Winning Hearts and Minds through Dialogue: Experimental Evidence from Mozambique's Islamist Insurgency

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Abstract

As insurgencies rise in fragile states and international aid diminishes, finding effective non-material strategies to reduce civilian support for armed groups has become a critical policy challenge. This paper evaluates a novel field experiment in Pemba, the capital of Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, where an ongoing Islamist insurgency has displaced over one million people and raised concerns about social fragmentation and the need to win the hearts and minds of both locals and the population internally displaced by the conflict (IDPs). Participants were randomly assigned to small cohorts that engaged in four sequenced community meetings, facilitated by religious leaders and grounded in Islamic moral framing. Sessions addressed displacement, prejudice, radicalization, and reconciliation through structured dialogue. Outcomes were measured across five survey waves using direct questions, a novel graphical list experiment, and an Implicit Association Test. Effects were strongest among locals – especially Muslims and those without prior contact with IDPs – who showed large reductions in support for insurgents and increased religious tolerance. Among IDPs, positive shifts emerged among those exposed to violence or with low social integration.

Keywords: Conflict; Insurgency; Jihadism; Forced Displacement; Intergroup Contact.

JEL: C93, D74, D83, D91 J15, O15, Z12, Z13.

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1 Introduction

Violent extremism poses a major challenge to peace and development in fragile states. Sub-Saharan Africa has emerged as the global epicentre of violent extremist activity, accounting for nearly half (48 percent) of all terrorism-related deaths worldwide (UNDP 2023). In African contexts such as Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Mozambique – and similarly in places like Iraq and Afghanistan – insurgent groups capitalize on mistrust, perceived injustice, and the erosion of state legitimacy to recruit and expand their influence (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011).

Standard counterinsurgency strategies – military operations and development aid – are mostly effective in reducing violence when coupled with credible state presence (Crost, Felter, and Johnston 2014, Dell and Querubin 2018). In fragile settings, these approaches often fall short or backfire. Moreover, economic interventions alone rarely shift beliefs or reduce ideological support for violence (Blattman and Ralston 2015, Lowe 2024). This has led to growing interest in non-material interventions that leverage local norms and moral narratives to shift attitudes away from supporting armed groups.

To address this gap, this paper studies whether structured, community-based dialogue can reduce support for insurgents and foster social cohesion in the midst of an ongoing Islamist insurgency. The field experiment took place in Pemba, the capital of Cabo Delgado province in northern Mozambique, where over one million people have been displaced since 2017 due to a violent Islamist insurgency. The intervention brought together local residents and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in small, mixed cohorts for four sequenced community meetings, facilitated by trained religious leaders. Each session followed a pre-specified protocol designed by the research team, local community members and leaders, and it focused on a specific topic: shared experiences and daily life; intergroup prejudice; Islam, radicalization and peacebuilding; reconciliation and aspirations.

The intervention's follows the framework proposed by Herzig and Chasin (2006) and previously tested as a proof-of-concept in Pemba by Barros (2025). It is grounded in psychological theories of belief updating and intergroup contact, which suggest that exposure to personal narratives, shared identity, and structured ideological dialogue can reshape attitudes and reduce support for violence (Allport 1954, Doosje et al. 2016, Khader et al. 2018, Milla and Umam 2019). While prior

work has documented the role of intergroup dialogue in reducing prejudice, this paper pioneers the study of whether such an approach – in which material incentives are absent– can meaningfully shift attitudes toward extremist groups in a fragile context.

To evaluate the effects of the intervention, the study estimates dynamic treatment effects using a panel of over 1,076 locals and IDPs surveyed across five waves. Outcomes related to religious tolerance, reconciliation, and support for insurgents are captured through three complementary instruments that measure both explicit and implicit shifts in behavior: direct survey questions, a novel graphical list experiment designed to capture sensitive views about the insurgents, and a tablet-based Implicit Association Test (IAT) that captures subconscious bias toward insurgents relative to government authorities. Each follow-up survey was conducted, on average, 60 days after the preceding community meeting, allowing for the identification of medium-run effects. A final endline survey was administered approximately 115 days after the last meeting, enabling the analysis of more persistent attitudinal changes.

The community meetings generated significant improvements in religious tolerance and preference for reconciliation, and a decrease in the support for the insurgency. Among locals, meetings that directly addressed intergroup prejudice and the ideological foundations of violence were especially effective. Religious tolerance increased by up to 0.32 standard deviations following the second meeting, which covered intergroup prejudice between locals and IDPs; while support for the insurgency decreased by as much as 0.50 standard deviations after the third meeting, in which participants discussed Islam, radicalization and peacebuilding. These effects were concentrated among those who had not previously hosted IDPs – and therefore were less familiar with the actions taken by insurgents – and among Muslim participants, who are more directly affected by insurgents' identity-based narratives.

For IDPs, the intervention's effects were more mixed. While most single outcomes showed limited statistical significance, a composite index combining tolerance, reconciliation, and anti-insurgent attitudes significantly increased by 0.22 to 0.25 standard deviations after several meetings. Heterogeneity analyses reveal that impacts were strongest among IDPs with prior exposure to violence, lower initial levels of social integration, and among Muslims. These groups responded most positively to early sessions centered on personal narratives, prejudice, and forgiveness – suggesting that the psychological needs and social positioning of participants play a key role in shaping

what types of dialogue are most effective.

This paper advances four strands of research on counterinsurgency, deradicalization, intergroup contact, and belief measurement in fragile environments. First, the paper contributes to the literature on counterinsurgency and civilian support for armed groups. A central debate in this literature concerns whether support for insurgents is driven primarily by material incentives or by grievances and identity-based narratives. While development aid and state services can reduce violence under conditions of state control and legitimacy (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011, Crost, Felter, and Johnston 2014, Dell and Querubin 2018), such strategies often fail in fragile settings with weak institutions or contested authority. Moreover, meta-analyses find inconsistent effects of employment programs on support for violence (Blattman and Ralston 2015), and some studies highlight backlash risks when the state lacks credibility (Dell and Querubin 2018). This paper challenges the view that material incentives are a necessary condition for shifting attitudes. It provides experimental evidence that targeted belief change – around religious tolerance, violence, and reconciliation – can occur through psychosocial channels alone, without financial transfers or coercion. In doing so, it contributes to a growing strand of work calling for non-material levers of counterinsurgency and peacebuilding.

Second, the study advances research on identity-based deradicalization and the role of credible local messengers. Recent field experiments show that religious leaders, when equipped with theologically coherent messages, can reduce support for extremist violence and reshape community norms (Vicente and Vilela 2022). This paper complements that work by shifting the focus from religious elites to broader civilian populations. It shows that structured dialogue, facilitated by religious leaders but centered on peer engagement, can have measurable effects on individual attitudes toward extremist ideologies – especially when content is aligned with local moral frameworks.

Third, the paper bridges the literature on intergroup contact and the psychological roots of conflict. A long tradition in social psychology and political economy suggests that structured contact – particularly when repeated, cooperative, and grounded in shared goals – can reduce prejudice and build trust (Allport 1954, Barros 2025, Lowe 2021, Mousa 2020, Rao 2019, Scacco and Warren 2018). Recent field experiments in conflict-affected settings have shown that exposure to empathy-inducing narratives, opportunities for collaborative engagement (Mousa 2020), and identity-integrating dialogue (Barros 2025) can improve social cohesion. This paper pioneers that

logic to conflict prevention, embedding dialogue within a religious and cultural framework and sequencing conversations to progressively tackle more sensitive ideological content. The findings suggest that intergroup dialogue is most effective when it is not only interpersonal but also morally and theologically anchored, allowing it to challenge narratives of violence while fostering empathy and social cohesion.

Fourth, the paper makes a methodological contribution to the measurement of belief change in fragile and low-literacy contexts. While research on deradicalization often relies on self-reported attitudes, this study combines standard surveys with two innovative tools: a graphical list experiment designed to elicit sensitive views on insurgents, and an image-based Implicit Association Test (IAT) adapted for a low-literacy, conflict-affected population. These tools expand the set of feasible measurement strategies in high-risk environments and allow for the detection of both explicit and implicit belief change. The panel structure of the data collected, with repeated measurements over 12 months, further enables analysis of short- and medium-term dynamics. In doing so, the study addresses concerns about causal inference in conflict settings (Bazzi and Clemens 2013) and responds to calls for more rigorous, longitudinal evidence on ideological interventions in fragile states (Lowe 2024).

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on the insurgency in Cabo Delgado and the motivation for the intervention. Section 3 describes the intervention and its implementation. Section 4 presents the research design and study implementation. The baseline sample balance is shown in Section 5. Section 6 details the measurement strategy. Section 7 presents the empirical findings, and Section 8 concludes.

2 Contextual Background

Cabo Delgado, the northernmost province in Mozambique, has experienced a violent Islamist insurgency since late 2017. The insurgency is rooted in both religious radicalization and longstanding local grievances. While the insurgent group – locally referred to as *Al-Shabaab* (unrelated to the Somali organization) – has pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, its emergence was initially shaped by internal religious tensions within Mozambique's Muslim communities. The rejection of traditional Sufi Islam and the rise of doctrinaire Salafi-inspired teachings, particularly among

disillusioned youth, created fertile ground for extremist ideologies to grow. The insurgency's early mobilization efforts explicitly framed their cause as a religious struggle against local Muslim authorities and state-aligned religious institutions, further deepening ideological divisions within the Muslim population.These religious dynamics have intertwined with socio-economic exclusion, local resentment over resource extraction, and weak state governance to drive recruitment and violence in the region (Estelle and Darden 2021, International Crisis Group 2021).

