

The (Lack of) Anticipatory Effects of the Social Safety Net on Human Capital Investment

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Abstract

How does the expectation of government benefits in adulthood affect human capital investments in childhood? In a simple economic model, expected future benefits decrease childhood human capital investments through income and substitution effects. Experts we surveyed also predicted a large decrease. We test this prediction by conducting a randomized controlled trial with families of children who receive Supplemental Security Income (SSI), a cash welfare program for children and adults with disabilities. The vast majority of parents whose children receive SSI overestimate the likelihood that their child will receive SSI benefits in adulthood. We provide randomly-selected families with information on the predicted likelihood that their child will receive SSI benefits in adulthood and use this randomized information shock to identify the effect of expectations about future benefits. We find that reducing the expectation that children will receive benefits in adulthood does not increase investments in children's human capital. This zero effect is precisely estimated, and we strongly reject the null hypothesis from our expert survey. Potential explanations for the zero effect include parents increasing their own work effort, financial or time constraints preventing further investment, and non-financial goals influencing investment decisions.

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1 Introduction

There is increasing evidence that social safety net programs improve children’s short- and long-term outcomes by providing financial resources to families in need (e.g., Akee et al., 2010; Dahl and Lochner, 2012; Aizer et al., 2016, 2022). This evidence demonstrates the positive *contemporaneous* effects of the social safety net, but the existence of the social safety net could also have *anticipatory* effects that are likely to be negative: does the anticipation of government benefits in adulthood reduce human capital investment in childhood? If so, such anticipatory behavior could cause irreversible harm to children and increase the cost of redistributing through the safety net.

In a simple economic model, the anticipation of benefits in adulthood decreases human capital investment through income and substitution effects. Through the income effect, expected government transfers reduce the child’s expected marginal utility of earned income in the future, lowering the expected utility return to investment in human capital. That is, parents invest less in human capital because they do not expect their child to “need” money from working in the future. Through the substitution effect, parents invest less in human capital because, due to the phase-out rules for transfer programs, a child’s future benefits will be reduced if they work. That is, parents invest less in human capital because they anticipate a high effective marginal tax rate on their child’s earnings in the future. We call these income and substitution effects collectively the “dynamic discouragement” effect of the social safety net (or, more broadly, the redistributive tax-and-transfer system) on human capital.

Several theoretical models of human capital investment feature this dynamic discouragement effect (e.g., Guvenen et al., 2014; Heathcote et al., 2017; Stantcheva, 2017). In empirical work, human capital investments have been shown to be responsive to many types of dynamic or anticipatory considerations, such as life expectancy (Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney, 2009; Oster et al., 2013) and adult earnings returns (Jensen, 2010). Abramitzky and Lavy (2014) find that when Israeli kibbutzim move from equal wages to productivity-based wages, young people increase their educational achievement. Although direct evidence on the dynamic discouragement effect of the social safety net is limited, experts on child development think this effect is large, according to a survey we conducted.¹

However, there are several reasons to believe that there might be less dynamic discouragement than the simple benchmark model predicts. Households may not be forward-looking enough to change behavior today in response to future government benefits (Ganong et al., 2021). Or households may be constrained to invest less than they would like due to lim-

¹We conducted this survey in 2022 through the Social Science Prediction Platform. We describe the survey in more detail in Section 3.5

ited money, time, or bandwidth, which could mean that any dynamic discouragement is inframarginal to actual investment. Alternatively, parents may make decisions about human capital investment based on non-financial objectives (such as finding purpose in work) in addition to the financial objectives included in the benchmark model.² Thus, the existence and magnitude of the dynamic discouragement effect are ultimately empirical questions.

In this paper, we test how beliefs about the availability of government benefits in adulthood affect human capital investment in childhood using an experiment that exogenously changes people’s beliefs. Our context is the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program—the largest cash welfare program in the United States, which, in 2022, spent \$51 billion on cash payments to 1.0 million children and 5.5 million adults with disabilities and low incomes. Most children receiving SSI qualify for the maximum annual benefit of around \$10,000 per year, which is about half of household income for the median family (Deshpande, 2016a). The majority of children receiving SSI qualify on the basis of mental and behavioral conditions such as ADHD.³ Understanding human capital investment among children who receive SSI benefits is critical, since they have very poor adult outcomes (Davies et al., 2009; Deshpande and Mueller-Smith, 2022).

When children who receive SSI turn 18, they are reevaluated for SSI as adults. Because the SSI criteria are different for children and adults, many SSI children do not qualify for SSI benefits as adults and lose both the cash benefits and categorical Medicaid eligibility when they turn 18. In fact, nearly 40% of SSI children and 70% of those with mental and behavioral conditions are removed from benefits at age 18, as they do not qualify as adults (Hemmeter and Gilby, 2009).

However, many parents whose children receive SSI are unaware that their children could lose benefits in adulthood. In our experimental sample, the average predicted likelihood that a child will be removed from SSI at age 18 is 70%.⁴ yet more than half of the parents in the sample believe there is *no chance* their child will stop receiving SSI benefits in the coming years. The average belief of the likelihood of removal is just 20%. These inaccurate beliefs about the likelihood of future benefits could lead parents to underinvest in their children’s human capital. The income effect is the most obvious channel for underinvestment, since the annual SSI benefit (about \$10,000 for most) is about half of household income for this population. The substitution effect may also play a role, since parents in our sample are aware that their child’s SSI benefits will be reduced in adulthood if the child works.

²This list is not exhaustive. As another example of why dynamic discouragement could be muted, as highlighted in Stantcheva (2017), future benefits and/or future progressive taxation can “help insure against earnings risk, thereby encouraging investment in risky human capital.”

³These figures come from Social Security Administration (2022) and Social Security Administration (2021) (Tables 18 and 20).

⁴We create the predicted likelihood using historical SSI data from the Social Security Administration.

We conducted a randomized controlled trial (RCT) providing about 6,000 parents of a national sample of children (aged 14–17 years) who receive SSI with information on their child’s predicted likelihood of removal from SSI at age 18. We use this information shock as a source of exogenous variation in expectations to determine how expectations about government benefits in adulthood affect human capital investments in childhood. To deliver the information, we showed each parent in the treatment group a video that told them their child’s specific likelihood of removal and the consequences of removal. For example, parents of children with a 70% removal probability (the median) watched a video telling them that 70% of children with similar characteristics to their child lose benefits at the age of 18. The video then emphasized that their child “will most likely not receive SSI benefits as an adult. If that happens, they will not receive any monthly payments from SSI...and they will need to find other sources of income to support themselves.”

Our survey data show that treated parents understood the information and the gravity of the situation: they updated their perceived likelihood of removal for their child by 20 percentage points (pp) relative to the control group, they expressed 10pp greater demand than the control group for an insurance product to insure them against the loss of SSI benefits, and they were 9pp more likely to make plans to work more themselves in the future if already employed. Despite these strong responses to the information, parents did not increase their take-up of human capital investments for their child—specifically, the resources we offered, such as tutoring and job training services, that evidence suggests could increase children’s future earnings. We estimate a treatment effect of information on average take-up of these human capital investments of virtually 0, just -0.2pp. This effect is precisely estimated: we can rule out that information increased take-up of the investments by more than 1.5pp, off of a base of roughly 30%.

We also find treatment effects that are close to zero when we restrict to the 80% of the sample that underestimated the likelihood of removal at baseline or the 60% of the sample who thought there was no chance of removal at baseline. In fact, we find a zero effect in every observable subgroup we look at, including parents who believe in a high return to human capital, parents who strongly believe the resources we offer would help their child succeed in school, and parents who feel they have the capacity to plan for the future.

This result is surprising relative to the benchmark model: most parents were unaware at baseline that their children might lose benefits, understood the information we provided and updated their beliefs, believed the loss of SSI would be a major income shock, and even changed their own plans to work in the future—yet they did not respond by investing more in the human capital of their child. The result is also a surprise relative to predictions by scholars with expertise in education and child development. In a survey we conducted, these

experts predicted, on average, that the treatment effect would be a positive 14 percentage points. Our experiment strongly rejects this null hypothesis. We can also reject the null hypothesis generated from calibrating the [Heathcote et al. \(2017\)](#) model, designed to estimate the effect of taxes on skill investment, to the specific parameters of the SSI program.

We next turn to understanding why decreasing the perceived likelihood of future benefits does not increase human capital investment as the benchmark model would predict. From our survey data, most parents plan to recover the lost SSI income by working more themselves. While parents’ work plans elucidate some of the puzzle, the question remains why parents do not *also* increase human capital investments in their children. Based on our survey evidence, we rule out the hypothesis that parents do not believe in their children’s potential to succeed in school and work in the labor market. Another hypothesis might be that the investments we measure are low-return or not valued by parents, but both revealed and stated preference show this is not the case. Take-up rates of our education and training resources are around 30% in the control group despite non-trivial monetary and/or time costs to take up the offers, and nearly 70% of parents at baseline say these resources would be “extremely” helpful (versus “not” or “somewhat”) for their child’s success in school and career.⁵ We also find no evidence in favor of high discount rates, though we cannot rule out this explanation entirely.⁶

We believe the evidence is more consistent with two (non-mutually-exclusive) explanations. First, parents do not make decisions about human capital investment based purely on the net present discounted value of the financial returns, as the benchmark model assumes. For example, 53% of parents say their primary objective in making decisions about their child’s education is to help their child “realize their potential,” compared to 30% who say their primary goals are financial. Moreover, parents hold beliefs that only make sense if they view work as having important non-financial value: at baseline, among the large fraction of parents who believe that their child will definitely receive SSI in adulthood and who also think that SSI has a 100% marginal tax rate on earnings, more than 75% expect their children to work in adulthood (despite no financial return). This evidence is consistent with empirical evidence from other settings suggesting that financial incentives may explain less of human capital investment than simple economic models imply ([Berry et al., 2020](#)).

Of course, assuming that parents still have some financial goals, non-financial consider-

⁵These resources also have high returns according to objective measures; for example, estimates suggest that job training services are worth \$960–\$4,700 annually in adult earnings ([Dean et al., 1999, 2015, 2017](#); [Wilhelm and Robinson, 2010](#)).

⁶We also rule out the explanation that informing parents about the possibility of SSI removal could lead them to decrease human capital investments if they believe that these investments increase the likelihood of removal. We designed subtreatments specifically to pick up this “perverse incentives” channel and find no evidence of it.

ations alone cannot explain the zero effect. But non-financial goals may interact with the second explanation: that parents have already reached the limit of the investments they can make given their time, money, and bandwidth constraints. Treated parents are slightly *less* likely to say that they expect their child to go to college, possibly because they are constrained and think college is no longer affordable without SSI.⁷ Moreover, the vast majority of these low-income parents report that they are already doing “all they can do” to help their child succeed. Indeed, parents who believe in the non-pecuniary value of education and work may be more likely to be at the limits of their investment even absent strong financial motivation to invest, leaving no room to invest further when the dynamic discouragement is removed. Ironically, it could be that the inefficiency of dynamic discouragement is mitigated by another inefficiency—the very real constraints facing disadvantaged households.

Our finding that there is no dynamic discouragement effect of the social safety net on human capital (at least in our context) has important policy implications. Dynamic discouragement impedes society’s ability to redistribute income. Our finding of zero dynamic discouragement implies that redistribution is less costly and that income can be redistributed more efficiently than previous models implied. It also suggests that existing adult safety net programs do less harm to children than researchers and policymakers had thought.

To our knowledge, this is the first paper to estimate the effect of expected future government benefits on current human capital investment using exogenous variation that isolates the anticipatory channel. Previous research has estimated the combined effect of contemporaneous and anticipatory changes created by reforms to redistribution policy. [Abramitzky and Lavy \(2014\)](#) estimate the effect of Israeli kibbutzim changing from equal wages to productivity-based wages, which could have affected both parents’ current incomes and children’s anticipated incomes. They find that children’s educational achievement increases and provide suggestive evidence that the channel is anticipatory rather than contemporaneous. [Dahl and Gielen \(2021\)](#) estimate the effect of a parent losing disability benefits, which could have affected both children’s current home environment and their anticipated benefits, and find a modest increase in educational achievement. A number of studies estimate the combined contemporaneous and anticipatory effects of the 1996 welfare reform law (which included many different provisions affecting current and future benefits) on employment, program participation, education, marriage, and fertility ([Kaestner et al., 2003](#); [Dave et al.,](#)

⁷This is an example of a “wealth effect” wherein the reduction in permanent income decreases investment by decreasing permanent income. However, wealth effects alone cannot explain all of our effects. For example, we would not expect a reduction in permanent income to decrease the take-up of resources with minimal upfront cost and immediate returns like job training, yet we find no effects there either. This suggests that, in addition to wealth effects, parents must also be up against other firm constraints (e.g., bandwidth) which limit the potential increases in investments like job training.

2012; Bastian et al., 2021)⁸

This paper also builds on three existing strands of the empirical literature on the effects of the social safety net on behavior. The first is a reduced form literature on the effect of the social safety net on labor supply and human capital, which focuses primarily on contemporaneous effects.⁹ Another strand is a reduced form literature on the dynamic effects of the social safety net, primarily in the context of savings behavior.¹⁰ A third strand consists of structurally estimated models of lifecycle behavior, especially labor supply and retirement decisions, accounting for the effects of social insurance and other policies (e.g., Haan and Prowse 2017; Borella et al. 2022; De Nardi et al. 2021). We build on all three strands by isolating the anticipatory effects of the social safety net on the important outcome of human capital investment using a randomized shock to expectations about future government benefits for identification. In doing so, we also relate to the theoretical literature modeling the human capital investment response to taxes and transfers (e.g., Golosov and Tsyvinski 2006; Guvenen et al. 2014; Heathcote et al. 2017; Stantcheva 2017).

Finally, we contribute to a growing literature on the poor life outcomes of children receiving SSI benefits and interventions to improve those outcomes (Davies et al. 2009; Hemmeter et al. 2009; Fraker et al. 2014; Mamun et al. 2019). Deshpande (2016a) and Deshpande and Mueller-Smith (2022) study the effect of removing youth from SSI at age 18 in a context in which removal was unexpected, and find that SSI removal has staggeringly adverse consequences for the youth. This paper asks whether removed SSI youth would have better outcomes in adulthood if their families could instead anticipate and prepare for their removal. We find that these low-income parents do not respond to information about SSI removal by increasing human capital investments, potentially because they face constraints that limit their ability to invest. Information provision alone—without the alleviation of other constraints—is therefore unlikely to counter the adverse effects of SSI removal.¹¹

⁸The time limits feature of the 1996 welfare reform law—that recipients could receive TANF for only five years over their lifetime and for only two consecutive years—has received particular attention, with papers finding evidence of anticipatory behavior in employment and welfare use among single mothers (Grogger 2002; Grogger and Michalopoulos 2003; Grogger 2003; Mazzolari 2007; Low et al. 2018; Chan 2018).

⁹Recent studies that examine the effect of disability programs on contemporaneous labor supply include Chen and van der Klaauw (2008); Von Wachter et al. (2011); Maestas et al. (2013); French and Song (2014); Moore (2015); Autor et al. (2015); Deshpande (2016a); Deshpande (2016b); and Strand and Messel (2019). Garthwaite et al. (2014) study this question in the context of health insurance and Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2012) in the context of food stamps. Recent studies that examine contemporaneous effects on human capital include Akee et al. (2010), Dahl and Lochner (2012), and Riddell and Riddell (2014), among others.

