Where international finance meets development: The role of currency risk
This is the fourth blog focusing on the role of currency risk for development in a series highlighting five priority areas for financial inclusion in Africa. See the third post here.
Economists have long studied how currency swings caused by changes in exchange rates influence economies and investment. But these ideas rarely make their way into the everyday questions that matter in development: how businesses grow, how entrepreneurs find financing, or why some firms scale while others do not. Often international finance is treated as something happening in the background rather than a force that directly shapes who gets access to capital.
A big reason for this gap is that currency movements and financial markets are hard to study with development-related rigorous micro tools. One cannot randomly assign an exchange‑rate shock, for example. That makes careful and creative empirical work, such as using firm‑level data, administrative records, or quasi‑experimental designs, especially important for understanding how central these dynamics are and how enormous the potential impact on questions in development economics might actually be.
Some recent studies have begun to move in this direction, showing how global financial mechanisms influence firm outcomes in African markets (e.g., see here, here, and here). But much remains to be understood and several key research questions stand out. In this post, we’ll dive into why this is important and what open questions we see on the horizon.
Why foreign exchange risk and local capital deserve a central place in development debates
In many African countries, the way money moves within the country and across borders has an impact on people’s lives and plays an important role in shaping development outcomes. Exchange‑rate risk, or the uncertainty created by changes in the value of a country’s currency, is embedded in international finance through everyday cross‑border activities such as loans, investments, trade, and remittances. This has an effect on economic activity.
When exchange rates swing, it becomes harder for local businesses to plan ahead. Sudden depreciation of local currency can make it more expensive to repay loans taken out in foreign currency, and limited access to financing in local currency also affects the choices businesses make: whether they can hire new workers, invest in equipment, set prices, or grow.
Countries usually face a choice about how to set their exchange rates, which is commonly discussed as a trade‑off between stability and autonomy. Pegging a local currency, typically to the US$, can help keep prices stable and predictable, while a more flexible approach allows for quicker responses to unexpected events and maintains monetary independence. Both options come with trade-offs, and there is no one-size‑fits‑all solution.
Our conversations in Nairobi last year highlighted an important perspective: Currency movements also shape how risk is distributed across governments, firms, households, and investors. When exchange rates move, someone must absorb the losses, and this allocation shapes which financial contracts make sense and who gains access to capital in the first place.
In countries where financial markets are small and offer few ways for firms and investors to protect themselves from currency swings, foreign exchange (FX) risk does not disappear. Instead, it shows up in higher interest rates, is built into firms’ and investors’ balance sheets, or leads investors to walk away altogether. In this way, currency risk influences development not only by affecting inflation or stability, but by shaping who can borrow and grow.
Understanding better how these dynamics affect development economics matters, because it can influence the debates about entrepreneurship, firm growth, and private investment in African countries.
How currency risk shapes households, firms, and markets
Remittances provide an example of how currency risk affects everyday economic activity. For many households, remittances are a key source of income and insurance. But sending money across borders requires dealing with foreign currency. When exchange-rate volatility rises or FX markets become illiquid or difficult to trade in, money transfer operators face higher costs that are difficult to hedge in the short run. These costs usually end up on the consumer’s side in the form of worse exchange rates.
In our meeting in Nairobi with NALA, an international money transfer platform, this friction was especially clear. The company emphasized that it does not hedge currency risk and, in countries where the gap between official and parallel-market exchange rates is large, it tries to offer rates as close as possible to the parallel rate. At the same time, it avoids entering markets where currencies are too unstable, such as Burundi and Malawi.
The broader lesson is that currency risk is not an abstract concept: It directly affects households by making it more costly to move money across borders. Policies that strengthen FX markets or give providers better tools to manage risk can bring these costs down in ways that competition alone cannot.
The impact of AI, and how it could make currency exchange markets more efficient, was also mentioned in the conversations: For instance, Flourish Ventures has pointed to the use of AI tools that scan markets in real time to secure favorable exchange rates. Similarly, Onafriq, a pan‑African payments provider, applies AI models to anticipate short‑term currency fluctuations during the settlement process (also see our first blog post in this series on how AI is reshaping the access to finance).
