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PARTY AFFILIATION, PARTISANSHIP, AND POLITICAL BELIEFS: A FIELD EXPERIMENT

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ABSTRACT

Political partisanship is strongly correlated with attitudes and behavior, but it is unclear from this pattern whether partisan identity has a causal effect on political behavior and attitudes. We report the results of a field experiment designed to investigate the causal effect of party identification. Prior to the February 2008 Connecticut presidential primary, researchers sent a mailing to a random sample of unaffiliated registered voters informing them of the need to register in order to participate in the upcoming primary. Comparing post-treatment survey responses to subjects' baseline survey responses, we find that those informed of the need to register with a party were more likely to affiliate with a party and subsequently showed stronger partisanship. Further, we find that the treatment group also demonstrated greater concordance than the control group between their pre-treatment latent partisanship and their post-treatment reported voting behavior and intentions and evaluations of partisan figures. Thus our treatment, which caused a strengthening of partisan identity, also caused a shift in subjects' candidate preferences and evaluations of salient political figures. This finding is consistent with the claim that partisanship is an active force changing how citizens behave in and perceive the political world.

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Scholars from a variety of disciplines contend that allegiances and group affiliations, from nationalism and religious identities to ethnic and kinship ties, have a powerful effect on attitudes and behavior. One such identity is partisanship, which political scientists have hypothesized is an active force shaping how individuals evaluate and interact with the political world ([in the U.S.] Campbell et al. 1960; more recently, Bartels 2002; [abroad] Brader and Tucker 2001; Dancygier and Saunders 2006; Whitefield and Evans 1999). Evidence presented to support the importance of partisanship includes the strong correlation between partisanship and salient political opinions ([vote choice] Campbell et al. 1960; Fiorina 1981; Miller 1991; Bartels 2000; [assessments of the economy] Bartels 2002; Erikson 2004; Wlezien, Franklin, and Twiggs 1997), the divergence among conflicting partisans in interpretations of common events (Bartels 2002; Lupia 2002; Rahn 1993; Zaller 1992) and preferences for biased political information (Lau and Redlawsk 2002; Redlawsk 2002), and the persistence over time of partisan affiliations (Alwin and Krosnick 1991; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Jennings and Niemi 1974; Niemi and Jennings 1991). Across accounts, both political and beyond, a common thread is the claim that affiliations and identities *cause* those outcomes associated with holding a particular allegiance.

While there exists a large body of research that tests whether identity shapes political views, a persistent concern with this research is that the observed correlation between partisanship and politically-relevant outcomes may originate in unobserved factors that both encourage particular partisan identities and the political outcomes associated with those beliefs (Bartels 2000; Fiorina 2002). Further, causality may flow in both directions, with partisanship reflecting political attitudes and events as well as causing them (Allsop and Weisberg 1988; Beasley and Joslyn 2001; Brody and Rothenberg 1988; Converse 1976; Kessel 1968; Fiorina 1981; Franklin and Jackson 1983; MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1989; Norrander and Wilcox 1993; Weisberg and Smith 1991). While scholars have implemented a variety of research approaches in an attempt to disentangle correlation from causation ([including using lagged partisanship as an independent variable] Miller and Shanks 1996; Bartels 2000; Bartels 2002; Goren 2005, Carsey and Layman 2006; [using state registration laws as an exogenous factor] Burden and

Greene 2000), we identify in existing research several persistent threats to causal inference. Overall, previous research has shown that measures of partisanship have great predictive power in statistical models of a variety of political outcomes, but has not demonstrated that those relationships reflect the casual influence of those affiliations.

We address the limitations of previous research by means of an experiment fielded in the state of Connecticut during the 2008 presidential primary election season. Connecticut has a closed primary system in which only voters affiliated with a party can vote in that party's primary. We surveyed a random sample of registered Independents (those who were both not formally affiliated with either the Democratic or Republican party and who also indicated they did not already consider themselves a Democrat or Republican) and based on their response to an item that asked which party the respondent felt closer to we classified some respondents as latent Democrats or Republicans. We classified as latent Independents those who declined to choose either party. We then randomly assigned equal proportions of latent Democrats and latent Republicans to treatment or control status. Treated individuals received a mailing informing them of the need to register with a party in order to participate in that party's upcoming presidential preference primary. Our intervention increased party registration with the party of one's latent partisanship by 7.2 percentage points in our target population. Treatment group members were also 3.3 percentage points more likely to vote in the primary election, placing our intervention on par with the most effective get out the vote efforts.

Four months after our intervention, we returned to the field to survey subjects and found that treated individuals, who by definition identified with neither party just months prior, were now more than seven percentage points more likely to identify with their latent party. Treatment group responses to the standard seven point party identification scale were similarly polarized. Our intervention is the first that we are aware of to manipulate partisan feelings over long periods of time and outside of the laboratory setting. In so doing, we have provided evidence of the political relevance of the psychological theory of cognitive dissonance, which states that people align their attitudes and behaviors in part to avoid a feeling

of discomfort that arises from their discordance.[1] Applying cognitive dissonance to the present context, months after declaring (or deciding to declare) oneself a member of a particular party, a citizen may hold favorable views of that party in part to avoid the internal discomfort of having registered (or decided to register) with a party for which the individual has a poor opinion. Because of the nature of our experiment, our evidence is robust to the criticism made of the first contributions to this literature (Beasley and Joslyn 2001 and Mullainathan and Washington 2009) that the attitudinal changes associated with voting (picking a candidate) may be due to altered information flows, rather than to the need for consistency between behavior and attitudes.

We then employ this randomly induced partisanship to test key theoretical arguments about the role of partisanship in shaping political opinions and behaviors. We find that in addition to heightened partisan identities, treatment group members were increasingly partisan in their voting choices and evaluations of partisan figures and institutions. Thus we demonstrate that randomly-induced variation in partisan identities yields changes in attitudes and planned voting decisions consistent with claims that partisanship is an active force shaping how citizens behave in the political world.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the methodological concerns motivating our experimental design, while Section II describes the experiment. In Section III we present results demonstrating that our treatment altered party affiliation, voter turnout, partisan identity, and, ultimately, partisan views. Given the variety of behavioral and attitudinal effects arising from our intervention, Section IV provides a discussion of potential mediators that may have led treated individuals to become more polarized in their partisan views. In Section V we conclude.

I. Research Design and Casual Inference

In this section, we discuss the barriers to causal inference in existing research and describe an

[1] Self-perception theory (Bem 1967), which stipulates that we look to our own behaviors to discover our attitudes, is another possible explanation. In this work we refer to the mechanism as cognitive dissonance because of its greater use in the psychological community and not to signify a stance on which of these internal mechanisms is at play.

alternative technique for measuring partisanship's effects. A conventional approach to demonstrating the effects of partisanship on political attitudes or behavior relies on cross-sectional data (or a pooled series of cross-sections). Those data are then used to estimate a regression of the following form:

(1) $Y_i = \alpha + \beta X_i + \gamma M_i + \varepsilon,$

where Y is the outcome of interest for individual i, X is partisanship, M is a vector of measured control variables (M for *measured variables*), and ε is the error term. Analysis employing this specification will generate a biased estimate of β, the effect of partisanship on outcome Y, in a variety of circumstances. The most important threats to inference originate in (a) omitted variable bias due to unobserved differences across individuals (unobserved heterogeneity) and (b) endogenous partisanship.[2]

Unobserved heterogeneity will bias β if there are any factors not included in M that are correlated with X and also affect Y (we label these unmeasured factors U, for *unmeasured variables*). In most survey settings, factors in U include variables such as wealth, heredity, personality, educational and employment experience, and parental socialization, variables that are both hard to measure accurately (even when attempts are made) and likely to have consequential effects on Y. Without an exhaustive measurement of all those factors that might plausibly affect partisanship and Y, and therefore belong in M but are instead left in U, analysis exploiting observed variation in partisanship cannot rule out the alternative that partisanship (and therefore β) merely proxies correlated but unmeasured factors. Consistent with this concern, analysts regularly find that including additional variables in M reduces the estimated effect of partisanship (β) on political opinions and behaviors (e.g., Fiorina 2002).

Endogenous partisanship poses a threat to estimates of β because regression analysis cannot distinguish the effect of changes in X on Y from the effect of changes in Y on X. If Y is a measure of political preferences, it is reasonable to anticipate that changes in Y (or the effects of any unmeasured factors that cause changes in those preferences) might affect another choice, partisan affiliations. Thus,

[2] Additional threats include measurement error in M. The effects of measurement error are complex and depend on the covariances among the variables and the pattern of measurement error. Measurement error may generate the same bias in β as unobserved heterogeneity if that measurement error is correlated with X. Correlated measurement error in X and Y may also generate bias in β.

even an exhaustive construction of M (reducing the share of variation left to the variables included in U) would not allow the analyst to demonstrate that partisanship changes opinions because one cannot rule out the possibility that it is instead opinions which cause partisanship.

Returning to omitted variable bias, one approach designed to address concerns about unmeasured factors (U) that shape both partisanship (X) and the outcome of interest (Y) is to employ panel data in which the same respondent is interviewed multiple times (e.g., Bartels 2000; Miller and Shanks 1996). The relationship between changes in partisanship and changes in Y can then be used to estimate β without bias originating in U, but this requires the restrictive assumption that those unmeasured factors and their effects on X are constant over time. If U changes, or if the effect of U on X or Y varies, however, then β may still be biased.[3] In practice, panel estimates of β are considered candidates for causal interpretation when it is reasonable to assume that the change in partisanship (X) is due to changes in some factor that does not directly affect Y. However, it is quite plausible that observed changes in partisanship are due to changes in unmeasured factors (U) such as life experiences (e.g., parenthood), wealth changes, changes in the views of close friends and relatives, or changes in religious beliefs, and any of these might cause changes in both partisanship (X) and Y. Alternatively, U may remain constant, but the nature of political conflict might vary. For example, wealthier individuals might hold different policy views or feel closer to one party or the other.[4] Even if these methodological issues were resolved, however, the panel approach still cannot resolve the uncertainty about the direction in which causality flows—it may still be the case that changes in opinions cause differences in partisanship rather than the other way around.

In light of these difficulties, what is needed to estimate the effect of partisan identity (X) on a political outcome of interest (Y) is a means to create variation in partisanship (X) that is independent of changes in opinions or those unmeasured factors (U). Setting aside for the moment the question of how one might create such variation, suppose that a sample of "latent" partisans exists, with some leaning

[3] As in the cross-sectional approach, measurement error may also cause estimates of β to be biased.
[4] Note also that in the absence of an explanation for observed changes in X, there is little reason to believe that changes in X cause variation in Y. Far more likely is that changes in X reflect common shocks to X and Y originating in U or measurement error in X, Y, or M.

toward the Democratic Party (D=1, 0 otherwise) and others leaning toward the Republican Party (R=1, 0 otherwise). We define latent partisans as individuals who, when initially asked if they identify with a party, say they are Independent, but respond to a follow up question by responding that they are closer to one of the parties. For purposes of exposition, we first consider the case where the sample consists only of latent Democratic partisans. Additionally, for notational convenience, we scale partisanship by setting initial partisanship (partisanship at time t, X_{it}), to 0 for the latent partisans.

Next, suppose there exists some treatment (T=1 if treated, 0 otherwise) which can be randomly applied to these latent Democratic partisans to induce some to more fully express those partisan leanings. Given that X_{it} is normalized to 0, if individuals in both the treatment and control groups are surveyed pre-treatment (at time t) and post-treatment (at time t+1), the change in partisanship for subject i is $X_{it+1} - X_{it} = X_{it+1}$. An unbiased estimate of the effect of the treatment on partisanship (the intent to treat effect of T on Y), can then be obtained from

(3) $$X_{it+1} = \alpha + \beta_1 T + \gamma M_{it} + \varepsilon,$$

where β_1 is the intent to treat effect on partisanship for latent Democrats and M are pre-treatment covariates included to increase efficiency. Note that in this specification we also measure other covariates M prior to the random assignment.[5] (The term controlling for the initial value of X is omitted due to the normalization of X_{it} to 0.) Using the same notation as in (3), we can estimate the intent to treat effect of T on Y using the equation:

(4) $$Y_{it+1} = \alpha + \beta_1 T + \beta_2 Y_{it} + \gamma M_{it} + \varepsilon.$$

The ITT (intent to treat) estimates provide unbiased measures of the effect of being assigned to the treatment on partisanship (T on X) and outcome measures of attitudes and behavior (T on Y). We are also interested in the effect of partisanship on outcome measures of attitudes and behavior (X on Y). The experimental treatment can be used to estimate the effect of X on Y if some additional assumptions are made. The critical assumption is that the treatment, T, has no direct effect on Y, and also does not cause

[5] Alternatively, one could measure M post-treatment if one was confident that T had no effect on M or its measurement.

any other changes that might indirectly affect Y, except through changes in X. In this case, and if T affects X, then T may be used as an instrumental variable for X. The assumption regarding how T affects Y is labeled the exclusion restriction and it implies that T can be omitted from an equation that explains Y as a function of X. The ITT estimates the effect of T on Y and X and does not rely on the exclusion restriction, however, the interpretation of the experimental results as the effect of X on Y does. We discuss this assumption in greater detail in section 4, where we consider the mechanisms by which T might affect Y.

