wife Work
Woman Assigned Work	0.01 (0.01)	0.14*** (0.05)	-0.06* (0.04)	0.17*** (0.05)
Man Assigned Work Mean	0.99	0.66	0.84	0.73
Shrp. q-val	0.080	0.012	0.063	0.009
Observations	193	193	217	217

**Notes:** Observations are restricted to men and women who received the work treatment. (1) is "Would you want your daughter to be educated?" (2) is "Would you want your daughter to work?" (3) and (4) repeat these two questions for the wife. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table A13: Positive outcomes from women's work

Panel A: Women					
	(1) Bring in money	(2) Friends outside	(3) Other activities	(4) New skills	(5) No positive
Woman Assigned Work	0.01 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	-0.10** (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.02)
Man Assigned Work Mean	0.94	0.25	0.34	0.44	0.04
Shrp. q-val	1.000	0.298	0.210	0.498	1.000
Observations	215	215	215	215	215

Panel B: Men					
	(1) Bring in money	(2) Friends outside	(3) Other activities	(4) New skills	(5) No positive
Woman Assigned Work	0.10** (0.05)	0.00 (0.04)	0.02 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	-0.11** (0.05)
Man Assigned Work Mean	0.79	0.22	0.40	0.36	0.16
Shrp. q-val	0.121	0.879	0.879	0.391	0.121
Observations	217	217	217	217	217

**Notes:** Observations are restricted to men and women who received the work treatment. The columns are possible responses (multiple choice allowed) to the question "What are the positive outcomes from a woman working outside the home?" (1) is to bring in money to help the household, (2) is she can make friends outside the house, (3) is she gets to do other activities, (4) is she can get to learn new skills, (5) is no positive outcome. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table A14: Negative outcomes from men's work

Panel A: Women					
	(1) Less tasks	(2) Less family	(3) Attitude	(4) Tension	(5) None
Woman Assigned Work	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)
Man Assigned Work Mean	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.97
Shrp. q-val	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Observations	215	215	215	215	215

Panel B: Men					
	(1) Less tasks	(2) Less family	(3) Attitude	(4) Tension	(5) None
Woman Assigned Work	0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.05 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Man Assigned Work Mean	0.09	0.08	0.14	0.09	0.61
Shrp. q-val	0.447	0.447	0.447	0.447	0.447
Observations	217	217	217	217	217

**Notes:** Observations are restricted to men and women who received the work treatment. The columns are possible responses (multiple choice allowed) to the question “What are the negative outcomes from a man working outside the home?” (1) is less time to spend on household tasks, (2) is less time to take care of the family, (3) is it will change his attitude, (4) is it will create more tension in the household, (5) is no negative outcome. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table A15: Positive outcomes from men's work

	Panel A: Women						
	(1) Money	(2) Friends	(3) Activities	(4) Skills	(5) Family	(6) Society	(7) No positive
Woman Assigned Work	0.00 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.06)	0.01 (0.02)
Man Assigned Work Mean	0.92	0.25	0.26	0.29	0.42	0.40	0.05
Shrp. q-val	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Observations	215	215	215	215	215	215	215

	Panel B: Men						
	(1) Money	(2) Friends	(3) Activities	(4) Skills	(5) Family	(6) Society	(7) No positive
Woman Assigned Work	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.06 (0.05)	0.01 (0.01)
Man Assigned Work Mean	0.94	0.36	0.44	0.40	0.40	0.44	0.00
Shrp. q-val	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Observations	217	217	217	217	217	217	217

**Notes:** Observations are restricted to men and women who received the work treatment. The columns are possible responses (multiple choice allowed) to the question "What are the positive outcomes from a man working outside the home?" (1) is to bring in money to help the household, (2) is he can make friends outside the house, (3) is he gets to do other activities, (4) is he can get to learn new skills, (5) is it is his role in the family, (6) is it is appropriate in this society, (7) is no positive outcome. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