The radicalization processes in Cabo Delgado have been significantly fueled by widespread discontent arising from stark inequalities and perceived marginalization. Despite vast offshore natural gas resources projected to transform Mozambique's economy, local communities continue to experience entrenched poverty, inadequate public service provision, and exclusion from economic opportunities (Morier-Genoud 2020, Pirio, Pittelli, and Adam 2019). Insurgent recruitment has effectively capitalized on this pervasive frustration, particularly among unemployed and disenfranchised youth. Promises of economic opportunity, empowerment, and moral vindication against corrupt local authorities have been strategically utilized by insurgent recruiters to galvanize support (Habibe, Forquilha, and Pereira 2019).

Additionally, external ideological influences have played a critical role. The emergence of the insurgency coincided with increased contact with transnational jihadist networks, notably through cross-border linkages with radical groups based in Tanzania and East Africa more broadly. Foreign-trained fighters and ideological guidance from radical clerics significantly contributed to the operational sophistication and doctrinal coherence of the insurgent movement (Estelle and Darden 2021, Pirio, Pittelli, and Adam 2019).

The complex security environment in Cabo Delgado has posed significant challenges for Mozambique's counterinsurgency efforts. In this context, concerns have been raised about the potential for certain security dynamics to contribute to the undermining of social cohesion among affected communities (Amnesty-International 2021, Barros 2025). These dynamics may inadvertently align with insurgent narratives – a reminder of the importance of locally grounded strategies that foster trust and social cohesion.

As of April 2023, at the onset of this study, the conflict had caused severe humanitarian impacts, displacing nearly 830,000 individuals, with over 160,000 individuals seeking refuge in the provincial capital of Pemba alone (IOM 2023). The substantial influx of IDPs intensified compe-



(a) Locals' baseline contact with IDPs.



(b) Local population and hosting of IDPs at baseline.

tition for scarce resources and heightened socio-cultural tensions between host communities and displaced populations, underscoring the urgency for innovative, community-based interventions addressing both radicalization and social integration.

2.1 Characterization of the locals and IDPs in Pemba: baseline exposure and attitudes towards the insurgency

This section provides a detailed characterization of the local and IDPs populations in Pemba, based on baseline survey data collected prior to the intervention. Descriptive statistics offer key insights into their socio-economic contexts, experiences of displacement, and attitudes towards the insurgency.

Figure 1a illustrates locals' frequency of interaction with IDPs, revealling a high degree of regular intergroup contact: at baseline 77% of locals interact daily with IDPs, 18% several times per week, while only 4% report interactions as infrequent as once per week and 1% once per month. The nature of the contact, however, is not captured by baseline data – these baseline pre-existing interactions could either be conducive of social integration and cooperation, but could also stem from competition and undermin social cohesion (Lowe 2021).

Figure 1b complements this perspective, indicating the extent of personal hosting of IDPs among locals. The majority of local respondents (54%) were currently hosting IDPs at the time of

the baseline survey. Moreover, 28% of locals had hosted IDPs at some point in the past, and only 18% had never hosted displaced persons. Together, these figures reinforce the narrative of locals actively providing shelter and support to the displaced community, further reflecting the depth of coexistence and potential for positive or negative intergroup dynamics.

The experiences of IDPs themselves are summarized in Figure 2. It highlights the severe impact of the insurgency on their lives: 73% of IDPs reported that their displacement was forced rather than voluntary, emphasizing the coercive and violent context of their flight from conflict-affected areas. A substantial proportion of IDPs (44%) personally knew someone who had been abducted by insurgents. Furthermore, nearly one-third of IDP households (29%) reported that at least one household member had been abducted or killed by insurgents. These statistics clearly illustrate the profound violence and trauma experienced by the displaced community, providing critical contextual information on their baseline emotional and attitudinal orientations.



Figure 2: IDPs who were exposed to the insurgency.

Finally, Figure 4 contrasts attitudes towards insurgents and related ideological dimensions between locals and IDPs. Locals and IDPs showed similar support for religious freedom (73% for both groups), indicating strong shared normative support for religious tolerance. Regarding insurgents who repent, IDPs displayed higher support for forgiveness (44%) compared to locals (39%),

reflecting potentially stronger preferences for reconciliation among those directly affected by insurgent violence. Similarly, both groups overwhelmingly rejected violence as a legitimate means of achieving political objectives – 80% among IDPs and 78% among locals – suggesting widespread normative resistance to insurgency violence. A divergence emerges, however, regarding the approach to ending insurgency. A majority of locals (54%) supported using military force rather than negotiation to end insurgent activity, while a smaller proportion of IDPs (46%) supported this approach. This difference could reflect distinct attitudes shaped by direct exposure to violence among displaced persons versus indirect, but still disruptive, effects of insurgency on locals' livelihoods and community stability.



Figure 3: Baseline attitudes of locals and IDPs towards the insurgency.

Overall, the descriptive evidence emphasizes critical distinctions and commonalities between locals and IDPs. Frequent intergroup interaction, extensive hosting of displaced families, and broadly shared attitudes towards tolerance and peace underscore potential positive foundations for interventions aiming at dialogue and reconciliation. Nonetheless, important differences exist, particularly concerning direct experiences with violence and approaches towards insurgency resolution, highlighting the complexities facing community-based interventions in conflict-affected settings such as Pemba.

3 The Intervention

The intervention consisted of four sequenced community meetings involving both IDPs and local residents of Pemba. Each meeting was designed around a specific theme and facilitated by trained religious leaders. The overarching goal of the intervention was to test whether structured community dialogue, without material transfers, could foster ideological change and social cohesion in a fragile, conflict-affected setting.

The design of the community meetings was grounded in the contact hypothesis proposed by Allport (1954), building on the intergroup dialogue framework proposed by Herzig and Chasin (2006) and the proof-of-concept intervention developed by Barros (2025) in Pemba. These frameworks were then adapted by the research team in collaboration with the local community and religious leaders in Pemba. The intervention aimed to leverage peer-to-peer engagement and religious teaching to create a setting where narratives of identity, ideology, and reconciliation could be contested and reshaped. The meetings progressed from general discussions of daily life and displacement to increasingly sensitive conversations around prejudice, radicalization, and forgiveness. In doing so, the intervention operationalized several mechanisms proposed in the belief-updating literature: narrative exposure, empathetic exchange, identity salience, and cognitive dissonance through contradiction of prior beliefs (Doosje et al. 2016, Milla and Umam 2019). Each meeting had a pre-specified protocol that was strictly followed, ensuring consistency across cohorts of participants.

Participants were randomly assigned to small mixed cohorts (locals and IDPs), with 10–12 individuals per group. Each cohort attended four 3-hour meetings spaced approximately two months apart. Moderators facilitated discussions in local languages, ensured inclusive participation, and introduced religious references and moral framing aligned with Islamic principles. Below, I summarize the thematic content and core mechanisms emphasized in each meeting (the full protocols for each community meeting are shown in Appendix D). Figure 4 shows how a typical community meeting resembled.

Community Meeting 1: Shared Experiences and Everyday Life. The first meeting introduced participants to one another and created a psychologically safe space for dialogue. Thematic emphasis was placed on sharing how IDPs' lives changed after displacement. Locals were invited

Figure 4: Example of a community meeting.

to discuss how the arrival of IDPs changed neighborhood dynamics, while IDPs reflected on the disruption and trauma of leaving their communities. This session's aim was to use personal stories and experiences to foster empathy, surface latent grievances, and set the foundation for mutual understanding. This session closely followed the proof-of-concept protocol developed by Barros (2025) and the decision to begin the intervention with this format was based on its proven record of effectively improving the social integration of IDPs.

Community Meeting 2: Prejudice and Intergroup Perceptions. The second meeting addressed stereotypes and social stigma between IDPs and host communities, following a *Prejudice Exercise* created by Herzig and Chasin (2006). Participants were explicitly asked to reflect on prejudices they perceive others to have about their group (including those that are offensive, false, or contain a kernel of truth). The session employed a structured "prejudice exercise" that encouraged cognitive dissonance and perspective-taking. This meeting operationalized key features of the contact hypothesis – equal status, cooperative discussion, and open dialogue about group-based misconceptions – intended to reduce intergroup bias.

Community Meeting 3: Religion, Radicalization, and Peacebuilding. This was the most ideologically charged session. It opened with a moral dilemma story involving violence and religion, followed by discussion of when, if ever, Islam justifies violence. Participants were then asked to reason about what motivates individuals to join radical groups. The conversation culminated in a moderated reading of Quranic verses on religious tolerance and peace. This session explicitly confronted the ideological basis of the insurgency, with the intention of challenging support for insurgents by invoking theological authority and discrediting violent interpretations of Islam.

Community Meeting 4: Forgiveness, Reconciliation and Aspirations. The final meeting focused on reconciliation, long-term aspirations, and the possibility of coexistence with repentant insurgents. Participants were invited to imagine the future of their neighborhood and the potential for rebuilding trust after violence. The conversation centered on forgiveness, both personal and communal, and sought to prompt reflection on moral redemption and post-conflict social healing. This session served as a closure mechanism, consolidating narrative shifts and signaling a transition from grievance to hope.

4 Research Design and Implementation

This section outlines the sampling process, intervention rollout and data collection, sequenced over a 12-month period (April 2023 to April 2024) and according to the pre-analysis plan (Barros 2023). Figure 5 provides a schematic overview of the five project phases, including both the timing of key survey waves and the four community meetings that constitute the study's intervention.