We assume the exclusion restriction holds and we estimate the effect of X on Y using the following pair of equations:

(5) $X_{it+1} = \alpha + \beta T + \gamma M_{it} + \varepsilon,$

and

(6) $Y_{it+1} = \alpha + \beta_1 X_{it+1} + \beta_2 Y_{it} + \gamma M_{it} + \varepsilon.$

To ease exposition, we have so far restricted our presentation to the case where the latent partisans are all of one party. Our empirical sample, however, includes both Democratic and Republican latent partisans. The notation presented above can be adjusted to permit the statistical model to include the entire sample. First, let partisanship at time t+1 take on the value 1 if a respondent's post-treatment partisanship is equal to her pre-treatment latent partisanship and 0 otherwise. Assuming that the treatment effect is the same for latent partisans of both parties, the ITT estimate of T on X can be estimated by:

(3)' $X_{it+1} = \alpha + \beta_1 T + \beta_2 D_{it} + \gamma M_{it} + \varepsilon,$

where pre-treatment measures of latent partisan identity (D_{it}=1 if latent Democrat, 0 otherwise) and observables (M_{it}) are included for efficiency. Turning next to the ITT effect of T on Y for the pooled sample, define Y so that it measures the degree of correspondence between latent partisanship and the outcome measure. Thus, individuals score more highly when their expressed opinions match their partisan leanings. For example, Y is maximized when a Democrat has a positive view of the Democratic candidate and when the Republican subject has a negative view of the Democratic candidate. If we assume that the

effect of the treatment on opinions is the same (in terms of increasing the concordance between latent partisanship and opinions) for latent Democrats and latent Republicans, (4) can be rewritten as

(4)' $Y_{it+1} = \alpha + \beta_1 T + \beta_2 Y_{it} + \beta_3 D_{it} + \gamma M_{it} + \varepsilon.$

Finally, under the exclusion restriction, we estimate the effect of X on Y using the system of equations:

(5)' $Y_{it+1} = \alpha + \beta_1 X_{it+1} + \beta_2 D_{it} + \gamma M_{it} + \varepsilon,$

where we instrument for X using the random assignment of T:

(6)' $X_{it+1} = \alpha + \beta_1 T + \beta_2 D_{it} + \gamma M_{i\,t} + \varepsilon.$

As previously discussed, under the assumption that T affects Y only through its effect on X, the two-stage least squares estimate of β_1 will then provide a consistent estimate of the effect of changes in partisanship on changes in opinions. Of course, this leaves unresolved the question of how one might induce random variation in partisanship, the topic to which we now turn.

II. Experimental Protocol

The basic requirements of the experiment are to, first, randomly produce subjects with strengthened partisan identities and, second, to measure the effect of the randomly induced changes in partisanship on salient political attitudes and opinions.

There are several important hurdles to surmount in creating random variation in partisan affiliations. First, we must identify a pool of respondents amenable to conversion. Second, and perhaps most critically, we must develop a means to induce changes in partisanship that can be randomly applied to some individuals but not others. Third, we must be able to measure changes in outcomes associated with changes in partisanship before other actors (e.g., candidates in political races) who might also condition their behavior on a respondent's newly-activated party affiliation can impose additional treatments on those individuals.

Fortunately, we are able to address these concerns by exploiting a unique opportunity afforded to

us during the 2008 presidential primary season in Connecticut. For ease of exposition, it is useful to divide our experiment into three stages, outlined in Table 1.

Phase 1 of our experiment involved identifying a pool of latent partisans. In early 2008 (January 11-16) we fielded a survey to measure the latent partisanship and pre-treatment opinions of a large set of registered, but formally unaffiliated, Connecticut voters.[6]

Table 1: Experiment Outline

Phase 1: Identification of Latent Partisans and Measurement of Baseline Opinions (Survey, January 11-16, 2008)	Survey registered but unaffiliated CT voters to measure partisan leanings and baseline opinions.
Phase 2: Mail Information about Primary Election Voting Rules(Mailed January 22, 2008)	Send randomly selected subset of surveyed voters a letter informing voter of need to register with a party if they wished to vote in the upcoming Democratic or Republican presidential primary.
Phase 3: Measure Post Primary Opinions and Behaviors (Updated CT Voter File and Survey, June 2008)	Analyze voter file to measure changes in party registration status and turnout in 2008 presidential primary. Gather survey data on post-primary opinions and behaviors.

Partisanship was measured using the standard branching NES instrument in which respondents were initially asked "Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?" Respondents who chose either the Democratic or Republican Party were then asked "Would you call yourself a strong [Democrat/Republican] or a not very strong [Democrat/Republican]?" All other respondents were then asked "Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party?" We classify as latent partisans those respondents who declined to identify with the Democratic or Republican Party when asked the first question, but stated that they felt closer to either party in response to the follow up question.[7] In our random sample of unaffiliated registered Connecticut voters there were 975 latent Democrats and 565 latent Republicans. Additionally, we identified 808 Independents (those who refused to express a preference for either major party or

[6] Further details about sample restrictions, experimental protocol, and coding of variables appear in the Appendix.

[7] Of the 3,787 individuals who completed our survey, 8.3% identified as strong Democrats, 11.3% as weak Democrats, 25.7% as closer to the Democrats, 21.3% as true Independents (responded to the second question as closer to neither), 14.9% as closer to the Republicans, 7.3% as weak Republicans, and 4.6% as strong Republicans. An additional 6.5% of respondents answered "don't know" or refused to answer the second question after refusing to choose either major party in the first question.

specified "other" in response to the second question).[8]

Phase 2 of our experiment had the effect of randomly inducing a small subset of these unaffiliated voters to alter their registration to affiliate with a party. In Connecticut, unaffiliated voters cannot vote in either the Democratic or Republican presidential preference primary without first formally registering with the respective party. All of the respondents in our sample were thus initially ineligible to participate in the February 5, 2008 primary.[9] We sent a treatment letter to a 50% random subset of the experimental participants.[10] Mailed on January 22, 2008, these letters, which were prepared in cooperation with the Connecticut election officials, reminded the recipient of the upcoming election, explained the need to affiliate with a party in order to participate in the party's presidential primary, and were accompanied by a blank party affiliation form.[11] Each letter included the following text:

> In 2008, the Democratic and Republican Presidential preference primaries will be held on February 5th and the general election will be held on November 4th. Polls will be open from 6 AM to 8 PM on both primary and election days.
>
> Based on the most recent voter registration records, you are not currently affiliated with a political party. I wish to remind you that in Connecticut, unaffiliated voters cannot vote in primary elections. If you wish to vote in a party's primary, your registration records must show that you are affiliated with that party. *If you have recently amended your registration status to affiliate with a party, please disregard this notice.*
>
> To affiliate with a party, please fill out and return the enclosed voter registration form to your town's registrar of voters.

Note that the letter provides voters with information about their registration status, the upcoming primary, and the need to register with a party to participate in the primary. Our treatment, therefore,

[8] In the remainder of our exposition here, we focus on the latent partisans, although we also randomly treated some individuals with all different levels of partisanship as well as individuals we never surveyed in order to allow us to examine treatment effects for larger populations. Results for those additional groups are available upon request from the authors and are discussed below.

[9] The results of Connecticut's presidential preference primary, as reported by Connecticut's Secretary of State (http://www.ct.gov/sots/cwp/view.asp?a=3179&Q=392194&SOTSNav_GID=1846), were as follows. In the Republican primary: McCain (52%), Romney (32.9%), Huckabee (7.0%), and All Others (8.1%). In the Democratic primary: Obama (50.6%), Clinton (46.5%), Edwards (1.0%), and All Others (1.9%).

[10] A test of random assignment appears in Table A1 in the Appendix, in which we demonstrate that observable features of respondents in the treatment and control groups cannot explain treatment assignment.

[11] Citizens may be unaware of legal requirements for primary participation in closed primary states and this may present a barrier to participation. These mailings were part of a larger project investigating the turnout effects of providing pre-election information about primary voting rules.

lowered the cost to changing one's registration, made individuals aware of the impending primary, and provided information about a potential benefit of party affiliation. While the letter is non-partisan, as a result of receiving the letter, a portion of treated respondents decided to affiliate with a party.[12] We detail the size of this effect in Section III.

Phase 3 of our experiment involved measuring the effects of the treatment on various outcomes of interest, including partisan registration status, party affiliations, and opinions. Data come from two sources. The first is a survey we conducted in June 2008 of all respondents for whom we initially measured pre-treatment partisanship in our January 2008 survey (we label this second survey the post-survey). Of the 1,540 latent partisans we initially surveyed, we were able to complete a second survey for approximately 497, or about 32%.[13] The survey took place soon after 2008 primary turnout and changes in party registration were added to the CT voter file, minimizing our concern about effects originating in targeted communications in response to turnout or changes in party registration. Measures included on the survey are detailed in the Appendix and include all of the questions asked on the baseline survey as well as planned vote intention for the November 2008 election, evaluations of important historical partisan figures, measures of various forms of political behavior, and reports of campaign contact.

The second data source is the Connecticut voter file, an updated version of which was provided to us by state election officials on June 25, 2008. The voter file allows us to track all respondents in our original sample and to obtain an accurate measure of their registration and turnout behavior. Because Connecticut towns are not required to report turnout to the Secretary of State's office by a particular deadline, however, accurate turnout records may not be available for all towns in the voter file. (No such concern applies to changes in registration.) We identified seven Connecticut towns where no voters were

[12] In Connecticut, voters who chose to register with a party could do so in person up to the day before the election, or by January 31 if doing so by mail.

[13] Out of concern that non-random variation in survey response might generate bias, we tested whether treatment status affected the probability a latent partisan completed a second interview and found no evidence that it does. Those results appear in Table A2. In a model in which a simple treatment indictor is used to predict response to the second survey, the coefficient on treatment is .005 with a p-value of 0.842. In a model in which we also interact treatment status with all of the other control variables available from the voter file and our pre-survey, an F-test for the joint significance of treatment status and those interactions has p-value of .301.

shown to have voted in the 2008 primary. These seven towns include 24 of the 1540 latent partisans in our sample (1.6%).[14]

Finally, because of concerns that bad addresses in the voter file would have interfered with our efforts to treat respondents, we also employed an outside vendor to verify the addresses listed in the voter file for all individuals in our survey sampling frame (both treatment and control groups). This validation took place in June 2008, and led us to identify 32 latent partisans who completed both surveys but had questionable contact information in the voter file (or 6.7% of the 479 latent partisans who completed both surveys).[15]

III. Results

In this section, our analysis proceeds in two phases. First, we examine the effect of our treatment on party affiliation, voter turnout, and party identification. Having verified that our treatment did in fact induce changes in partisanship, our second step is to test whether those induced changes in partisanship were accompanied by corresponding changes in political opinions and attitudes.

We examine separately two sets of attitudinal outcomes: Voting decisions and evaluations of political figures and opinions on salient political issues. (Sample means and standard deviations for dependent variable measures among latent partisans who completed both surveys appear in Table A3.) To foreshadow our findings, the results show that our treatment induced individuals to alter their reports of future and past voting behavior as well as their evaluations of the parties in a manner consistent with their change in partisanship. However, we find little evidence that changes in partisanship result in changes in opinions on salient political issues. (We consider below whether this last result reflects issues of timing and issue selection.)

Treatment Effect on Party Registration and Party Identification

[14] Accurate town turnout records are missing for 1.3% of respondents who provided a measure of party identification in the first survey, and 1.1% of all records in our original first-survey sampling frame.
[15] 6.6% of all respondents who provide a first-interview measure of partisanship were similarly classified. In the entire sampling frame, 16.6% of respondents were classified in this way (for individuals never surveyed, we also eliminated individuals who are reported as having died).

Table 2 demonstrates the effect of the pre-election mailing on party affiliation rates as presented in the June 2008 Connecticut voter file. Overall, treated individuals were more likely to affiliate than those in the control condition. The table divides the results by initial political leaning. Recall that latent Democrats are those who answered "no" to the initial question of whether they identified with either of the major parties, but stated that they felt closer to the Democratic Party in response to the follow-up question. Latent Republicans are defined in a parallel fashion while Independents are those who stated they did not feel closer to either of the parties. The first three columns of Table 2 focus on the latent Democrats. 15.5% of treated individuals affiliated with the Democratic Party while an additional 0.7% affiliated with the Republicans, for a net increase of 14.9% in Democratic registration. Of the non-treated latent Democrats, 6.4% affiliated with the Democrats and only 0.2% with the Republicans, for a net increase of 6.2% in Democratic registration. The difference between these figures implies the treatment caused an increase in net Democratic Party registration of 8.7 percentage points among latent Democrats.

Not surprisingly, latent Republicans (shown in the final three columns of the table) break in the opposite direction, with an increase of 1.6 percentage points in net Republican registration. One explanation for the relatively greater effect on Democratic Party registration is that contrary to initial expectations that Hilary Clinton would be the easy winner while the Republicans would be fighting into the spring, the Democratic race for the nomination was much closer than the Republican race. Thus, participation in the closely contested race for the Democratic nomination may have been more compelling.[16] This intuition is supported by two facts: First the Democratic primary saw turnout rates of 51 percent compared to 37 percent for the Republican contest. Second, among Independents, the treatment letter increased net Democratic registration by 2.3 percentage points.[17]

<Table 2 about here>

In our experimental setting in which letters were randomly sent to some survey participants but

[16] See Kaplan 2008 and Layton 2008 on the greater effort put into the Connecticut race by the Democratic candidates.

[17] Standardizing the relative figures for the latent Democrats and latent Republicans by this amount, on the theory that the adjusted figure would be what one would expect in a primary with equally compelling drama and candidates for both parties, yields comparable figures of 6.4 and 3.9 percentage points, respectively.

not others, the numbers presented in Table 2 are unbiased estimates of the effect of the letter on party affiliation. In Table 3 we present regression adjusted estimates of the treatment effect of the mailings (the regression follows equation (4)'). We include as covariates information gleaned from the pre-treatment survey and voter file. In our experimental setting, the inclusion of covariates serves to increase the precision of our coefficients. We find that the letter increases the propensity to affiliate with the Democratic Party by 8.2 percentage points ($p<.01$) for latent Democrats (column 2), while it increases the probability of registering with the Republican Party by 3.8 percentage points ($p<.10$) for latent Republicans (column 5). The estimated treatment effect for Independents is also quite similar to that shown in Table 2.