Currency risk becomes even more important when firms and foreign investors move capital across borders. When capital crosses borders, shifts in the exchange rate can change the value of investments. When prices differ across countries for long periods, these fluctuations become a source of uncertainty that investors price in. Especially when the global economy slows, currencies in African markets often weaken just as investors are looking for safety, increasing the perceived risk of investing there.
This connects to a long-standing concern: many African countries cannot borrow on global markets in their own currency, a “challenge often called “original sin”. Because of this, when exchange rates move, the cost of repaying foreign-currency debt can rise quickly, forcing firms and governments to pull back on investment. Currency stability may change how risk appears, but it does not remove it. Firms and investors still feel its effects in ways that matter for growth and development.
A recurring theme in our meetings with founders, banks, and investors in Nairobi was how hard currency risk becomes to manage when local capital markets are shallow. Firms often face a tough choice: borrow in foreign currency and take on exchange-rate risk, or rely on scarce and expensive local-currency finance.
Local investors matter because they can provide capital in local currency, protecting firms from exchange rate movements. When domestic savings, pension funds, and financial institutions are unable to provide enough local currency, currency risk is priced into interest rates. This raises the cost of borrowing and crowds out exactly the mid-sized firms that are too big for microloans, but too small to access multinational financing. What stands out is that these challenges are visible even in Nairobi, one of Africa’s most dynamic urban economies. If firms in Kenya struggle to secure local‑currency finance, the limitations are likely even sharper in countries with less developed financial systems.
A research agenda hiding in plain sight: from macro frameworks to micro evidence
First, who bears exchange-rate risk?
How is exchange-rate risk allocated across households, firms, and governments under different monetary regimes? Which actors ultimately absorb currency losses when exchange rates move, and how does this affect inequality, firm survival, and investment decisions?
Second, what effect does the availability of local currency have?
When does the presence of local-currency capital meaningfully reduce FX risk for firms? What policies help build domestic markets without crowding out private finance or distorting incentives?
Third, how do institutions and policy affect firm financing under currency risk?
How do exchange-rate regimes, prudential regulation, and development finance institutions shape the types of financing available to firms, including whether credit is offered in local or foreign currency and at what maturity? When do public policies—such as local-currency credit lines, FX hedging facilities, or partial credit guarantees—help relax financing constraints for productive firms, and when do they instead reallocate exchange-rate risk across intermediaries’ balance sheets? Which firms ultimately benefit from these interventions, and do they translate into more investment and firm growth?
Fourth, how can we measure exchange-rate risk at the micro level?
What is the effect of currency volatility on remittances? What are the effects of currency volatility on firm investments, entrepreneurial decisions, investors, etc.? How can FX risk be measured directly at the firm level, —through balance sheets, contracts, pricing, and investment choices, rather than inferred from aggregate volatility alone? Which data sources and empirical strategies best capture how currency risk affects firm behavior over time?
In 2025, J-PAL Finance Sector Co-Chairs Emily Breza and Emanuele Colonnelli convened a group of researchers in Nairobi, Kenya with J-PAL Affiliated Professor Christopher Woodruff and Private Enterprise Development in Low-Income Countries (PEDL) to engage with finance-sector stakeholders and advance the research agenda on inclusive finance for development. These discussions highlighted five priority areas for financial inclusion in Africa, including AI and finance, building venture markets, high-growth entrepreneurship, forex risk and local capital, and agricultural value chains. Building on this, J-PAL’s Finance policy team continues to support new research and synthesizes findings across studies to inform policymakers and financial institutions. Future posts in this series will share evidence-informed approaches to expanding access to financial services, enabling innovation, and building economic empowerment. Subscribe to receive updates.