Phase 1: Baseline (April–June 2023). The study began with the random selection of participants, conducted separately within 10 distinct neighborhoods of Pemba. This sampling strategy was adopted due to political considerations – specifically, the limits on conducting research across areas governed by different authorities – as well as logistical considerations related to participant mobility (requiring participants to travel significant distances could have increased the likelihood of attrition from the study). Within each neighborhood, IDPs were randomly selected using the Displacement Tracking Matrix provided to the research team by the International Organization for



Figure 5: Timeline of the study.

Migration (IOM). This comprehensive dataset contains the names of nearly all IDPs residing in each neighborhood of Pemba. For local residents, a similar comprehensive dataset was unavailable; thus, the research team employed a random-walk method for their selection.

Upon finalizing the participant selection, baseline data collection commenced, involving a total of 1,076 individuals – 426 locals and 650 IDPs.[1] Data collection encompassed a survey addressing demographic characteristics, social capital, interactions between locals and IDPs, integration of IDPs into host communities, religious tolerance, attitudes toward insurgents, and displacement experiences. Additionally, two specialized tools assessed support for insurgents: an implicit association test (IAT), measuring participants' subconscious associations with government authorities compared to insurgents, and a graphical list experiment intended to uncover explicit attitudes toward insurgents.

Immediately after baseline data collection concluded, participants were randomly assigned to either treatment or control cohorts, each consisting of 10 to 12 individuals, evenly divided between locals and IDPs. Participants in the treatment cohorts proceeded to the first community meeting, while those in the control cohorts completed their participation after baseline activities. To mitigate attrition, each follow-up survey wave took place at a consistent location (e.g., local community centers or municipal offices), and participants were provided with a modest meal or phone airtime

[1]The greater number of IDPs relative to locals in the sample reflects the research team's expectation of higher attrition rates among IDPs, informed by prior findings from Barros (2025).

reimbursement.

Phases 2-4: Intermediary (July–December 2023). Following the baseline phase, the study implemented three intermediary phases with an identical format. Each of these phases involved a follow-up data collection for all participants, identical to baseline measures. Immediately after, treatment cohort participants attended an additional community meeting, consistent with predefined protocols. Phase 2 took place between July and August 2023, on average 58 days after Phase 1, and included 1,051 individuals (411 locals and 640 IDPs). This phase's community meeting focused on addressing prejudice between locals and IDPs. Phase 3 occurred between September and October 2023, on average 60 days after Phase 2, involving 1,015 individuals (398 locals and 617 IDPs), with the third community meeting centering on religion, radicalization, and peacebuilding. Finally, Phase 4 was implemented between November and December 2023, approximately 68 days following Phase 3. It involved 994 participants (393 locals and 601 IDPs) and included the last community meeting, which addressed themes of reconciliation and future aspirations.

Phase 5: Endline (July–December 2023). The study concluded with the endline data collection phase, conducted approximately 115 days after Phase 4. A total of 1,007 individuals (398 locals and 609 IDPs) participated in this phase, marking the end of the research activities.

5 Sampling, Randomization, and Baseline Data

This section examines the baseline balance between treatment and control groups, drawing on the combined summary statistics presented in Table 1. The results suggest that the randomization was broadly successful for both locals and IDPs, with most baseline characteristics well balanced across treatment and control groups.

For the local population (426 individuals: 217 control, 209 treatment), key demographic and socio-economic characteristics such as age, gender, education levels, and income are similar across groups. Differences in religious and ethnic composition are generally small, though two variables show significant baseline differences at the 10% level: a higher share of Catholics in the treatment group compared to control (16.3% vs. 10.2), and a lower proportion of individuals identifying as

Macua in treatment relative to control (79.3% vs. 85.6%).

Indicators of social attitudes and perceptions, including religious tolerance and preferences regarding insurgents and reconciliation, are also well balanced across treatment arms for locals. One exception is the index constructed using the methodology proposed by Anderson (2008), and which aggregates religious tolerance, preference for reconciliation, survey attitudes against the insurgents and the IAT. The index value is significantly lower among locals in the treatment group (p-value=0.022). While modest in size, this imbalance can lead to conservative estimates of treatment effects in case positive treatment effects are observed.

For the sample of IDPs (634 individuals: 319 control, 315 treatment), balance is similarly strong. Demographic and ethnic composition is broadly similar across groups, with no statistically significant differences in age, gender, or religious affiliation. Education levels show significant differences at the 10% level, particularly at the elementary education level, in which the treatment group has a slightly higher share (32.2% vs. 25.1%). Additionally, the share of individuals reporting "other ethnicity" is slightly higher in the treatment group (3.2% vs. 1.3%), though this involves small numbers overall. Outcome measures are also balanced for IDPs. Preferences regarding insurgents, religious tolerance, and social integration into host communities do not differ significantly across groups.

Table 2 presents evidence on differential attrition between treatment and control groups for both locals (Panel A) and internally displaced persons (IDPs, Panel B) across four follow-up waves. Among locals, treatment assignment is consistently associated with a small and statistically insignificant reduction in attrition, with estimated coefficients ranging between -0.027 and 0.009 across specifications. Control group attrition rates remain relatively stable, ranging from 3.5% to 7.6%. Among IDPs, treatment effects on attrition are positive but also statistically insignificant across all waves, with point estimates fluctuating between 0.000 and 0.025. Attrition in the control group starts at a low 1.5% in Wave 1 and increases slightly across waves. The inclusion of individual, cohort, and neighborhood controls does not qualitatively change the results. Overall, the absence of significant treatment effects on attrition across both groups and all waves suggests that differential attrition is unlikely to bias the impact estimates in subsequent analyses.

Table 1: Summary statistics by treatment assignment (baseline survey).

	Locals						IDPs					
	N		Mean		Diff	p-val	N		Mean		Diff	p-val
Variable	C	T	C	T			C	T	C	T		
Age	213	207	40.35	40.09	-0.26	0.871	317	315	39.56	38.47	-1.09	0.383
Women	217	209	0.85	0.82	-0.03	0.374	319	315	0.68	0.74	0.06	0.127
Religion												
Catholic	216	208	0.10	0.16	0.06	0.072	317	315	0.25	0.26	0.02	0.694
Muslim	216	208	0.88	0.82	-0.06	0.130	317	315	0.75	0.72	-0.03	0.547
Other religion	216	208	0.02	0.01	-0.00	0.732	317	315	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.231
Ethnic group												
Macua	216	208	0.86	0.79	-0.06	0.065	318	315	0.51	0.45	-0.06	0.224
Maconde	216	208	0.06	0.09	0.03	0.244	318	315	0.22	0.25	0.03	0.472
Mwani	216	208	0.07	0.11	0.04	0.208	318	315	0.26	0.27	0.01	0.893
Other ethnicity	216	208	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.970	318	315	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.079
Education												
No education	217	208	0.04	0.05	0.02	0.435	319	314	0.06	0.05	-0.02	0.403
Informal education	217	208	0.58	0.56	-0.02	0.707	319	314	0.55	0.53	-0.02	0.534
Elementary education	217	208	0.24	0.26	0.02	0.670	319	314	0.25	0.32	0.07	0.066
Secondary education	217	208	0.02	0.02	-0.00	0.772	319	314	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.981
Social capital index	217	208	7.82	8.18	0.36	0.550	318	315	7.20	7.65	0.45	0.317
Income level	216	209	4.31	4.39	0.08	0.473	319	315	4.21	4.23	0.02	0.785
Host status / Origin district	217	209	0.53	0.54	0.01	0.921	-	-	-	-	-	-
Social integration of IDPs	-	-	-	-	-	-	319	315	1.50	1.50	-0.01	0.879
Prior exposure to the insurgency	-	-	-	-	-	-	315	314	0.18	0.22	0.04	0.218
District of origin (IDPs)												
Macomia	-	-	-	-	-	-	319	315	0.27	0.29	0.02	0.564
Meluco	-	-	-	-	-	-	319	315	0.04	0.02	-0.02	0.152
Mocimboa da Praia	-	-	-	-	-	-	319	315	0.20	0.24	0.05	0.184
Muidumbe	-	-	-	-	-	-	319	315	0.15	0.13	-0.01	0.680
Palma	-	-	-	-	-	-	319	315	0.08	0.07	-0.01	0.664
Quissanga	-	-	-	-	-	-	319	315	0.23	0.20	-0.03	0.346
Other district	-	-	-	-	-	-	319	315	0.04	0.05	0.01	0.672
Outcomes												
Religious tolerance	217	209	0.80	0.75	-0.05	0.156	319	315	0.78	0.76	-0.02	0.596
Pref. against insurgents (survey)	217	209	0.76	0.74	-0.02	0.244	319	315	0.73	0.73	0.01	0.717
Preference for reconciliation	217	209	0.42	0.39	-0.03	0.446	319	315	0.48	0.43	-0.05	0.157
Pref. against insurgents (IAT)	215	207	0.02	-0.04	-0.06	0.422	315	311	0.03	-0.07	-0.10	0.105
Aggregate Index	217	209	0.02	-0.05	-0.07	0.022	319	315	-0.02	-0.05	-0.04	0.240

C and T refer to individuals in control and treatment groups, respectively.
"Pref." refers to *preference*.