In the remaining two columns of the table we present the effect of the treatment on party affiliation for what will be our focal sample: latent party leaners who completed a follow-up survey. We focus on this population in the remainder of the paper for three reasons: First, and most obviously, we cannot measure the impact of the treatment on political opinions without the responses to the second survey measuring post-treatment opinions. Secondly, we restrict attention to the party leaners because for this population (as opposed to Independents) we can measure whether changes in opinions are in fact increases or decreases in partisan-aligned views. Finally, we focus on party leaners, as opposed to strong partisans, because there is room for partisan leaners to increase their (measured) level of partisanship.

Column 7 of the table shows that our treatment increased registration with the party a respondent leaned toward by 7.2 percentage points in the focal population. Our treatment also increased primary turnout by about 3.3 percentage points.[18] This increase in turnout, coming after such a simple intervention, is large relative to the effects of most impersonal communications (By contrast, door-to-door canvassing increases turnout by 5-10 percentage points. See Gerber and Green 2000.).

<Table 3 about here>

Our simple mailing treatment resulted in increased turnout and party registration. As we show next, it also increased partisan identity in a manner consistent with the changes in registration. This

[18] The p-value (one-sided) of the effect of treatment on turnout is .103.

portion of the analysis is based on the post-treatment survey. Table 4 presents two measures of changes in partisan identification: (1) the proportion of those respondents who post-identify with their latent pre-survey partisanship (coded 1 if a respondent now stated that "generally speaking" s/he thought of her/himself as of that party and 0 otherwise) and (2) the standard party-ID measure scaled so that it is directional relative to a respondent's pre-survey latent partisanship (coded so that 7=the respondent now strongly identified with his or her pre-survey latent partisanship and 1=the respondent now strongly identified with the opposing party). We present these measures separately for latent Democrats and latent Republicans as well as for a pooled sample of all latent partisans.

<Table 4 about here>

The results presented in Table 4 indicate that the treatment strengthened the latent partisanship of our survey respondents. Among latent Democrats, we see a net increase in the treatment group relative to the control group of 5.1 points in the percentage of respondents calling themselves Democrats. Treated latent Democrats also increase their relative partisanship on the seven point ID scale by about .19. Among latent Republicans, we see a net increase of 5.6 points in the percentage identifying as Republicans, and the average relative movement on the seven point party ID scale is .16. Pooling all partisan leaners we see a relative increase in dichotomous identification of about 5.2 percentage points and of .18 points on the seven point identification scale.

To give a greater sense of the effect of the treatment on reported partisanship throughout the entire distribution of partisan leanings, we also present our data graphically. Figure 1 displays the post-survey party-ID scale by treatment status and by pre-survey partisan leaning. Panel (A) focuses on latent Democrats. The distribution of post-treatment partisan leanings for control group members appears on the left and that for treated individuals appears on the right. The partisan identification scale goes from a low of strong Democrat to a high of strong Republican. Note that among latent Democrats, the treatment group has a distribution of partisan identity that is to the left (or to the more Democratic end) of the control group. Among latent Republicans, shown in Panel (C), the pattern is reversed with the treatment distribution to the right of that of the control. Interestingly, we see in Panel (B) that Independent

respondents also seem to have strengthened their commitment to their partisan view as a result of the treatment. The treated distribution has more mass in the center of the scale, indicating that treated Independents became *more* independent. This fact suggests that the treatment acted to cause respondents to reaffirm and strengthen their initial partisanship for all groups, which in the case of "true" Independents is an identity that is divorced from either party.[19]

<Figure 1 about here>

In Table 5, we present regression results that confirm these tabular and graphical presentations (these regressions follow equation (3)'). In columns (1) through (3), the dependent variable is the aforementioned post-survey identification with the pre-survey latent partisanship (coded 0 to 1), while in (4) through (6) it is the directional measure of party affiliation with pre-survey latent partisanship (coded 1 to 7). In column (1), we find that the letter increased partisan identification by 8.1 percentage points ($p<.05$ in a two-tailed test), an effect which is reduced only slightly (to 7.5, $p<.10$) with the inclusion of measures from the voter file.

<Table 5 about here>

In column (3), we add measures of opinions from the pre-survey to the list of covariates. Because our outcome of interest is the correspondence between the respondent's latent partisanship and his or her post-survey expressed partisanship, we recoded the survey responses (other than primary interest) to reflect the degree of agreement between the respondent's latent partisanship and those opinions. Higher values indicate a respondent's pre-survey opinions coincided more with his or her latent partisanship. So, for example, the variable "Pre-survey 2000 vote aligned with pre-survey latent partisanship" is coded 1 for latent Democrats (Republicans) who reported voting for Gore (Bush) in 2000, and 0 for all others. Similarly, responses to the Bush Approval measure are multiplied by -1 for respondents who were latent Democrats, so that latent Democrats who evaluated Bush negatively were scored highly on this measure

[19] This graphical result is supported by statistical analysis. Focusing on these pre-survey Independents, in a regression framework in which we code post-identity as an Independent=1, the coefficient on treatment is .12 (p-value=.05, one-tailed, N=210) in a model without controls. With all controls from the voter file the coefficient is .09 (p-value=.09).

along with latent Republicans who evaluated Bush positively. In this specification, we find the effect of receiving mail to be 7.3 percentage points ($p<.10$).

Columns (4) through (6) mirror the specifications from (1) through (3), substituting as the dependent variable the 7-point scale measured relative to pre-survey latent partisanship. In the OLS specifications, the coefficients range from .225 to .233 with a maximum p-value less than .05. Substantively, these estimates suggest that being sent the letter moved a respondent about a quarter of unit between any two of the 7 point scale measures of partisanship.

Overall, these results show that the treatment caused important changes in both political behavior and identification. On the behavior side, we find evidence that latent partisans reacted to the letter by formally registering with the party they felt closer to. Additionally, treated individuals were more likely than controls to vote in the presidential primary. With respect to identity, we see that the letter induced recipients to increasingly identify themselves as partisans and to more fully express their previously latent partisanship.

Treatment Effect on Opinions

Table 6 presents estimates from a series of models examining the effect of the treatment letter on voting decisions and evaluations of political figures (columns [1] through [9]) and salient policy opinions (columns [10] through [12]). The results suggest that the manipulation of partisanship induces corresponding partisan-tinged differences in reported voting decisions and evaluations of political figures, but is not accompanied by similar movements in policy opinions. We examine these results in greater detail here.

<Table 6 about here>

Table 6 contains 12 columns. The models explain 4 different outcome variables and there are three regression models for each of the outcomes. The first regression in each of the triples (columns 1, 4, 7, and 10) is the intent to treat effect of treatment on the particular political outcome variable (equation 3'). The remaining columns report the results of two-stage least squares estimation of the effect of partisanship on political attitudes and behavior (based on the system of equations 5' and 6').

In columns (1) through (3), the dependent variable is a scale of the alignment between a respondent's latent partisanship and post-survey responses to four questions (Candidate choice in 2000, planned vote in November 2008, and evaluation of the Democratic and Republican parties). Results by individual items for this and other indexes appear in the appendix. The .293 in column 1 indicates that the treatment letter increased the degree of alignment between partisanship and these opinions. To put the magnitude of this increase in perspective, note that it is $1/6^{th}$ of the observed standard deviation in the index for all latent partisans (1.73). This impact is significant at standard levels with a p-value of .02. (Given that we expect effects, if any, to manifest in the direction of a greater agreement between a respondent's latent partisanship and subsequent opinions, we report in the text here and at the bottom of the table one-tailed/directional hypotheses tests.) Thus, receiving the pre-election letter led individuals to increase the degree of alignment in their expressed opinions and planned and past voting decisions.

This result is displayed graphically in Figure 2. The figure plots the cumulative distribution of the alignment scale for the pooled sample of latent partisans by treatment status. The fact that those in the treatment group have greater alignment between their latent partisanship and their voting and evaluations alignment scale score is apparent from the fact that the cumulative distribution of responses for the treated respondents (the dotted line) is consistently below the untreated respondents (the solid line) by about 5 to 7% for the entire distribution. The entire distribution of alignment scale scores is shifted to the right for those sent the letter.

<Figure 2 about here>

Assuming that the effect of the treatment letter on the alignment scale is mediated through the increased partisanship we documented in Table 5, we measure the impact of partisanship on party alignment in opinions in the second and third columns of Table 6. In column 2 we use the dichotomous measure of partisanship and in column 3 we rely on the seven point variable to scale our average treatment-on-the-treated effects. The 3.9 in column 2 (p=.06) implies that identifying with one's latent party increases a respondent's scale score by about 4 points on the 10 point scale, more than twice the observed standard deviation in the scale score. The 1.3 in column (3) (p=.02) means that a 2-point move

in the party ID scale (from feeling closer to one's latent party to feeling strongly that one is of that party) increases a respondent's index score by about 2.7, or about 70% of the effect estimated in the column (2) specification.

In columns (4) through (9) we test the robustness of these results to the inclusion of additional items in our voting and party alignment scale. In columns (4) through (6) we add measures of the degree of agreement between a respondent's latent partisanship and evaluations of Congress and President Bush, while in columns (7) through (9) we also add the degree of alignment in evaluations of two iconic partisan figures: Former presidents Carter (a Democrat) and Reagan (a Republican).[20] In general, the results with these changes can be characterized as follows: The size of the estimated effect increases (which is not surprising given that the range of the scales being used also increases), but the standard errors increase by slightly larger proportions than the coefficients. P-values in columns (4) through (6) range from .05 to .08, while in (7) through (9) they range from .06 to .12.

Overall, these results provide the first evidence that exogenously induced changes in partisanship are accompanied by movements in political opinions. This pattern is consistent with the claim that partisanship affects voting decisions and perceptions of political figures.

The effects of our mailing treatment do not appear to extend to personal policy opinions on important issues of the day. In columns (10) through (12) of Table 6 we presents results where the dependent variable is an index of the alignment between a respondent's expressed personal policy opinions and his or her latent pre-survey partisanship. (The four policy items deal with policy in Iraq, taxing the rich, and evaluations of retrospective economic performance and unemployment rates.) These results show little evidence that the letter induced personal opinion polarization. The estimated

[20] One concern we had about the evaluation of Bush and Congress measures was that Bush was unpopular for reasons, apart from his partisanship. (Even many Republicans in Connecticut reported strong displeasure with his performance in our pre-survey.) Additionally, evaluations of Congress were already relatively polarized in our pre-survey, raising concerns about ceiling effects. We were also concerned that evaluations of Carter and Reagan might be relatively uninformative because those figures do not remain as salient partisans in many individuals' memories (indeed, the oldest person in our sample was only 21 in 1980 when Carter left office). Evidence consistent with this fear is that in our data, both former presidents appear to be viewed relatively positively by the vast majority of respondents (less than 14% of all respondents viewed Carter or Reagan negatively).

coefficients are small in size, negative, and have large standard errors (the *smallest* p-value, with a one-tailed test, despite being negative, is only .38). One concern we have in interpreting this result is that the component measures of this scale are of salient issues where respondents likely had developed relatively strong opinions even prior to our intervention. The claim that individuals adjust their personal policy preferences in response to their party identification often describes a long-run process of adjustment (perhaps driven by elite queuing or selective exposure to different forms of media or campaign communications) or the role of partisanship in guiding opinion formation on newly-emergent issues. We measure only relatively short-term responses on persistent issues, and so we remain agnostic about whether a similar pattern would emerge with alternative issues or over longer periods of time.

What we have demonstrated is that the receipt of the letter informing the recipients about the need to be affiliated with a party to vote in that party's primary increased partisan affiliation, voter turnout, partisan identity, and, ultimately, partisan perceptions of political figures. Thus we provide the first evidence that we are aware of that researchers can manipulate partisanship in the field. That the manipulation arose from a treatment that induced most proximately a behavior change (deciding on or declaring a party affiliation) provides support for the importance of a need for cognitive consistency (aligning subsequent attitudes with prior decisions and behaviors). That we find that increased partisanship is accompanied by increased partisan views provides support for the hypothesis that partisanship is an active mediator of political views. However, because our intervention affected a variety of behaviors and attitudes, our experiment can not definitively sort out the mechanism that led from letter receipt to increased partisan views. Was it the increased partisan allegiance, voting in a partisan primary, or the new party affiliation that increased partisan attitudes? In the next section we discuss the feasibility of each of these various mechanisms.

IV. Discussion of Mechanisms

Our random intervention caused both a shift in partisan allegiance and changes in opinions. We can be certain, subject to sampling error, that the treatment caused these two types of effects. However,

the conclusion that the opinion changes are due to changes in partisanship rests on an exclusion restriction that we cannot test directly. In particular, two alternative interpretations must be considered. First, we must consider whether the treatment (the information letter) itself caused the change in outcome measures. Second, we must consider whether a treatment induced change, *other than increased partisanship*, led to the increase in partisan views.

We dismiss the former account, that the informational letter directly caused changes in partisan identities and opinions, as implausible. There is no reason to believe that obtaining information about the upcoming election and Connecticut election laws could alter subjects' voting intentions or recollections of their views about the merits of each party in a way that would generate the observed greater polarization between competing latent partisans.[21]

The latter account suggests that other treatment induced changes, in particular increased political affiliation (party registration) or voting, generated the observed changed in opinions. We discuss these alternative explanations in turn.