¹⁰Gruber and Yelowitz (1999) find that Medicaid eligibility reduces household savings. Dynarski (2004) calculates a high tax of college financial aid on household savings.

¹¹There are a number of recent evaluations of other policies designed to improve the outcomes of children receiving SSI. For example, The Youth Transition Demonstration found that employment experiences and other supports increased employment and earnings modestly in the short-term but had declining long-term effects (Fraker et al. 2014). The Promoting the Readiness of Minors in SSI (PROMISE) demonstration found short-term increases in youth employment from providing and coordinating services to families of

2 Context: The SSI program

SSI provides monthly cash payments to children (1.0 million) and adults (5.5 million) who have a qualifying disability and limited income and assets (Social Security Administration, 2022). The maximum federal benefit amount for an individual is \$841/month (\$10,092/year) in 2022, and most states provide a small supplement. This amount is roughly equivalent to average parent earnings for households of child recipients (Deshpande, 2016a). SSI provides categorical Medicaid eligibility in most states.¹² Duggan et al. (2015) provide a comprehensive review of the SSI program and literature.

SSI children must requalify for the program under the adult criteria when they turn 18. About 40% of all children receiving SSI, and nearly 70% of children with certain behavioral conditions like ADHD, are removed from SSI at the age of 18 (Hemmeter and Gilby, 2009). Children are removed from SSI at high rates at age 18 because the definition of disability changes between childhood and adulthood. For adults, disability is defined as an inability to work. Adults must demonstrate that they cannot earn more than the “substantial gainful activity” limit (\$1,350/month for non-blind individuals in 2022) in order to qualify for disability benefits. In contrast, eligibility for children is based on age-appropriate activity. Children must have “marked and severe functional limitations” that limit their activities, which can include social interaction and school performance. Conditions like ADHD and speech and language delays may qualify a child for SSI because they limit age-appropriate activity, but they are less likely to qualify an adult unless they are severe enough to prevent work. Children who qualify on the basis of these conditions are thus highly likely to be removed at 18. In 2015, the Social Security Administration began sending families of adolescents receiving SSI annual information about the age 18 redetermination and resources available to help with the transition, but it is unclear how many families read or understand this information.¹³

The SSI adult program has a high effective marginal tax rate on earnings. In the SSI children’s program, the income and assets of the parents are used to determine both financial eligibility and monthly benefit amount.¹⁴ The SSI payment is made to the parent or representative payee of the child. Once a child turns 18, the child’s own income and assets

children receiving SSI (Mamun et al., 2019), with estimates of the long-term effects expected in 2022.

¹²Ten states use stricter criteria to determine Medicaid eligibility for the disabled. Seven other states require SSI recipients to submit a separate Medicaid application to the state.

¹³See <https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-11005.pdf> for pamphlet. Another pamphlet, distributed when an SSI award is made, mentions that children who reach 18 will be reviewed (<https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10153.pdf>). See [ssa.gov/youth](https://www.ssa.gov/youth) for a full list of resources that SSA makes available. Students receiving special education services may also have transition discussions as part of their Individualized Education Program (IEP).

¹⁴The SSI asset limit is \$2,000 for an individual and \$3,000 for a couple and excludes the value of a home and one vehicle.

are considered, along with in-kind support from family. The monthly SSI benefit amount is reduced based on income. After a small exclusion, the monthly benefit is reduced by \$1 for every \$2 of earned income. Thus, there is effectively a 50% marginal tax rate on earned income. The benefit completely phases out at around \$18,000 in earned income. SSI conducts periodic evaluations of both medical eligibility and non-medical eligibility for adults. The SSI payment is made to the adult recipient, though our baseline survey indicates that the vast majority of children who receive SSI will continue living with their parents or be financially dependent on them after age 18 (see Online Appendix Table [H.10](#)).

Youth who receive SSI benefits are eligible for vocational rehabilitation services, provided by state vocational rehabilitation (VR) agencies, with the goal of preparing youth with disabilities for postsecondary education and/or employment. However, take-up of VR services among children receiving SSI has historically been low, with estimates around 10–15% ([Honeycutt et al., 2015](#); [Hoffman et al., 2017](#)).

3 Experimental design

Our goal is to estimate the effect of beliefs about the availability of SSI benefits in adulthood on human capital investments in childhood. The key challenge in estimating the relationship between the expected future safety net and investment is identifying exogenous variation in expectations or beliefs. Our experiment generates exogenous variation by randomly delivering information to some households about the likelihood of removal from SSI at age 18. Since this information only concerns future adult benefits, not current childhood benefits, it allows us to isolate the anticipatory effect of future benefits from the contemporaneous effect of benefits. We begin by measuring parents’ beliefs about their child’s likelihood of removal from SSI at age 18. We then deliver the information. Finally, we measure the effects of the information on beliefs and investment.

In this section, we begin by explaining how we draw our sample and generate predicted likelihoods of removal, with additional details in Appendix [D](#). We then describe our treatment groups and the information intervention. Next, we explain the logistics of how we implemented the experiment. We then describe our data sources and outcome variables. Finally, we present baseline summary statistics.

3.1 Predicted likelihoods and sample selection

We used administrative data provided by the Social Security Administration (SSA) to implement the experiment. First, using historical SSA data on age 18 removal decisions for children receiving SSI, we created an OLS prediction of the likelihood of removal for any given individual child based on their observable characteristics.¹⁵ We then applied that model to

¹⁵Alternative methods such as LASSO and causal forest yielded similar predictions. See Appendix [D](#) for more details on the procedure for creating the prediction.

the universe of all current SSI recipients to generate individual-level predicted likelihoods of removal.

Next, we used the SSA data to select a sample of households with at least one child currently receiving SSI. The main criteria for inclusion in the sample were the following: (a) the child had a predicted likelihood of removal at age 18 above 35% and below 95% (roughly 2/3 of all SSI child recipients), and (b) the child was aged 14–17 years.¹⁶ We drew the sample nationally from across the US, oversampling three states (Michigan, Wisconsin, and Massachusetts) where we had connections for later administrative data as well as six additional states where we had connections to state vocational rehabilitation offices. See Appendix D for the complete set of sample restrictions.

3.2 Treatment groups and intervention

Figure 1 shows the experimental design. We first randomly divide our sample into two main groups:

1. *Treatment group*: Watch a video containing information about their child’s predicted likelihood of removal (based on their diagnosis, severity, and state). Within the Treatment group, we randomized most individuals into the basic treatment group (“Information”) and a small subset (“Information-Perverse”) to receive an additional sub-treatment discussed in detail below.
2. *Control group*: Watch a video with “placebo” (innocuous) information. Within the Control group, we randomized the type of placebo information (Geography or History), as discussed below.

We chose to convey the information through a video after extensive piloting of different modalities suggested that video was the most effective way to convey the information to parents. Because simply watching a video could have effects beyond the receipt of information, however, we also showed the Control group videos that gave them “placebo” information. All videos, both information and control, had three sections:

1. First section (same for all groups): Introduction and brief overview of SSI, reminding parents of the basic structure of the program.
2. Second section (different across groups): Information intervention for Treatment group, placebo information for Control group. We discuss the information intervention in detail below.

¹⁶We limited to those with an above 35% likelihood so as not to bother parents of children who are likely to continue on to adult SSI. We also did not include those with a likelihood above 95% because we did not want to tell anyone their child’s removal was guaranteed (since our model is imperfect and reviews have some natural variation). We focus on children aged 14–17 years old based on guidance from caseworkers who work with this population that these are the prime ages at which dynamic discouragement is relevant.




Figure 1: Experimental Design

3. Third section (same for all groups): Overview of the Resource Center that we set up for the experiment, which parents could visit to take up free education and job training resources for their child. Section 3.3.2 has more information on the Resource Center.

Information intervention. The second section of the video shown to the Treatment group told parents the likelihood that their child would be removed from SSI. We began by explaining that the eligibility criteria for SSI benefits were different for adults than children, and that their child would have to be re-evaluated at the age of 18 to see if they still qualified for benefits. We then told them the likelihood that their child would be removed from benefits at the age of 18 (rounded to the nearest 10%), explaining that the prediction was based on other children who had the same diagnosis, severity, age, and state of residence. We used several graphics, as well as qualitative descriptors, to ensure that even parents with a limited education level would understand the information.¹⁷ For example, the video for children with 80% removal rates says:

“We find that *almost all* of these children [who have the same characteristics as your child] lose SSI when they enter adulthood at the age of 18. In fact, 8 out

¹⁷From our baseline survey, 20% of parents have less than a high school degree, 30% have only a high school degree, and 26% have some college but no degree. See Online Appendix Table H.2

of 10 of these children lose their SSI benefits as adults. That means that 80% of these children stop receiving SSI. Because these children have the same severe medical condition as your child, we think that your child also has an 80% chance of losing their SSI benefits when they turn 18. This means that your child will *most likely not receive* SSI benefits as an adult.”

The specific numbers and qualitative statements were tailored to be accurate for the specific removal probability (e.g., “almost all” for 80% versus “most” for 60%). Appendix A contains the scripts and screenshots from the Treatment video (see Online Appendix E for Control), and the videos are available to view on YouTube.¹⁸

In the video, we also tried to make the consequences of removal from SSI concrete for parents. The video told parents that, if their child was removed from SSI at the age of 18, “they will not receive any monthly payments from SSI, they will not qualify for Medicaid through SSI, and they will need to find other sources of income to support themselves.”

Note that the video’s message is focused on the income effect (losing the income transfer), rather than the substitution effect (no longer being subject to SSI’s 50% marginal tax rate). This is because the concept of marginal tax rates is complicated to explain, and given parents’ limited bandwidth, we wanted the message of the video to be clear. That said, parents appear in practice to be well-informed about the high marginal tax rates associated with participation in the SSI program, and so we expect that they may have also made inferences about the substitution effect based on the video.¹⁹

Control group “placebo” treatment. For the Control group videos, the second section of the video contained “placebo” information. To verify that this information did not have an effect, we randomized control participants into one of two groups that received different information:

1. *Geography*: Video with information about the geographic distribution of child SSI recipients across the U.S.
2. *History*: Video with information about the history of the SSI program (e.g., the year in which it was founded).

In Online Appendix Table H.1, we test and find that there are no significant or meaningful differences in the effect of these two placebo videos on any outcomes, suggesting that they served their purpose of delivering innocuous information.

¹⁸The Treatment video is available at <https://youtu.be/57jvdStkhd4>; History video at <https://youtu.be/gDxlLpTP-0o>, and Geography video at <https://youtu.be/T3TgbzKGCKQ>.

¹⁹According to our baseline survey, 62% of parents believe that in adulthood their child’s SSI benefit will be reduced by at least 50 cents for every dollar the child earns (see Online Appendix Table H.10).

Subtreatments to assess potential “perverse incentive” effect. We are interested in the effect that the expectation of future benefits has on current human capital investment. However, in our setting, there is another channel through which information about the likelihood of removal from benefits could affect behavior. Specifically, if parents believe that children with higher human capital are more likely to be removed, then increasing parents’ perceived likelihood of removal could lead parents to decrease human capital investments in an attempt to prevent their child from being removed. The net effect of information will thus include this “perverse incentive” effect in addition to the dynamic discouragement (income and substitution) effect of interest.

In order to disentangle these effects, we implement two subtreatments. The first attempts to dampen the perverse incentives effect by telling a randomly selected 50% of parents that their take-up of resources will be kept confidential (“Confidentiality subtreatment”). The second attempts to amplify the perverse incentives effect by giving a small, randomly selected subset of the Treatment group (which we call “Information-Perverse, ” shown in Figure 1) true information about what factors SSA considers in the age 18 removal decision (e.g., that the decision would depend upon whether their child is “able to earn a living as an adult” and that they would be asked to provide “information about [their] child’s schooling”). Appendix Section D.4 provides more details on these subtreatments.

3.3 Logistics and implementation

We first sampled 37,000 parents from SSA data using the criteria outlined in Section 3.1. We then randomly assigned households to the groups outlined above (Information, Information-Perverse, History, and Geography), stratified based on state of residence and whether the child had above-median removal probability for the sample selected from their state.

We then mailed letters to parents asking them to complete a web survey for a cash payment. We sent several reminder mailings during the 9 weeks the survey was accepting responses and followed-up by phone 4 weeks after the initial letter with non-responders. Note that the Treatment and Control groups were treated exactly the same (e.g., identical letters and phone calls) until they reached the video portion of the survey.²⁰ See Appendix D for more details on implementation.

Among parents mailed letters, 18% started the web or phone survey. Among those who started the survey and were deemed eligible, 95% made it to the beginning of the treatment or placebo video, for an estimated 17% ($=18\% \times 95\%$) sample inclusion rate among eligi-

²⁰The only exception is that individuals assigned to the Information-Perverse group were asked one additional question in the baseline survey that the other groups did not receive: “If your child were to graduate from high school and excel academically, do you think that would make him/her more or less likely to remain eligible for SSI?” This question was part of the Information-Perverse subtreatment.

bles.²¹ The vast majority (96%) of parents responded by web. Perhaps surprisingly, survey respondents do not differ meaningfully from non-respondents in observable characteristics from the SSA administrative data (see Appendix Table B.1). To further probe external validity, we estimate the treatment effects separately for earlier and later responders in Online Appendix Table H.3 and find no difference, suggesting that the treatment effects would also be similar if we had recruited more people into our sample.

3.3.1 Web survey

The web survey, hosted by the NORC at the University of Chicago and available in both English and Spanish, consisted of 3 parts. Parents first completed a baseline survey. They then watched the videos. They then completed an endline survey. They were then provided with a link to the Resource Center. We grouped all of these activities into one survey to minimize attrition between the stages based on our experience from piloting. We discuss each activity in detail here.

Baseline survey. This brief survey gathered baseline data on parents’ beliefs and attitudes about their children’s education and SSI benefits. The most important section assessed parents’ beliefs about the likelihood with which their child would be removed from SSI in the future, which we assessed with two questions:

1. Do you think there’s any chance [KID] will stop receiving SSI benefits over the next 10 years? *[No, there is no chance that [his/her] benefits will stop. / Yes, there is some chance that [his/her] benefits will stop.]*
2. (If “Yes”) How likely do you think it is that [KID] will stop receiving benefits? *[10% (highly unlikely to lose benefits) / 20% (unlikely) / 30% (some chance) / 40% (could very well) / 50% (good chance) / 60% (likely) / 70% (probably) / 80% (most likely) / 90% (almost certainly) / 100% (certainly will lose benefits)]*

We started with the “yes/no” questions to avoid asking a complicated probabilistic question to parents who were completely unaware of the removal possibility, as we thought that could potentially be a treatment in and of itself.²²

²¹94% of those who started the survey were deemed eligible, meaning they said that their child was receiving SSI. Our analysis sample includes all eligible parents who made it to the beginning of the treatment or placebo video. The 17% sample inclusion rate estimate assumes that there is the same rate of eligibility among non-responders as responders. A more conservative estimate of the sample inclusion rate, which assumes that every non-responder is eligible, would be 16%.