	Follow-up Wave 1		Follow-up Wave 2		Follow-up Wave 3		Follow-up Wave 4	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A. Locals								
Treated	-0.022	-0.027	-0.026	-0.017	0.008	0.009	-0.026	-0.023
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.021)
Mean (control group)	0.046	0.047	0.078	0.079	0.074	0.074	0.078	0.079
N	426	421	426	421	426	421	426	421
Number of attritors	15	15	28	28	33	32	28	28
Controls	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
Panel B. IDPs								
Treated	0.012	0.008	0.022	0.016	0.016	0.025	0.000	0.007
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.020)
Mean (control group)	0.009	0.009	0.040	0.037	0.067	0.068	0.064	0.065
N	650	646	650	646	650	646	650	646
Number of attritors	10	10	33	32	49	49	42	42
Controls	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes

OLS estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at the cohort level. The dependent variables are binary, taking value 1 if the study participant was an attritor and 0 otherwise. Columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) include neighborhood dummies, controls for individuals and cohort characteristics.

Table 2: Differential attrition among locals and IDPs.

6 Outcomes measured

To quantify religious tolerance, attitudes towards reconciliation, and preferences regarding insurgents, multiple methodological strategies were employed. These included combining explicit survey responses. Given the ethical, political and security challenges of directly inquiring about insurgent support, two additional instruments were used: the implicit association test (IAT), and a graphical list experiment.

Religious tolerance: this index is constructed from two survey questions about individual preferences regarding religious freedom and the imposition of Sharia. This variable is derived from averaging the responses to two survey questions, where respondents were asked to choose the sentence that they mostly agreed with. The first question presented a choice between two statements: *the law should make everyone follow the same religion* and *people should be free to follow any religion, even if I do not like that religion*. The second question asked participants to choose between: *the Sharia should be imposed, as most of Cabo Delgado's population is Muslim* and *freedom of religion is a person's right, even if I don't like that religion*. The resulting index is constructed to take values in the unit interval, with higher values indicating greater religious tolerance. I hypothesized that meeting attendance would improve religious tolerance.

Reconciliation: this index captures explicit attitudes toward forgiving insurgents by averaging responses to two survey items: whether respondents believe insurgents who surrender and express remorse should be forgiven or punished; and respondents' willingness to personally forgive repentant insurgents. Higher values indicate stronger reconciliation preferences, and responses were standardized and averaged to create the final index within the unit interval.

Explicit attitudes towards insurgents: this index aggregates explicit responses from three survey questions assessing attitudes toward insurgent ideologies and the use of violence. Specifically, it includes respondents' opinions on whether violence may be justifiable; whether some insurgent claims might be just; and the preference negotiations with the insurgents, as opposed to the government negotiating with the insurgents. Responses were averaged, with higher index values reflecting stronger opposition to insurgent ideologies and violence.

Implicit Association Test (IAT) : it captures participants' inherent biases toward government authorities or insurgents. The IAT is a psychometric assessment tool developed by Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz (1998) to measure individuals' implicit attitudes and beliefs that may be inaccessible through explicit self-reporting methods, namely on sensitive topics – in the case of this study, religious extremism. The IAT operates on the principle of differential association of two target concepts with an attribute, thereby revealing unconscious cognitive biases. Specifically, the IAT entails a series of rapid categorization tasks in which subjects are required to pair presented stimuli –words or images – with specific attributes.

In the spirit of the successful implementation of an IAT in low-literacy setting in Uganda by Lowes et al. (2015), I opted by using IAT stimuli consisting of images shown on a tablet screen (instead of words). The test included two target categories – *government authorities* and *insurgents* – and two attribute categories – *happy* and *sad* human faces. The full set of stimuli used is shown in Figure 6.

The IAT proceeded as shown in Figure 7. The test included of multiple trials, each one consisting of one image belonging to one of the four categories (authorities, insurgents, happy and sad). The image presented in each trial was randomly chosen from the stimuli set shown in Figure 6. In each trial respondents were asked to press *left* or right on the tablet screen as quick as possible and according to the labels in the top of the screen. Using as example the trial displayed in Figure 7, participants were asked to press *left* if the image shown corresponded to the *insurgents* or *happy* categories, and they should press *right* if the images corresponded to the *authorities* or *unhappy* categories. Throughout the test the pairing between target (authorities, insurgents) and attribute categories (happy, sad) were randomly changed, such that each combination was tested in different block of trials.

After all blocks of trials were conducted, a test score aggregating all trials was calculated. This score measured how relatively faster and accurately a respondent classified (i) *insurgents–sad* and *authorities–happy* versus (ii) *insurgents–happy* and *authorities–sad*. The underlying idea is that faster responses and fewer errors occur when the presented pairs align more closely with the individual's implicit beliefs. If someone was faster and more accurate in classifying the combination (i) relatively to (ii), then the implicit bias toward insurgents would be smaller (corresponding to a

Figure 6: Stimuli used in the Implicit Association Test.

Figure 7: Example of how images were displayed during the implicit association test.

lower test score).[2]

For instance, a quicker association of positive emotions with authorities and negative ones with insurgents indicated an IAT score closer to preferring government authorities over insurgents. This example corresponds to the testable prediction in this study: by questioning previously held beliefs, preference for insurgents decreases, reflected by a stronger bias toward authorities over insurgents.

Graphical list experiment: this is a newly designed *graphical* variation from list experiments, which overcomes some limitations of the traditional list experiment formats. In the specific context of Cabo Delgado, reading out loud sentences related to sensitive topics can generate fear and serious concerns among locals and IDPs. Therefore, instead of reading out loud sentences, study participants were shown images. All individuals were shown 4 non-sensitive images, while others were randomly shown a 5th sensitive image. Figure 8 displays the 5 images exactly as they were presented to study participants. The non-sensitive images include a market in Pemba, Mozambique's military, Mozambicans playing football, and a road in Pemba. The sensitive image showed the insurgent group Al-Shabaab after they conquered Quissanga, a district capital to the north of Pemba. This sensitive image was chosen after consulting with a focus group composed of people from Cabo Delgado, who confirmed that this image was widely recognized in the region.

[2]The IAT in this study was conducted on a tablet with a 10-inch screen and using Qualtrics software. The individual-level raw data was then scored using the algorithm proposed by Cui et al. (2021) following the score formula proposed by Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003).

Figure 8: Images shown in the graphical list experiment.

This graphical list experiment proceeded as follows. The enumerator used a tablet with a 10-inch screen to show the list experiment images. The randomization between 4 or 5 images was done automatically by Qualtrics, with a 0.5 probability of being shown the sensitive image. The enumerator instructed the study participant to look at all images carefully for one minute. All images contained a legend, and study participants were told they could ask for any clarification about the content of the images. At the end, the enumerator asked the number of images that the study participant liked, without indicating which images were sensitive.

The graphical list experiment represents a significant improvement in the measurement of sensitive attitudes and behaviors, and has the potential to be adapted to other contexts with similar sensitivity concerns. Nevertheless, there are several downsides to this method. The first issue is related to the difficulty in controlling the level of attention that individuals pay to the images. Al-

though every local enumerator instructed participants to look closely at each image for one minute and read out the caption of each image upon request, it is impossible to ensure that participants payed sufficient attention to the images. The second limitation is associated with age-related ophthalmological problems, which could have made it challenging for older participants to see the list experiment images clearly. In such situations, local enumerators provided participants with additional time to look at the images and read out the captions if needed. Despite these limitations, the graphical list experiment remains a promising tool for measuring sensitive attitudes and behaviors. I hypothesize that meeting attendees would show reduced preference for insurgents, as evidenced by whether those exposed to the sensitive image favored fewer images than the control group.

Aggregate Index: to assess the overall impact of the community meetings, I construct an aggregate outcome index following the methodology proposed by Anderson (2008), combining measures of religious tolerance, reconciliation preferences, explicit attitudes towards insurgents, and the IAT. This composite index provides a comprehensive measure of the meetings' cumulative effect across multiple attitudinal dimensions. This method addresses the multiple inference problem by creating a weighted average of standardized outcomes, where weights are determined through a generalized least squares approach based on the inverse covariance matrix of the outcomes. This ensures that correlated outcomes contribute proportionally less information, increasing statistical efficiency and mitigating the risk of false-positive results arising from testing multiple hypotheses simultaneously.

7 Empirical Results

7.1 Empirical Strategy

To estimate the impact of the community meetings on key outcomes, I assess both immediate and medium-term treatment effects by exploiting the panel structure of the data. Immediate effects are measured using outcomes collected 2-3 days after each meeting, while medium-term effects are drawn from survey waves fielded approximately two to three months later. In each case, I restrict the sample to post-intervention periods and apply a consistent empirical strategy across waves.

The main specification is a two-way fixed effects model with dynamic treatment effects, specified as follows:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \sum_t \beta_t \, \text{Treat}_i \times \mathbf{1}\{t = \tau\} + \gamma_t + \mu_i + \varepsilon_{it} \tag{1}$$

All estimates represent intent-to-treat effects, capturing the average causal impact of being assigned to participate in the dialogue intervention, regardless of actual attendance. In Equation 1, Y_{it} denotes the outcome of interest for individual i at survey wave t. The variable Treat_i is a binary indicator equal to 1 and 0 if individual i was assigned to the treatment or control groups, respectively. The term $\mathbf{1}\{t = \tau\}$ represents a binary variable for survey wave τ, and the interaction $\text{Treat}_i \times \mathbf{1}\{t = \tau\}$ captures the treatment effect β_t at each wave t. The coefficient γ_t denotes survey wave fixed effects, included to control for aggregate time-varying shocks common to all individuals. μ_i captures individual fixed effects, accounting for time-invariant heterogeneity at the individual level. Standard errors are clustered in two ways: by treatment cohort and by survey wave. This strategy follows the recommendations of Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011), Cameron and Shah (2015) to account for potential dependence along both dimensions of the data. The set of interaction terms $\text{Treat}_i \times \mathbf{1}\{t = \tau\}$ allows for dynamic treatment effects, enabling the estimation of wave-specific treatment effects over time. The omitted category in this specification corresponds to the baseline wave prior to the intervention, serving as the reference period against which post-treatment effects are identified.