Our treatment increased the rate of party registration. Changes in party registration may induce partisan views by altering information flows. The parties may send their members information specifically designed to strengthen their partisan views in regards to vote choice and opinions of prominent partisans. While this is a theoretical possibility, it is unlikely to be applicable to our experiment. The presidential primary election campaigns in Connecticut were unlikely to have known about or reacted to changes in registration, particularly those induced by our treatment in the very last days before the election. (In particular, Connecticut's highly decentralized town based system of election administration ensured that any information trickling in to town election offices would be impractical to incorporate into mass communications efforts.) Alternatively, perhaps those who registered with a party or voted subsequently received a different flow of general election mailings? In this case, this seems unlikely because the Connecticut voter file was updated to include registration and turnout in the primary

[21] For the same reason, we believe that an account which posits that the letter caused changes in opinions that preceded the changes in partisan identity is not feasible. We are unaware of any means by which this letter could induce greater partisan-colored opinions without first inducing a change in partisan identities.

election only near the end of April, and we surveyed the subjects in late June. We are aware of no active campaign efforts during that brief window, a fact that is unsurprising given the season (late spring) and Connecticut's solid Democratic status for the upcoming general election.

Additionally, we sought to confirm that our treatment group members were not contaminated by partisan information transmission by asking them about this topic in our post treatment survey. We find no evidence that those sent letters were more likely to seek out information or receive information from campaigns, as we demonstrate in Table 7.

<Table 7 about here>

We examine three outcomes: campaign interest, political behavior, and reported campaign contact. We measure interest using a single question. Our index of political behavior is comprised of three items: seeking out political information, trying to persuade others, and donating to a campaign. Finally, our index of campaign treatment is comprised of five items measuring whether a respondent viewed a political advertisement, received a request for money, or was contacted by a campaign via telephone, mail, or face-to-face campaigning. We find that the mailing slightly depressed interest in the general election[22] (column 1), and had no statistically discernable effect on political participation (column 2) or reported receipt of campaign contact (columns 3). Thus we rule out information as the source of our increased partisan views based both on our experimental design and on the empirical evidence concerning political behavior and campaign treatment.

A second way in which party registration might affect opinions is if the act of registering with a party leads the subject to change his or her opinions about the parties. As cognitive dissonance theory suggests, if a subject perceives the act of registering as affirming a partisan identity (rather than a mere technical act necessary to participate in an upcoming election), the act of formally affiliating would create a wish to reconcile actions (affiliating with the party) and views (attitudes toward the party and its

[22] We have two hypotheses of how the mailing may have depressed interest in the general election campaign. First, political affiliation or partisan views may render the question of how to vote in the general election decided and thus decrease any need or interest to think further about the campaign. Second, the decrease in interest may be coming from those who supported a losing primary candidate. Unfortunately, we did not collect the data on primary vote choice to evaluate this second explanation.

positions). Classic accounts of the formation of partisan identity emphasize both the external influences that lead to partisan orientation, such as parental socialization and key political experiences during formative years, and the persistent effects of early political acts such as initial voting decisions. If the act of registering with a party has a direct psychological effect on a subject's partisan identity and subsequent evaluations of political objects, this is consistent with the standard view of how partisan identity drives attitudes. Interestingly, the active consideration and rejection of party registration appears to have strengthened the independent views of our Independent non-latent partisans (Independents who refused to express feeling closer to either party).[23] This suggests that reflecting upon one's partisanship and actively refusing to register with a party (a non-action) can also strengthen partisan allegiances.

<Table 8 about here>

The second additional mechanism we consider relates to the effect of casting a vote. Our treatment increased turnout in the presidential primary. Both Beasley and Joslyn (2001) and Mullainathan and Washington (2009) provide evidence that the act of voting for a candidate causes an increase in support for that candidate. However, these studies do not provide evidence on whether voting for a candidate increases partisan views of partisans who were not standing for office in that particular election. While it would be an interesting new channel for reinforcing partisan identity, it seems unlikely in the present experiment that voting increased the partisan views we observe. Unlike a general election, the primary election did not force voters to select a particular partisan view (or any opinion we subsequently measured). On the Democratic side, for example, the leading candidates, Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton, were quite similar in their political ideology. Thus voting in the primary was not a commitment to any particular partisan view. In contrast, registration—for the Democratic or the Republican side—forced a commitment to the partisan choice. Thus, if an act of commitment is driving our findings, it is

[23] Columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 present results from a pair of models in which we examine the probability that non-leaning Independents in the pre-treatment survey identified as non-leaning Independents in the post-survey as a function of whether they received our treatment letter. As these results show, Independent non-leaners in the treatment group are 11.6 (column 1, one-sided p-value=.05) to 9.4 (column 2, p-value =.09) percentage points more likely to identify as non-leaning Independents, despite the fact that they could not express that independence through a formal change in registration.

likely the act of affiliating as discussed above. (We note also that the above finding concerning Independent non-leaners, that they become more independent in response to the treatment, suggests voting is not the only mechanism by which partisan divergence is generated, as these Independents could only express their independence in action by not voting in either of the major parties' primaries.)

V. Conclusion

This paper presents the first evidence we are aware of that researchers can induce changes in partisanship in the field. We drafted a letter that informs unaffiliated but registered voters that their eligibility to participate in a party's presidential primary hinges on their willingness to register with that party. This letter was sent to a randomly selected subset of registered Connecticut voters who were unaffiliated with either party but who also describe themselves as Independents who felt "closer" to either the Democratic or Republican parties. Receiving this letter causes a substantial increase in partisan registration as well as increasing self-reported partisan identification in the direction of this latent partisanship.

This mechanism for inducing changes in partisanship has important consequences for understanding the causal role of partisanship in explaining behaviors and opinions. In particular, we provide the first evidence that induced changes in partisanship are accompanied by partisan-tinged divergence in planned and reported voting behavior as well as in evaluations of partisan figures. This effect does not appear to carry over into personal policy opinions, although this may be because we survey on already salient policy issues or because the period between our treatment and post-survey measure of policy opinions is four months, which may be insufficient for longer-term effects of partisanship on information acquisition and elite cue-taking to manifest. Nor does partisanship appear to be immediately related to increased personal political involvement, a finding that again may suggest the persistent effects of partisanship may be confined to turnout or may be similarly delayed in developing (e.g., if caused by subsequent targeted campaigning).

Turning to other questions, we argue that the basic design we propose can be used to study a

variety of important questions about partisanship. For example, do partisans seek out different sorts of political information (selective exposure), evaluate the information transmitted by political elites differently (cue-taking and source attribution), or receive differential campaign treatments (strategic targeting of campaigns)? We are currently exploring the last question, but future experiments with larger sample sizes and different and more widely-spaced survey instruments could provide panel studies of media consumption and over-time opinion changes associated with changes in partisanship. Indeed, it may be the case that the effects we find understate the long-term changes associated with changes in formal affiliation because of other factors that reinforce this initial change in registration and identification.

More generally, our research is a single and relatively small study of induced changes in partisanship in Connecticut during a particularly compelling presidential primary season. While our experimental design provides us with no reason to believe our findings are spurious or overly large, a larger sample and treatments on different populations would provide insights into the robustness of this finding for different populations and across different electoral contexts. Indeed, the latent partisans we are able to convert to active partisans may be more or less amenable to attitude change then other groups with different levels of attachments to one party or another.[24]

Among the questions we are interested in examining in future work is whether similar changes in partisan identity can be created in the absence of party registration rules. We see several promising avenues in this regard, one of which would be to identify a similar cohort of latent partisans in states with open or semi-open primaries and to randomly induce some to participate in the party primary most closely associated with their latent partisanship. If participation led to the quick development of persistent

[24] For example, it might be the case that Independents who refused to feel closer to either party but who had issue beliefs that made them seem closer to one party would experience more attitude change if they were induced to register with that party because their views were initially less structured by any partisan leanings, even though they might be less likely to affiliate in the first place. It might also be the case that those who have a strong partisan identity but who were not registered with that party might be less receptive to our treatment and therefore demonstrate less movement in their opinions. (Given that strong partisanship would ordinarily also be associated with formal registration.) Support for this conjecture is found by including in our analysis data for all unaffiliated partisans, latent and otherwise. When we do so, the effects on opinions reported here are reduced.

changes in partisanship and opinions, again prior to targeted campaign communication, this would provide additional information about the mechanism by which partisanship can emerge. In particular, it would demonstrate the effects do not originate solely because of the relatively formal decision to legally affiliate with one party rather than another.

Returning to the larger questions that motivate our inquiry, we believe this research provides compelling evidence for interpreting the consistent relationship in survey data between partisanship and voting decisions and evaluations of partisan figures as causal. In an experimental setting outside of the laboratory, we have demonstrated an ability to randomly strengthen partisan affiliations and shown that those induced changes in partisanship are accompanied by corresponding changes in political opinions and planned behaviors. Our results imply that partisanship is an active force causing changes in important political outcomes even prior to the imposition of partisan-targeting by political campaigns and other actors. Our findings thus suggest that partisanship deserves a place as an independent source of political decisions and opinions and our work implies more broadly that group allegiance influences like-minded attitudes.

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Appendix 1: Experiment Protocol and variable coding

Phase 1: Identification of Latent Partisans and Measurement of Baseline Opinions

Latent partisans were indentified from a random survey of registered but unaffiliated voters listed in the Connecticut voter file provided to us by the Secretary of State's office in January 2008.

We processed the voter file to identify households (common telephone numbers or addresses) with valid CT telephone numbers and containing two or fewer registered voters, at least one of whom was unaffiliated. In households with two unaffiliated voters, we randomly selected which voter to interview. To ensure we could reach individuals for surveying and for our subsequent treatment, we further restricted the sample to eliminate records for registered voters with out of state mailing addresses, invalid mailing addresses, or discrepancies among the multiple addresses listed in the voter file. Finally, to maximize the returns to our survey efforts by avoiding calling individuals who had likely moved or had little likelihood of responding to any treatment, we restricted the sample to younger voters (18-49, inclusive) and to those that met a minimal engagement standard (Having voted in any election in 2006, 2004, or 2002 or being less than 21 or having registered after 2000). This list of 118,076 names and numbers was then randomly ordered for survey sampling reasons.

We were able to gather data for 3,787 complete surveys, of which we obtained a valid measure of partisanship for 3,539. Question wording and statistics on the distribution of measured partisan identification appear in the text.

Additional questions included on this survey included the following:

Primary Interest: There will be a presidential primary election in Connecticut this February. This election will help determine the Democratic and Republican party presidential candidates. How interested are you in this election? Would you say that you are very much interested, somewhat interested, or not much interested in this election? (2=Very, 1=Somewhat, 0=Not Much. All other responses coded missing)

2000 Turnout: Putting aside how you currently feel about President George Bush and former vice president Al Gore, do you remember whether or not you voted in the 2000 presidential election between Republican George Bush, Democrat Al Gore, and Green candidate Ralph Nader? (1=Yes, 0=No/Don't Know/Refused/Etc.)

2000 Vote Choice (Asked only if 2000 Turnout=1): Which one did you vote for? Vote for Bush/Gore: (1=Yes, 0=Other candidate/Didn't vote/Don't Know/Refused/Etc.)

Economy Retrospective Judgment: Thinking about the economy in the country as a whole, would you say that OVER THE PAST YEAR the nation's economy has gotten better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse? If Better/Worse: Much [Better/Worse] or somewhat [Better/Worse]? (2=Much Better, 1=Better, Somewhat or Don't Know response to second question, 0=Same/Don't Know, -1=Worse, Somewhat or Don't Know response to second question, -2=Much Worse).

Unemployment Performance: George Bush was elected president in November 2000 and took office in January 2001. He will soon be leaving office next year after eight years as president. Would you say that compared to 2000, the level of unemployment in the country has gotten better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse? If Better/Worse: Much [Better/Worse] or somewhat [Better/Worse]? (2=Much Better, 1=Better, Somewhat or Don't Know response to second question, 0=Same/Don't Know, -1=Worse, Somewhat or Don't Know response to second question, -2=Much Worse).

Bush/Congress Approval: Do you approve or disapprove of the way George Bush is handling his job as president? The Democratic party currently controls the Congress. Do you approve or disapprove of the performance of Congress? If Approve/Disapprove: Strongly or not strongly? (2=Strongly Approve, 1=Approve, not strongly, 0=Don't Know, -1=Disapprove, not strongly, -2=Strongly Disapprove).

Phase 2: Mail Information about Voting Rules

Balance statistics for treatment and control groups, by pre-survey status and partisanship (if surveyed) appear in Table A1.

Phase 3: Measure Post Primary Opinions and Behaviors

The Voting and Party Alignment Scale is coded as the sum of these four measures:

1. Post-survey 2000 vote aligned with pre-survey latent partisanship (1 if respondent reports voting for Bush in 2000 and felt closer to Republicans in pre-survey or if respondent reports voting for Gore in 2000 and felt closer to Democrats in pre-survey, 0 otherwise). 2000 Vote is measured and coded in the same was as on the pre-survey.

2. Post-survey Nov. 2008 vote aligned with pre-survey latent partisanship (1 if respondent reports will vote for Republican in 2008 and felt closer to Republicans in pre-survey or if respondent reports will vote for Democrat in 2008 and felt closer to Democrats in pre-survey, 0 otherwise). Question: Who do you think you will likely vote for in the election for President this coming November, the Democratic candidate, the Republican candidate, or the candidate of some other party? If Don't Know, this probe is used: Needless to say, the election for president of the United States is a long time away in November, but I'd like to ask you for your best guess about who you will vote for in the election for president in November.