## B Details on outcome measures

### Outcome Variable Descriptions

<b>Psychological Well-being</b>	
PHQ9	The standardized total score of 9 questions from the Patient Health Questionnaire-9 (PHQ9). Inversely coded so a higher score indicates less depression.
Locus of Control	The standardized total score from responses to four locus of control questions (Levenson's Scales). “In the last 7 days, how many days did you feel that to a great extent your life is controlled by accidental/chance happenings...”
Life Satisfaction Index	A standardized average of survey responses to four questions from Diener's standardized scale, responses made along a six-point Likert scale.
Stress Index	The standardized total score from three elements of adapted from the Cohen Stress scale. “How many of the last 7 days have you [been able to fall asleep peacefully / felt nervous / felt frustrated]?”. Inversely coded so a higher score indicates less stress.
Sociability	The number of conversations with other adults in the previous day.
Stability Index	The standardized total score from responses to two stability questions using a Cantril ladder. “How secure [do you feel / think you will feel] [at present / five years from now]”
Purpose	Index of the respondent's self rating of relative to the person who <i>does the most</i> in their family and community (as in Hussam et al. (2022)).
Self-Worth	Index of the respondent's self rating of relative to the person who is <i>respected the most</i> in their family and community (as in Hussam et al. (2022)).
<b>Intimate Partner Violence</b>	
Psychological Abuse	Index of the frequency of seven (four for men) psychological abuse IPV actions, including jealousy, humiliation, and insulting, with a higher score corresponding to higher frequency. See Table A8 notes for exact questions
Physical Abuse	Index of (a) the frequency of threatened physical abuse and (b) two questions about whether physical abuse should be tolerated/is justified (How often should a wife tolerate being beaten by her husband in order to keep the family together; How often should a husband have the right to beat his wife)
<b>Bargaining and Norms</b>	
Bargaining: Wife Participated	Bargaining game: Wife participated in decision making process (binary)
Bargaining: Success	Bargaining game: Received at least desired bargaining amount (binary)

Actions: Influence Index	Inverse covariance weighted index of (a) how often the spouse takes the respondent's input into consideration, how often the respondent expresses their disagreement, how often the respondent tries to change their spouse's mind, and how often the respondent changes their mind in response, and (b) who makes the final decision in case of disagreement.
Actions: Decision Index	Inverse covariance weighted sum of (a) an index of who decides how much to spend on a set of five item types (small/large household purchases, child, health, and luxury), (b) an index of what percentage of the household's monthly budget they can spend, and (c) an index of who decides who performs a set of four time use categories (such as raising children). A higher index value means that the respondent holds greater sway over decision-making.
Norms: Actions	Inverse covariance weighted sum of (a) an index of who should decide how much to spend, (b) an index of what percentage of the household's monthly budget they should be able to spend, and (c) an index of who should decide who should do the task. A higher index value means that the respondent believes they should hold greater sway over decision-making.
Norms: Men in Household	Index of level of disagreement with the statements "A husband who helps his wife with the household chores should not be respected" and "A husband who makes important decisions jointly with his wife is weak".
Norms: Women at Work	Inverse covariance weighted sum of hours women should be allowed to work in/outside the block, level of disagreement with the statement "A wife who prioritizes work outside the home over household-chores is not a good wife".

### **Aspirations for Children**

Eldest Daughter	Preferred level of education for the oldest daughter. Raw score: 0 for no education, 1 for Grades 1-5, religious or vocational education, 2 for Grades 6-10, 3 for Grades 11-12, and 4 for university or higher.
Eldest Son	Preferred level of education for the oldest son, with scoring as above.
Daughter-in-law	Preference for daughter-in-law who wishes to work outside the home. Raw score: -1 for a daughter-in-law who does not want to work, 1 for one who does, and 0 for no preference.
Son-in-law	Preference for son-in-law who allows his wife to work outside the home, with scoring as above.