* We would like to thank all finance-sector stakeholders we were able to meet in Nairobi for their insights and openness: Antler East Africa, Baridi, Beyond Capital Ventures, British International Investments (BII) in Kenya, Central Bank of Kenya, Enza Capital, Equity Bank Kenya, FASA - Financing for Agricultural SMEs in Africa Fund, Fleetsimplify, Flourish Ventures, IETP - Investisseurs et Partenaires, IFC Kenya, Ketha Africa, Kukua, NALA, NCBA Bank Kenya Plc, Norfund, Onafriq, Proparco, Pure Infrastructure Ltd, Qhala, Sayuni Capital, Stanford Seed East Africa, TLCom Capital, TLG Capital, Untapped Global, VestedWorld, ZEP-RE (PTA Reinsurance Company), and 4C Group.
Microcredit: Impacts and promising innovations
Evaluations of innovations to microcredit products, such as targeting high-potential entrepreneurs or providing flexible repayment options, led to higher business and household outcomes and show promise for financial service providers looking to reduce poverty through credit. Moreover, adjusting the mode of loan disbursement can crucially increase women’s control of capital.
Findings on the impacts of microcredit continue to evolve. Early evidence from randomized evaluations in low- and middle-income countries showed that the classic microcredit model did not lead to transformative impacts on income or consumption for the average borrower across many contexts. However, a subset of high-potential entrepreneurs saw high returns to microcredit. More recent research similarly finds that certain groups like experienced business owners can have high returns to credit, and the benefits of microcredit can extend to nonborrowers.
Many policymakers are interested in entrepreneurship as a potential pathway out of poverty, and several studies show that small-scale entrepreneurs have access to high-return investments [1] [2] [3]. Yet, low-income households have historically had limited access to financial services such as credit, savings, and insurance products that could lead to increased investments [4].1 Microcredit was designed to overcome credit market failures and help low-income borrowers take advantage of investment opportunities. It expanded access to credit around the world, typically in the form of small business loans with relatively high interest rates and immediate, biweekly loan repayments. In 2018, around 140 million people around the world were active borrowers from a microcredit institution, a 43 percent increase from 98 million in 2009 [4].
A review of seven randomized evaluations in low- and middle-income countries, which studied microcredit expansions between 2003 and 2009, found that the traditional microcredit model did not facilitate high-return investments among the poor or lead to transformative results for the average borrower. Demand for traditional microcredit products—which have high repayment frequencies, charge high interest rates, hold groups of borrowers jointly liable for each other’s individual loans, and typically target women—was more modest for many borrowers than many of its advocates had claimed. Investments often rose but did not lead to increased average enterprise profits in most cases, though researchers have drawn differing conclusions on whether these effects are detectable when pooling across studies [13] [20] [38]. Additionally, investment in children’s schooling did not rise, and there were no increases in average household incomes. The traditional microcredit model also did not lead to increases in women’s empowerment on average despite the vast majority of microcredit products being targeted toward women. However, microcredit did not lead to widespread harmful effects as critics had feared, and it even gave households more freedom in their financial decision-making.
Donors with the goal of supporting poverty reduction by financing or subsidizing microcredit lending should understand the limitations of the traditional microcredit model. However, they should also recognize how various product design innovations can improve upon it. First, a meta-analysis of randomized evaluations found that for businesses with no experience, the impacts of microfinance were negligible. In contrast, the impacts were potentially large for entrepreneurs with prior experience owning a business, suggesting that more targeted and larger loans can raise the overall impact of credit [13] [20]. One longer-run study suggests these differences may actually widen over time [21]. Second, traditional microcredit products demanding immediate, inflexible repayment may perpetuate liquidity constraints on borrowers. Four randomized evaluations have shown that credit products with more flexible repayment options led to increased business profits or household income. Third, changing the mode of loan disbursement by providing women with private accounts or digitizing payments can enable female entrepreneurs to invest more in their own businesses, whereas they may have previously felt pressure to share financial resources [3] [26]. In addition to these product innovations, two studies found that microcredit had impacts that extended beyond its clients and influenced the wages, household earnings, and social networks of local nonborrowers as well [27] [28].