Given the several outcomes evaluated, I correct for multiple hypothesis testing using Romano-Wolf stepdown adjusted p-values (Romano and Wolf 2005a;b; 2016), which are reported in square brackets. These adjusted p-values are computed separately for each survey wave, based on the joint null hypothesis that treatment has no effect on any outcome within that survey wave.

7.2 The effects of community meetings on locals

Figure 9 presents the dynamic treatment effects of each of the four community meetings on local participants. P-values adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing are presented inside the squared brackets (the full results are presented in Table 3).[3]

[3]The analysis is based on a balanced panel of 1,994 observations across four survey waves, covering approximately 390–410 local participants per wave. The number of observations varies slightly by outcome due to item non-response,



Figure 9: Main results on locals.

Column (1) shows that religious tolerance increased significantly after the second, third and fourth meetings. The largest statistically significant effect is observed after the second meeting, which specifically focused on addressing prejudices between locals and IDPs. This meeting increased religious tolerance by 0.32 standard deviations (significant at the 5% level). The third meeting, dedicated explicitly to religion, radicalization, and peace, similarly increased religious tolerance by 0.25 standard deviations, significant at the 5% level. The fourth meetings generated smaller effect of 0.15, only significant at the 10% level. The first meeting produced a statistically insignificant 0.16 standard deviations increase in religious tolerance.

Column (2) shows preferences regarding reconciliation with insurgents. The third meeting, which explicitly addressed ideological justifications of violence, significantly decreased locals' preference for pardoning and reconciliation with insurgents: a negative effect of 0.21 standard deviations, significant at the 5% level (and an adjusted p-value of 0.119). Meetings one, two, and four did not yield statistically significant effects, with estimates ranging between 0.014 and 0.081 standard deviations.

Columns (3), (4), and (5) present locals' attitudes toward insurgents using survey questions, the

with the sample for the graphical list experiment (Column (5)) being slightly smaller (N = 1,898). The estimation includes individual fixed effects and controls for survey wave and cohort characteristics.

IAT, and the graphical list experiment. Higher outcome values reflect stronger negative attitudes toward insurgents.

In Column (3), explicit attitudes toward insurgents, as measured by survey data, reveal significant negative attitudes towards insurgents following the third meeting (0.50 standard deviations, significant at the 1% level). The first, second, and fourth meetings produced smaller and statistically insignificant changes, ranging between 0.13 and 0.18 standard deviations.

Column (4), which presents the IAT effects, shows a significant negative shift in implicit attitudes toward insurgents following the second meeting (0.27 standard deviations, significant at the 5% level). Subsequent meetings (first, third, and fourth) generated small and statistically insignificant effects, ranging from -0.08 to 0.033 standard deviations.

Column (5) shows results from the graphical list experiment, indicating that only the first meeting significantly increased negative attitudes towards insurgents (0.55 standard deviations; significant at the 10% level, and adjusted p-value of 0.168). The other meetings produced statistically insignificant effects ranging between -0.20 and 0.36 standard deviations.

Column (6) presents the index combining outcomes from Columns (1) through (4), following the procedure proposed by Anderson (2008).[4] The index reveals that the intervention led to statistically significant attitudinal shifts after the second and third meetings (0.34 and 0.32 standard deviations, respectively significant at the 1% and 5% levels). The first and fourth meetings produced smaller and statistically insignificant changes (0.15 and 0.16 standard deviations, respectively).

Overall, these results suggest that the effectiveness of the community meetings on locals depended on the former's thematic content. Meetings explicitly addressing prejudice between groups and challenging ideological justifications for violence produced the strongest and most robust changes in attitudes toward insurgents and religious tolerance. Conversely, general narrative exchanges about neighborhood life (as in the first meeting meeting) or discussions about reconciliation and aspirations (fourth meeting) generated comparatively weaker and less consistent effects. Explicit attitudinal measures were generally more responsive to ideological dialogue, whereas implicit attitudes showed a distinct response pattern, reacting strongly only to direct discussions of intergroup prejudice.

[4]The graphical list experiment is excluded from this index due to its different data structure involving within-experiment randomization.

7.3 The effects of community meetings on IDPs

Figure 10 presents the estimated effects of the four community meetings on IDPs. As with locals, each estimate reflects the treatment effect measured immediately after a meeting. P-values adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing are presented inside the squared brackets (the full results are presented in Table 4). [5]



Figure 10: Main results on IDPs.

As shown in Column (1), the community meetings did not significantly influence religious tolerance among IDPs. The effects are small in magnitude, ranging from -0.04 (after the fourth meeting) to 0.072 (second meeting), with none statistically significant at any common level.

Regarding preference for reconciliation with insurgents who repent (Column 2), IDPs also exhibited no statistically significant shifts across all four meetings, with the largest positive coefficient emerging after the first meeting (0.16 standard deviations), and the smallest after the third meeting (0.059 standard deviations).

Column (3) displays the treatment effects on survey-based attitudes toward insurgents. Similar

[5] The analysis is based on a panel of 3,021 observations, with approximately 580–625 IDP respondents surveyed per wave. Slight variation in sample size across outcomes reflects item-level non-response, particularly for the graphical list experiment (Column (5)), which includes 2,885 observations. The estimation strategy includes individual fixed effects, survey wave fixed effects, and controls for cohort and neighborhood characteristics.

to previous outcomes, results remain statistically insignificant across all meetings. Point estimates range narrowly between -0.012 (third meeting) and 0.087 (first meeting).

The IAT results in Column (4) indicate positive treatment effects after the first meeting (0.19 standard deviations, significant at the 5% level), suggesting a reduced implicit preference for insurgents relative to government authorities. This effect remains stable after the second meeting (0.18 standard deviations) but it become less precise (significant at the 10% level). The effects measured after the third and fourth meetings yield statistically insignificant estimates, ranging from 0.013 to 0.22 standard deviations (respectively following the third and fourth meetings).

The graphical list experiment in Column (5) shows no significant shifts for IDPs across any of the meetings. Estimates remain small and statistically insignificant, ranging from -0.47 (fourth meeting) to 0.091 (first meeting).

Column (6), shows the effects using as dependent variable an aggregate index that combines outcomes (1)-(4), using the method proposed by Anderson (2008). The results show small but statistically significant positive effects from the first (0.22 standard deviations, significant at the 5% level), second (0.22 standard deviations, significant at the 10% level), and fourth meetings (0.25 standard deviations, significant at the 5% level). This suggests that while individual outcome measures show limited statistical significance, cumulatively, the community meetings generated positive attitudinal shifts among IDPs, which remained fairly stable in magnitude size.

Overall, the community meetings had limited individual-level effects on outcomes such as religious tolerance, reconciliation preferences, or survey-based attitudes toward insurgents among IDPs. However, the aggregated index across these outcomes reveals consistent and statistically significant positive shifts, suggesting that while each individual outcome alone shows limited responsiveness, cumulatively, the dialogues had a meaningful impact. Importantly, the IAT results highlight that these meetings were particularly effective in reducing implicit preferences toward insurgents relative to government authorities, especially following the initial sessions.

7.4 Heterogeneous Effects

7.4.1 IDPs' Prior Exposure to the Insurgency

This section explores whether the effects of the community meetings on IDPs vary according to their prior exposure to the insurgency. I split the sample of IDPs into two subgroups: those without prior exposure to the insurgency, as measured by personally knowing someone directly affected by the insurgency (Panel A); and those with such exposure (Panel B).



Figure 11: Heterogeneous effects: IDPs without prior exposure to the insurgency.

The results on IDPs without prior exposure to the insurgency are displayed in Figure 11. Among IDPs who did not report prior exposure to the insurgency, the effects of the meetings generally displayed limited magnitude and statistical significance. The only statistically significant impact is observed after Meeting 2 – after which support for reconciliation with insurgents increases by 0.33 standard deviations, and produced a positive effect on implicit attitudes measured through the IAT (0.19 standard deviations), with both effects significant at the 10% level. These changes are reflected in the aggregate index (Column (6)), which shows a significant overall increase of 0.27 standard deviations following Meeting 2. No significant changes were detected for religious tolerance (Column (1)) or explicit attitudes toward insurgents (Column (3)). This sug-

gests that for IDPs without direct exposure to violence, discussions on prejudice and stereotypes (Meeting 2) were relatively more effective, while dialogues focused on ideology, reconciliation or future aspirations (Meetings 3 and 4) did not lead to measurable shifts in attitudes.

Figure 12 displays the effects of the community meetings on IDPs with prior exposure to the insurgency. These IDPs showed more consistent and precise responses across several meetings and outcomes. Meeting 1, which emphasized personal narratives and everyday life before displacement, produced statistically significant effects on reconciliation preferences (0.32 standard deviations) and implicit attitudes (0.28 standard deviations), as well as a significant increase in the aggregate index (0.35 standard deviations, significant at the 10% level).



Figure 12: Heterogeneous effects: IDPs with prior exposure to the insurgency.

Meeting 3 also generated positive and significant effects on reconciliation preferences and the aggregate index (0.28 and 0.22 standard deviations, respectively), while Meeting 4 had similar effects (0.23 and 0.32 SD). Meeting 2, which has shown to be effective among non-exposed IDPs, produced weaker and insignificant effects among those IDPs previously exposed to the insurgency. These results suggest that the psychological needs and social predispositions of IDPs may differ markedly by their exposure to the conflict. While those without direct exposure responded more to prejudice- and norm-based messages (Meeting 2), IDPs who experienced violence were more

responsive to meetings focused on shared experiences, ideology, reconciliation and aspirations (Meetings 1, 3, and 4).