3. Post-survey evaluation of Reps. aligned with pre-survey latent partisanship (If latent Republican, 2=very positive, 1=somewhat positive, 0=DK/Neutral, -1=somewhat negative, -2=very negative, scale reversed if latent Democrat.). Question wording was from battery that asked respondents to evaluate several actors using: Now I'm going to read you the names of several public figures and organizations, and I'd like you to rate your feelings toward each one as either very positive, somewhat positive, neutral, somewhat negative, or very negative. If you don't know the name, please just say so. Actor in this case was Republican Party.

4. Post-survey evaluation of Dems. aligned with pre-survey latent partisanship (If latent Democrat, 2=very positive, 1=somewhat positive, 0=DK/Neutral, -1=somewhat negative, -2=very negative, scale reversed if latent Republican.). Question wording same as above. Actor in this case was Democratic Party.

Post-survey evaluation of Bush aligned with pre-survey latent partisanship & Post-survey evaluation of Congress aligned with pre-survey latent partisanship. Question word same as in pre-survey, responses flipped for individuals aligned with opposing party (e.g., Democrats evaluating Bush, Republicans evaluating Congress).

Post-survey evaluation of Reagan aligned with pre-survey latent partisanship (Coded same as for Republican Party alignment). Actor in this case was Former President Ronald Reagan.

Post-survey evaluation of Carter aligned with pre-survey latent partisanship (Coded same as for Democratic Party). Actor in this case was Former President Jimmy Carter.

The Policy evaluations alignment scale is coded as the sum of these four measures:

1. Post-survey Iraq Policy aligned with pre-survey latent partisanship (If latent Republican, 2= strongly agree, 1=partially agree, 0=DK/feel neutral, -1=partially disagree, -2=strongly disagree, scale reversed if latent Democrat). I'm going to read you a number of positions that a candidate might take. For each one, please tell me whether you strongly agree with this position, partially agree, feel neutral, partially disagree, or strongly disagree. Favors keeping American troops in Iraq until the mission there is complete, no matter how long this takes

2. Post-survey Taxing Rich aligned with pre-survey latent partisanship (If latent Democrat, 2= strongly agree, 1=partially agree, 0=DK/feel neutral, -1=partially disagree, -2=strongly disagree, scale reversed if latent Republican). I'm going to read you a number of positions that a candidate might take. For each one, please tell me whether you strongly agree with this position, partially agree, feel neutral, partially disagree, or strongly disagree. Favors increasing taxes for upper-income taxpayers to fund health care for the uninsured.

3. Post-survey Retrospective Economy aligned with pre-survey latent partisanship. Same question wording as in pre-survey. Responses reversed coded for latent Democrats.

4. Post-survey Unemployment Performance aligned with pre-survey latent partisanship. Same question wording as in pre-survey. Responses reverse coded for latent Democrats.

General Election Interest (2=Very, 1=Somewhat, 0=Not Much): There will be a presidential election in November. How interested are you in this election? Would you say that you are very much interested, somewhat interested, or not much interested in this election?

Participation, Individual Behavior Index is coded as the sum of these three measures:

Here is a list of things some people do during election year. Which if any did you do in the last six months? (1 point for each yes, 0 for No/DK.)

1. Talked to other people to persuade them to vote for a particular candidate?
2. Looked for information about one or more of the candidates running for the nomination, for example by reading the newspaper, watching TV, or searching on the Internet.
3. In the last 6 months, did you contribute MONEY to an individual candidate, party group, a political action committee, or any other organization that supported a candidate or a ballot proposition? (1=Yes, 0=No/DK)

Participation, Campaign Treatment Index is coded as the sum of these five measures:

We have a series of questions about any contact you may have had since January 1 on behalf of any candidate. Please tell us whether you have been contacted in this way during the last 6 months. Have you… (1 point for each yes, 0 for No/DK.)

1. Received a letter or piece of mail from a campaign?
2. Received a phone call from a campaign?
3. Had a face-to-face conversation or contact with someone from a campaign?
4. Received a request to donate money to a campaign?
5. Heard or saw a radio or television ad from a campaign?

Additionally, to supplement the voter file measure of gender (which was missing for many individuals), the interviewer coded gender.

Figure 1: Post−Survey Party Identification By Pre−Survey Party Identification and Whether Sent Mail



Note: Sample is respondents with measure of partisanship in both surveys, valid addresses, and who had not moved before treatment was applied.

Figure 2: Cumulative Distribution of Voting and Evaluations Alignment Scale Among Pre−Survey Latent Partisans by Whether Sent Mail



Note: Sample is all respondents with valid measure of Party ID in both surveys who had valid addresses and had not moved before treatment was applied

Larger scores on underlying scale indicate post−survey voting and evaluations are more aligned with pre−survey latent partisanship.

Table 2: Effect of Being Sent Mail on Registration Status

	Latent Democrats			Independents			Latent Republicans		
	Sent Mail?		Difference (Sent - Not Sent Mail)	Sent Mail?		Difference (Sent - Not Sent Mail)	Sent Mail?		Difference (Sent - Not Sent Mail)
	Yes	No		Yes	No		Yes	No	
% Registered with Democratic Party	15.52%	6.43%	9.09%	5.77%	2.45%	3.33%	3.88%	1.51%	2.37%
% Registered with Republican Party	0.67%	0.22%	0.44%	1.57%	0.54%	1.03%	6.98%	3.02%	3.96%
Increase in Net % Registered with Democratic Party	14.86%	6.21%	8.65%	4.20%	1.90%	2.30%	-3.10%	-1.51%	-1.59%
N	451	451	902	381	368	749	258	265	523

Sample is respondents interviewed in pre-survey who had valid addresses and had not moved before treatment was applied.

Table 3: OLS Analysis of Effect of Treatment on Probability Registered With Party and Primary Turnout

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Latent Democrats		Independents		Latent Republicans		Focal Sample (Pooled Latent Partisans Who Completed Both Surveys)	
	Registered with Republican Party	Registered with Democratic Party	Registered with Republican Party	Registered with Democratic Party	Registered with Republican Party	Registered with Democratic Party	Registered with Party Leaned Toward	Voted in Primary
Sent Mail	0.003	0.082***	0.007	0.037**	0.038*	0.020	0.072**	0.033
	[0.005]	[0.021]	[0.007]	[0.016]	[0.020]	[0.015]	[0.031]	[0.026]
Age, years (voter file)	0.001	-0.013	-0.007*	0.006	0.006	-0.001	-0.021	-0.009
	[0.003]	[0.011]	[0.004]	[0.008]	[0.011]	[0.009]	[0.017]	[0.014]
Age squared	0.000	0.000	0.000*	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Year registered, missing=2007 (voter file)	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.002	0.003	0.004**	0.004	0.002
	[0.001]	[0.003]	[0.001]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.004]	[0.003]
Year registered missing	-0.006	-0.075	0.010	0.014	0.046	-0.073**	-0.007	0.017
	[0.011]	[0.050]	[0.017]	[0.035]	[0.045]	[0.034]	[0.076]	[0.063]
Female (voter file)	-0.008	-0.039	-0.013	-0.021	-0.003	-0.028	0.021	0.012
	[0.006]	[0.026]	[0.009]	[0.019]	[0.023]	[0.018]	[0.042]	[0.035]
Gender missing in voter file	0.001	0.071***	-0.002	0.015	0.007	0.015	0.029	0.025
	[0.005]	[0.023]	[0.008]	[0.017]	[0.022]	[0.017]	[0.034]	[0.028]
Two registered people in household (voter file)	-0.004	0.031	-0.016	-0.003	0.034	0.044	0.037	-0.013
	[0.010]	[0.046]	[0.015]	[0.032]	[0.038]	[0.029]	[0.067]	[0.055]
Voted in 2006	0.002	0.029	0.007	0.011	0.007	0.026	-0.008	0.000
	[0.005]	[0.024]	[0.009]	[0.018]	[0.023]	[0.018]	[0.037]	[0.030]
Voted in 2004	0.002	0.034	0.009	0.022	-0.043*	-0.005	-0.010	0.019
	[0.006]	[0.027]	[0.009]	[0.019]	[0.026]	[0.020]	[0.041]	[0.034]
Voted in 2002	0.006	-0.015	0.004	0.013	0.018	0.037*	0.006	-0.027
	[0.007]	[0.032]	[0.012]	[0.024]	[0.027]	[0.021]	[0.045]	[0.037]
Voted in 2000	0.006	0.023	0.005	-0.020	-0.008	0.014	-0.022	0.035
	[0.007]	[0.031]	[0.012]	[0.025]	[0.028]	[0.021]	[0.046]	[0.038]
Voted in 1998	-0.012	-0.009	-0.015	-0.026	0.080*	0.021	0.007	0.013
	[0.011]	[0.049]	[0.019]	[0.039]	[0.042]	[0.032]	[0.060]	[0.050]
Voted in 1996	-0.006	-0.059	-0.016	-0.002	-0.009	-0.045	-0.020	-0.032
	[0.012]	[0.054]	[0.017]	[0.035]	[0.042]	[0.032]	[0.069]	[0.057]
Pre-survey Interest in Primary (2=Very, 1=Somewhat, 0=Not Much)	0.004	0.060***	0.004	0.034***	0.042***	0.012	0.079***	0.045**
	[0.004]	[0.016]	[0.005]	[0.010]	[0.015]	[0.011]	[0.025]	[0.020]
Pre-survey Report Voting in 2000 (1=yes)	-0.004	-0.035	0.005	-0.011	0.014	-0.021	0.015	0.015
	[0.009]	[0.042]	[0.012]	[0.026]	[0.044]	[0.034]	[0.061]	[0.051]
Pre-survey Report Voting for Bush in 2000 (1=yes)	0.000	0.094**	0.003	-0.018	-0.011	0.003		
	[0.010]	[0.044]	[0.011]	[0.022]	[0.035]	[0.027]		
Pre-survey Report Voting for Gore in 2000 (1=yes)	-0.009	-0.006	-0.018	-0.038	-0.071	0.070*		
	[0.008]	[0.034]	[0.012]	[0.024]	[0.048]	[0.036]		
Pre-survey Economy Retrospective Judgement (2=MB, 1=B, 0=Same/DK, -1=W, -2=MW)	0.000	-0.010	-0.001	0.000	0.021	-0.004		
	[0.003]	[0.015]	[0.005]	[0.011]	[0.013]	[0.010]		
Pre-survey Unemployment Performance (2=MB, 1=B, 0=Same/DK, -1=W, -2=MW)	-0.001	-0.009	0.003	-0.020**	-0.004	-0.016		
	[0.003]	[0.013]	[0.005]	[0.010]	[0.013]	[0.010]		
Pre-survey Bush Approval (2=SA, 1=WA, 0=DK, -1=WD, -2=SD)	-0.001	-0.016	-0.002	-0.015**	-0.007	-0.008		
	[0.003]	[0.012]	[0.003]	[0.007]	[0.008]	[0.006]		
Pre-survey Congress Approval (2=SA, 1=WA, 0=DK, -1=WD, -2=SD)	-0.001	0.002	-0.003	0.000	0.002	-0.007		
	[0.002]	[0.008]	[0.003]	[0.007]	[0.008]	[0.006]		
Pre-survey 2000 vote aligned with pre-survey latent partisanship							-0.008	-0.037
							[0.040]	[0.033]
Pre-survey Unemployment performance rel. pre-survey latent partisanship (-2 to 2)							0.020	-0.005
							[0.016]	[0.013]
Pre-survey Economy Retrospective Judgment rel. pre-survey latent partisanship (-2 to 2)							0.017	-0.013
							[0.020]	[0.016]
Pre-survey Bush Approval rel. pre-survey latent partisanship (-2 to 2)							-0.002	0.018
							[0.015]	[0.012]
Pre-survey Congress Approval rel. pre-survey latent partisanship (-2 to 2)							-0.017	-0.019*
							[0.012]	[0.010]
Constant	-0.081	-4.318	-0.476	-4.407	-6.443	-7.606**	-7.487	-4.917
	[1.314]	[5.806]	[1.779]	[3.709]	[4.529]	[3.445]	[7.819]	[6.519]
Observations	852	852	666	666	473	473	418	414
R-squared	0.018	0.095	0.029	0.065	0.070	0.098	0.104	0.067
P-value of treatment effect (one-sided)	0.272	0.000	0.158	0.009	0.032	0.099	0.011	0.103

Note: OLS coefficients with robust (Huber/White) standard errors in brackets. *** denotes p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10, two-tailed tests. Sample is respondents interviewed in pre-survey who had valid addresses and had not moved before treatment was applied. This includes respondents who did not complete June 2008 follow-up survey. All respondents were listed as unaffiliated in January 2008 voter file. Party registration measured using June 2008 voter file.

Table 4: Effect of Being Sent Mail on Party Identification

	Latent Democrats			Latent Republicans			Pooled Latent Partisans		
	Sent Mail?		Difference (Sent - Not Sent Mail)	Sent Mail?		Difference (Sent - Not Sent Mail)	Sent Mail?		(Sent - Not Sent Mail)
	Yes	No		Yes	No		Yes	No	
Post-Identify With Pre-Survey Latent Party (1=yes)	26.67%	21.57%	5.10%	20.88%	15.29%	5.59%	24.48%	19.33%	5.15%
Post-Survey Directional Party ID Relative to Pre-Survey Latent Party (1=Strongly against to 7=Strongly with)	5.22	5.03	0.19	4.93	4.78	0.16	5.11	4.94	0.18
N	150	153	303	91	85	176	241	238	479

Sample is respondents interviewed in pre-survey who had valid addresses and had not moved before treatment was applied and who also completed party identification measure in post-survey.