²²The baseline survey also included questions about the following: basic demographic information (e.g., relationship to child, education, race, disability); information about the child’s schooling (e.g., type of school, grade); expectations about the child’s future (e.g., expected educational achievement, expected work, whether college affordable); perceived returns to human capital (e.g., whether high school or college worth the cost); parent attitudes (e.g., responsibility for child’s future, whether too early to start planning); how helpful various resources would be to help their child excel in school and/or career. Appendix C contains more information about the belief measures.

Videos and Intervention: We then showed the parents the appropriate video given their treatment group and, if applicable, child removal probability. The Information and Information-Perverse groups watched the video about SSI removal at age 18 tailored for their child’s removal probability (rounded to the nearest 10%). The History and Geography control groups watched their respective placebo videos. For all groups, we conducted a “knowledge check” after the video to ensure the parent had watched the video and nearly all respondents got the knowledge check correct.²³

Endline survey We then conducted a brief endline survey. We first assessed parents’ beliefs about their own child’s removal probability. To avoid “priming” the Control group by asking too many questions about SSI removal, we asked the endline beliefs questions to the Treatment group and to a 15% randomly-chosen subset of the Control group.

1. Do you think that [KID] will lose SSI benefits as an adult?
[No, won’t lose benefits / Will probably not lose benefits / May or may not lose benefits / Will probably lose benefits / Yes, will definitely lose benefits]
2. (If not “No, won’t lose benefits”): How likely do you think it is that [KID] will lose benefits?
[10% (highly unlikely to lose benefits) / 20% (unlikely) / 30% (some chance) / 40% (could very well) / 50% (good chance) / 60% (likely) / 70% (probably) / 80% (most likely) / 90% (almost certainly) / 100% (certainly will lose benefits)]

Next, the survey asked qualitative questions about plans for the future and parental attitudes. It then measured two of our primary outcomes, described below. After the endline survey, the web survey told parents they had completed the survey. We then provided parents with a link and log-in information for the Resource Center, where parents could sign up for additional education resources (described below). At the end of the Resource Center, we also asked parents another beliefs question about their perceived likelihood of their child being removed from SSI. The purpose of this question was to see whether the change in beliefs about removal persisted after the information had been delivered.

3.3.2 Resources Offered (Primary Outcomes)

To capture parents’ level of investment following the treatment, we offered parents in both the Control and Treatment groups four human capital resources for their child, which

²³For the Treatment group, we asked what fraction of children with their child’s removal probability were removed at age 18. We asked the Geography subgroup what fraction of SSI recipients lived in their region and the History subgroup what year SSI was founded (both statistics from their respective videos.) Most participants gave the correct answer: 75% for the Treatment group, 73% for Geography, and 88% for History. The participants who got the initial “knowledge check” wrong were shown text screens with the information from the videos before answering the “knowledge check” question a second time. Only 5% for Information, 6% for Geography, and 1% for History got the question wrong both times.

we use as our primary outcomes. Since beliefs could affect multiple types of human capital investments, we offered different types of resources. In particular, investments can be financial or temporal in nature, and they can be targeted at either education or career preparation. In order to measure parental responses on as many margins as possible, we pre-specified four primary outcomes that reflect different types of investments (financial vs. temporal, education vs. career preparation).

The first two resources were measured at the end of the endline survey and represent *financial* investments:

- *Resource 1: Career Book.* At the end of the survey, we told parents they had two choices for how to receive their survey payment. They could either receive \$40 cash, or “\$35 cash plus a career guide book for teens (worth \$16) with secrets to nailing job interviews and preparing for college entrance exams.” *We interpret choosing the career book over cash as a financial investment in career preparation.*
- *Resource 2: Tutoring.* After the survey payment, we told parents that, as an additional thank you for their time, they would be entered into a lottery where they could choose in advance whether their prize would be \$50 cash or \$300 of one-on-one tutoring for their child. *We interpret choosing tutoring over cash in the lottery as a financial investment in education.*

At the end of the survey, we sent all parents a link to the “Resource Center” and told them they could sign up for education and job training resources for their child, at no charge to them, by visiting this site. Parents who chose to visit the Resource Center could sign up for the following educational resources for their children. These resources represent *temporal* investments since they required only the parent’s time to sign up:

- *Resource 3: Math Skills.* We set up an online education platform where children could complete lessons in math and computer skills. *We interpret signing up for online math lessons as a temporal investment in education.*
- *Resource 4: Job Training.* Children and adults receiving SSI are eligible to receive free job training services provided by state vocational rehabilitation (VR) agencies. The Resource Center provided an overview of these services and invited parents to complete the sign-up forms for these services for their state. *We interpret completing the intake forms for job training services as a temporal investment in career preparation.*²⁴

²⁴Residents of nine states where VR agencies agreed to participate (Arizona, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, and Wisconsin) were able to complete the forms directly through our survey. Residents of the other states were sent an email with information about how to sign up for services in their state; in these cases, we use signing up for the information as the primary outcome variable. In Online Appendix Table [H.4](#) we show results separately for those who completed sign-up forms in the survey versus those who were sent an email with information. In addition to job training, parents

We chose these resources based on 1) parent interest from our focus groups and pilots and 2) evidence that these resources can improve the earnings potential of young people. Evidence suggests that tutoring can increase earnings potential by \$1,090–\$2,540 annually (Guryan et al., 2021), job training by \$960–\$4,700 annually (Dean et al., 1999, 2015, 2017; Wilhelm and Robinson, 2010), and math skills training by \$600–\$1,600 annually.²⁵ Consistent with this evidence on returns, the majority of parents say at baseline that the tutoring, math skills, and job training resources would be “extremely” (versus “somewhat” or “not”) helpful for their child to excel in school and/or their career.

We also measure a few secondary outcomes. In the endline survey, we ask parents about whether they intend for their children to attend college in the future and whether they intend for their children to work in young adulthood. In addition, we measure take-up of information about ABLE savings accounts in the Resource Center as a measure of parents’ interest in saving for their child’s future.²⁶

3.4 Data, balance, and summary statistics

The analysis uses several data sources: administrative data from the SSA, data from the survey (including baseline survey, video portion, and endline), and take-up data from the Resource Center we created. Table 1 presents baseline summary statistics and tests for balance across the Control and Treatment groups. Sampled children were 16 years old on average, and 27% were female. Seventy-three percent came from single-parent households.²⁷ Eighty nine percent of respondents were female and 96% were the child’s parent, with the remainder primarily relatives who live with the child. We refer to all respondents as “parents.”

To assess balance across groups, we test for the joint orthogonality of all baseline variables with our various treatments: Treatment versus Control, History versus Geography, and Information versus Information-Perverse. We fail to reject the null of orthogonality in any of these tests. Moreover, the differences across groups are never large. Following Imbens and Rubin (2015), we assess the size of the differences in our various baseline measures. All of our normalized differences, presented in the “Std. Diff.” columns, are far below the “cutoff” of 0.25 SD, which indicates good balance.

could also sign up for education planning through the VR resource.

²⁵For math skills, we calculate the earnings increases combining standardized math achievement test scores increases from Barrow et al. (2009) with estimates from Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) who find that one standard deviation increase in test scores is associated with a 12 percent increase in earnings in adulthood.

²⁶Created by the ABLE Act of 2014, ABLE accounts are savings accounts that allow SSI recipients (or parents of children receiving SSI) to save for the future in a way that is exempt from SSI’s asset limits. As part of the Resource Center, we offered parents information about signing up for an ABLE savings account. We use requesting an email about how to sign-up for the account as a secondary outcome to capture the effect of removal information on parents’ interest in saving money.

²⁷The five most common diagnoses are ADHD (43%), speech/language delays (15%), learning disorder (7%), autistic disorders/other pervasive development disorders (5%), and oppositional/defiant disorder (5%).

Table 1: Balance and summary statistics

	Full Sample		Control vs Information			Control: History vs Geography			Treatment: Info vs Info-Perverse		
			Cntrl.	Info.	Std. Diff.	Hist.	Geo.	Std. Diff.	Info. per- verse	Info.	Std. Diff.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
	Mean	SD	Mean	Mean	Diff.	Mean	Mean	Diff.	Mean	Mean	Diff.
A. Administrative Data											
Female Child	0.27	0.44	0.27	0.27	-0.01	0.26	0.27	-0.02	0.28	0.27	0.03
Child's Age	15.58	0.88	15.58	15.58	0.00	15.56	15.60	-0.04	15.53	15.58	-0.05
Single Parent Household	0.73	0.44	0.73	0.74	-0.04	0.73	0.72	0.03	0.69	0.74	-0.12
Mother's Age	40.36	6.08	40.47	40.26	0.03	40.58	40.37	0.03	40.10	40.26	-0.03
Sibling on SSI	0.26	0.44	0.26	0.24	0.05	0.27	0.26	0.01	0.29	0.24	0.11
Months receiving SSI	71.19	44.05	70.53	71.63	-0.02	69.58	71.46	-0.04	73.68	71.63	0.05
Had a Child Medical Review	0.77	0.42	0.77	0.76	0.03	0.76	0.78	-0.07	0.79	0.76	0.08
Lost SSI from Child Medical Review	0.16	0.37	0.16	0.16	0.00	0.16	0.17	-0.05	0.17	0.16	0.02
Disability: Intellectual	0.04	0.19	0.04	0.03	0.06	0.04	0.05	-0.01	0.04	0.03	0.02
Disability: Mental	0.83	0.37	0.83	0.84	-0.04	0.82	0.84	-0.05	0.85	0.84	0.02
Disability: Physical	0.13	0.33	0.13	0.13	0.01	0.14	0.12	0.06	0.12	0.13	-0.03
B. Baseline Survey											
Female Respondent	0.89	0.31	0.88	0.90	-0.05	0.88	0.89	-0.01	0.90	0.90	-0.01
Parent Respondent	0.96	0.20	0.95	0.96	-0.04	0.96	0.95	0.02	0.94	0.96	-0.09
Parent with Disability	0.41	0.49	0.42	0.41	0.02	0.42	0.42	0.00	0.41	0.41	0.01
Parent Has Done Some College	0.50	0.50	0.49	0.50	-0.01	0.50	0.49	0.02	0.46	0.50	-0.08
Child Receiving Edu. Accommodations	0.76	0.43	0.75	0.77	-0.03	0.75	0.75	-0.00	0.78	0.77	0.04
Child Grade	9.52	1.06	9.53	9.52	0.01	9.50	9.56	-0.06	9.41	9.52	-0.10
Race: White	0.41	0.49	0.42	0.39	0.06	0.42	0.43	-0.02	0.39	0.39	-0.01
Race: Black	0.44	0.50	0.43	0.45	-0.04	0.45	0.42	0.06	0.42	0.45	-0.07
Race: Other	0.04	0.20	0.04	0.04	0.01	0.05	0.04	0.06	0.07	0.04	0.11
Ethnicity: Hispanic/Latino	0.18	0.38	0.17	0.18	-0.02	0.17	0.18	-0.04	0.18	0.18	0.01
C. Removal Probability											
Predicted Likelihood of Removal	69.60	11.83	69.45	69.80	-0.03	69.59	69.32	0.02	68.98	69.80	-0.07
Perceived Likelihood of Removal	20.04	29.11	20.04	19.94	0.00	20.57	19.52	0.04	21.08	19.94	0.04
Belief Gap	-49.58	30.96	-49.39	-49.91	0.02	-48.97	-49.81	0.03	-47.80	-49.91	0.07
Thought No Chance of Removal	0.60	0.49	0.60	0.60	0.01	0.60	0.61	-0.04	0.60	0.60	-0.01
Test for joint orthogonality											
F-stat					0.81			0.81			0.98
P-value					0.93			0.92			0.54
Number of individuals	5,968		2,854	2,873		1,409	1,445		241	2,873	
Percent of Sample	100.0		47.8	48.1		23.6	24.2		4.0	48.1	

Notes: Table shows summary statistics from SSA data in Panel A, and from our baseline survey in Panels B and C. Different samples are shown in different columns. The Std. Diff. columns display the difference between the means in the two previous columns, normalized by the square root of half the sum of the two group variances. “Had a Child Medical Review” means the child previously received a regularly scheduled re-evaluation of their medical condition to determine if they should continue to receive SSI benefits. “Predicted Likelihood of Removal” is the OLS prediction of the child’s likelihood of removal at age 18 as specified in Appendix [D](#). “Beliefs Gap” is the gap between “Perceived Likelihood of Removal” (parents’ beliefs about their child’s likelihood of removal, as measured through our baseline survey) minus the “Predicted Likelihood of Removal.” Covariate balance test for the Confidentiality subpopulation (not shown) has p-value of 0.93.

3.5 Expert prediction survey

In February 2022, we also conducted a survey through the Social Science Prediction Platform. The goal of the platform is to collect expert forecasts regarding the results of

experiments in order to develop a more realistic null hypothesis to test. We sent the survey to all members of the NBER children’s and education groups. Of the 243 individuals in the sample, 64 members completed the survey, a 26% response rate. The survey described to participants the study design, the size of the first stage effect on beliefs, and the average in the Control group of a (relatively easy-to-describe) outcome: whether participants took up either resource in the Resource Center. The survey then asked participants to predict the take-up in the Treatment group of that same outcome (i.e., to predict the treatment effect). As recommended by the Social Science Prediction Platform, we use the mean from this survey as a null hypothesis that we test.

4 Effects of SSI removal information on beliefs and human capital investment

We begin by briefly summarizing our hypotheses for how information about SSI removal might affect investment. We then proceed to analyze the actual effect of providing information on beliefs and investment.

4.1 Hypotheses for the effect of information

In a simple economic model, providing information that decreases the likelihood of future benefits could increase human capital investments through income and substitution effects. Via the income effect, the large loss in expected future unearned income increases the marginal utility of future earned income, thereby increasing the marginal utility returns to investment in human capital. Through the substitution effect, the decrease in the expected future tax rate increases the net financial returns to earned income, thereby increasing the financial return to investment in human capital.

The combined “dynamic discouragement” effect from the income and substitution effects could have a quantitatively meaningful effect on human capital investment in our context. For example, when we calibrate the [Heathcote et al. \(2017\)](#) model using an SSI-like transfer program, the model results imply an 11% increase in investments as a result of our information treatment (see Online Appendix [G](#) for details). Separately, in our survey of experts, virtually all respondents (97%) predicted a positive treatment effect, and the average of experts’ predictions of the treatment effect of information is a large 14 percentage point or 34% increase.²⁸

However, there are also other factors that could decrease the magnitude of the treatment effect. For example, households may not be as forward-looking as the simple model assumes. Alternatively, as highlighted by [Heathcote et al. \(2017\)](#) in an extension to their baseline

²⁸We also conducted qualitative interviews with counselors and other individuals who work with families of children receiving SSI benefits, and they also thought that advance knowledge of SSI removal would lead to higher educational attainment.

model, constraints on investment (e.g., credit) could also dampen responsiveness of investment to expected future benefits and/or taxes. Households that are already investing at the limit of their constraints may not be able to increase investment in response to information. In this section, we provide empirical evidence on whether the dynamic discouragement effect exists in practice.