Demand for traditional microcredit products was modest when offered to a general population. In four studies where microcredit institutions offered microloans to a general population, take-up ranged from 13 to 31 percent [6] [7] [10] [11]. This was much lower than what the partner microcredit institutions had originally forecasted. Demand was higher among borrowers who had already expressed interest in or applied for a loan, ranging from 40 to 100 percent [8] [9] [19]. These results suggest that traditional microcredit may be perceived as a useful product by some, but not all, potential borrowers [5][12].
Randomized evaluations of the traditional microcredit model found limited returns to the average borrower while also suggesting that expanded access to credit led to high returns for some entrepreneurs. Despite access to credit resulting in higher rates of business ownership, greater business revenues, more business investments, and increased inventory and assets in five out of the seven countries, most borrowers did not see these effects translate to higher business profits [6] [7] [9] [10] [19].
Microcredit only led to higher average business profits in Morocco, where profits increased by 22 percent on average. Even within this context, these profit increases were driven by larger businesses and borrowers that had previously farmed and owned livestock [6]. In India, three years after microcredit was introduced, profit increases were concentrated among the most profitable businesses that had existed before the expanded access to microcredit [10].
| Outcome | Bosnia and Herzegovina | Ethiopia | India | Mexico | Mongolia | Morocco | Philippines |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Business revenue | — | — | — | ↑ | — | ↑ | — |
| Business inventory/ assets | ↑ | no data | ↑ | no data | ↑ | ↑ | — |
| Business investment/ costs | — | — | ↑ | ↑ | no data | ↑ | ↓ |
| Business profit | — | — | — | — | — | ↑ | — |
| Household income | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Household spending/ consumption | — | ↓ | — | ↓ | ↑ | — | — |
| Social well-being | — | — | — | ↑ | — | — | ↓ |
Note: Green (red) arrows represent statistically significant positive (negative) differences in outcomes between the treatment and comparison groups at the 90 percent confidence level or higher, dashes represent no statistically significant difference.
More recent research, including long-term follow-ups and meta-analyses of earlier randomized evaluations, suggests that targeting certain groups like high-potential entrepreneurs may increase the impact of microcredit products [13] [20] [21]. Returning to India, researchers found that six years after receiving access to microcredit, households who were already managing an enterprise at baseline were generating more than double the revenue and reported 35 percent more business assets than their similarly experienced peers who did not receive access to microcredit. By contrast, households with no prior experience running a business did not grow their business or increase firm revenues [21]. A meta-analysis of seven randomized evaluations similarly found that the impact of microcredit was negligible for households with no business experience before the introduction of microcredit, while there was potential for large increases in household income among those with prior business experience [13].
Microcredit institutions have several possible avenues to target high-potential entrepreneurs, although further research is needed to measure the effectiveness of these avenues and what others may exist. Differential impacts between high-potential entrepreneurs and those with less experience mean that it may be worthwhile to allocate more financial capital to a smaller set of productive businesses, which can increase employment and wages as they grow. However, some borrowers may not use microcredit for their business but for other important purposes such as consumption and risk mitigation. For example, some borrowers reported using loans to smooth consumption (15 percent in India) or buy goods (8.5 percent in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 15 percent in India) [9] [10]. Policymakers can continue to support those who may not be considered high-potential entrepreneurs by increasing access to other low-cost financial services like savings accounts or insurance products.
The important question of how these entrepreneurs can be identified, aside from deploying a wide and expensive network of banking agents, also arises. A key ingredient to the feasibility of the traditional microcredit model is that it does not require costly information generation, making this question challenging to resolve. Many microcredit studies have also struggled to capture exactly how borrowers use their loans, further illustrating the difficulties that lenders face in gathering information about their clients.