Table 5: Regression Analysis of Effect of Being Sent Mail on Party Identification

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Post-Identify With Pre-Survey Latent Party (1=yes)			Post-Survey Directional Party ID Relative to Pre-Survey Latent Party (1=Strongly against to 7=Strongly with)		
Sent Mail	0.081**	0.075*	0.073*	0.233**	0.225**	0.230***
	[0.040]	[0.041]	[0.040]	[0.092]	[0.093]	[0.088]
Leaned to Dems in pre-survey	0.082**	0.067	0.099	0.300***	0.273***	0.093
	[0.040]	[0.042]	[0.076]	[0.098]	[0.102]	[0.158]
Age, years (voter file)		0.005	0.004		0.086	0.068
		[0.022]	[0.023]		[0.065]	[0.061]
Age squared		0.000	0.000		-0.001	-0.001
		[0.000]	[0.000]		[0.001]	[0.001]
Year registered, missing=2007 (voter file)		0.010**	0.009**		0.018**	0.015
		[0.004]	[0.004]		[0.009]	[0.009]
Year registered missing		-0.130	-0.140		-0.266	-0.329
		[0.086]	[0.090]		[0.204]	[0.211]
Two registered people in household (voter file)		0.041	0.041		-0.060	-0.088
		[0.059]	[0.061]		[0.132]	[0.131]
Female (1=yes) VF/Survey		0.036	0.032		0.177*	0.163*
		[0.041]	[0.041]		[0.097]	[0.092]
Voted in 2006		-0.074	-0.086*		-0.009	-0.025
		[0.051]	[0.049]		[0.102]	[0.098]
Voted in 2004		0.105**	0.096*		0.118	0.064
		[0.052]	[0.052]		[0.111]	[0.109]
Voted in 2002		-0.042	-0.034		0.015	0.034
		[0.051]	[0.052]		[0.096]	[0.094]
Voted in 2000		-0.043	-0.046		-0.045	-0.031
		[0.051]	[0.052]		[0.103]	[0.100]
Voted in 1998		0.033	0.019		0.019	-0.052
		[0.066]	[0.069]		[0.151]	[0.152]
Voted in 1996		0.064	0.083		0.140	0.159
		[0.079]	[0.079]		[0.165]	[0.153]
Pre-survey Interest in Primary (2=Very, 1=Somewhat, 0=Not Much)			0.049			0.101
			[0.033]			[0.070]
Pre-survey 2000 vote aligned with pre-survey latent partisanship			-0.010			0.090
			[0.048]			[0.096]
Pre-survey Unemployment performance rel. pre-survey latent partisanship (-2 to 2)			0.005			0.095*
			[0.025]			[0.053]
Pre-survey Economy Retrospective Judgment rel. pre-survey latent partisanship (-2 to 2)			-0.037			-0.028
			[0.029]			[0.063]
Pre-survey Bush Approval rel. pre-survey latent partisanship (-2 to 2)			0.039**			0.194***
			[0.019]			[0.048]
Pre-survey Congress Approval rel. pre-survey latent partisanship (-2 to 2)			0.022			0.096***
			[0.016]			[0.034]
Constant	0.126***	-20.507**	-17.348**	4.732***	-33.620*	-26.705
	[0.036]	[8.180]	[8.454]	[0.090]	[18.393]	[18.703]
Observations	418	418	418	418	418	418
R-squared	0.018	0.051	0.073	0.037	0.064	0.155
P-value of treatment effect (one-sided)	0.023	0.033	0.034	0.006	0.008	0.005

Note: OLS coefficients with robust (Huber/White) standard errors in brackets. *** denotes p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10, two-tailed tests. Sample is respondents interviewed in pre-survey who had valid addresses and had not moved before treatment was applied and who also completed party identification measure in post-survey.

Table 6: Regression Analysis of Effect of Being Sent Mail on Political Opinions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Voting and Party Alignment Scale (-4 to 6)			Voting and Party Alignment Scale adding Congress/Bush (-8 to 10)			Voting and Party Alignment Scale also adding Reagan/Carter (-12 to 14)			Policy evaluations alignment scale (-8 to 8)		
	OLS	ATT (Identified with pre-survey latent party)	ATT (Post-Survey Directional Party ID Relative to Pre Survey Latent Party)	OLS	ATT (Identified with pre-survey latent party)	ATT (Post-Survey Directional Party ID Relative to Pre Survey Latent Party)	OLS	ATT (Identified with pre-survey latent party)	ATT (Post-Survey Directional Party ID Relative to Pre Survey Latent Party)	OLS	ATT (Identified with pre-survey latent party)	ATT (Post-Survey Directional Party ID Relative to Pre Survey Latent Party)
Sent Mail	0.293**			0.339			0.417			-0.052		
	[0.143]			[0.210]			[0.267]			[0.226]		
Post-survey identified with pre-survey latent party		3.924			4.369			4.554			-0.971	
		[2.517]			[3.146]			[3.839]			[3.179]	
Post-Survey Directional Party ID Relative to Pre-Survey Latent Party			1.336**			1.487			1.550			-0.325
			[0.676]			[0.911]			[1.158]			[1.072]
Leaned to Dems in pre-survey	0.071	-0.248	-0.041	0.328	-0.060	0.171	-1.316***	-1.739***	-1.498***	3.972***	4.028***	3.973***
	[0.241]	[0.408]	[0.281]	[0.379]	[0.537]	[0.408]	[0.453]	[0.610]	[0.472]	[0.413]	[0.455]	[0.404]
Age, years (voter file)	-0.032	-0.038	-0.101	0.036	0.027	-0.043	0.045	0.063	-0.010	0.149	0.161	0.176
	[0.071]	[0.098]	[0.087]	[0.112]	[0.122]	[0.111]	[0.132]	[0.138]	[0.132]	[0.109]	[0.114]	[0.132]
Age squared	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.001	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]
Year registered, missing=2007 (voter file)	0.012	-0.022	-0.008	0.046*	0.004	0.019	0.050*	0.004	0.020	0.019	0.023	0.019
	[0.016]	[0.029]	[0.020]	[0.024]	[0.040]	[0.029]	[0.028]	[0.045]	[0.032]	[0.028]	[0.039]	[0.032]
Year registered missing	-0.174	0.489	0.368	-0.339	0.411	0.277	-0.792	0.080	-0.060	0.485	0.281	0.314
	[0.346]	[0.588]	[0.422]	[0.549]	[0.754]	[0.573]	[0.646]	[0.857]	[0.670]	[0.551]	[0.706]	[0.655]
Two registered people in household (voter file)	-0.573***	-0.701**	-0.437**	-0.906***	-1.053***	-0.760***	-1.258***	-1.365***	-1.060***	-0.427	-0.359	-0.428
	[0.190]	[0.297]	[0.198]	[0.280]	[0.380]	[0.265]	[0.356]	[0.440]	[0.332]	[0.326]	[0.404]	[0.333]
Female (1=yes) VF/Survey	0.371**	0.253	0.150	0.558**	0.406	0.292	0.627**	0.450	0.331	0.072	0.034	0.057
	[0.148]	[0.218]	[0.198]	[0.221]	[0.279]	[0.279]	[0.285]	[0.345]	[0.352]	[0.237]	[0.268]	[0.310]
Voted in 2006	0.015	0.452	0.132	-0.228	0.220	-0.137	-0.003	0.475	0.103	0.017	-0.058	0.021
	[0.169]	[0.338]	[0.178]	[0.242]	[0.409]	[0.237]	[0.297]	[0.515]	[0.294]	[0.262]	[0.409]	[0.275]
Voted in 2004	0.242	-0.253	0.070	0.474*	-0.105	0.254	0.212	-0.401	-0.027	-0.640**	-0.657	-0.739**
	[0.191]	[0.385]	[0.218]	[0.271]	[0.463]	[0.273]	[0.338]	[0.583]	[0.350]	[0.280]	[0.482]	[0.310]
Voted in 2002	-0.274	-0.230	-0.407**	-0.228	-0.168	-0.366	0.029	0.072	-0.133	0.100	0.133	0.178
	[0.189]	[0.293]	[0.205]	[0.281]	[0.364]	[0.283]	[0.347]	[0.436]	[0.351]	[0.286]	[0.309]	[0.293]
Voted in 2000	-0.149	0.053	-0.051	-0.043	0.173	0.058	0.106	0.354	0.234	0.187	0.108	0.135
	[0.193]	[0.301]	[0.217]	[0.286]	[0.383]	[0.295]	[0.367]	[0.474]	[0.381]	[0.311]	[0.350]	[0.317]
Voted in 1998	-0.200	-0.318	-0.168	-0.220	-0.385	-0.218	-0.448	-0.609	-0.435	-0.377	-0.335	-0.372
	[0.248]	[0.371]	[0.291]	[0.357]	[0.464]	[0.390]	[0.478]	[0.550]	[0.495]	[0.435]	[0.444]	[0.447]
Voted in 1996	0.468	0.342	0.454	0.233	0.092	0.217	0.378	0.340	0.470	0.550	0.853	0.824
	[0.298]	[0.457]	[0.329]	[0.361]	[0.507]	[0.408]	[0.490]	[0.631]	[0.543]	[0.470]	[0.607]	[0.552]
Pre-survey Interest in Primary (2=Very, 1=Somewhat, 0=Not Much)	0.193*	0.043	0.088	0.205	0.030	0.079	0.338	0.168	0.219	0.192	0.250	0.239
	[0.112]	[0.196]	[0.153]	[0.163]	[0.248]	[0.206]	[0.218]	[0.323]	[0.278]	[0.191]	[0.262]	[0.242]
Pre-survey 2000 vote aligned with pre-survey latent partisanship	0.838***	0.917***	0.748***	1.072***	1.132***	0.943***	1.264***	1.307***	1.111***	0.059	0.126	0.166
	[0.166]	[0.252]	[0.184]	[0.241]	[0.306]	[0.250]	[0.309]	[0.364]	[0.308]	[0.273]	[0.300]	[0.279]
Pre-survey Unemployment performance rel. pre-survey latent partisanship (-2 to 2)	0.141	0.112	0.012	0.232*	0.221	0.110	0.436***	0.441**	0.325*	0.820***	0.820***	0.845***
	[0.092]	[0.119]	[0.105]	[0.139]	[0.152]	[0.142]	[0.168]	[0.177]	[0.171]	[0.144]	[0.149]	[0.175]
Pre-survey Economy Retrospective Judgment rel. pre-survey latent partisanship (-2 to 2)	0.189**	0.337**	0.223**	0.236	0.417**	0.291*	0.396**	0.554**	0.422**	0.686***	0.654***	0.683***
	[0.093]	[0.162]	[0.106]	[0.146]	[0.213]	[0.151]	[0.173]	[0.240]	[0.169]	[0.158]	[0.187]	[0.157]
Pre-survey Bush Approval rel. pre-survey latent partisanship (-2 to 2)	0.453***	0.310**	0.207	1.159***	0.995***	0.881***	1.338***	1.180***	1.060***	0.305***	0.357**	0.381
	[0.062]	[0.144]	[0.154]	[0.099]	[0.183]	[0.212]	[0.124]	[0.219]	[0.266]	[0.111]	[0.177]	[0.248]
Pre-survey Congress Approval rel. pre-survey latent partisanship (-2 to 2)	0.207***	0.103	0.055	0.725***	0.607***	0.554***	0.935***	0.796***	0.741***	0.291***	0.300***	0.311**
	[0.060]	[0.102]	[0.093]	[0.085]	[0.123]	[0.119]	[0.114]	[0.149]	[0.149]	[0.092]	[0.108]	[0.132]
Constant	-22.951	44.127	13.111	-92.837**	-8.176	-42.709	-100.799*	-8.909	-44.907	-41.198	-49.401	-41.435
	[32.455]	[58.957]	[39.118]	[47.049]	[80.250]	[56.927]	[55.546]	[89.373]	[61.926]	[55.430]	[77.956]	[63.170]
Observations	413	399	399	413	399	399	413	399	399	412	398	398
R-squared	0.360			0.514			0.468			0.684		
P-value of treatment effect (one-sided)	0.020	0.060	0.024	0.054	0.083	0.051	0.060	0.118	0.091	0.410	0.380	0.381

Note: OLS and 2SLS (Instrumenting for aligning party identification with latent partisanship using treatment status) coefficients with robust (Huber/White) standard errors in brackets. *** denotes p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10, two-tailed tests. Sample i respondents interviewed in pre-survey who had valid addresses and had not moved before treatment was applied and who also completed post-survey.