4.2 Beliefs about SSI removal

We use our experiment to generate exogenous variation in parents’ beliefs about their children’s SSI receipt in adulthood in order to identify the dynamic discouragement effect. This strategy relies on parents being misinformed at baseline about their children’s likelihood of removal from SSI. Figure 2 shows that parents of children receiving SSI generally underestimate their child’s likelihood of removal at baseline. Panel (a) presents separate histograms of parent beliefs about their child’s likelihood of removal, as measured through our baseline survey (see Section 3.3.1 for exact question), and their child’s true predicted likelihood of removal, as measured by our prediction using SSA data.²⁹ About 80% of parents underestimate the likelihood that their child is removed. The median parent underestimates the likelihood by 60pp and the mean gap is 50pp (see Table 1). About 60% of parents believe the likelihood of removal is 0, suggesting that the majority of parents are unaware of the age 18 review. Panel (b) of Figure 2 shows that average perceived removal probability does not increase with predicted removal probability. In other words, parent beliefs about removal are not even correlated with predicted removal probability, likely because many parents appear to be unaware of the existence of the age 18 review altogether.


Figure 3 shows that our information video caused parents to update their beliefs. The figure shows a histogram of the *endline* beliefs gap (endline perceived likelihood of removal minus predicted likelihood of removal) separately for the Treatment and Control groups.³⁰ The Treatment group endline distribution is notably different from the Control distribution, with the Treatment group having a 20pp smaller median beliefs gap. Roughly 22% of parents in the Treatment group have an endline gap of 0 (up from 3% at baseline): they fully update their beliefs based on the information. Many other parents in the Treatment group update their beliefs to be somewhere between their baseline and the information delivered—i.e., the

²⁹Parents who answered “No” to the first baseline beliefs question (“Do you think there’s any chance [KID] will stop receiving SSI benefits over the next 10 years?”) are coded as having a perceived likelihood of 0. Because parents could only report their perceived likelihood of removal rounded to the nearest 10%, we calculate the beliefs gap from the predicted removal probability rounded to the nearest 10% as well. Using the unrounded predicted removal probability does not change the results. Whether using unrounded or rounded measures, 77% of parents underestimate their child’s probability of removal. The average gap using both the unrounded and rounded predicted removal probability is 50pp.

³⁰Again, because parents could only report their endline perceived probability of removal rounded to the nearest 10%, we calculate the endline beliefs gap from the predicted removal probability rounded to the nearest 10%.



(a) Histogram of predicted removal probability versus parents' baseline perceived probability



(b) Parents' baseline perceived removal probability by predicted removal probability

Figure 2: At baseline, SSI parents underestimate the chance that their child will lose benefits

Note: Top figure presents a histogram of predicted removal probability, as measured by our OLS prediction using SSA data, and parents' baseline perceived removal probability, as measured through our baseline survey. Bottom figure presents average perceived removal probability at baseline by predicted removal probability, where the size of the marker corresponds to relative group size. Predicted removal probability comes from our OLS prediction. Baseline beliefs are responses to the baseline question "How likely do you think it is that [KID] will stop receiving SSI benefits over the next 10 years?" This question is asked of respondents who respond to the preceding question "Do you think there's any chance [KID] will stop receiving SSI benefits over the next 10 years?" with "Yes, there is some chance that [his/her] benefits will stop." For those who respond "No, there is no chance that [his/her] benefits will stop," we code their perceived likelihood of removal as 0. Online Appendix Figure [H.1](#) shows a histogram of the gap, at baseline, between predicted and perceived removal probabilities. Appendix Section [C](#) includes more information on the measurement of parent beliefs. Top figure sample size: $N = 5968$. Bottom figure sample size: $N = 5968$.

mass at smaller beliefs gaps increases relative to larger beliefs gaps.^{31,32}




Figure 3: In response to information, treated parents update beliefs relative to control parents

Note: Figure shows histograms of the gap between a parent's beliefs about their child's likelihood of removal after the intervention, as measured through our endline survey, minus their child's true predicted likelihood of removal, as measured by our prediction using SSA data. Histograms are shown separately for the Control group members from whom we collected endline beliefs (to avoid priming the Control group, we collected endline beliefs about the likelihood of removal for only a subset of respondents in our Control group) and the Information group. We exclude the Information-Perverse group. Endline beliefs are responses to the endline question "How likely do you think it is that [KID] will lose benefits?" This question is asked of respondents who respond to the preceding question "Do you think that [KID] will lose SSI benefits as an adult?" with anything other than "No, won't lose benefits." For those who respond "No, won't lose benefits," we code their perceived likelihood of removal as 0. See Appendix Section C for more information on the measurement of endline beliefs. See Online Appendix Figure H.2 for a version of this figure limited to the subset of our sample that underestimates their child's likelihood of removal by 30pp or more at baseline. Sample size: Control N = 436; Information N = 2758.

³¹Recall that the endline beliefs question is asked of only 15% of the Control group to avoid priming them to think about SSI removal. Note that the Control group beliefs also shift, with the median beliefs gap in the Control group falling from 60pp to 40pp. This shift within the Control group emphasizes the importance of having a control group. The Control group shift could be the result of priming (that simply asking about the likelihood of removal causes Control group parents to update their beliefs to some extent) or simply the result of the baseline and endline questions being phrased differently. Panel (c) of Appendix Figure B.1 shows the distribution of endline beliefs separately between the Treatment and Control groups (as opposed to showing the gap between endline beliefs and predicted removal probabilities), with consistent results.

³²Note that we do not expect all parents to fully update to the number we provide, since parents could have private information about their child's condition or strong prior beliefs. For a random subset of parents whose endline perceived removal probability is more than 30pp below the predicted removal probability, we ask an open-ended question of why they think their child's removal probability is different than children who are similar on observable characteristics. Most of these parents mention their child's diagnosis, while others say that they think their child's condition is particularly severe or permanent, or is deteriorating or not improving.

We now test more formally whether information affected beliefs by estimating the following regression equation:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta \text{Information}_i + \gamma X_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where Y_i is parent endline beliefs, Information_i is an indicator for whether the child was assigned to the Information group, and, following our pre-analysis plan, X_i is a vector of controls selected using double-LASSO along with stratum fixed effects³³. Again, following our pre-analysis plan, in our main specifications, we (a) exclude the Information-Perverse group and (b) restrict to the 80% of individuals who underestimate the likelihood of removal by at least 30pp at baseline (“underestimators”), since we expected the effects of information to be largest among individuals with the least accurate beliefs.

Table 2 column 1 presents the results. Parents in the Information group believe that their children’s removal probability is 18pp higher than parents in the Control group, or a roughly 80% increase in the mean perceived removal probability relative to the Control group mean of 23%. Thus, our information treatment had a significant impact on beliefs, allowing us to use the treatment as a source of exogenous variation to estimate the effect of beliefs on investments.

Recall that we ask a final qualitative beliefs question at the end of the Resource Center, asking people to report the likelihood of removal on a 5 point likert scale. Since (as shown in Online Appendix Table H.5) there is no selection based on treatment status in who visits the Resource Center, we can use this final beliefs question to test whether the effect on beliefs persisted or dissipated after the information delivery.³⁴ We find that the treatment effect on beliefs persisted. Roughly two-thirds of the Information group answered the beliefs question at the end of the Resource Center the same as the beliefs question immediately following the video. Moreover, as shown in Appendix Figure B.1e, the Information group’s beliefs remained significantly different than the Control group’s, with the size of the treatment effect similar to that measured in the endline survey (Appendix Figure B.1c).

³³For consistency with our later results using our primary outcomes, we use here the controls selected by double-LASSO for all of our primary outcomes pooled. Using controls selected by double-LASSO for parent endline beliefs rather than those selected for our pooled primary outcomes does not meaningfully change our results. Online Appendix Table F.3 lists the controls selected by LASSO.

³⁴That said, because not all respondents visited and/or reached the end of the Resource Center, only 50% of the respondents eligible to answer the question answered it. (Recall that we only asked the question of control group members who were also asked the endline beliefs question.)

Table 2: Information about SSI removal affects beliefs about SSI removal

Dependent Var:	Endline perceived probability of SSI removal			
	Underestimators		Full IV Sample	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Information	18.46*** [1.237]	-5.849 [6.113]	16.08*** [1.340]	-3.666 [5.424]
Information \times Removal Prob.		0.351*** [0.0891]		0.334*** [0.0782]
Removal Prob.		-0.0138 [0.114]		-0.00555 [0.0999]
Information \times Baseline Beliefs		0.0225 [0.0694]		-0.131*** [0.0404]
Baseline Beliefs		0.418*** [0.0604]		0.549*** [0.0375]
Control Mean	22.90	22.90	30.02	30.02
N (Individuals)	2,559	2,559	3,194	3,194
N (Control)	345	345	436	436
N (Information)	2,214	2,214	2,758	2,758
F-stat		94.4		95.9

Notes: Table shows OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the endline perceived probability of removal (on a scale from 0-100) as measured in our endline survey. The sample in regressions (1) and (2) is the Information group (i.e., Treatment group excluding Information-Perverse) and the subset of the Control group we collected endline beliefs from, with both groups limited to individuals who underestimated their child's likelihood of removal at baseline by at least 30pp. The sample in regressions (3) and (4) is the Information group and the subset of the Control group we collected endline beliefs from. All regressions include controls selected by double-LASSO for a specification that pools all four of our primary outcomes, along with stratum fixed effects. See Online Appendix Table [F.3](#) for a list of selected controls. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.

4.3 The effect of beliefs on human capital investment

Having shown that our information treatment shifted beliefs, we now analyze the effect on investments. Figure 4 shows the average take-up of our four main outcomes separately for underestimators in the Control group and the Treatment group. Take-up is very similar between the two groups. Note that take-up of each resource in the Control group is between 20 and 40 percent, indicating that a sizable fraction of parents find the resources valuable enough to make the meaningful financial or temporal investment to take up.




Figure 4: Providing removal information does not increase human capital investment

Note: Figure shows the fraction of respondents taking up each resource and 95% confidence intervals. The sample limits to those who a) underestimate the removal probability by at least 30pp at baseline, and b) are not in the Information-Perverse group. “Career book” indicates choosing a \$35 survey payment plus career book (worth \$16), versus a \$40 survey payment or no response. “Tutoring” indicates choosing the \$300 in tutoring, versus \$50 in cash in the lottery or no response. “Math/computer” indicates signing up for the math/computer skills platform in the Resource Center. “Job training” indicates completing an intake form for vocational rehabilitation services (in applicable states) or requesting information on how to sign up for those services. Sample sizes: Control group $N = 2282$; Information group $N = 2307$.

Table 3 presents regression estimates, and these also indicate a precise 0 effect of information on investments. Columns (1)–(4) in panel A show estimates of equation (1), again for the underestimator sample, where the dependent variable is equal to take-up of each of the main outcome variables. Column (5) shows all outcomes pooled, with standard errors clustered at the individual level. There is no statistically significant increase in take-up of any of the outcomes. The null effect is precisely estimated. For example, the pooled specification in column (5) of Table 3 rules out (at 95% confidence) that information increased take-up of investments by a mere 1.5pp relative to a control mean of 28%. Online Appendix Tables H.6 and H.7 show that the precise null is robust to using the full sample (i.e., not restricting to underestimators) and robust to excluding controls.

Table 3: Providing removal information does not increase human capital investment

Dependent Var:	Career Book	Tutoring	Math Skills	Training	Pooled
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Panel A. Treatment effect of information on resource take-up</i>					
Information	0.00831 [0.0127]	-0.00167 [0.0121]	-0.0189 [0.0132]	0.00211 [0.0129]	-0.00186 [0.00858]
Control Mean	0.25	0.23	0.34	0.30	0.28
N (Individuals)	4,589	4,589	4,589	4,589	4,589
N (Control)	2,282	2,282	2,282	2,282	2,282
N (Information)	2,307	2,307	2,307	2,307	2,307
N (Observations)	4,589	4,589	4,589	4,589	18,356
<i>Panel B. IV estimate of effect of beliefs on resource take-up</i>					
Endline Beliefs	-0.00124 [0.00125]	-0.00170 [0.00123]	-0.00281** [0.00131]	-0.000247 [0.00128]	-0.00126 [0.000844]
Control Mean	0.30	0.27	0.32	0.28	0.29
N (Individuals)	3,194	3,194	3,194	3,194	3,194
N (Control)	436	436	436	436	436
N (Information)	2,758	2,758	2,758	2,758	2,758
N (Observations)	3,194	3,194	3,194	3,194	12,776

Notes: Table shows OLS regressions where the dependent variables are 0/1 indicators for the take-up of human capital investments. “Career Book” indicates choosing a \$35 survey payment plus career book (worth \$16), versus a \$40 survey payment or no response. “Tutoring” indicates choosing the \$300 in tutoring, versus \$50 in cash in the lottery or no response. “Math Skills” indicates requesting log-in information for the math/computer skills platform in the Resource Center. “Training” indicates completing an intake form for vocational rehabilitation services (in applicable states) or requesting information on how to sign up for those services. Column (5) pools the outcomes from columns (1)–(4) into one regression. Robust standard errors are in brackets, except for regression (5) where standard errors are clustered at the individual level. In columns (1)–(4), each individual has one observation; in column (5), each individual has four observations—one observation for each resource. The sample in Panel A limits to those who a) underestimate the removal probability by at least 30pp at baseline, and b) are not in the Information-Perverse group. The sample in Panel B limits to those who are in the Information group or in the random subset of the control group we solicited endline beliefs from. Each regression includes stratum fixed effects and controls selected by double-LASSO, shown in Online Appendix Table [F.3](#). As described in Online Appendix Section [F.1](#) IV models in this table were fixed to account for a pathing issue in our results. IV results limited to the sample that completed the survey after the issue was fixed are similar but precision is lower, as shown in Online Appendix Table [F.1](#). Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.

The effect of 1.5pp is small relative to other differences in take-up: 8pp between parents who do and do not believe college has a high return, 11pp between parents who are above-median and below-median for thinking it is too early to plan for their children’s future, and 17pp between parents who believe the resources are highly useful and those who do not (Appendix Table [B.3](#)).

In addition to testing the null hypothesis of 0, we also test and reject the null hypotheses generated both by our calibration of [Heathcote et al. \(2017\)](#) and by our expert survey. Turning first to the [Heathcote et al. \(2017\)](#) model, the “base case” model and calibration assumptions imply a treatment effect of 11% (see Online Appendix [G](#) for details). The top of our confidence interval rules out an effect of 5% (1.5pp on a control mean of 28%). Even if the baseline assumptions used in the [Heathcote et al. \(2017\)](#) model overestimate the effect by a factor of 2, our confidence intervals would still rule out its predicted effect.

We can also rule out the null hypothesis generated by our expert survey, the results of which are shown in the purple histogram in Figure [5](#). The average of the predicted treatment effects is 14pp, whereas our actual treatment effect outcome is -1pp (shown in orange). This means that we can strongly reject the null of the mean from the prediction survey. Moreover, since 95% of experts’ predictions fall outside the confidence interval (shown in gray), we can reject 95% of expert predictions in addition to the mean of the expert predictions. Thus, the fact that we do not see a positive treatment effect is a clear rejection of expert opinion that we would see an effect.