Overall, conflict exposure appears to moderate the types of messages and themes that are most effective. Meetings that offered space for personal reflection and addressed trauma-related dimensions (such as reconciliation, forgiveness, and meaning-making) proved more impactful for those with direct exposure to violence. In contrast, more normative or prejudice-focused content resonated more with those without such close contact with the insurgency.

7.4.2 Heterogeneous Effects: Locals' baseline exposure to IDPs

To investigate whether the effects of the intervention varied depending on prior experiences with displacement, we compare treatment effects for two subgroups of local participants: those who did not host IDPs at baseline (Panel A) and those who did (Panel B).



Figure 13: Heterogeneous effects: Locals who did not host IDPs at baseline.

Among locals who did not host IDPs at baseline (Figure 13), the intervention was effective across several outcomes. Meeting 2, which addressed prejudice and mutual perceptions, significantly improved religious tolerance (Column (1)), increased the implicit bias against insurgents (Column (4)), and generated a sizeable and statistically significant gain in the aggregate index of

outcomes (presented in Column (6) a 0.6 standard deviations increase, significant at the 5% level). Meetings 3 and 4 also generated positive effects, particularly on the aggregate index in Column (6), suggesting that dialogue on religion and reconciliation with repentant insurgents helped reduce support for violence and improved social attitudes (0.453 standard deviation increase after Meeting 3, significant at the 5% level), even though effects on individual components were not always significant.



Figure 14: Heterogeneous effects: Locals who hosted IDPs at baseline.

Among locals who hosted IDPs at baseline (Figure 14), treatment effects are generally smaller and less consistent across outcomes. For instance, Meeting 2 improves religious tolerance (Column (1)), but the effect on reconciliation is negative and insignificant, and the aggregate impact (Column (6)) shows a small magnitude and it is statistically insignificant (0.173 standard deviations). Meeting 3 is the only session showing a consistently strong effect, particularly on explicit anti-insurgent attitudes captured in the survey (Column (3)), showing a 0.6 standard deviations increase, sginficcant at the 1% level. Similarly, Meeting 3 also yields a statistically significant increase in the aggregate index: 0.288 standard deviations (significant at the 10% level). As the same meeting significantly reduced reconciliation scores (-0.454 standard deviations, significant at 1% level, in Column (2)), there may exist potential trade-offs on how the content was received by

those with deeper exposure to IDPs (and indirectly to the conflict).

Taken together, these results suggest that locals without prior hosting experience were more responsive to the intervention in terms of improving tolerance, reconciliation, and attitudes toward insurgency. Meanwhile, among those who had already hosted IDPs – likely having more entrenched views or fatigue from the burden of hosting – impacts were weaker and, in some cases, even contradictory.

7.4.3 Heterogeneous Effects: Sample restricted to Muslims

In this section, I analyze the impact of the intervention on Muslim participants. This focus is particularly relevant in the context of Cabo Delgado, where insurgents have instrumentalized Islamic identity to recruit and justify violence. Given the religious framing of the conflict, Muslim communities are often caught in the dual situation of being both seen as victims of violence as well as targets of suspicion. Understanding how Muslims respond to peacebuilding interventions is therefore essential to designing effective strategies that promote reconciliation without reinforcing stigma.[6]

The results for Muslim locals (Figure 15) show that the meetings had selective but significant effects. Meeting 2, which focused on prejudice and mutual perceptions, significantly improved implicit attitudes against insurgents as captured by the IAT (Column (4)), which shows a 0.288 standard deviations increase (significant at the 10% level). This meeting also yielded a positive and statistically significant effect on the aggregate index of outcomes (Column (6)): a 0.261 standard deviations increase, also significant at the 10% level.

Meeting 3, which directly addressed themes of Islam, radicalization, and peace, produced the strongest effects. It increased religious tolerance (Column (1)) by 0.2 standard deviations (significant at the 10% level), preferences against insurgents (Column (3)) by 0.5 standard deviations (significant at the 1% level), and improved the aggregate outcome index by 0.301 standard deviations (significant at the 5% level). Interestingly, however, this meeting produced a negative significant effect on reconciliation (Column (2)), which reduced by 0.27 standard deviations (significant at the 5% level). The effects of Meetings 1 and 4 on Muslim locals were smaller and statistically in-

[6]While the data available includes both Muslim and non-Muslim participants, the non-Muslim sample is too small to allow for meaningful disaggregated analysis. As such, I restrict the analysis in this section to include only Muslim participants, who represent 85% of the locals and 73% of the IDPs in the sample.



Figure 15: Sample restricted to Muslim locals.

significant across most outcomes, with point estimates suggesting mild positive trends but limited statistical power to confirm significant changes.



Figure 16: Sample restricted to Muslim IDPs.

For Muslim IDPs (Figure 16), the pattern of effects is different. The meetings generally generated more consistent improvements across outcomes, suggesting that the intervention resonated more with IDPs than with settled locals. Meeting 1 (focused on discussing neighborhood life and the experience of displacement) led to significant improvements in implicit attitudes against insurgents (Column (4)) and the aggregate index (Column (6)), which increased respectively by 0.23 and 0.28 standard deviations (both significant at the 5% level). Similarly, Meeting 2 improved the IAT scores in Column 4, which increased by 0.216 standard deviations (significant at the 5% level) and had a positive effect on the aggregate index of Column 6, which registered an increase of 0.236 standard deviations, significant at the 10% level. These findings suggest that displaced Muslims, who have directly experienced the consequences of insurgent violence, were more responsive to interventions promoting tolerance and social reintegration.

Meeting 4 also produced a statistically significant increase in the aggregate index, which increase by 0.290 standard deviations (significant at the 5% level), although effects on individual components were not significant. In contrast, Meeting 3 – which was most impactful among Muslim locals – did not generate significant effects among Muslim IDPs. This may reflect differences in interpretation: while some may have found reassurance in discussing peace within an Islamic framework, others might have found it redundant or disconnected from their immediate concerns as victims of displacement.

Overall, the results suggest that Muslim participants – both locals and IDPs – responded positively to the intervention, but in distinct ways. Muslim locals were especially responsive to discussions around radicalization (Meeting 3), though with mixed effects on reconciliation. Muslim IDPs, by contrast, showed stronger responses to content addressing displacement (Meeting 1) and prejudice (Meeting 2), reflecting their lived experiences.

7.4.4 Heterogeneous Effects: Baseline social integration of IDPs into host neighborhoods

This section explores how the intervention affected IDPs depending on their initial level of social integration into host neighborhoods. This heterogeneity is theoretically relevant because social integration shapes how individuals perceive and interact with others, including their openness to reconciliation, tolerance, and trust in collective solutions.

The results indicate that the intervention had strong and consistent positive effects among IDPs



Figure 17: IDPs with lower social integration at baseline.

who were less socially integrated at baseline (Figure 17). Meeting 1, focused on neighborhood life and displacement, significantly increased religious tolerance (Column (1)) and improved the aggregate index (Column (6)) respectively by 0.327 and 0.352 standard deviations (both significant at the 10% level). Meeting 2, which targeted prejudice and mutual perceptions, also had a statistically significant impact on reconciliation (Column (2)) and the aggregate index, which increased respectively by 0.277 and 0.365 standard deviations (significant at the 10% level). These results suggest that early sessions that addressed daily coexistence and prejudice were especially effective for those with lower social capital and weaker community ties.

Meeting 4, centered on forgiveness and reconciliation with repentant insurgents, had a particularly strong effect on negative attitudes toward insurgents in the survey module (Column (3)) and the aggregate index, which increased respectively by 0.31 and 0.43 standard deviations (significant at the 5% level). While results for Meeting 3 were more modest and not statistically significant, the overall pattern suggests that IDPs with low social integration benefited across most dimensions, especially from content promoting recognition and inclusion.

IDPs who were already well integrated at baseline (Figure 18) exhibited weaker and less consistent responses to the intervention. Most treatment effects in this subgroup are small and statistically



Figure 18: IDPs with higher social integration at baseline.

insignificant. For instance, Meeting 1 had no impact on religious tolerance or reconciliation and only a marginally significant effect on the IAT in Column (4): a 0.27 standard deviations increase, significant at the 5% level. Meeting 2 also improved IAT scores by 0.305 standard deviations (significant at the 5% level), but did not translate into broader improvements in the aggregate index. Meetings 3 and 4 showed no statistically significant effects across any outcomes.

This muted responsiveness could be due to a ceiling effect – participants with higher baseline integration may have already held more tolerant or reconciliatory views, leaving less room for change. Alternatively, their established networks might have shielded them from the exclusion or distrust the intervention was designed to address, making its content feel less salient or necessary. These findings underscore the importance of targeting interventions to those most in need of social inclusion. IDPs who began the intervention socially isolated responded positively across several dimensions – religious tolerance, reconciliation, and opposition to insurgents – while those already better socially integrated in host communities showed limited gains.

8 Concluding Remarks

This paper shows that intergroup dialogue, when thoughtfully structured and rooted in local religious and cultural norms, can meaningfully shift individual attitudes in the midst of active conflict. In the context of the Islamist insurgency in Cabo Delgado, the sequence of four community meetings joined by IDPs and the local hosts in the city of Pemba led to significant changes, notably among locals. This group increased religious tolerance and reduced sympathy for insurgents. The attitudinal shifts were strongest after meetings that explicitly addressed intergroup prejudice and the ideological underpinnings of the insurgency, which is consistent with the idea that belief change can occur through credible religious messaging and narrative reframing, even without material incentives.