### **Disaggregated Consumption**

Better Food	In the last 2 weeks, how much did you spend on daily groceries (rice, lentils, oil)?
Paan	...paan, cigarettes, tea and coffee?
Education	...education (private tutor)?

Healthcare	...healthcare?
Give Loans	...giving loans?
Festivals	...festivals/dawat (eid, funeral, wedding, ear piercing)?
Small Household	...small/regular (non-food) household expenditures (phone bill, mosquito nets, kitchen materials)?

#### **Other Outcomes**

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Days Healthy	Number of days not sick in the past 30 days
Cognitive Ability	A standardized weighted index of the number of correct responses to i) a digit span (forward and backward) memory test and ii) basic arithmetic problems including addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division.
Risk Tolerance	Button “gambling” game: 10 minus the button level reached, so that a higher value indicates greater risk tolerance.

#### **Labor Supply Exercise**

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Preference for Women	Indicator with value 1 when the respondent prefers that the woman of the household works at parity (200 taka/day).
Value of Woman Working	Additional daily wage required for the man to work. For example, if the respondent only prefers that the man work at 300 Tk (when the woman makes 200 Tk), the value of a woman working is +100 Tk. A negative wage premium indicates that the respondent prefers the man to work.

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## C Deviations from Pre-Analysis Plan (PAP)

Below we note the deviations in the analysis from the PAP; available [here](#).

### C.1 Sample and Specification

- To focus our exposition on *employment*'s impact on the lives of those closest to the employed, we include only work treatment and control groups. This lowers our sample to 1080 households across 120 sub-blocks. The estimating question is updated accordingly. We report outcomes for the cash and volunteer arms in the companion paper (Hsu et al., 2025).
- We report results separately for each sub-group of respondents (treated men, treated women, partner men, partner women), rather than run a pooled regression with interactions. We chose this presentation for ease of comparison across four groups. Formal tests of equality between coefficients are still done via interactions with p-values reported in text.

### C.2 Main Outcomes

- **Psychosocial wellbeing:** We expand our psychosocial wellbeing index by including three dimensions listed as mechanisms in our PAP: **purpose**, **self-worth**, and **sociability**. We limit the definition of sociability to only the measure of how many people the respondent had a conversation with yesterday. We made this change to ensure our psychosocial index was inline with (and directly comparable to) our previous work Hussam et al. (2022).
- **IPV:** We report an additional index of intimate partner violence as another main outcome. This includes the pre-specified IPV measures listed in the PAP.
- **Household Power Dynamic:** We re-organize several mechanisms under a discussion of household power dynamics. This includes the pre-specified questions from the incentivized **household bargaining** game.
  - It also includes the pre-specified questions which we refer to in the paper as “actions”: 1) the ability to **influence** one’s spouse in case of disagreement, 2) intra-household **decision making** about consumption and time use decision-making.

- \* We combine decision-making over consumption and time-use in a single index rather than leaving them disaggregated (for ease of presentation - there is no movement along this margin).
- It also includes the pre-specified questions which we refer to in the paper as “**norms**”: 1) beliefs around **who should** make decisions about consumption and time use; 2) norms around **men in the household**; and 3) norms around **women in the workplace**.
  - \* We combine beliefs about who should make decision-making over consumption and time-use into a single index (for ease of presentation - there is no movement along this margin).
  - \* From the norms around women in the workplace: to avoid “double counting” we no longer consider the pre-specified questions about one’s preference for a son-in-law (daughter-in-law) that allows one’s daughter (son) to work to be a reflection of norms of women’s work. Rather we present them in the aspirations for children section.
- **Aspirations for Children:** We re-organize another set of policy-relevant variables under the heading **aspirations for children**. This includes the pre-specified questions about one’s preference for a son-in-law (daughter-in-law) that allows one’s daughter (son) to work. We also include two new variables about the highest level of educational attainment that one desires for their eldest daughter (son) that were included in the survey (time-stamped and public) but that we forgot to mention in the pre-analysis plan.
- **Labor Supply** To investigate the asymmetric nature of the spillover effects in our main outcomes, we returned to our study setting 15 months after the original treatment period. In households that received the work treatment, we used an incentivized choice experiment to reveal respondents’ preferences for whether the husband or wife should work.