One randomized evaluation in Egypt studied an alternative way of providing lenders insight into their clients by surveying firm owners about their personal initiative, preference for flexible schedules, and other questions designed to identify potential for business success. Those who were predicted to perform well indeed earned 55 percent higher profits and increased monthly wages paid to employees by EGP 2,400 (about USD$160) per month, or 122 percent, relative to the comparison group [29].
Graduating borrowers to asset-based microcredit, or credit products tied to a specific asset, may also hold potential as a mechanism to target high-potential entrepreneurs, as clients of such products would need to have successfully repaid previous loans to be eligible for asset-based microcredit. In Pakistan, credit-based access to a productive asset worth up to USD$1,900 raised business assets by USD$401 (a 40 percent increase) and monthly household income by USD$31 (a 9 percent increase) [30]. Outside the context of microfinance, community knowledge and mobile phone data have also demonstrated promise as tools to identify high-potential entrepreneurs [15] [31]. However, more research is needed before firm conclusions can be drawn around which targeting mechanisms should be recommended to policymakers.
Modifications to the traditional microcredit model such as grace periods and flexible repayment options can improve business outcomes and consumption. Traditional microcredit models are characterized by high repayment frequency requirements, with repayment often occurring on a biweekly or even weekly basis almost immediately after loan disbursement, framed by providers as a way to promote fiscal discipline among borrowers [32]. Yet, putting such stringent requirements on entrepreneurs and other small-scale business owners may fail to consider irregular cash flows, such as those common in seasonal industries like agriculture and sales of other perishable goods [14] [22] [33] [34]. Product and market innovations can make it easier for banks to lend at lower costs. Meanwhile, including grace periods or having more flexible microcredit products can enable firm owners to withstand negative shocks and accumulate the capital required for costly and riskier higher-return investments, thereby relaxing constraints to business growth.
Indeed, an early randomized evaluation in India found that providing a two-month grace period enabled clients to accumulate a larger lump sum of capital and thus make larger business investments. The grace period increased weekly profits by INR 640 (41 percent) and monthly household income by 20 percent relative to the comparison group, but clients’ likelihood of default also rose by up to 9 percentage points (213 percent more than the comparison group) [25]. An eleven-year follow-up to this study found that illiterate household enterprise owners increased their income by 27 percent compared to their illiterate counterparts who did not receive the product [37].
Four recent randomized evaluations also found that flexible repayment contracts led to increases in business profits but suggest that flexibility does not necessarily raise default rates [22] [23] [24] [39]. In India, a flexible microcredit product that allowed for borrowing and repayment at any time increased profits by up to INR 125 (15 percent), and borrowers were no more likely to default after a short-term period of four months [22]. Also in India, an option for borrowers to defer payments at a time of their choosing both increased monthly profits and sales and raised the likelihood of repaying the full loan early by 10 percentage points (a 33 percent increase) after three years. Borrowers previously exposed to volatile sales were more likely to opt for a deferral [23]. In Bangladesh, an option to delay two repayments increased annual household income by US$1,309 (17 percent) and reduced the likelihood of default by 1.7 percentage points (35 percent). Clients who chose to delay repayment were more willing to engage in business risks such as investing in tools and machines, suggesting that flexibility may have induced more entrepreneurial risk taking [24].
However, one study found that providing payment deferral options for first-time borrowers instead of repeat borrowers increased default rates by 3–4 percentage points (5 percent) while leading to no changes in profits [39]. Taken together with the other studies, these findings suggest the need for greater understanding around which types of borrowers may suffer from increased risk without a corresponding increase in return from repayment flexibility. Moreover, these findings may align with those of the previous section if first-time borrowers are less likely to use microcredit for business purposes than high-potential entrepreneurs.