Among IDPs, the results show that individual outcomes were often statistically insignificant, while an aggregate index measure revealed consistent improvements, although smaller than locals' – especially among IDPs with lower levels of social integration or direct exposure to insurgent violence. This suggests that the salience and effectiveness of dialogue depend heavily on lived experience: individuals navigating trauma or social exclusion appeared more receptive to the intervention. Across both groups, the content of the meetings mattered. Sessions on prejudice were more effective for participants with no exposure to the insurgency, while those focused on religion, trauma, and forgiveness had greater impact on individuals with greater exposure to the insurgency.

A central contribution of this study lies in its methodological approach. In a fragile and low-literacy environment, the study combined standard survey questions with two novel tools aimed at measuring support for the insurgency – likely to be underreported. One tool is a graphical list experiment designed to measure sensitive attitudes without direct questioning, and the second is an image-based Implicit Association Test (IAT) tailored to the local context of locals and IDPs in Pemba. The IAT results, in particular, point to the important distinction that while explicit attitudes – such as stated tolerance or support for insurgents – proved responsive to the intervention, implicit biases remained more stable. This highlights the layered structure of beliefs. Changing what people are willing to say or endorse in public is an important step, but deeper cognitive associations may require longer or more intensive engagement.

The findings described in this paper also challenge the common view that counterinsurgency

requires large-scale aid, coercion, or visible state presence. Instead, they show that structured, community-based dialogue – facilitated by trusted community members and anchored in local moral language and culture – can produce meaningful shifts in individual attitudes through non-material, psychosocial channels. In fragile states where legitimacy is contested and state capacity is limited, such interventions offer a low-cost and scalable complement to more traditional resource-intensive counterinsurgency strategies.

This study opens several paths for future research. First, more work is needed to understand whether shifts in attitudes translate into behavioral change – such as civic engagement, cooperation with authorities, or resistance to insurgent recruitment. Second, combining dialogue with other forms of support – material assistance, trauma counseling, or religious mentorship – may amplify its effects, particularly among harder-to-reach groups. Finally, testing this approach in other conflict settings – especially those driven by non-religious ideologies – would help clarify the conditions under which dialogue is most effective.

Taken together, the findings offer cautious optimism. In settings marked by displacement, distrust and violence, dialogue – when grounded in local culture and communities – when can be a powerful counterinsurgency and social-cohesion tool.

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A Output tables of main results

	Religious Tolerance	Reconciliation	Preference Against Insurgents			Aggregate Index
			Survey	IAT	List Experiment	Outcomes (1) to (4)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Meeting 1	0.122	0.081	0.126	-0.080	0.548*	0.150
	(0.114)	(0.123)	(0.136)	(0.120)	(0.314)	(0.123)
Meeting 2	0.288**	0.014	0.177	0.270*	0.204	0.344**
	(0.135)	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.138)	(0.333)	(0.136)
Meeting 3	0.249**	-0.212**	0.499***	0.033	-0.067	0.325***
	(0.116)	(0.106)	(0.139)	(0.121)	(0.287)	(0.112)
Meeting 4	0.164*	0.050	0.148	-0.016	0.360	0.158
	(0.098)	(0.124)	(0.137)	(0.115)	(0.358)	(0.104)
R^2	0.300	0.308	0.233	0.283	0.294	0.272
N (Total)	1994	1994	1994	1994	1898	2005
N (F-UP 1)	409	409	409	409	355	409
N (F-UP 2)	397	397	397	396	383	397
N (F-UP 3)	391	391	391	389	386	391
N (F-UP 4)	385	385	385	392	379	396
Control Mean F-UP 1	-0.051	-0.166	-0.022	0.039	-0.116	-0.131
Control Mean F-UP 2	-0.004	-0.006	0.046	-0.153	-0.359	-0.019
Control Mean F-UP 3	0.090	0.137	-0.093	0.087	-0.056	0.084
Control Mean F-UP 4	0.071	0.225	-0.097	0.070	0.063	0.106
Individual FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey Wave FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Cohort characteristics	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Panel estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at the cohort and survey date levels are presented in parentheses, following the multi-way clustering procedure proposed by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011), Cameron and Shah (2015). All specifications include controls for individual characteristics and neighborhood dummies. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% critical level.

Table 3: Locals' main results, as presented in Figure 9.

	Religious Tolerance	Reconciliation	Preference Against Insurgents			Aggregate Index
			Survey	IAT	List Experiment	Outcomes (1) to (4)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Meeting 1	0.056	0.093	0.087	0.194**	0.091	0.220**
	(0.120)	(0.079)	(0.107)	(0.091)	(0.305)	(0.106)
Meeting 2	0.072	0.162	0.002	0.183*	-0.046	0.216*
	(0.145)	(0.112)	(0.108)	(0.100)	(0.300)	(0.119)
Meeting 3	0.014	0.059	-0.012	0.013	-0.105	0.030
	(0.107)	(0.104)	(0.106)	(0.096)	(0.280)	(0.103)
Meeting 4	-0.040	0.084	0.137	0.223	-0.047	0.255**
	(0.139)	(0.092)	(0.106)	(0.168)	(0.318)	(0.122)
R^2	0.274	0.259	0.249	0.226	0.290	0.254
N (Total)	3021	3021	3021	3017	2885	3032
N (F-UP 1)	625	625	625	625	558	625
N (F-UP 2)	602	602	602	602	589	602
N (F-UP 3)	586	586	586	582	575	586
N (F-UP 4)	584	584	584	592	555	595
Control Mean F-UP 1	-0.028	-0.110	-0.035	-0.055	-0.113	-0.130
Control Mean F-UP 2	0.108	-0.062	0.071	0.030	-0.195	0.047
Control Mean F-UP 3	0.244	-0.039	0.020	0.010	0.009	0.059
Control Mean F-UP 4	0.033	0.123	-0.186	-0.067	0.140	-0.123
Individual FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey Wave FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Cohort characteristics	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Panel estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at the cohort and survey date levels are presented in parentheses, following the multi-way clustering procedure proposed by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011), Cameron and Shah (2015). All specifications include controls for individual characteristics and neighborhood dummies. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% critical level.

Table 4: IDPs' main results, as presented in Figure 10.

	Religious Tolerance	Reconciliation	Preference Against Insurgents			Aggregate Index
			Survey	IAT	List Experiment	Outcomes (1) to (4)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Meeting 1	0.083	0.087	0.107	0.082	0.313	0.194**
	(0.087)	(0.068)	(0.079)	(0.075)	(0.233)	(0.083)
Meeting 2	0.161	0.097	0.083	0.218**	0.079	0.272***
	(0.102)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.084)	(0.235)	(0.096)
Meeting 3	0.104	-0.057	0.194**	0.016	-0.087	0.139
	(0.094)	(0.075)	(0.078)	(0.070)	(0.209)	(0.086)
Meeting 4	0.045	0.072	0.148*	0.125	0.132	0.223***
	(0.092)	(0.070)	(0.074)	(0.106)	(0.211)	(0.083)
R^2	0.274	0.269	0.232	0.226	0.277	0.249
N (Total)	5020	5020	5020	5014	4787	5042
N (F-UP 1)	1035	1035	1035	1035	913	1035
N (F-UP 2)	999	999	999	998	972	999
N (F-UP 3)	978	978	978	971	962	978
N (F-UP 4)	970	970	970	984	935	992
Control Mean F-UP 1	-0.036	-0.130	-0.031	-0.018	-0.114	-0.129
Control Mean F-UP 2	0.064	-0.040	0.061	-0.042	-0.258	0.021
Control Mean F-UP 3	0.182	0.032	-0.025	0.041	-0.017	0.069
Control Mean F-UP 4	0.048	0.164	-0.151	-0.013	0.109	-0.032
Individual FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey Wave FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Cohort characteristics	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Panel estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at the cohort and survey date levels are presented in parentheses, following the multi-way clustering procedure proposed by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011), Cameron and Shah (2015). All specifications include controls for individual characteristics and neighborhood dummies. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% critical level.

Table 5: all' main results, as presented in Figure 19.