Table 7: Regression Analysis of Effect of Treatment on Political Interest, Participation, and Reported Campaign Treatment

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	General Election Interest (2=Very, 1=Somewhat, 0=Not Much)	Participation Behavior Index (0-3)	Participation, Campaign Treatment Index (0-5)
Sent Mail	-0.091**	-0.070	-0.059
	[0.044]	[0.057]	[0.103]
Leaned to Dems in pre-survey	0.052	0.027	-0.328*
	[0.077]	[0.101]	[0.180]
Age, years (voter file)	0.011	-0.003	0.030
	[0.025]	[0.035]	[0.051]
Age squared	0.000	0.000	0.000
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.001]
Year registered, missing=2007 (voter file)	-0.008	0.000	0.033***
	[0.005]	[0.007]	[0.010]
Year registered missing	0.161*	-0.003	-0.191
	[0.095]	[0.107]	[0.251]
Two registered people in household (voter file)	-0.010	-0.133*	0.040
	[0.054]	[0.070]	[0.131]
Female (1=yes) VF/Survey	-0.049	-0.119**	-0.039
	[0.046]	[0.059]	[0.107]
Voted in 2006	0.099*	0.029	0.083
	[0.053]	[0.065]	[0.121]
Voted in 2004	-0.033	-0.005	0.028
	[0.061]	[0.069]	[0.133]
Voted in 2002	0.044	-0.051	0.177
	[0.062]	[0.079]	[0.143]
Voted in 2000	0.016	0.055	0.301*
	[0.062]	[0.076]	[0.154]
Voted in 1998	-0.169**	-0.099	-0.049
	[0.079]	[0.115]	[0.186]
Voted in 1996	0.059	0.001	-0.387*
	[0.089]	[0.139]	[0.207]
Pre-survey Interest in Primary (2=Very, 1=Somewhat, 0=Not Much)	0.275***	0.207***	-0.028
	[0.038]	[0.047]	[0.073]
Pre-survey 2000 vote aligned with pre-survey latent partisanship	0.075	0.018	-0.055
	[0.054]	[0.065]	[0.116]
Pre-survey Unemployment performance rel. pre-survey latent partisanship (-2 to 2)	0.038	0.025	0.064
	[0.029]	[0.036]	[0.063]
Pre-survey Economy Retrospective Judgment rel. pre-survey latent partisanship (-2 to 2)	-0.042	-0.040	0.117*
	[0.032]	[0.040]	[0.067]
Pre-survey Bush Approval rel. pre-survey latent partisanship (-2 to 2)	0.019	0.029	0.052
	[0.023]	[0.028]	[0.046]
Pre-survey Congress Approval rel. pre-survey latent partisanship (-2 to 2)	0.000	-0.004	0.015
	[0.020]	[0.023]	[0.042]
Constant	17.608*	1.924	-64.828***
	[10.073]	[13.258]	[20.499]
Observations	433	423	436
R-squared	0.194	0.093	0.071

Note: OLS coefficients with robust (Huber/White) standard errors in brackets. *** denotes p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10, two-tailed tests. Sample is respondents interviewed in pre-survey who had valid addresses and had not moved before treatment was applied and who also completed post-survey.

Table 8:Treatment Effect on Partisan Identity Among Non-Leaning Independents

	(1)	(2)
	Among Non-Leaning Independents, Post-ID As (non-leaning) Independent (1=yes)	
Sent Mail	0.116*	0.094
	[0.069]	[0.071]
Age, years (voter file)		0.016
		[0.037]
Age squared		0.000
		[0.001]
Year registered, missing=2007 (voter file)		-0.008
		[0.007]
Year registered missing		0.065
		[0.148]
Two registered people in household (voter file)		0.039
		[0.087]
Female (1=yes) VF/Survey		0.003
		[0.070]
Voted in 2006		-0.103
		[0.079]
Voted in 2004		0.029
		[0.088]
Voted in 2002		0.202**
		[0.100]
Voted in 2000		-0.098
		[0.108]
Voted in 1998		0.081
		[0.134]
Voted in 1996		0.108
		[0.140]
Constant	0.490***	15.733
	[0.051]	[13.925]
Observations	210	210
R-squared	0.013	0.088

Note: OLS coefficients with robust (Huber/White) standard errors in brackets. *** denotes p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10, two-tailed tests. Sample is respondents interviewed in pre-survey who had valid addresses and had not moved before treatment was applied and who also completed post-survey.

Table A1: Sample Statistics for Sent Mail and Not Sent Mail Groups

	LATENT DEMOCRATS				LATENT REPUBLICANS	
Variable	Lean D, Control	Lean D, Treatment	Indpt, Control	Indpt, Treatment	Lean R, Control	Lean R, Treatment
Age, years (voter file)	38.200	37.741	38.409	39.253	39.787	39.981
	[8.3544]	[8.4974]	[8.5502]	[8.1387]	[7.5695]	[7.0676]
Year registered, missing=2007 (voter file)	2001.501	2001.548	2001.318	2001.435	2000.264	2000.600
	[5.1257]	[5.7615]	[5.7917]	[5.7073]	[5.7942]	[6.237]
Year registered missing	0.062	0.084	0.068	0.079	0.062	0.098
	[.2416]	[.2781]	[.2525]	[.2698]	[.2417]	[.298]
Female (voter file)	0.574	0.559	0.538	0.497	0.500	0.517
	[.495]	[.4971]	[.4992]	[.5007]	[.501]	[.5007]
Gender missing in voter file	0.073	0.087	0.068	0.092	0.105	0.106
	[.2607]	[.2814]	[.2525]	[.29]	[.3067]	[.308]
Two registered people in household (voter file)	0.248	0.211	0.260	0.209	0.267	0.291
	[.4325]	[.4082]	[.4391]	[.4073]	[.4435]	[.4549]
Voted in 2006	0.532	0.546	0.459	0.508	0.597	0.543
	[.4995]	[.4985]	[.499]	[.5006]	[.4915]	[.4991]
Voted in 2004	0.621	0.632	0.612	0.620	0.690	0.657
	[.4857]	[.4828]	[.488]	[.4862]	[.4634]	[.4757]
Voted in 2002	0.215	0.224	0.213	0.226	0.322	0.268
	[.4113]	[.4173]	[.4097]	[.4185]	[.468]	[.4437]
Voted in 2000	0.264	0.275	0.236	0.245	0.314	0.325
	[.4412]	[.447]	[.4253]	[.4304]	[.465]	[.4691]
Voted in 1998	0.064	0.098	0.068	0.057	0.085	0.064
	[.2456]	[.297]	[.2525]	[.2323]	[.2798]	[.2455]
Voted in 1996	0.047	0.078	0.081	0.060	0.070	0.060
	[.2109]	[.2678]	[.2738]	[.2374]	[.2552]	[.2386]
Pre-survey Interest in Primary (2=Very, 1=Somewhat, 0=Not Much)	1.453	1.382	1.126	1.117	1.395	1.313
	[.6936]	[.72]	[.8106]	[.7741]	[.6893]	[.7227]
Pre-survey Report Voting in 2000 (1=yes)	0.767	0.783	0.738	0.712	0.841	0.845
	[.4231]	[.4129]	[.4406]	[.4535]	[.3663]	[.3623]
Pre-survey Report Voting for Bush in 2000 (1=yes)	0.129	0.131	0.291	0.285	0.647	0.645
	[.3351]	[.3376]	[.455]	[.4522]	[.4787]	[.4793]
Pre-survey Report Voting for Gore in 2000 (1=yes)	0.497	0.550	0.202	0.193	0.093	0.091
	[.5005]	[.4981]	[.4021]	[.3951]	[.291]	[.2875]
Pre-survey Economy Retrospective Judgement (2=MB, 1=B, 0=Same/DK, -1=W, -2=MW)	-1.258	-1.240	-1.136	-1.177	-0.787	-0.741
	[.7756]	[.7777]	[.8264]	[.7987]	[.8399]	[.9313]
Pre-survey Unemployment Performance (2=MB, 1=B, 0=Same/DK, -1=W, -2=MW)	-0.665	-0.629	-0.529	-0.515	-0.125	-0.087
	[.885]	[.8689]	[.8512]	[.9126]	[.8971]	[.9331]
Pre-survey Bush Approval (2=SA, 1=WA, 0=DK, -1=WD, -2=SD)	-1.503	-1.429	-0.799	-0.807	0.081	0.230
	[.9529]	[1.014]	[1.3261]	[1.3647]	[1.4572]	[1.5196]
Pre-survey Congress Approval (2=SA, 1=WA, 0=DK, -1=WD, -2=SD)	-0.101	0.068	-0.356	-0.384	-0.466	-0.562
	[1.3057]	[1.2892]	[1.213]	[1.1945]	[1.3013]	[1.2685]
Chi-squared statistic for test of random assignment	22.844		15.728		13.790	
P-value of Chi-squared statistic	0.297		0.733		0.841	
Observations	451	451	381	368	258	265

Standard deviations in brackets

Table A2: Test for Non-Random Panel Attrition

	(1)	(2)
	Completed Post-Treatment Survey (1=yes)	
Pre-treatment, Latent Democrat	0.003	0.059
	[0.042]	[0.056]
Age, years (voter file)	0.005	-0.007
	[0.013]	[0.019]
Age squared	0.000	0.000
	[0.000]	[0.000]
Year registered, missing=2007 (voter file)	0.002	0.005
	[0.003]	[0.004]
Year registered missing	-0.089	-0.135*
	[0.055]	[0.072]
Two registered people in household (voter file)	-0.131***	-0.140***
	[0.029]	[0.040]
Female (voter file)	0.028	0.012
	[0.027]	[0.038]
Gender missing in voter file	-0.010	-0.049
	[0.050]	[0.066]
Voted in 2006	0.037	0.069*
	[0.028]	[0.039]
Voted in 2004	0.011	-0.052
	[0.032]	[0.044]
Voted in 2002	0.079**	0.099*
	[0.037]	[0.053]
Voted in 2000	0.011	0.027
	[0.036]	[0.048]
Voted in 1998	0.145**	0.157**
	[0.057]	[0.078]
Voted in 1996	-0.078	-0.171**
	[0.058]	[0.079]
Pre-survey Interest in Primary (2=Very, 1=Somewhat, 0=Not Much)	0.020	0.003
	[0.018]	[0.025]
Pre 2000 vote aligned with pre PID	0.049*	0.070*
	[0.028]	[0.039]
Pre Econ Retrospective rel. pre PID (-2 to 2)	-0.015	-0.045**
	[0.017]	[0.023]
Pre Econ Unemployment performance rel. pre PID (-2 to 2)	0.005	0.017
	[0.015]	[0.021]
Pre Bush Approval rel. pre PID (-2 to 2)	0.021*	0.021
	[0.012]	[0.016]
Pre Cong Approval rel. pre PID (-2 to 2)	0.009	0.014
	[0.010]	[0.014]
Sent Mail	0.008	16.069
	[0.026]	[12.867]
Sent Mail * Pre-treatment, Latent Democrat		-0.129
		[0.084]
Sent Mail * Age, years (voter file)		0.023
		[0.026]
Sent Mail * Age squared		0.000
		[0.000]
Sent Mail * Year registered, missing=2007 (voter file)		-0.008
		[0.006]
Sent Mail * Year registered missing		0.089
		[0.112]
Sent Mail * Two registered people in household (voter file)		0.024
		[0.058]
Sent Mail * Female (voter file)		0.038
		[0.055]
Sent Mail * Gender missing in voter file		0.064
		[0.100]
Sent Mail * Voted in 2006		-0.058
		[0.057]
Sent Mail * Voted in 2004		0.140**
		[0.064]
Sent Mail * Voted in 2002		-0.045
		[0.076]
Sent Mail * Voted in 2000		-0.046
		[0.073]
Sent Mail * Voted in 1998		0.000
		[0.116]
Sent Mail * Voted in 1996		0.214*
		[0.119]
Sent Mail * Pre-survey Interest in Primary (2=Very, 1=Somewhat, 0=Not Much)		0.041
		[0.036]
Sent Mail * Pre 2000 vote aligned with pre PID		-0.053
		[0.057]
Sent Mail * Pre Econ Retrospective rel. pre PID (-2 to 2)		0.069**
		[0.034]
Sent Mail * Pre Econ Unemployment performance rel. pre PID (-2 to 2)		-0.029
		[0.030]
Sent Mail * Pre Bush Approval rel. pre PID (-2 to 2)		0.000
		[0.024]
Sent Mail * Pre Cong Approval rel. pre PID (-2 to 2)		-0.013
		[0.020]
Constant	-2.941	-10.600
	[6.323]	[8.792]
Observations	1325	1325
R-squared	0.046	0.063
F-statistic for test of joint significance of Sent Mail and all Sent Mail interactions.		1.137
P-value of F-statistic statistic		0.301

Note: OLS coefficients with robust (Huber/White) standard errors in brackets. *** denotes p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10, two-tailed tests.
Sample is latent partisans interviewed in pre-survey who had valid addresses and had not moved before treatment was applied.

Table A3: Summary statistics for outcome measures among latent partisans

Variable	(1)
Registered with party closest to pre-survey PID	0.114
	[.3183]
Voted in 2008 primary	0.072
	[.2592]
Post-Identify With Pre-Survey Latent Party (1=yes)	0.224
	[.4172]
Post-Survey Directional Party ID Relative to Pre-Survey Latent Party (1=Strongly against to 7=Strongly with)	5.040
	[.9533]
Voting and Party Alignment Scale (-4 to 6)	2.465
	[1.7289]
Voting and Party Alignment Scale adding Congress/Bush (-8 to 10)	3.714
	[2.9566]
Voting and Party Alignment Scale also adding Reagan/Carter (-12 to 14)	4.376
	[3.5187]
Policy evaluations alignment scale (-8 to 8)	2.481
	[3.8415]
General Election Interest (2=Very, 1=Somewhat, 0=Not Much)	1.727
	[.5031]
Participation Behavior Index (0-3)	2.037
	[.5939]
Campaign Treatment Index (0-5)	1.671
	[1.0742]
Observations	447

Standard deviations in brackets. Sample is respondents interviewed in pre-survey who had valid addresses and had not moved before treatment was applied and who also completed post-survey.