Figure 5: We strongly reject expert predictions of a positive treatment effect

Note: Figure shows data from our survey through the Social Science Prediction Platform and from our experiment. The purple histogram represents expert predictions of the treatment effect of information on the outcome of whether respondents who underestimated the probability of removal would take up either of the resources in the Resource Center. The sample for the expert predictions is 64 experts (out of 243 contacted) from the NBER Children’s and Education groups. The x-axis shows the treatment effect on that outcome. The purple line denotes the mean of the expert predictions (14pp). The orange line denotes the actual treatment effect point estimate (-1pp). The control group mean of the outcome is 41.8%. The gray region represents the 95% CI around the actual treatment effect, with the inner CI being the 95% CI for rejecting any fixed null and the lighter (slightly larger) CI being the 95% CI for rejecting the mean of the predicted treatment effect distribution, accounting for the fact that the mean is an estimate of an underlying population parameter.

The theory of dynamic discouragement effects predicts that the underestimators should have increased their investments and the overestimators should have decreased their investments. However, Figure 6 shows that treatment effects are zero in both groups. The treatment effect is also zero in all other observable subgroups that we test, including parents of children with a high removal probability, parents who say it's not too early to plan for their child's future, parents who are less credit constrained, parents who say our resources are helpful to their child's success, and households with different demographic characteristics (e.g., child sex, child age, child disability, parent race).




Figure 6: No significant effects of information on human capital in any sub-sample

Note: Figure shows the treatment effect coefficient and 95% confidence interval from estimating the pooled specification from column (5) of Table 3 in different subsamples. All subsamples limit to those who are not in the Information-Perverse group. The samples below the horizontal line additionally limit to those who underestimate the removal probability by at least 30pp at baseline. The row label indicates the specific subsample. “Said some (no) chance of removal:” said some (no) chance of removal at baseline. “Overest/accurate removal prob:” overestimate likelihood of removal at baseline or within 30 percentage points of predicted removal probability. “Underestimate removal prob:” underestimate at baseline by at least 30pp. “Underest removal prob, > 75 pctl:” difference between predicted baseline removal probability and perceived removal probability above the 75th percentile. “Below median removal prob,” “Above median removal prob,” and “Above 75th percentile removal prob:” below-median, above-median, or above 75th percentile value of predicted removal probability, respectively. “Parents says too early to plan” and “Parent says not too early to plan:” below-median and above-median responses to baseline question regarding whether too early to plan for child’s future. “Less credit constrained” and “more credit constrained:” below-median and above-median responses to baseline question about likelihood of affording college. “Resource extremely useful” and “Resource not/somewhat useful:” defined at respondent \times resource level, indicators for saying resource “extremely useful for the child’s future income and career” (versus something less than that). “Resource not useful if no college” and “Resource useful if no college:” defined at respondent \times resource level, indicators for saying resource would be helpful even if child does not attend college. “Parent says college worth it” and “Parent says college not worth it:” indicators for parent saying they think increase in earnings from attending a 4-year college enough to cover the cost. “Younger child” and “Older child:” below-median and above-median child age. “Disability: physical/mental:” child disability type. “Respondent edu/disability/race:” self-reported. See Appendix Table B.3 for estimates.

Turning to our secondary outcomes, Table 4 shows no increases in parents’ expectations about their child going to college or their child working in adulthood. If anything, we estimate a statistically significant *decrease* in parents’ expectations about college-going. This negative effect could be a chance result or it could reflect wealth effects combined with credit constraints: that the prospect of losing SSI income makes parents think that college tuition will no longer be affordable or that the child will need to forgo college to work instead (though again, we find no effects on work plans). We also do not find any effect of the information on parents’ interest in signing up for savings accounts for their children.

Table 4: Providing information does not increase college, work, or savings plans

Dependent Var:	Thinks child will go to college	Thinks child will work	Savings account
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Information	-0.0575*** [0.0128]	-0.00156 [0.0138]	-0.0141 [0.0116]
Control Mean	0.51	0.58	0.21
N (Individuals)	4,394	4,379	4,589
N (Control)	2,186	2,183	2,282
N (Information)	2,208	2,196	2,307

Notes: Table shows OLS regressions where the dependent variables are 0/1 indicators for if the parent thinks the child will go to college or if the child will work as an adult, as measured in our endline survey, and if the parent requests information about the ABLE savings account in the Resource Center. All regressions include a vector of controls selected by double-LASSO, shown in Online Appendix Table F.3, as well as stratum fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in brackets. The sample limits to those who a) underestimate the removal probability by at least 30pp at baseline, and b) are not in the Information-Perverse group. Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.

4.3.1 IV specification

The fact that we have no treatment effect of information among samples that updated their beliefs in a positive direction suggests that those beliefs likely did not affect investments. Still, to formally verify this conclusion, we run an instrumental variables analysis for the following second-stage equation:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta \text{EndlineBeliefs}_i + \gamma X_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (2)$$

where Y_i is the outcome variable, $EndlineBeliefs_i$ are the respondent’s endline beliefs about the likelihood that their child is removed, and X_i is a vector of controls and stratum fixed effects. To leverage the fact that our treatment had different effects on beliefs based on both the removal probability delivered and the respondent’s baseline beliefs, we instrument for $EndlineBeliefs_i$ using $Information_i$ and the interactions between $Information_i$ and two pre-specified predictors of how much the parent would update beliefs: the actual removal probability and the baseline perceived removal probability. We exclude the Information-Perverse group and include in the control vector the main effects of the two predictors, plus stratum fixed effects and the same controls used in the OLS specification. Our *ex ante* prediction was that $\beta > 0$.³⁵

Column (4) of Table 2 shows the first stage equation. The information treatment has heterogeneous effects with respect to both removal probabilities and baseline beliefs, and the heterogeneity is in the expected direction. Those with higher removal probabilities and/or lower baseline beliefs update their beliefs more positively. The first-stage F-statistic on the three excluded interactions ($Information$, $Information$ interacted with baseline perceived removal probability, and $Information$ interacted with predicted removal probability) is 94.³⁶

We present the IV results in Panel B of Table 3. Unsurprisingly given the absence of treatment effects, we find that the perceived likelihood of removal from SSI has no effect on any investment. All coefficients are numerically nearly 0. We can rule out (at 95% confidence) that a 10pp increase in the perceived likelihood of removal increases take-up of resources by more than 0.004pp (1.4%). As a comparison, the OLS estimate of the effect on take-up of resources is 3.2pp, assuming the same change in beliefs that our experiment generated among underestimators (the estimate becomes 1.8pp if we use the same controls as the IV regression; see Appendix Table B.2). To the extent that we expect OLS to be biased upward, the relatively small OLS estimate suggests that the null effect from our experiment is reasonable.

³⁵IV estimation requires that the instrument(s) move the endogenous variable (removal beliefs) in the same direction for everyone (i.e., the monotonicity condition). In our case, it is likely that monotonicity would be violated if we only used a single instrument (Information), since 8.2% of parents overestimate the likelihood of removal at baseline and treatment could reduce the perceived probability of removal for them. However, our approach of interacting Information with baseline covariates that are predictive of the beliefs change (actual removal probability and baseline perceived removal probability) reduces the monotonicity concern since it allows the effect of treatment on beliefs to vary with the covariates (Słoczyński, 2020).

³⁶One complication with this approach is that, because measuring beliefs multiple times could prime the Control group to think about removal, we only measured *EndlineBeliefs* for a small subsample of the Control group. The IV approach is thus identified off of a subsample, which could reduce power. As a result, our pre-analysis plan specified that we would run the first stage and, if the first stage F-stat was sufficient, proceed, and if not, run a different “predicted IV” specification. We believe a first stage F-stat of 94 is likely sufficient but we show the “predicted IV” results in Online Appendix Section F.3 (Online Appendix Table F.5). The results are consistent and the estimates more precise.

5 Explaining the null effect of information on human capital investment

Why does there not appear to be dynamic discouragement — that is, why does information about SSI removal not lead parents to increase human capital investment in their children? There are two possible explanations for the null effect: that there is truly no dynamic discouragement effect of beliefs about the future safety net on human capital investment (i.e., that the effect of interest is null), or that the true dynamic discouragement effect of interest is non-0 but that our field experiment did not adequately measure it (i.e., that our measurement of the effect broke down). Figure 7 depicts these explanations graphically. The effect of interest is the effect of updating people’s beliefs about SSI removal (circle 2 in Figure 7) on human capital investment (circle 5), as outlined in green. In practice, we measure the effect of providing information about SSI removal (circle 1) on the take-up of education resources (circle 6). As described in more detail below, the left side (outlined in red) shows what must hold for us to properly *measure* the effect of interest, while the right side (outlined in blue) depicts the true *channels* that could underlie the effect of interest.




Figure 7: Mechanisms diagram

Note: Figure shows the channels that need to take place for information to have a “dynamic discouragement” effect on human capital investment. Violations of these channels could explain the null effect. The center highlights the “effect of interest” (dynamic discouragement effect), the left-hand side of the Figure outlines what is required to accurately measure the effect of interest, and the right-hand side describes potential channels for the effect of interest. Bolding indicates that we find evidence that these channels are violated and could therefore contribute to the null effect. “HK” stands for human capital.

To assess the different explanations depicted in Figure 7, we conducted a follow-up study from January to April 2022. The follow-up study had a similar design to the main study, but with a smaller sample (approximately 1,000 responses) and a few important changes to assess mechanisms.³⁷

- We asked a question about a hypothetical insurance product that would pay out after the child turns 18 *if* the child were not receiving SSI.
- We asked parents about their own work plans and (for Treatment group parents only) how they would handle the loss of SSI income if their child lost SSI at age 18.
- Instead of sending the link to the Resource Center immediately after parents had completed the survey, we waited a few days to send the link to allow for a “cool-down” period for emotions to settle and parents to process the removal information.³⁸

In this section, we combine analyses from our main study and our follow-up study to provide evidence that our measurement did in fact capture the effect of interest. We then provide suggestive evidence on the reasons that the true effect is null.

5.1 Confirming that measurement issues do not explain the null effect

The left-hand side of Figure 7 outlines the steps that must hold for our experiment to properly measure the true effect of interest: 1) our removal information must lead to meaningful and persistent changes in beliefs about removal (i.e., the link from circle 1 to circle 2 must hold) and 2) take-up of our resources must be a good measure of parents’ investments in human capital (i.e., the link from circle 5 to circle 6 must hold). For that true effect to represent the effect of the social safety net on human capital investment (i.e., dynamic discouragement), it must further be the case that either parents do not update their beliefs about the responsiveness of SSI removal to human capital investments (i.e., that there is no link from circle 2 to circle 7) or that they do not respond to that updated belief by decreasing human capital (i.e., that there is no link from circle 7 to circle 5). That is, it must be the case that parents do not update their beliefs about their ability to endogenously affect the removal probability through the “perverse incentives” channel discussed in Section 3.2. As we outline in detail below, we find that all of these conditions are true. In other words,

³⁷Online Appendix Table H.8 shows summary statistics and tests for balance across Treatment and Control group for the follow-up study. Unlike the main study, the follow-up study was nationally representative and did not over-sample particular states. The follow-up stratified on region of residence, rather than state of residence, because of the smaller sample size. In addition, due to limited sample size, the follow-up did not include an Information-Perverse group. See Online Appendix Table H.12 for estimates of the effect on primary outcomes in the follow-up study, which are all consistent with the effects in the main study.

³⁸Due to logistical constraints, links were sent out once a week, and so the exact cool down period length depended on the day of week the person received their survey. On average, participants who visited the resource in the follow-up study visited it 11 days after they completed the endline survey, as compared with 30 hours after completion in the main study.

we find that measurement issues cannot explain the null effect.

1. Get information → 2. Update removal beliefs. Figure 3 from the main study shows that Treatment group parents update their beliefs about their child’s removal likelihood relative to the Control group. These updated beliefs persist to the end of the Resource Center in both the main study (Appendix Figure B.1e and Online Appendix Figure H.4) and the follow-up study (Appendix Figure B.1f). The fact that updated beliefs persisted in the follow-up study is particularly notable given that most respondents did not answer that question for several days after they completed the intervention (the median gap was 3.5 days and the mean was 11 days).³⁹


Moreover, to verify that parents fully internalized the information and its implications, we asked a question in the follow-up study about a hypothetical insurance product: “Suppose SSA gives you the option to receive \$100 less in SSI benefits each month over the next year.... In return, they would give you \$7,000 when your child turns 20 if your child is no longer receiving SSI benefits at that time, but nothing if your child is still receiving SSI. Would you take this offer?” As shown in Figure 8a, take-up is a statistically significant 10pp higher in the Treatment group than the Control group. This treatment effect indicates that parents are not simply regurgitating the removal information or responding to the endline beliefs question with the answer they think is expected of them. Instead, they appear to internalize that their child’s removal risk is higher than expected and to use that updated removal risk to make decisions about the future.

Further evidence that the Treatment group understands the information comes from differences in the emotional state of the Treatment group and Control group at endline. As shown in Figure 8b, the Treatment group has somewhat more negative emotions after receiving the removal information: they are more likely than the Control group to report feeling “angry” or “discouraged” and less likely to report feeling “hopeful.”⁴⁰


5. Change actual human capital investment → 6. Change take-up of resources. We turn next to evaluating whether the take-up of our resources is a good measure of parents’ broader intentions to invest in human capital. Several pieces of evidence confirm

³⁹That said, because not all respondents visited the Resource Center or went to the end of it, the subset of respondents who answered is small in both studies and smaller in the follow-up study (50% in the main study and 11% in the follow-up study). (Note that these fractions condition on being programmed to receive the question; recall that we did not ask the question to the full control group). There was no selection across the Information and Control groups into who answered the Resource Center beliefs question, since there was no selection into who visited the Resource Center (again, see Figure 10).

⁴⁰One potential concern would be if the Treatment group’s changed emotional state temporarily caused them to not react to the information, but they would have then reacted differently if given more time to process. We addressed this concern in the follow-up study by using the “cool-down” period before sending parents to the resource center and, as discussed below, find that there are still no treatment effects after the cool-down.



(a) Information increases demand for insurance against loss of SSI



(b) Information has some effect on parent emotions

Figure 8: Information group internalizes information (follow-up, endline)

Note: Top panel shows the fraction of respondents saying “Yes” to the following question (and the 95% confidence interval) in the endline survey: “This is a hypothetical question about your budget for the next few years. Suppose SSA gives you the option to receive \$100 less in SSI benefits each month over the next year (a total of \$1,200 less over the year). In return, they would give you \$7,000 when your child turns 20 if your child is no longer receiving SSI benefits at that time, but nothing if your child is still receiving SSI. Would you take this offer?” See Online Appendix Table [H.9](#) for estimates. Sample size: Control group $N = 148$; Information group $N = 328$. Bottom panel shows the fraction of respondents in the follow-up study choosing a given emotion (and 95% confidence interval) in response to the endline survey question “In this moment, how are you feeling about your child’s future? Select all that apply.” See Online Appendix Table [H.10](#) for estimates. For both graphs, the sample limits to those who a) underestimate the removal probability by at least 30pp at baseline and b) are in the Information group (i.e., Treatment group excluding Information-Perverse) or a randomly selected subset of the Control group. Sample size: Control group $N = 348$; Information group $N = 335$.

that parents believe the resources we offered are valuable. The first is revealed preference: take-up of our primary outcomes among the Control group is around 30% (see Figure [4](#)) despite non-trivial financial and/or time costs to obtain them⁴¹. In addition, for three of the

⁴¹In our piloting, we tried offering some of these services without the financial and/or time cost and take-up was extremely high, suggesting that parents value these resources highly. We added the financial and/or time costs so that there would not be ceiling effects that prevented us from detecting treatment effects.

four primary outcomes, the majority of parents say that the resource would be “extremely” useful in helping their child excel in school and/or their career (versus “somewhat” or “not” useful, see Figure 9). Even when we limit the sample to the parents saying that the resource would be “extremely” helpful, we do not find a treatment effect (see “Resource extremely useful” subgroup in Figure 6). Moreover, as discussed in Section 3.3.2, estimates from the literature suggest that parents are correct and that the resources would be very helpful for their children’s future earnings. For example, parents appear to be giving up \$960–\$4,700 by failing to take-up the job training (Dean et al., 1999, 2015, 2017; Wilhelm and Robinson, 2010).