### C.3 Pre-specify outcomes no longer in the main paper

- The following outcomes are no longer in the main text. We provide justifications for these decisions in what follows, and present the associated tables in the next section.
- While we pre-specified **physical wellbeing** (in the form of sick days in the past month), **cognitive ability** (through a digit span and arithmetic test), and **risk preferences** (through a risk-elicitation game) as dimensions of well-being, in retrospect

we do not think these outcomes belong together as measures of wellbeing. Instead, we think these outcomes are likely downstream of pyschosocial improvements (as discussed in Hussam et al. (2022)), therefore we do not report them in our main wellbeing analysis.

- We pre-specified a measure of beliefs (norms) around bargaining: “A wife who frequently expresses her opinion in the household is overbearing/talks too much.” This question was not well understood (there was no adequate translation for the word “overbearing”)
- We elicited their willingness to work for an additional week of work. Our findings align with those of Hussam et al. (2022), but we believe a more relevant measure of labor supply decisions—given the focus of this paper—comes from the 15-month follow-up. In this survey, we ask treated individuals *and* their partners about their willingness to accept work, providing deeper insight into their labor preferences.
- We specify a robustness check for one potential confound: participants in the work and volunteering arms may expect their work engagement to unlock other employment opportunities in the future. We replicate (Hussam et al., 2022) using a sub-experiment where we presented certificates of participation to a randomized half of our sample. As with (Hussam et al., 2022) we find no evidence of this confound.
- We tracked several variables through our weekly surveys, which we present below. However, since these surveys were not conducted with partners, they do not directly relate to the focus of this paper.

## D Additional Pre-specified results

Table A17: Physical health, cognitive health and preferences, female-treated households

Panel A: Treated Women			
	(1) Days Healthy	(2) Cognitive Index	(3) Risk Tol.
Work	0.037 (0.074)	0.053 (0.078)	-0.033 (0.099)
Control Mean	0.049	-0.211	-0.013
Shrp. q-val Work	1.000	1.000	1.000
Observations	518	518	518

Panel B: Partner Men			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Work	-0.027 (0.106)	0.100 (0.067)	-0.092 (0.097)
Control Mean	0.039	-0.097	-0.063
Shrp. q-val Work	1.000	0.699	0.699
Observations	505	505	505

**Notes:** All outcomes have been standardized. (1) is the number of days not sick in the past 30 days. (2) is an inverse covariance weighted sum of the digit memory game (sum of level reached) and the number of math questions answered correctly. (3) is the inverse (tolerance, instead of acceptance) of the level at which the respondent was willing to accept the risk game bet. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table A18: Physical health, cognitive health and preferences, male-treated households

Panel A: Treated Men			
	(1) Days Healthy	(2) Cognitive Index	(3) Risk Tol.
Work	0.146** (0.071)	-0.159** (0.065)	0.112 (0.093)
Control Mean	-0.039	0.220	0.063
Shrp. q-val Work	0.048	0.048	0.084
Observations	524	524	524

Panel B: Partner Women			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Work	0.056 (0.097)	0.031 (0.074)	0.020 (0.096)
Control Mean	-0.040	-0.132	0.011
Shrp. q-val Work	1.000	1.000	1.000
Observations	518	518	518

**Notes:** All outcomes have been standardized. (1) is the number of days not sick in the past 30 days. (2) is an inverse covariance weighted sum of the digit memory game (sum of level reached) and the number of math questions answered correctly. (3) is the inverse (tolerance, instead of acceptance) of the level at which the respondent was willing to accept the risk game bet. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table A19: Psychosocial wellbeing, pooled