Table A4: Regression Analysis of Effect of Being Sent Mail on Political Opinions by item

	(1) Post-survey 2000 vote aligned with pre survey latent partisanship	(2) Post-survey Nov. 2008 vote aligned with pre survey latent partisanship	(3) Post-survey evaluation of Reps aligned with pre-survey latent partisanship	(4) Post-survey evaluation of Dems aligned with pre-survey latent partisanship	(5) Post-survey evaluation of Bush aligned with pre-survey latent partisanship	(6) Post-survey evaluation of Congress aligned with pre survey latent partisanship	(7) Post-survey evaluation of Reagan aligned with pre-survey latent partisanship	(8) Post-survey evaluation of Carter aligned with pre-survey latent partisanship	(9) Post-survey Iraq Policy aligned with pre survey latent partisanship	(10) Post-survey Taxing Rich aligned with pre survey latent partisanship	(11) Post-survey Retrospective Economy aligned with pre survey latent partisanship	(12) Post-survey Unemployment Performance aligned with pre survey latent partisanship
Sent Mail	0.080**	0.034	0.071	0.109	-0.001	0.047	0.132	-0.054	0.104	0.009	-0.043	-0.121
	[0.036]	[0.046]	[0.084]	[0.081]	[0.077]	[0.108]	[0.096]	[0.097]	[0.124]	[0.131]	[0.058]	[0.077]
Leaned to Deems in pre-survey	0.028	0.097	-0.329**	0.275**	0.792***	-0.535***	-2.247***	0.604***	0.241	0.639***	2.425***	0.663***
	[0.056]	[0.083]	[0.137]	[0.139]	[0.142]	[0.194]	[0.153]	[0.164]	[0.212]	[0.221]	[0.121]	[0.138]
Age, years (voter file)	0.032**	-0.001	-0.021	-0.042	-0.025	0.093	-0.039	0.047	0.049	0.145**	-0.028	-0.018
	[0.016]	[0.025]	[0.042]	[0.039]	[0.040]	[0.058]	[0.052]	[0.044]	[0.064]	[0.064]	[0.032]	[0.037]
Age squared	-0.000*	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.000	-0.002**	0.000	0.000
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.001]
Year registered, missing=2007 (voter file)	0.001	-0.001	0.017*	-0.005	0.017**	0.017	0.008	-0.003	0.000	0.007	0.008	0.002
	[0.004]	[0.005]	[0.010]	[0.009]	[0.008]	[0.012]	[0.011]	[0.010]	[0.016]	[0.016]	[0.007]	[0.009]
Year registered missing	0.006	-0.067	-0.210	0.097	-0.176	0.011	-0.272	-0.181	0.479*	0.052	-0.152	0.107
	[0.071]	[0.113]	[0.212]	[0.185]	[0.207]	[0.239]	[0.208]	[0.201]	[0.278]	[0.293]	[0.127]	[0.192]
Two registered people in household (voter file)	-0.091*	-0.109*	-0.212*	-0.161	-0.112	-0.221	-0.122	-0.230*	0.114	-0.488***	-0.068	0.011
	[0.053]	[0.061]	[0.117]	[0.109]	[0.097]	[0.148]	[0.118]	[0.126]	[0.167]	[0.172]	[0.084]	[0.106]
Female (1=yes) VF/Survey	0.089**	0.067	0.025	0.190**	0.094	0.092	-0.053	0.122	0.013	-0.063	0.069	0.052
	[0.038]	[0.048]	[0.087]	[0.084]	[0.081]	[0.113]	[0.101]	[0.103]	[0.133]	[0.133]	[0.065]	[0.081]
Voted in 2006	0.015	-0.001	0.092	-0.091	0.055	-0.298**	0.248**	-0.024	0.017	0.032	-0.059	0.025
	[0.042]	[0.054]	[0.094]	[0.097]	[0.082]	[0.120]	[0.113]	[0.114]	[0.152]	[0.150]	[0.072]	[0.093]
Voted in 2004	0.090*	-0.023	0.169	0.007	0.050	0.182	-0.168	-0.094	-0.311*	-0.190	0.010	-0.150
	[0.050]	[0.059]	[0.103]	[0.112]	[0.089]	[0.141]	[0.126]	[0.128]	[0.158]	[0.156]	[0.083]	[0.099]
Voted in 2002	-0.080*	0.023	-0.129	-0.088	0.058	-0.012	0.064	0.192	-0.004	0.167	-0.008	-0.053
	[0.048]	[0.061]	[0.127]	[0.113]	[0.120]	[0.143]	[0.136]	[0.134]	[0.180]	[0.180]	[0.073]	[0.102]
Voted in 2000	0.064	-0.055	-0.043	-0.116	-0.078	0.184	0.010	0.139	-0.057	0.170	0.032	0.045
	[0.054]	[0.064]	[0.130]	[0.117]	[0.116]	[0.151]	[0.141]	[0.148]	[0.192]	[0.186]	[0.073]	[0.105]
Voted in 1998	-0.025	-0.018	-0.079	-0.078	0.056	-0.076	-0.222	-0.005	-0.116	-0.198	0.021	-0.083
	[0.063]	[0.089]	[0.197]	[0.154]	[0.145]	[0.224]	[0.167]	[0.171]	[0.231]	[0.248]	[0.104]	[0.146]
Voted in 1996	-0.072	0.018	0.043	0.479***	-0.116	-0.119	0.196	-0.051	0.008	0.326	-0.044	0.260
	[0.087]	[0.096]	[0.229]	[0.151]	[0.168]	[0.245]	[0.202]	[0.164]	[0.254]	[0.236]	[0.116]	[0.183]
Pre-survey Interest in Primary (2=Very, 1=Somewhat, 0=Not Much)	-0.004	0.089**	0.103	0.004	-0.019	0.032	0.105	0.027	-0.026	0.086	0.095*	0.038
	[0.028]	[0.036]	[0.065]	[0.064]	[0.066]	[0.081]	[0.073]	[0.079]	[0.101]	[0.102]	[0.050]	[0.058]
Pre-survey 2000 vote aligned with pre-survey latent partisanship	0.592***	0.017	0.103	0.127	0.132	0.102	0.122	0.070	0.079	0.015	0.044	-0.081
	[0.047]	[0.053]	[0.098]	[0.097]	[0.094]	[0.126]	[0.110]	[0.116]	[0.154]	[0.147]	[0.071]	[0.089]
Pre-survey Unemployment performance rel. pre-survey latent partisanship (-2 to 2)	0.056**	0.002	0.089*	-0.006	0.129**	-0.037	0.156**	0.048	0.113	0.256***	0.077**	0.375***
	[0.024]	[0.029]	[0.051]	[0.053]	[0.052]	[0.074]	[0.065]	[0.065]	[0.076]	[0.085]	[0.035]	[0.049]
Pre-survey Economy Retrospective Judgment rel. pre-survey latent partisanship (-2 to 2)	-0.043*	0.036	0.124**	0.071	0.056	-0.008	0.037	0.122*	0.240***	-0.056	0.288***	0.217***
	[0.025]	[0.032]	[0.054]	[0.054]	[0.056]	[0.081]	[0.066]	[0.064]	[0.081]	[0.091]	[0.044]	[0.055]
Pre-survey Bush Approval rel. pre-survey latent partisanship (-2 to 2)	0.027	0.077***	0.223***	0.126***	0.600***	0.106**	0.155***	0.023	0.195***	0.024	0.003	0.082**
	[0.018]	[0.023]	[0.041]	[0.039]	[0.048]	[0.053]	[0.044]	[0.048]	[0.061]	[0.067]	[0.031]	[0.036]
Pre-survey Congress Approval rel. pre-survey latent partisanship (-2 to 2)	0.023	0.045**	-0.063*	0.203***	0.038	0.480***	-0.018	0.229***	0.077	0.093*	0.031	0.090***
	[0.015]	[0.018]	[0.034]	[0.033]	[0.032]	[0.043]	[0.041]	[0.039]	[0.050]	[0.053]	[0.022]	[0.030]
Constant	-2.413	3.179	-34.078*	10.362	-33.329**	-36.558	-13.736	5.774	-1.213	-17.374	-17.823	-4.657
	[8.356]	[10.714]	[20.185]	[17.867]	[16.880]	[24.476]	[22.274]	[20.411]	[32.061]	[32.719]	[14.594]	[17.597]
Observations	413	413	413	413	413	413	413	413	413	413	413	412
R-squared	0.486	0.151	0.219	0.214	0.687	0.344	0.495	0.229	0.210	0.134	0.869	0.552

Note: OLS coefficients with robust (Huber/White) standard errors in brackets. *** denotes p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10, two-tailed tests. Sample is respondents interviewed in pre-survey who had valid addresses and had not moved before treatment was applied and who also completed post-survey.

Table A5: Regression Analysis of Effect of Treatment on Participation and Reported Campaign Treatment by item

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Items in Behavior Index			Items in Treatment Index				
	Tried to get info (1=yes)	Tried to persuade others (1=yes)	Gave campaign donation in prev. 6 mos.	Saw or heard ad (1=yes)	Asked for cash (1=yes)	Campaign face to face contact or conversation (1=yes)	Received campaign phone (1=yes)	Received campaign mail (1=yes)
Sent Mail	-0.044	-0.008	-0.024	-0.015	0.003	0.013	-0.026	-0.034
	[0.031]	[0.040]	[0.025]	[0.030]	[0.036]	[0.021]	[0.041]	[0.045]
Leaned to Deems in pre-survey	-0.023	0.060	0.000	-0.029	-0.177***	-0.042	0.057	-0.137*
	[0.059]	[0.069]	[0.045]	[0.051]	[0.058]	[0.044]	[0.073]	[0.078]
Age, years (voter file)	0.023	-0.037	0.015	0.006	-0.008	0.005	0.004	0.023
	[0.020]	[0.022]	[0.011]	[0.016]	[0.019]	[0.009]	[0.020]	[0.021]
Age squared	0.000	0.001	-0.000*	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Year registered, missing=2007 (voter file)	0.000	0.007	-0.006**	0.002	0.007*	0.004	0.007*	0.013***
	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.003]	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.003]	[0.004]	[0.004]
Year registered missing	0.045	-0.147*	0.090*	0.062	0.036	-0.031	-0.055	-0.202*
	[0.062]	[0.078]	[0.052]	[0.061]	[0.093]	[0.057]	[0.110]	[0.104]
Two registered people in household (voter file)	0.002	-0.064	-0.065	0.023	-0.095**	-0.016	0.095	0.033
	[0.039]	[0.050]	[0.040]	[0.042]	[0.044]	[0.027]	[0.059]	[0.062]
Female (1=yes) VF/Survey	-0.062*	-0.112**	0.063**	-0.042	-0.029	0.012	0.028	-0.009
	[0.032]	[0.044]	[0.029]	[0.032]	[0.039]	[0.022]	[0.043]	[0.046]
Voted in 2006	-0.014	0.041	-0.007	0.071**	0.048	-0.002	-0.055	0.021
	[0.035]	[0.048]	[0.029]	[0.035]	[0.043]	[0.028]	[0.049]	[0.054]
Voted in 2004	-0.005	-0.005	0.002	0.025	0.008	0.011	0.018	-0.033
	[0.038]	[0.054]	[0.032]	[0.037]	[0.046]	[0.029]	[0.056]	[0.060]
Voted in 2002	0.039	-0.051	-0.034	-0.013	0.056	0.023	0.022	0.089
	[0.045]	[0.059]	[0.032]	[0.037]	[0.050]	[0.037]	[0.059]	[0.063]
Voted in 2000	-0.002	0.062	-0.010	-0.042	0.044	0.062	0.062	0.175***
	[0.047]	[0.058]	[0.033]	[0.041]	[0.051]	[0.041]	[0.061]	[0.066]
Voted in 1998	-0.015	-0.013	-0.060	0.005	-0.012	-0.007	-0.049	0.014
	[0.059]	[0.069]	[0.063]	[0.063]	[0.066]	[0.051]	[0.077]	[0.088]
Voted in 1996	-0.019	0.036	-0.036	-0.032	-0.062	-0.101***	-0.113	-0.079
	[0.069]	[0.082]	[0.078]	[0.075]	[0.071]	[0.034]	[0.082]	[0.100]
Pre-survey Interest in Primary (2=Very, 1=Somewhat, 0=Not Much)	0.108***	0.098***	0.003	-0.021	0.043*	-0.001	-0.019	-0.029
	[0.029]	[0.029]	[0.017]	[0.025]	[0.024]	[0.015]	[0.033]	[0.034]
Pre-survey 2000 vote aligned with pre-survey latent partisanship	0.036	-0.017	-0.012	0.013	0.021	-0.038	-0.019	-0.033
	[0.037]	[0.048]	[0.028]	[0.034]	[0.040]	[0.026]	[0.050]	[0.053]
Pre-survey Unemployment performance rel. pre-survey latent partisanship (-2 to 2)	-0.009	0.043*	-0.012	-0.019	0.024	0.029**	-0.004	0.033
	[0.018]	[0.025]	[0.017]	[0.019]	[0.021]	[0.013]	[0.026]	[0.028]
Pre-survey Economy Retrospective Judgment rel. pre-survey latent partisanship (-2 to 2)	0.028	-0.054*	-0.009	0.028	0.063***	0.014	-0.029	0.040
	[0.022]	[0.029]	[0.020]	[0.022]	[0.023]	[0.013]	[0.029]	[0.031]
Pre-survey Bush Approval rel. pre-survey latent partisanship (-2 to 2)	-0.012	0.036*	0.001	0.007	0.007	0.010	0.006	0.022
	[0.015]	[0.019]	[0.011]	[0.014]	[0.018]	[0.010]	[0.020]	[0.020]
Pre-survey Congress Approval rel. pre-survey latent partisanship (-2 to 2)	-0.004	-0.011	0.011	0.015	-0.019	0.004	0.002	0.013
	[0.013]	[0.016]	[0.010]	[0.013]	[0.015]	[0.009]	[0.017]	[0.018]
Constant	0.229	-12.568	13.520**	-2.262	-13.647*	-8.495	-14.522*	-25.903***
	[8.198]	[8.911]	[5.282]	[7.685]	[7.503]	[5.372]	[8.680]	[8.765]
Observations	434	436	423	436	436	436	436	436
R-squared	0.071	0.094	0.073	0.038	0.075	0.054	0.046	0.079

Note: OLS coefficients with robust (Huber/White) standard errors in brackets. *** denotes p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10, two-tailed tests. Sample is respondents interviewed in pre-survey who had valid addresses and had not moved before treatment was applied and who also completed post-survey.