Figure 9: Vast majority of parents think resources are useful for their child’s future (main, baseline)

Note: Figure shows the fraction of parents responding in the baseline survey with “Not helpful,” “Somewhat helpful,” or “Extremely helpful” when asked “How much would [RESOURCE] help your child excel in school and/or their career?” The sample includes all parents in the Control and Treatment groups in the main study. Sample size: $N = 5923$.

Further evidence that our resources are capturing true investment decisions comes from take-up levels that are consistent with our priors about which groups value resources the most—e.g., higher take-up among parents who believe college is a worthwhile investment and among parents who think the resources are “extremely” useful (see Appendix Table B.3). In addition, if parents were in fact adjusting other human capital investments in order to prepare their children to work more in adulthood, but just not adjusting the take-up of our resources, we would also expect to see their plans for their children’s future work change. Yet, we find a null effect on parents’ expectations about whether their children will work in adulthood (Table 4), which makes it more likely that there are no human capital investment effects of any kind.

We next provide evidence against the idea that we measured the resources too soon. Since the Treatment group had slightly more negative emotions at endline (see Figure 8b), in our follow-up study we implemented a “cool down” period of several days before sending the

link to the Resource Center. Even with the cool-down period, the treatment effect remains zero (with lower overall take-up, see Figure 10 and Online Appendix Table H.12). The lack of any difference in the treatment effect between immediate measurement and measurement after the “cool-down” period suggests that insufficient time does not explain our null effect.




Figure 10: No treatment effect even with “cool down” period before resources (endline)

Note: Figure shows the fraction of parents who visit the Resource Center after completing the survey (and the 95% confidence interval), in both the main study and the follow-up study. In the main study, respondents received the Resource Center link immediately after completing the survey, as well as several email and text reminders. In the follow-up study, respondents received the Resource Center link by email several days after completing the survey, as well as several email and text reminders. For the main study, the sample limits to those who a) underestimate the removal probability by at least 30pp at baseline, and b) are not in the Information-Perverse group. The follow-up study did not have an Information-Perverse group, so the sample limits to those who underestimate the removal probability by at least 30pp at baseline. Sample sizes: Main survey: Control group $N = 2282$, Information group $N = 2307$; Follow-up survey: Control group $N = 348$, Information group $N = 335$.

A final concern would be if our zero overall treatment effect masked significant heterogeneity, with some people responding to information by increasing their take-up of the resources and others responding by decreasing their take-up. The fact that we do not see significant negative or positive treatment effects in any subsample suggests that this is not the case (Figure 6). In addition, a mix of heterogeneous effects would likely affect the *variance* of number of resources taken up even if it does not affect the mean. However, the distribution of the number of resources taken up is exactly the same for the Control and Information groups (see Online Appendix Figure H.3).

Perverse incentives: 2. Update removal beliefs \rightarrow 7. Update beliefs about responsiveness of removal to human capital \rightarrow 5. Change actual human capital investment. Recall from Section 3.2 the possibility that parents could respond to information about SSI removal by decreasing human capital investments if they think that higher human capital increases the likelihood of removal. We have two pieces of evidence that perverse incentives do not explain the null effect. First, perverse incentives are possible only if parents think that having higher human capital leads to a higher likelihood of removal, but

parents in our baseline survey for the most part do not believe this.⁴² In our diagram, this implies that the link from circle 2 to circle 7 does not hold. Second, we do not find any effect of our subtreatments intended to pick up the perverse incentives effect.⁴³ In our diagram, this implies that overall the perverse incentives channel running from circle 2 through circle 7 to circle 5 is not operational.

5.2 Investigating hypotheses behind the true null effect

Having established that measurement issues cannot explain the null effect, we investigate various hypotheses for why the true effect of updated removal beliefs on human capital investments is null, as outlined in the right-hand side of Figure 7. To summarize the discussion below, we confirm that updated beliefs about SSI removal lead to updated beliefs about the need for income and the earnings return to human capital. However, when we examine whether those updated beliefs about income needs and returns to human capital translate into an increased desire to invest in human capital, we find some evidence of channels that could dampen the response relative to the benchmark model. In particular, we find that parents plan to work more themselves to recover the lost SSI income, which could decrease how much the income effect affects human capital investment. In addition, parents appear to make decisions about their children’s education at least partly with non-financial objectives in mind (e.g., work providing a sense of purpose), which could dampen responsiveness to financial incentives. Finally, we investigate explanations for why desired increases in human capital investment may not translate into actual increases in human capital investment. Here we find suggestive evidence that parents are constrained in how much their investments can increase, both because the SSI loss reduces permanent income and because parents may

⁴²At baseline, we asked parents in our Information-Perverse group, “If your child were to graduate from high school and excel academically, do you think that would make them more or less likely to remain eligible for SSI?” From Online Appendix Table H.2, the most common response was to say “About as likely” (33% of parents) and, if anything, more parents responded that their child was *less* likely to be removed (with 21% responding “somewhat less likely and 23% responding “much less likely”) than more likely (11% saying much more likely and 12% saying somewhat more likely). Although it was a baseline question, we only asked it to the Information-Perverse group because we felt the question would be too priming regarding the potential for perverse incentives for any other groups.

⁴³The Information-Perverse group in the main study received a message immediately after the information video saying that SSA would evaluate whether the child is able to earn a living as an adult and would use various information about school, work, and medical treatment to make the decision (see footnote 56). The goal was to amplify perverse incentives, to the extent that they exist. Recall also that we cross-randomized (among Control and Treatment groups, but excluding the Information-Perverse group) a subtreatment saying “The University of Chicago will keep your responses to these offers confidential,” delivered just before providing the link to the Resource Center. The goal was to dampen perverse incentives, to the extent that they exist. Appendix Table B.4 shows that the Information-Perverse group did not respond differently than the basic Information group in any economically meaningful or statistically significant way. Appendix Table B.4 also shows that the interaction between Information and receiving the Confidentiality message is near 0 and not statistically significant.

already be investing at the limit of their monetary or time constraints.⁴⁴

2. Update removal beliefs → 3. Update beliefs about need for income and return to human capital. The follow-up study provides evidence that parents believe SSI removal would be a major financial shock (i.e., that there is an income effect): 81% said the loss would be catastrophic or that they would be “much” or “somewhat” (versus “not much”) worse off (see Online Appendix Table H.10).⁴⁵ Moreover, parents expect to support their children in adulthood, with 61% saying their child will continue living with them in adulthood and another 30% saying they will support their child even if the child lives separately.⁴⁶ In addition, parents appear to understand that SSI receipt in adulthood affects the return to work, with 62% of parents saying that their child’s SSI benefit in adulthood would fall by either \$1 or 50 cents for every dollar their child earns from working in adulthood (the correct answer is 50 cents). That is, parents understand that there is a substitution effect wherein receiving SSI benefits as an adult decreases the financial returns to work.⁴⁷

In order for the income effect and substitution effect to affect human capital investment in particular, parents must also believe that human capital would have an earnings return for their children. In the baseline survey of the follow-up study, nearly 80% of parents say high school would increase their own child’s earnings from work “a little” or “a lot,” and a plurality of parents say that 4-year college would increase their child’s earnings enough to cover the cost (see Online Appendix Table H.10).⁴⁸ Moreover, parents are very confident in their children’s abilities in school and work: 64% think their child could attend college, and 84% expect their child to have a part-time or full-time job in adulthood (see baseline questions section of Online Appendix Table H.2).⁴⁹

⁴⁴Studies on the effects of low-touch information interventions on educational outcomes find a mix of positive (e.g., Jensen, 2010; Bergman, 2021; Wiswall and Zafar, 2015; Hoxby and Turner, 2015) and null effects (e.g., Bergman et al., 2019; Bettinger et al., 2012; Darolia and Harper, 2018; Booij et al., 2012) on behavior and outcomes.

⁴⁵This question was asked at endline to the Treatment group only. We did not ask the Control group in order to avoid priming them about the potential of removal from SSI.

⁴⁶From the PROMISE evaluation, around 40% of parents of adolescents receiving SSI expect their child to live independently at age 25 and around 65% expect them to be financially independent (Mamun et al., 2019).

⁴⁷Recall that the information video focuses on the child losing SSI income, rather than the child no longer being subject to SSI’s 50% marginal tax rate. A natural question is whether the information would have generated an investment response if it had included SSI’s marginal tax rate. We think this is unlikely because, as stated above, parents already appear well-informed about the marginal tax rate.

⁴⁸Even among parents who say 4-year college is worth it, we do not estimate a treatment effect (see “Parent says college worth it” group in Figure 6).

⁴⁹Note that these figures are much higher than actual educational achievement or employment rates for this population (Social Security Administration, 2012; Davies et al., 2009). However, they are consistent with findings from PROMISE of very optimistic beliefs by both parents and youth (with some variation across sites): nearly 100% of youth expect to complete high school, around 60% (45%) of youth (parents) expect the youth to go to college, and around 95% (95%) of youth (parents) expect the youth to be employed at age 25 (Mamun et al., 2019).

3. Update beliefs about need for income and return to human capital → 4. Update desired human capital investment. We find evidence that updating about income needs and returns to human capital might translate to a weaker desire to increase human capital investment than the benchmark model predicts, for a few reasons. First, parents have alternative plans to recover the lost income. When we asked treated parents how they would recover the lost income if their child were to lose SSI benefits in adulthood, only 25% say they would mainly respond by having their child work more in adulthood (see Figure 11). Instead, nearly half of parents (49%) say they themselves would work more in response to the SSI loss.⁵⁰ (Another 10% say they would do “nothing” and another 9% would try to apply for other benefits.) Indeed, as shown in Figure 12, information leads to an increase in plans to work more in the future among currently employed parents (significant at the 10% level).





Figure 11: Parents would make up for lost income from benefits in many ways (follow-up, endline)


Note: Figure shows responses among parents in the follow-up study to the endline survey question “If your child were to lose SSI benefits at the age of 18, would you try to make up for that lost income? If so, what is the primary way you would do that?” The response options were the following: “No, I wouldn’t try to make up for the lost income.” / “Yes, by trying to have my child work more in adulthood.” / “Yes, by trying to work more myself.” / “Yes, by trying to get benefits from another program.” / “Other, specify:”. The sample is all parents in the Treatment group in the follow-up study. See Online Appendix Table H.10 for estimates. Sample size: $N = 450$.

Second, parents appear to make decisions about their children’s education based not only on financial objectives but also non-financial ones. In the follow-up study, 53% of parents say their “primary goal when making decisions about [their] child’s education” is to help them “realize their potential” versus 30% saying “achieve a stable financial future” (with another 14% saying “engage in activities they enjoy”), as shown in Figure 13. Other evidence

⁵⁰While we discuss parental work plans as a potential *reason* that the human capital investment response to lost income might be muted, it is also possible that parental work plans are a *response* to constraints that prevent human capital investment in children from being a viable strategy to make up lost income (outlined below when discussing the step from circle 4 to circle 5 of Figure 7).



(a) Currently employed parents



(b) Currently unemployed parents

Figure 12: Currently employed parents increase plans to work in response to removal info (follow-up, endline)

Note: Top graph shows, among currently employed parents in the follow-up study, the fraction saying “Work more” (and 95% confidence interval) to the questions “In the next few years, while your child is under 18, do you plan to work more or less than you are currently?” and “Once your child becomes a young adult, do you plan to work more or less than you are currently?” Bottom graph shows, among currently unemployed parents in the follow-up study, the fraction saying “Yes” to the questions “In the next few years, while your child is under 18, do you plan to work at a job?” and “Once your child becomes a young adult, do you plan to work at a job?” Both graphs show the fraction choosing the \$35 survey payment plus parent career book (versus \$40 survey payment or no response) and the 95% confidence interval. The sample is all parents (Treatment and Control groups) in the follow-up study who underestimate the removal probability by at least 30pp at baseline. See Online Appendix Table [H.11](#) for estimates. Sample sizes: Top graph: Control group N = 161, Information group N = 166; Bottom graph: Control group N = 183, Information group N = 167.

also suggests that parents make decisions about work based on factors other than financial well-being. Among parents who think there is no chance their child will lose benefits and who think SSI’s marginal tax rate is 100% (meaning there is no financial return to work if receiving SSI), more than 75% still expect their child to work in adulthood, and the take-up of our resources is just as high as in other groups. Taken together, this evidence suggests that parents believe that work and human capital may be good for their children for reasons beyond income generation. It is also consistent with findings from other contexts that parents care about more than just the financial returns to education (Berry et al., 2020).




Figure 13: Evidence that parents make investment decisions based on non-financial goals (follow-up, baseline)

Note: Figure shows responses among parents in the follow-up study to the baseline survey question “My primary goal when making decisions about my child’s education is to help them:” The response options were the following: “Realize their potential” / “Engage in activities they enjoy” / “Achieve a stable financial future” / “Other, specify:”. Sample size: $N = 915$. See Online Appendix Table H.10 for estimates.

We also investigated the possibility of high discount rates dampening plans for human capital investment, but did not find much evidence for this explanation. In the follow-up study, roughly 45% of parents “strongly disagree” (and another 30% “disagree”) with the statement “It’s too early to start thinking about my child’s life as an adult.” Even among parents who “strongly disagree,” we do not estimate a treatment effect (see “Parent says not too early to plan” in Figure 6).

4. Update desired human capital investment → 5. Change actual human capital investment. The explanations discussed above—parents’ plans to work more themselves and non-financial objectives for investing in human capital—can explain why information has a more muted effect on human capital investment than the benchmark model might predict. However, they cannot explain why information would have no effect on human capital investment. Instead, roadblocks on the path from desired investment to actual investment might explain the zero effect on human capital investment.

First, we find some evidence that the wealth effect—the reduction in permanent income

due to the SSI loss—could choke off some types of human capital investment. In the main study, we find a statistically significant *negative* effect of the information on the secondary outcome of college-going plans (see Table 4). This suggests that credit-constrained parents may believe they can no longer afford the tuition or the opportunity cost of their child being in college.⁵¹ This could lead to reductions in investments that are complementary to college-going. However, two pieces of evidence suggest that the wealth effect cannot fully explain our null effect for other outcomes. First, there is no treatment effect even for resources like job training that are not complementary to college-going. Second, we do not find a treatment effect among parents who are less credit constrained or among the majority of parents who believe the resources are useful even if their child does not attend college (see “Less credit constrained” and “Resource useful if no college” in Figure 6).⁵²

Our results are more consistent with the explanation that these low-income parents are already at the limit of investment subject to time and resource constraints. As shown in Online Appendix Table H.10, 89% of parents in the follow-up study report that they are already doing “all they can do” to help their child succeed. This could mean that parents have reached either their own limits (in terms of money, time, or bandwidth) or their child’s limits for investment opportunities, and there is no room for additional investment even in light of SSI removal information. Especially if parents have strong non-financial objectives for investing (as discussed above), they may be more likely to already be at the limits of what they can invest, even in the absence of strong financial incentives. (In contrast, parents with *only* financial objectives may be less likely to have invested up to their limit at baseline, given that the income and substitution effects mean that financial incentives to earn a living in adulthood are weak.)⁵³ The idea that resource constraints limit dynamic discouragement is consistent with Heathcote et al. (2017), who show in an extension to their benchmark model that adding resource constraints reduces the responsiveness of investment to future taxes and increases the amount of redistribution that a social planner would choose.