Panel A: Treated			Individual Components of PS Index						
	(1) PS Index	(2) PHQ	(3) Stress	(4) Life Sat.	(5) Social	(6) Purpose	(7) Self-Worth	(8) Control	(9) Stability
Work	0.092*** (0.030)	0.175*** (0.063)	0.098 (0.062)	0.121*** (0.046)	0.039 (0.041)	0.094* (0.055)	0.066 (0.058)	0.075 (0.056)	0.054 (0.053)
Control Mean	0.004	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000
Shrp. q-val Work	-	0.034	0.204	0.034	0.292	0.204	0.292	0.271	0.292
Observations	1043	1043	1042	1042	1042	1042	1042	1042	1042

Panel B: Partner			Individual Components of PS Index						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Work	0.043 (0.029)	0.121* (0.073)	0.102 (0.063)	0.006 (0.055)	-0.026 (0.044)	0.104* (0.058)	0.117** (0.056)	-0.047 (0.053)	0.118* (0.064)
Control Mean	-0.020	-0.059	-0.049	0.015	-0.006	-0.041	-0.049	0.032	-0.102
Shrp. q-val Work	-	0.210	0.525	0.317	0.210	0.210	0.230	0.210	0.210
Observations	1023	1023	1023	1023	1023	1023	1023	1023	1023


**Notes:** All outcomes have been standardized against the respondent's gender. (2) is an index created from the nine-question PHQ-9 (inversely coded so a higher score indicates less depression). (3) is an index of three questions inspired by Cohen's Perceived Stress scale (inversely coded so a higher score indicates less stress). (4) is an index created from Diener's Satisfaction With Life Scale. (5) is how many people the respondent had conversations with yesterday. (6) is an index of the respondent's self rating of relative to the person who does the most in their family and community. (7) is similar to (6), but relative to the person who is respected the most. (8) is an index created from Levenson's Multidimensional Internal Locus of Control Scales. (9) is an index assessing stability by asking respondents how secure they feel at the moment and expect to feel in the future. The overall index (1) is an inverse covariance weighted sum of the previous seven outcomes. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table A20: Psychosocial index, heterogeneity by participation certificate

	(1) PS Index	(2) PHQ	(3) Stress	(4) Life Sat.	Individual Components of PS Index				
					(5) Social	(6) Purpose	(7) Self-Worth	(8) Control	(9) Stability
Work	0.087** (0.041)	0.153* (0.091)	0.028 (0.087)	0.132** (0.065)	0.077 (0.055)	0.054 (0.074)	0.005 (0.071)	0.045 (0.080)	0.138** (0.067)
Work x Got Certificate	0.004 (0.058)	0.035 (0.127)	0.142 (0.127)	-0.023 (0.091)	-0.094 (0.080)	0.086 (0.113)	0.135 (0.103)	0.044 (0.107)	-0.183* (0.108)
Got Certificate	0.039 (0.052)	0.051 (0.113)	-0.071 (0.102)	0.014 (0.074)	0.171*** (0.064)	-0.074 (0.093)	-0.141 (0.087)	0.094 (0.086)	0.180** (0.087)
Control Mean	0.004	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000
Shrp. q-val Work	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Observations	1043	1043	1042	1042	1042	1042	1042	1042	1042


**Notes:** This table reports the treatment effect of receiving employment and receiving a certificate (and the interaction) – which we investigate as a robustness check. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Figure A1: Labor supply curve, by gender



**Notes:** This figure presents the cumulative distribution function of the reservation wage expressed by employment treatment participants for an additional week of work using the incentivized Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism. The horizontal axis is in units of Bangladeshi Taka. The vertical dotted line represents the point at which individuals express a willingness to work one additional week for zero pay. Negative reservation wages are a measure of how much respondents are willing to forego earning in an alternative (minimal effort) task in order to continue working for one week with no pay.