| Country | Innovation | Effect on firm profit | Effect on household income | Effect on likelihood of default | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aragón, Karaivanov, and Krishnaswamy (2020) | India | Repay whenever | ↑ 15 percent (INR 125), daily | N/A | None (only short-term impacts studied) |
| Barboni and Agarwal (2023) | India | Repayment deferral option | ↑ INR 5,241, monthly (compared to the comparison group losing INR 5,170) | N/A | None |
| Battaglia et al. (2021) | Bangladesh | Repayment deferral option | ↑ 27 percent (USD $97), monthly | ↑ 17 percent (USD $1,309), annually | ↓ 1.7 percentage points (35 percent) |
| Brune, Giné, and Karlan (2022) | Colombia | Repayment deferral option | Insignificant effects | N/A | ↑ 3–4 percentage points (5 percent) |
| Field et al. (2013) | India | Grace period | ↑ 41 percent (INR 641), weekly | ↑ 19.5 percent, monthly | ↑ 6–9 percentage points (213-372 percent) |
The traditional microcredit model did not increase income, women’s empowerment, or investment in children’s schooling. Microfinance institutions (MFIs) have typically prioritized lending to women given the barriers that they have historically faced in accessing credit and formal banking services in low- and middle-income countries [35]. Yet, two evaluations found that credit did not lead to increased investment or improved business outcomes for women [2] [36]. Moreover, in three of the four studies that evaluated women’s empowerment, microcredit access had no effect [6] [7] [10] [11]. In Mexico, where Compartamos Banco emphasized empowerment as part of its product, women did enjoy a small increase in decision-making power [7]. In addition, the six studies that measured children’s schooling also found no effect [6] [7] [9] [10][11][19]. By contrast, one study found that a more flexible microcredit contract can lead to long-run increases in educational attainment for children of borrowing households [37].
Two recent studies suggest that intrahousehold dynamics affect the use of microfinance. Changing the mode of loan disbursement to give women more control over the loan proceeds can help ensure that the product fit the needs of their enterprises [3] [26]. Uncovering how microcredit can ease financial constraints of female business owners remains an important area of study. A reanalysis of three randomized evaluations of microcredit and cash grants suggest that household dynamics may be a barrier to growth for women-owned enterprises. Specifically, women-owned businesses that are the sole enterprise of the household see higher returns to credit than those who do share households with men-owned businesses and may thus have to compete for household financial resources [3].
A recent study that evaluated the impact of digital loan disbursement on female borrowers offers a potential way to prevent the misallocation of capital. Directly depositing loans into a private mobile money account increased women’s monthly enterprise profits by USD$18 (15 percent) and the value of their business capital by USD$70 (11 percent) relative to those who received cash. An examination of the characteristics of the entrepreneurs who benefited the most from the digital loan disbursement highlighted that receiving the loan on a mobile money account alleviated pressure to share the loan with family and increased women’s control over the loan. [26]. These studies provide suggestive evidence that products that tighten women’s control of their capital can enable higher returns in their enterprises.
Microcredit may also have broader impacts in local economies, affecting even those who do not borrow from MFIs. In principle, it is possible that microcredit access could increase the wages and employment of nonborrowers if borrowers use loans to consume local goods and services, to purchase more business assets, or to hire new workers. However, testing the effects of microcredit on an economy-wide scale is challenging to do with randomized evaluations. One quasi-experimental study examined the effects of an unanticipated, state-level regulation in Andhra Pradesh, India that wiped out USD$1 billion across the country and revealed that losing access to microcredit lowered investment and overall expenditures in districts that experienced a greater decline. As a result, daily wages fell by around 4 percent, contributing to a decline in weekly household earnings of INR 86 (a 10 percent decrease) [27].
Although the results above suggest that the arrival of microcredit created positive spillovers to some types of local economic activity in India, negative spillovers may also exist if access to microcredit reduced the availability of informal credit. One randomized evaluation in Hyderabad, India and one quasi-experimental study in Karnataka, India found that the introduction of MFIs in participating communities led to reductions in social network links, including those of households unlikely to borrow from MFIs. Consistent with the idea that social network relationships often serve as informal sources of credit and insurance in local communities, borrowing activity fell most sharply for households unlikely to borrow from MFIs [28]. All together, these results suggest that policymakers may need to look beyond just borrowing households when assessing the impact of microcredit.
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