⁵¹Assuming college is primarily seen as a financial investment, the credit constraints are relevant because, in the absence of credit constraints, the level of investment should not depend on wealth—only on returns. Credit constraints are, however, not necessary for there to be a wealth effect if college-going also has consumption value or other non-financial value.

⁵²Note that the latter is defined at the parent \times resource level and so focuses only on the specific resources which parents find useful in the absence of college.

⁵³Note that this hypothesis is conceptually distinct from the wealth effect hypothesis: while wealth effects regard the *change* in wealth and permanent income due to information, the constraints hypothesis concerns the baseline *level* of resources available to invest. The fact that we do not find a treatment effect among those who are less credit constrained in Figure 6 suggests either that some of the constraints are non-monetary (e.g., time, bandwidth) or that even the “less credit constrained” members of this low income sample are still relatively credit constrained.

6 Conclusion

Our results indicate that, at least in the context of the SSI program, expectations of future benefit receipt from the social safety net have limited, if any, impacts on educational investments in childhood. We thus provide some of the first evidence on the anticipatory effects, or lack thereof, of the social safety net on human capital investment.

From the perspective of how to improve the life outcomes of children who receive SSI, our findings are disappointing news. Removing children at age 18 from SSI has adverse effects on children and society, including large increases in criminal activity (Deshpande and Mueller-Smith, 2022). Our results suggest that dynamic discouragement stemming from lack of information about SSI removal alone is not the cause of the adverse effects, and hence that providing information about removal is unlikely to counter the adverse effects, unless other constraints on investment are also removed. Improving the adult outcomes of children who receive SSI benefits will thus require other policies, potentially in conjunction with information.

From a broader policy perspective, however, our finding that there is limited dynamic discouragement is encouraging news for the social safety net. Both economic theory and experts predict that expected future benefits reduce human capital investments in children, which could be detrimental to their well-being. The absence of this effect means that social safety net programs are not having unintended harmful effects on children. It also means that redistribution is more efficient, and thus the optimal amount of redistribution potentially higher, than previously thought. Future research should further explore the specific mechanisms for the (lack of) anticipatory effects, and whether there are some contexts (e.g., contexts where households face fewer constraints) in which there is more dynamic discouragement.

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A Information video script and screenshots

A.1 Script

The following are the scripts for the Treatment group video (see Online Appendix [E](#) for Geography and History scripts). Sections 1 and 3 appeared in all videos. Section 2 had different versions for the Treatment group than the Control group, and within the Treatment group, for children with different removal probabilities, as indicated. All removal probabilities were rounded to the nearest 10%.

Section 1. Basic overview of SSI [all videos]

We want to share some useful information about your child’s SSI benefits. Your child receives SSI benefits for a disability. This means you receive monthly SSI payments and your child receives access to Medicaid. SSI is an important resource for many families who have children with disabilities.

Section 2. Group-specific information

Treatment group: Information intervention script

Note: There are 6 versions of this script, one for each of 40%, 50%, 60%, 70%, 80%, and 90% removal probabilities. The [X] values are specific to the video.

But what families often don’t know is that many children stop receiving SSI benefits when they turn 18. This is because the medical conditions that qualify someone for benefits are different for adults than they are for children [screenshot in Appendix Figure [A.1](#)]. At the age of 18, children are re-evaluated to see if their condition still qualifies and many kids with your child’s condition do not qualify and stop receiving benefits.

We have looked at children who have the same medical condition as your child, whose condition is just as severe, and who are also the same age as your child and live in the same state.

We find that [“almost all” (for 80-90%), “most” (for 50-70%), “a lot” (for 40%)] of these children lose SSI when they enter adulthood at the age of 18. In fact, [X] out of 10 of these children lose their SSI benefits as adults [screenshot in Appendix Figure [A.2](#)]. That means that [X%] of these children stop receiving SSI [screenshot in Appendix Figure [A.3](#)]. Because these children have the same severe medical condition as your child, we think that your child also has a [X%] chance of losing their SSI benefits when they turn 18.

That means your child [will almost certainly (for 90%) / will most likely (for 70-80%) / will likely (for 50-60%) / could very well (40%)] not receive SSI benefits as an adult [screenshot in Appendix Figure [A.4](#)]. If that happens, they will not receive any monthly payments from SSI, they will not qualify for Medicaid through SSI, and they will need to find other sources of income to support themselves [screenshot in Appendix Figure [A.5](#)].


We're showing you this video so that you can help prepare your child for an adulthood without benefits. Your child can still be successful in adulthood as long as you both take the right steps to prepare.

Section 3. Ending and overview of Resource Center [Everyone]

Of course, success looks different for different children. If success for your child means earning a living in adulthood, then education and training are the best way to help them get there [screenshot in Appendix Figure [A.6](#)]. And we can help. We have set up an education and training Resource Center where you'll find resources like math tutoring and job readiness training. You can select as many resources as you want, and you will receive them at no cost to you. We'll direct you to the Resource Center at the end of the survey.

We want to make sure we communicated all of this information effectively. Please click NEXT to answer a question about the information we just presented.


A.2 Screenshots



Appendix Figure A.1: Information Screenshot: “The medical conditions that qualify someone for benefits are different for adults than they are for children”



Appendix Figure A.2: Information Screenshot: “[8] out of 10 of these children lose their SSI benefits as adults”




Appendix Figure A.3: Information Screenshot: “[80%] of these children stop receiving SSI”



Appendix Figure A.4: Information Screenshot: “Your child [will most likely] not receive SSI benefits as an adult”




Appendix Figure A.5: Information Screenshot: “If that happens...they will need to find other sources of income to support themselves”



Appendix Figure A.6: Screenshot: Resource Center Lead-In

B Key Appendix Figures and Tables



Appendix Figure B.1: Treated parents more likely to update that child will lose benefits

Notes: Panels (a) and (b) show endline beliefs for Control and Information groups in the main and follow-up surveys, respectively. Panels (c) and (d) show responses (in main and follow-up, respectively) among parents to the beliefs question measured at endline “Do you think that [KID] will lose SSI benefits as an adult?” The response options were “No, will definitely not lose benefits” / “Will probably not lose benefits” / “May or may not lose benefits” / “Will probably lose benefits” / “Yes, will definitely lose benefits.” Panels (e) and (f) show responses to the same question at the end of the Resource Center. Respondents were given a link to the Resource Center immediately after completing the endline survey in the main study, but several days after in the follow-up. The sample for (a)-(d) is the Information group and the random subset of the Control group from whom we gathered endline data; the sample for (e) and (f) additionally limits to those who completed the Resource Center and answered the question measured there. 30% of the sample were asked and answered the Resource Center beliefs question in the main study compared to 11% in the follow-up. Panel (a) sample size: Control N = 436; Information N = 2758. Panel (b) sample size: Control N = 442; Information N = 453. Panel (c) sample size: Control N = 438; Information N = 2766. Panel (d) sample size: Control N = 442; Information N = 451. Panel (e) sample size: Control N = 167; Information N = 1509. Panel (f) sample size: Control N = 52; Information N = 52.

Appendix Table B.1: Those in the sample and not in the sample look similar on observables

	All invited		In sample vs not in sample		
			In sample	Not in sample	Std. Diff.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Mean	SD	Mean	Mean	Diff.
A. Administrative Data					
Female Child	0.26	0.44	0.27	0.26	0.02
Child's Age	15.75	0.89	15.73	15.75	-0.02
Single Parent Household	0.76	0.43	0.73	0.77	-0.07
Mother's Age	40.36	6.10	40.36	40.37	-0.00
Sibling on SSI	0.27	0.44	0.26	0.27	-0.03
Months receiving SSI	72.14	43.60	71.19	72.32	-0.03
Had a Child Medical Review	0.77	0.42	0.77	0.77	-0.01
Lost SSI from Child Medical Review	0.18	0.38	0.16	0.18	-0.04
B. Removal Probability					
Predicted Likelihood of Removal	69.84	11.82	69.60	69.88	-0.02
Test for joint orthogonality					
F-stat					6.72
P-value					0.00
Number of individuals	37,000		5,968	31,032	
Percent of Sample	100.0		16.1	83.9	

Notes: Table shows summary statistics for those in our sample and those not in our sample from Social Security Administration administrative data. Child's age and mother's age is as of January 1, 2022. In sample includes anyone who started the survey and made it to the video section of the survey. Not in sample includes anyone who was sent an invitation to complete the web survey but is not in our sample, either because they did not start the survey at all or because they started it and exited before the video section.

Appendix Table B.2: OLS estimates of beliefs on resource take-up are also small

Dependent Var:	Pooled resource take-up		
	OLS		IV
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Endline beliefs	0.00176*** [0.000564]	0.000959* [0.000579]	-0.00126 [0.000844]
N (Individuals)	436	436	3,194
N (Control)	436	436	436
N (Information)	0	0	2,758
N (Observations)	1,744	1,744	12,776
controls	N	Y	Y

Notes: Table shows estimates from regressions that pool the four primary outcomes (take-up of career book, tutoring, math skills, and job training). All regressions control for stratum fixed effects and resource type. Columns (2) and (3) include a vector of additional controls selected by double-LASSO for our Table 3 specification (see Online Appendix Table F.3). Estimates in (1) and (2) are OLS; estimates in (3) are IV. Columns (1) and (2) are limited to only the control group. Column (3) limits to those we collected removal beliefs from at endline and excludes the Information-Perverse group. The units for the dependent variable are 0/1. Endline beliefs represent endline perceived removal probability and run on a scale from 0 to 100. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.

Appendix Table B.3: No significant treatment effects for any subgroup

Dependent Var:	Pooled resources			Control Group
	Effect of information		IV	
	Underestimators	Full sample	Full sample	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	
Full sample	-0.00186 [0.00858]	0.00145 [0.00774]	-0.00126 [0.00084]	0.287
Said some chance of removal		0.00828 [0.01261]	-0.00091 [0.00153]	0.311
Said no chance of removal		-0.00488 [0.00993]	-0.00173* [0.00104]	0.273
Overestimate/accurate removal prob		0.01463 [0.01780]	0.00320 [0.00380]	0.313
Underestimate removal prob		-0.00186 [0.00858]	-0.00172** [0.00087]	0.280
Underest removal prob, above 75th pctl		0.00496 [0.01208]	-0.00126 [0.00108]	0.272
Above median removal prob.		-0.00898 [0.01366]	-0.00169 [0.00209]	0.290
Below median removal prob.	0.00631 [0.00940]	0.00631 [0.00940]	-0.00107 [0.00091]	0.285
Above 75th percentile removal prob	-0.00600 [0.01350]	-0.00600 [0.01350]	-0.00171 [0.00114]	0.284
Parent says too early to plan	0.00495 [0.01150]	0.00996 [0.01052]	-0.00165 [0.00113]	0.231
Parent says not too early to plan	-0.00656 [0.01289]	-0.00625 [0.01148]	-0.00104 [0.00126]	0.338
Less credit constrained	-0.00324 [0.01443]	0.00125 [0.01287]	-0.00240 [0.00159]	0.268
More credit constrained	-0.00330 [0.01078]	0.00123 [0.00973]	-0.00064 [0.00101]	0.296
Resource not/somewhat useful	0.00805 [0.01017]	0.00517 [0.00930]	-0.00090 [0.00109]	0.177
Resource extremely useful	-0.00603	0.00018	-0.00157	0.352

	[0.01137]	[0.01011]	[0.00108]	
Resource not useful if no college	-0.00335 [0.00958]	-0.00538 [0.00873]	-0.00119 [0.00098]	0.193
Resource useful if no college	-0.00706 [0.01225]	0.00150 [0.01089]	-0.00168 [0.00118]	0.375
Parent says college not worth it	0.00289 [0.01239]	0.00141 [0.01117]	-0.00191 [0.00118]	0.269
Parent says college worth it	-0.00757 [0.01564]	-0.00062 [0.01351]	-0.00012 [0.00131]	0.345
Male child	-0.00043 [0.00997]	0.00375 [0.00897]	-0.00078 [0.00098]	0.286
Female child	-0.01593 [0.01728]	-0.00993 [0.01545]	-0.00238 [0.00178]	0.287
Younger child	-0.00425 [0.01222]	-0.00294 [0.01084]	-0.00086 [0.00118]	0.272
Older child	-0.00062 [0.01217]	0.00583 [0.01114]	-0.00201 [0.00126]	0.301
Received benefits < 5 yrs.	-0.01914 [0.01288]	-0.01358 [0.01156]	-0.00195* [0.00107]	0.302
Received benefits \geq 5 yrs.	0.01306 [0.01154]	0.01583 [0.01045]	-0.00052 [0.00131]	0.273
Disability: physical	0.01258 [0.02464]	0.00985 [0.02195]	-0.00334 [0.00267]	0.272
Disability: mental	-0.00472 [0.00944]	-0.00179 [0.00851]	-0.00129 [0.00092]	0.293
Respondent edu: HS grad or less	0.00063 [0.01135]	0.00043 [0.01028]	-0.00143 [0.00101]	0.249
Respondent edu: at least some college	-0.00694 [0.01325]	0.00183 [0.01173]	-0.00141 [0.00158]	0.325
Respondent has a disability	-0.01305 [0.01332]	-0.00998 [0.01206]	-0.00102 [0.00135]	0.290
Respondent does not have a disability	0.00676 [0.01126]	0.00761 [0.01009]	-0.00150 [0.00107]	0.284
Respondent race: white	0.00183 [0.00940]	0.00578 [0.00850]	-0.00119 [0.00087]	0.280
Respondent race: black	0.00183	0.00578	-0.00119	0.280

	[0.00940]	[0.00850]	[0.00087]	
Respondent race: other	-0.01541	-0.01649	-0.00299	0.315
	[0.02200]	[0.01927]	[0.00240]	

Notes: Table shows estimates for different subgroups where the dependent variable pools our four main outcomes (book, tutoring, math, job training) into one regression. All regressions control for stratum fixed effects, resource type, and a vector of additional controls selected by double-LASSO (see Online Appendix Table F.3). Estimates in (1) and (2) are OLS; estimates in (3) are IV. Column (1) limits to those who underestimate their child’s removal probability by at least 30pp at baseline. Column (3) limits to those we collected removal beliefs from at endline. Column (4) shows the control group mean. All columns exclude Information-Perverse group. See Figure 6 notes for definitions of subgroups. As described in Online Appendix Section F.1 IV models in this table were fixed to account for a pathing issue in our results. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.