Figure A2: Weekly trends in outcomes for participant



**Notes:** This figure shows the results of our weekly surveys. (a) is an index of how the respondent is currently feeling and how many days they felt well in the past seven. (b) is an index created from the number of days in the past seven that the respondent had trouble sleeping, felt nervous, or stressed. A higher value indicates less stress. (c) is an index of whether the respondent engaged their partner in case of disagreement, and whether they were successfully able to change their mind. (d) asks the respondent to rate themselves relative to someone who does the most for their family. Each figure plots the impact of the work treatment on the participant by gender and by week relative to the control arm. The estimates to the right of the dotted line represent the pooled effect across all six weeks.

## E Labor Supply Elicitation

**INTRODUCTION TO RESPONDENTS** You may recall you previously worked with us. We now have extra budget to offer this type of work for one more week. This will be the last time we will be able to offer any type of work opportunity in the camps.

We have a work opportunity for four days. You will receive at least 200 taka for each day of work. This means that you will receive at least 800 taka for the next week. You must come to the collection point next week for your work to be reviewed, to answer the questions and collect your earnings, you cannot send someone else on your behalf.

Now let me tell you about the work opportunity. We are conducting a research project in which we are trying to understand how you feel about life and how you spend your days in the camps. You do not have to accept the job, but if you do, it will help us with our research. Does it make sense to you?

**INITIAL SCREEN:** Would you AND your spouse be interested in doing this survey work for four days in the near future? We can guarantee a rate of 200 taka per day, or 800 taka per week. Please note that the work must be completed every day you are assigned without mistakes in order to receive payment. This would be the only week we are able to offer you this opportunity.

**PRESENTING CHOICE** We only have enough funding to offer the work opportunity for you OR your spouse. Again, we can guarantee 200 taka per day, or 800 taka per week. Who would you prefer to receive this opportunity?

It doesn't matter to us who does the work. We are happy with you doing it or your spouse doing it, but we do need to know ahead of time. Please tell me who, yourself or your spouse, you would prefer takes this opportunity.

**EXPLAINING SWTICH POINT** Now, we want to understand how strong your preference is that word\_pref (name\_pref) work. We want to understand how much money it would take for you to switch your preference for who works to word\_not\_pref (name\_not\_pref).

For example, you said that you prefer that word\_pref (name\_pref) works if both you and your spouse can make 200 taka per day. You may even prefer that word\_pref (name\_pref) works if word\_not\_pref (name\_not\_pref) can make 250 taka per day, while word\_pref (name\_pref) only makes 200 taka per day. But if word\_not\_pref (name\_not\_pref) has the opportunity to make 300 taka per day, perhaps you prefer that word\_not\_pref (name\_not\_pref) works instead. This is just an example – there is no right answer, and we want to understand what you really want.

Please answer as honestly as possible, because after you give us the wage at which where you are willing to switch the work opportunity to word\_not\_pref (name\_not\_pref), my computer will randomly choose an option given by you or your spouse. (Recall that your spouse is also answering this survey.) There is also one random amount that the computer can pick. This is the “secret-keeping” choice. Why the “secret-keeping” choice? We are adding this to ensure that your choice remains secret from your spouse. Suppose you draw an wage that you have not seen before. This could be the amount that your spouse chose for you or it could be the secret-keeping choice. There is no way for you to know. The same applies for your spouse; there is no way for them to know your choices. We do this so that you can be assured that your choices are known only to you and me. I will not share any information about what you choose in private with your spouse.

Either you or your spouse will then be offered the job for the wage that the computer randomly chooses. Does that make sense?

**ELICITING SWTICH POINT** If we offered word\_not\_pref (name\_not\_pref): [INCREASING AMOUNTS FROM 200 TAKA] per day of work, would you prefer that they work. Remember, the other option is that we pay word\_pref 200 taka per day to do this work.