Income Tax Evasion and Optimal Enforcement Policies: Evidence from Third Party Consumption Data and a Field Experiment in Pakistan

This project has been canceled. Tax evasion is not just a problem in the developing world; however, lower GDP has a stronger association with the propensity of working in a shadow economy. The Federal Bureau of Revenue is responsible for the formulation and administration of fiscal policies including the levy and collection of federal taxes. Recognizing the problem of tax evasion, a separate wing was set up under the FBR for ‘Broadening the Tax Base’ (BTB) in Pakistan. This project aims to work closely with the BTB Programme Team in order to carry out a field study of tax evasion and come up with certain policy recommendations in order to assist the team with their goal of increasing the income tax base in the country.

RFP Cycle:
2015
Location:
Pakistan
Researchers:
  • Michael Best
Type:
  • Pilot project