Appendix Table B.4: No evidence that perverse incentives play a role in information’s (lack of) effects

Dependent Var:	Career Book	Tutoring	Math Skills	Training	Pooled
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Information	0.00908 [0.0127]	-0.00112 [0.0121]	-0.0195 [0.0188]	-0.00335 [0.0182]	0.00269 [0.0121]
Information-Perverse	-0.0153 [0.0320]	0.0353 [0.0313]	0.000117 [0.0352]	-0.0459 [0.0333]	-0.00802 [0.0222]
Information × Confidentiality			0.000784 [0.0264]	0.0111 [0.0258]	-0.00855 [0.0172]
Confidentiality			-0.00902 [0.0187]	0.00633 [0.0182]	0.00466 [0.0122]
Control Mean	0.25	0.23	0.34	0.30	0.28
<i>p</i> -value Information- Perverse = 0	.633	.259			
N (Individuals)	4,776	4,776	4,776	4,776	4,776
N (Observations)	4,776	4,776	4,776	4,776	19,104

Notes: Table shows OLS regressions where the dependent variables are 0/1 indicators for the take-up of human capital investments. “Treatment” indicates the Treatment group (including Information-Perverse group), “Information-Perverse” indicates the Information-Perverse group, and “Confidentiality” indicates that the respondent was assigned to the Confidentiality subtreatment (see Appendix D.4 for more details). All regressions include a vector of controls selected by double-LASSO and stratum fixed effects. See Online Appendix Table F.3 for a list of selected controls. Column (5) pools the outcomes from columns (1)–(4) into one regression and includes an additional control for resource type. Robust standard errors are in brackets, except for regression (5) where standard errors are clustered at the individual level. The sample limits to those who underestimate the removal probability by at least 30pp at baseline. Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.

C Measuring Beliefs

C.1 Main Study

We solicited parents’ beliefs about their child’s likelihood of removal from SSI at age 18 three times during the main study: before the video intervention (baseline), after the video intervention (endline), and at the end of the Resource Center.

The baseline and endline questions are shown in Section 3.3.1. Recall from Section 3.3.1 that we only collected endline beliefs for a random subset of the Control group. To keep the survey experience constant, we asked the Control group parents who did not receive the endline beliefs questions two placebo questions, structured identically to the beliefs questions.⁵⁴ Once again, we did not ask parents the second question if they answered “No” to the first question. Parents who answered “No” had their answer recorded as 0% for the second question. (There was a minor pathing issue with the endline question, described in more detail in Online Appendix Section F.1.)

After parents had selected resources in the Resource Center, we assessed their beliefs about their child’s likelihood of losing SSI benefits again. This time, we asked one question:

1. Do you think that [KID] will receive SSI benefits as an adult? There is no right or wrong answer; we just want to know what you think.
 - Yes, will definitely receive benefits
 - Will probably receive benefits
 - May or may not receive benefits
 - Will probably not receive benefits
 - No, definitely will not receive benefits

We asked the Resource Center question to the Treatment group and to the same random subset of the Control group from whom we had collected beliefs at endline.

C.2 Follow-Up Study

For the follow-up study conducted between January and April 2022, we made a few adjustments to our beliefs questions. First, we assessed beliefs for all parents at baseline, endline, and after the Resource Center. Second, for both the baseline and endline beliefs questions, we dropped the restriction that parents were asked the second beliefs question only if they did not answer “No” to the first question. We dropped this restriction so we could collect more detailed endline beliefs for all parents in the sample. As a result, we added

⁵⁴The first placebo question was “Do you think that [KID] will live outside the [REGION] as an adult?” The second placebo question was “How likely do you think it is that [KID] will live outside the [REGION] as an adult?”

“0% (definitely will not lose benefits)” as an answer option to the second beliefs question.

Third, we changed the answer options on the first question at baseline to allow for more nuance. The question for the follow-up study was:

1. Do you think there’s any chance [KID] will lose SSI benefits over the next 10 years?
 - No, will definitely not lose benefits
 - Will probably not lose benefits
 - May or may not lose benefits
 - Will probably lose benefits
 - Yes, will definitely lose benefits

C.3 Differences across studies in baseline responses

In our main study, 60% of the sample said there was no chance their child will lose SSI benefits at baseline. In the follow-up study, where respondents had more answer options than just “Yes” and “No,” only 29% said their child “will definitely not” lose benefits. An additional 20% said their child “will probably not” lose benefits.

Responses to the second baseline beliefs question were also different across main and follow-up. Parents in the main study thought on average that their child had a 20% chance of losing benefits in the next 10 years, compared to a 29% chance among parents in the follow-up study. Similarly, average baseline beliefs gap (the difference in a parent’s believed removal probability and our predicted removal probability) was 50pp in the main study, compared to 39pp in the follow-up.

Some of the difference in baseline beliefs between the main and follow-up comes from the different treatment of “No” responses to the first question. In the main study, everyone who said “No” to the first question was considered to have a 0% perceived likelihood of removal. In the follow-up, when we let those who said “No” select their perceived likelihood of removal, 68% selected a 0% likelihood and the other 32% selected a larger probability. But even if we replace the perceived likelihood of removal for those 32% with 0% (analogous to our procedure in the main study), the average expected likelihood for the follow-up is still 27%, well above the main study average of 20%.

D Appendix to the Experimental Design

D.1 OLS Prediction

We used historical Social Security Administration data on age 18 removal decisions for children receiving SSI to create an OLS prediction of the likelihood of removal for any given child based on their observable characteristics. Alternative methods such as LASSO and causal forest yielded similar predictions. We applied our model to the universe of all current SSI recipients to generate individual-level predictions of likelihood of removal.

To create the prediction, we started with the Supplemental Security Record linked to parental earnings from the Master Earnings File. We included individuals with years of birth between 1991 and 2002, inclusive, so that we could observe the outcome of the age 18 redetermination. For each integer age between 14 and 17, we created a sample of individuals who received SSI in that year and, for this sample, regressed an indicator for not being on SSI at age 19 on the following observable characteristics: sex, primary and secondary diagnosis code, medical diary (which determines how often the individual is supposed to receive a medical review, generally based on severity or expected recovery), family structure, number of years on SSI, number of moves, age at last medical review, number of older siblings who received SSI, race, parental earnings, and 3-digit ZIP code. The R-squared on the prediction regression is 0.216. While this R-squared may appear low at first glance, because the dependent variable in the prediction regression is binary (an indicator for not being on SSI at age 19), there is a natural upper bound on the R-squared. Cox and Wermuth (1992) write that “in linear regressions with binary responses...low values of R^2 , roughly .1, are inevitable even if an important relation is present” (page 1).

D.2 Sampling

We drew our sample from administrative records provided by the Social Security Administration. From the universe of all current SSI recipients, we selected our sample nationally from across the US, oversampling three states (Michigan, Wisconsin, and Massachusetts) where we had connections for later administrative data, as well as six additional states (Arizona, Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, and Ohio) where we had connections to state vocational rehabilitation offices. We drew our sample based on the following criteria:

1. The child had a predicted likelihood of removal at age 18 of above 35% and below 95%. Roughly 2/3 of all SSI child recipients had a predicted likelihood of removal in this range. We limited to those with an above 35% likelihood so as not to bother parents of children who are likely to continue on to adult SSI. We also did not include those with a likelihood above 95% because we did not want to tell anyone their child’s removal was guaranteed (since our model is imperfect and reviews have some natural

variation).

2. The child was 14–17 years old. We wanted to reach kids for whom the age 18 review wasn't too far off, but we didn't want to risk contaminating our sample with anyone who had already been contacted about their age 18 review (which occurs 6 months before the 18th birthday).
3. The parent's primary language must be English or Spanish as recorded in the SSA administrative data. We wanted to ensure that parents would be able to understand the presented information.
4. The child must not have been included in any of our previous rounds of piloting, nor had any of the parents' other children.
5. The child must not have an older sibling who received SSI at age 17, since parents would be more likely to be well-informed about the age 18 review.
6. The child must have a living parent reported in the SSI administrative data.
7. The child must have been receiving SSI at the time the sampling was drawn from SSA, 10 months before the experiment began.
8. The child must live in the contiguous United States, excluding Florida and New York. We excluded Alaska and Hawaii because of mailing costs and delivery times. We excluded Florida and New York because state law prohibits lotteries and one of our real-stakes questions was a lottery.

For all states other than Michigan, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin, we also applied an additional restriction:

9. The child must have a likelihood of removal above the median likelihood of removal. The median was determined on a state-by-state basis and was the median of the 35%-95% removal probability sample.

If there was more than one child meeting these criteria in the household, the oldest child was included in the sample.

Sampling took place in two stages. We first selected a sample based on the criteria outlined above. Our nine over-sampled states were sampled at a sampling rate of 100%. Our other states were sampled at a 72% sampling rate. This first draw of the sample was then sent through an address check service. Some of our respondents were updated to reside in other states, so we applied restriction (8) again. From this sample that was returned from the address check service, we sampled our nine over-sampled states at 100% sampling rate and our other states at a 68% sampling rate.

When assigning treatment, we stratified our sample based on state of residence and above-

median removal probability. We grouped states where we expected fewer than 110 completes together regionally. We grouped Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont; North Dakota, South Dakota, and Nebraska; Washington D.C. and Delaware; and Montana, Wyoming, and Utah. In our selected sample, we then defined above median removal probability on a state-by-state basis. In our pilot rounds, median removal defined state-by-state rather than nationally was a better predictor of the baseline beliefs gap. In Massachusetts, Michigan, and Wisconsin, where we did not initially restrict our sample based on having an above-median removal probability, we stratified based on state of residence and quartile of predicted removal probability defined on a state-by-state basis. We then randomly assigned households to treatment groups (Information, Information-Perverse, History, and Geography) within strata.

D.3 Logistics and Implementation

We then mailed letters to parents asking them to complete a web survey for which they would receive \$40 if they completed the survey within 2 weeks or \$25 after that. The letter included the web link and an individual PIN that was programmed to lead them through the correct version of the survey (Information, Information-Perverse, History, or Geography). We sent several reminder mailings during the 9 weeks the survey was accepting responses: a postcard during week 2, a letter during week 3, a postcard during week 4, a postcard during week 5, and a “last chance” letter during week 7. We followed-up by phone 4 weeks after the initial letter with non-responders. Note that the Treatment and Control groups were treated exactly the same (e.g., identical letters and phone calls) until they reached the video portion of the survey.⁵⁵

Our experimental sample represents the 16% of parents who started the web or phone survey and made it to the beginning of the treatment or placebo video, with the vast majority (96%) responding by web. A small fraction of participants (4%) completed the survey by phone instead of online. These participants answered all questions over the phone, and watched the videos on their phones or computers. We began calling non-responders 4 weeks after sending the initial letter inviting parents to complete the survey. If telephone surveyors reached the participant and gained their consent to proceed, they first asked the baseline questions, then emailed or texted the appropriate video to the participant, stayed on the line while the participant watched the video, and finally asked the endline questions and offered the two endline resources. However, participants who completed the survey by phone still only had the option of visiting the Resource Center online. Due to staffing issues, we

⁵⁵The only exception is that individuals assigned to the Information-Perverse group were asked one additional question in the baseline survey that the other groups did not receive: “If your child were to graduate from high school and excel academically, do you think that would make him/her more or less likely to remain eligible for SSI?” This question was part of the Information-Perverse subtreatment.

stopped the telephone portion of the survey early.

D.4 Potential “perverse incentive” effects

We are interested in the effect that the expectation of future benefits has on current human capital investment. However, in our setting, there is another channel through which information about the likelihood of removal from benefits could affect behavior: it could affect beliefs about the responsiveness of removal from SSI to the child’s level of human capital. Specifically, parents might expect that children with higher human capital are more likely to be removed. If they think removal is unlikely, this belief is unlikely to affect behavior. However, if they receive information that removal is highly likely, they might update to think that they can decrease their child’s likelihood of removal by ensuring that their child does not have high human capital. Thus, information that increases the perceived likelihood of removal could cause parents to decrease their human capital investment.

Note that in practice, parents do not appear to be concerned about this possibility. When we asked parents in our baseline survey “Would graduating from high school and excelling academically make your child more or less likely to remain eligible for SSI?” (see Online Appendix Table [H.2](#)), the most common response was to say “About as likely” (33% of parents). More parents responded that their child was *less* likely to be removed (with 21% responding “somewhat less likely” and 23% responding “much less likely”) than more likely (11% saying “much more likely” and 12% saying “somewhat more likely.”

Still, if there is any perverse incentive effect, then the net effect of information estimated by comparing parents who did and did not watch the information treatment video will incorporate the “perverse incentive” effects in addition to the dynamic discouragement (income and substitution) effects, posing a measurement problem. In order to disentangle the “perverse incentive” effect from our effect of interest, we implemented two subtreatments:

1. *Subtreatment 1: Shut down perverse incentive effect.* Our first subtreatment attempts to “shut down” the perverse incentives effect as much as possible. For ethical reasons, it is impossible to fully shut down the perverse incentives channel, since SSA reviewers—who are attempting to determine whether the 18-year-old can work in adulthood—may in fact use measures of human capital in their decision making. Instead, we partially shut down the perverse incentives channel with a “Confidentiality message” (cross-randomized across 50% of our Control and Information groups) shown before participants are given a link to the Resource Center and again when they enter the Resource Center: “The University of Chicago will keep your responses to these offers confidential.” The objective of the Confidentiality message is to reduce the likelihood that parents think taking up our resources would be observable to SSA and thus affect their child’s likelihood of removal. Of course, this message does not address the issue

that taking up human capital opportunities, even if unobservable to SSA, may affect downstream human capital outcomes that *are* observable to SSA.

2. *Subtreatment 2: Amplify perverse incentive effect.* Since Subtreatment 1 cannot fully shut down the perverse incentive channel, we implemented a second subtreatment designed instead to amplify the perverse incentive channel. We randomized a small fraction of our Treatment group into an auxiliary “Information-Perverse” arm, as shown in Figure 1. (We made this treatment arm small in case the perverse effect was strong enough to offset the main effects of interest.) After watching the information treatment video, the Information-Perverse arm was shown an additional message with (true) information about what SSA considers in the age 18 decision. The message told parents that the age 18 removal decision will depend upon whether their child is “able to earn a living as an adult,” and that they will be asked to “provide information about your child’s schooling, teachers and counselors, counseling and therapy, work, hospital and doctor visits, and medicines.” The latter list is taken directly from SSA documents disseminated to families.⁵⁶

We also ask the Information-Perverse group one additional question in the baseline survey that the other groups did not receive: “If your child were to graduate from high school and excel academically, do you think that would make him/her more or less likely to remain eligible for SSI?” We consider this question part of the Information-Perverse subtreatment.

None of the participants in the Information-Perverse group received the confidentiality message (subtreatment 1). Our pre-analysis plan excludes this arm from our primary treatment effect estimation; we then compare this arm with the Information arm (that does not receive this additional message) to assess the existence of perverse incentives in our setting.

⁵⁶See <https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-11005.pdf>. The full Information-Perverse message was as follows: *One last note about your child’s SSI benefits: The age 18 re-evaluation mentioned in the video will be conducted by Social Security. Someone from Social Security will evaluate your child to see whether he or she is able to earn a living as an adult.*

To help them determine if your child is able to earn a living, a representative from Social Security may ask you to provide information about your child’s schooling, teachers and counselors, counseling and therapy, work, hospital and doctor visits, and medicines. If they determine that your child is able to earn a living, then your child’s benefits will end.