	Religious Tolerance	Reconciliation	Preference Against Insurgents			Aggregate Index
			Survey	IAT	List Experiment	Outcomes (1) to (4)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A. IDPs without prior exposure to the insurgency						
Meeting 1	0.049	-0.098	0.107	0.115	0.114	0.074
	(0.150)	(0.146)	(0.129)	(0.090)	(0.385)	(0.121)
Meeting 2	0.052	0.331*	-0.071	0.191*	-0.033	0.272**
	(0.155)	(0.168)	(0.132)	(0.106)	(0.359)	(0.129)
Meeting 3	0.134	-0.115	-0.022	-0.075	0.052	-0.103
	(0.127)	(0.167)	(0.140)	(0.128)	(0.381)	(0.136)
Meeting 4	0.036	0.002	0.134	0.213	0.303	0.207
	(0.164)	(0.145)	(0.125)	(0.282)	(0.415)	(0.134)
R^2	0.289	0.256	0.246	0.243	0.313	0.249
N (Total)	1670	1670	1670	1666	1590	1677
N (F-UP 1)	344	344	344	344	303	344
N (F-UP 2)	335	335	335	335	331	335
N (F-UP 3)	323	323	323	321	320	323
N (F-UP 4)	323	323	323	328	307	330
Control Mean F-UP 1	0.024	-0.092	-0.049	-0.030	-0.097	-0.109
Control Mean F-UP 2	0.118	-0.171	0.076	0.052	-0.194	-0.009
Control Mean F-UP 3	0.255	0.032	0.056	-0.018	-0.020	0.142
Control Mean F-UP 4	0.059	0.129	-0.185	-0.084	0.177	-0.104
Individual FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey Wave FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Cohort characteristics	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Panel B. IDPs with prior exposure to the insurgency						
Meeting 1	-0.010	0.315**	0.037	0.284**	0.083	0.345*
	(0.176)	(0.149)	(0.186)	(0.140)	(0.486)	(0.182)
Meeting 2	0.046	-0.082	0.103	0.284*	0.120	0.146
	(0.195)	(0.172)	(0.200)	(0.161)	(0.508)	(0.190)
Meeting 3	-0.119	0.281*	0.011	0.162	-0.121	0.221*
	(0.189)	(0.153)	(0.201)	(0.128)	(0.433)	(0.133)
Meeting 4	-0.200	0.228*	0.138	0.237	-0.472	0.315*
	(0.214)	(0.125)	(0.190)	(0.166)	(0.476)	(0.185)
R^2	0.289	0.304	0.285	0.217	0.301	0.298
N (Total)	1340	1340	1340	1340	1285	1344
N (F-UP 1)	278	278	278	278	252	278
N (F-UP 2)	265	265	265	265	257	265
N (F-UP 3)	260	260	260	258	252	260
N (F-UP 4)	259	259	259	262	246	263
Control Mean F-UP 1	-0.079	-0.136	-0.023	-0.088	-0.123	-0.159
Control Mean F-UP 2	0.113	0.056	0.070	-0.071	-0.197	0.092
Control Mean F-UP 3	0.225	-0.120	-0.027	0.045	0.030	-0.043
Control Mean F-UP 4	0.006	0.108	-0.196	-0.048	0.099	-0.157
Individual FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey Wave FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Cohort characteristics	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Panel estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at the cohort and survey date levels are presented in parentheses, following the multi-way clustering procedure proposed by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011), Cameron and Shah (2015). All specifications include controls for individual characteristics and neighborhood dummies. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% critical level.

Table 6: Heterogeneous results of IDPs according to their baseline exposure to the insurgency, as presented in Figure 10.

	Religious Tolerance	Reconciliation	Preference Against Insurgents			Aggregate Index Outcomes (1) to (4)
			Survey	IAT	List Experiment	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A. Locals who did not host IDPs at baseline						
Meeting 1	0.104	0.241	0.155	-0.015	0.584	0.335*
	(0.180)	(0.213)	(0.194)	(0.144)	(0.464)	(0.186)
Meeting 2	0.344*	0.215	0.206	0.392**	-0.019	0.604**
	(0.192)	(0.203)	(0.208)	(0.185)	(0.478)	(0.229)
Meeting 3	0.287	0.085	0.323	0.068	-0.299	0.453**
	(0.177)	(0.170)	(0.225)	(0.141)	(0.439)	(0.184)
Meeting 4	0.241	0.373**	0.027	0.069	-0.423	0.366*
	(0.171)	(0.175)	(0.234)	(0.149)	(0.469)	(0.206)
R^2	0.345	0.326	0.251	0.589	0.311	0.340
N (Total)	916	916	916	920	874	924
N (F-UP 1)	188	188	188	188	163	188
N (F-UP 2)	185	185	185	184	177	185
N (F-UP 3)	179	179	179	178	177	179
N (F-UP 4)	174	174	174	181	171	182
Control Mean F-UP 1	-0.072	-0.074	-0.284	0.030	0.003	-0.288
Control Mean F-UP 2	-0.055	0.015	-0.037	-0.156	-0.299	-0.092
Control Mean F-UP 3	0.047	0.290	-0.248	0.285	-0.135	0.124
Control Mean F-UP 4	0.108	0.033	0.102	0.063	-0.122	0.130
Individual FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey Wave FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Cohort characteristics	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Panel B. Locals who hosted IDPs at baseline						
Meeting 1	0.156	-0.040	0.088	-0.095	0.601	0.020
	(0.166)	(0.203)	(0.170)	(0.174)	(0.541)	(0.203)
Meeting 2	0.327*	-0.195	0.184	0.208	0.571	0.173
	(0.171)	(0.186)	(0.219)	(0.166)	(0.501)	(0.195)
Meeting 3	0.262	-0.454***	0.661***	0.087	0.099	0.288*
	(0.205)	(0.156)	(0.151)	(0.172)	(0.521)	(0.171)
Meeting 4	0.090	-0.292	0.308**	-0.081	0.917	-0.020
	(0.154)	(0.200)	(0.150)	(0.160)	(0.599)	(0.182)
R^2	0.309	0.335	0.267	0.244	0.334	0.265
N (Total)	1078	1078	1078	1074	1024	1081
N (F-UP 1)	221	221	221	221	192	221
N (F-UP 2)	212	212	212	212	206	212
N (F-UP 3)	212	212	212	211	209	212
N (F-UP 4)	211	211	211	211	208	214
Control Mean F-UP 1	-0.033	-0.244	0.200	0.046	-0.214	0.002
Control Mean F-UP 2	0.043	-0.024	0.121	-0.151	-0.412	0.046
Control Mean F-UP 3	0.126	0.009	0.037	-0.081	0.010	0.051
Control Mean F-UP 4	0.039	0.390	-0.268	0.077	0.227	0.086
Individual FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey Wave FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Cohort characteristics	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Panel estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at the cohort and survey date levels are presented in parentheses, following the multi-way clustering procedure proposed by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011), Cameron and Shah (2015). All specifications include controls for individual characteristics and neighborhood dummies. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% critical level.

Table 7: Heterogeneous results of locals according to whether they hosted IDPs at baseline, as presented in Figures **??** *and 13.*

	Religious Tolerance	Reconciliation	Preference Against Insurgents			Aggregate Index
			Survey	IAT	List Experiment	Outcomes (1) to (4)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A. Locals						
Meeting 1	0.071	0.129	-0.018	-0.030	0.336	0.059
	(0.129)	(0.130)	(0.153)	(0.139)	(0.347)	(0.129)
Meeting 2	0.246	-0.029	0.140	0.288*	0.181	0.261*
	(0.153)	(0.155)	(0.143)	(0.145)	(0.355)	(0.138)
Meeting 3	0.225*	-0.271**	0.512***	0.092	-0.169	0.301**
	(0.133)	(0.124)	(0.162)	(0.137)	(0.324)	(0.131)
Meeting 4	0.128	-0.001	0.180	0.060	0.291	0.152
	(0.108)	(0.126)	(0.145)	(0.135)	(0.391)	(0.122)
R^2	0.302	0.317	0.237	0.238	0.293	0.279
N (Total)	1684	1684	1684	1683	1600	1694
N (F-UP 1)	345	345	345	345	295	345
N (F-UP 2)	336	336	336	335	324	336
N (F-UP 3)	331	331	331	329	327	331
N (F-UP 4)	324	324	324	330	319	334
Control Mean F-UP 1	-0.064	-0.243	0.009	0.030	-0.134	-0.167
Control Mean F-UP 2	-0.025	0.007	0.014	-0.176	-0.397	-0.049
Control Mean F-UP 3	0.055	0.153	-0.136	-0.027	-0.057	0.010
Control Mean F-UP 4	0.089	0.235	-0.103	0.028	0.018	0.098
Individual FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey Wave FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Cohort characteristics	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Panel B. IDPs						
Meeting 1	0.107	0.141	0.077	0.233**	0.307	0.281**
	(0.147)	(0.097)	(0.119)	(0.113)	(0.373)	(0.115)
Meeting 2	0.198	0.123	-0.006	0.216**	0.186	0.236*
	(0.166)	(0.132)	(0.138)	(0.107)	(0.376)	(0.134)
Meeting 3	0.082	0.182	-0.045	0.051	0.003	0.134
	(0.134)	(0.115)	(0.133)	(0.107)	(0.309)	(0.117)
Meeting 4	-0.122	0.173	0.124	0.266	0.013	0.290**
	(0.166)	(0.112)	(0.145)	(0.179)	(0.358)	(0.143)
R^2	0.269	0.259	0.253	0.236	0.297	0.258
N (Total)	2212	2212	2212	2209	2100	2219
N (F-UP 1)	457	457	457	457	398	457
N (F-UP 2)	441	441	441	441	430	441
N (F-UP 3)	426	426	426	423	417	426
N (F-UP 4)	432	432	432	438	412	439
Control Mean F-UP 1	-0.058	-0.121	-0.011	-0.069	-0.091	-0.138
Control Mean F-UP 2	0.038	-0.044	0.094	0.039	-0.198	0.065
Control Mean F-UP 3	0.213	-0.111	0.011	0.015	0.035	-0.018
Control Mean F-UP 4	0.009	0.040	-0.176	-0.146	0.126	-0.201
Individual FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey Wave FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Cohort characteristics	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Panel estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at the cohort and survey date levels are presented in parentheses, following the multi-way clustering procedure proposed by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011), Cameron and Shah (2015). All specifications include controls for individual characteristics and neighborhood dummies. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% critical level.

Table 8: The effects of community meetings on the Muslim subsample (locals and IDPs), as presented in Figures 15 and 16.

	Religious Tolerance	Reconciliation	Preference Against Insurgents			Aggregate Index
			Survey	IAT	List Experiment	Outcomes (1) to (4)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A. IDPs with low baseline social integration						
Meeting 1	0.327*	0.153	0.097	0.137	-0.310	0.352*
	(0.169)	(0.117)	(0.149)	(0.127)	(0.412)	(0.177)
Meeting 2	0.280	0.277*	0.016	0.044	0.068	0.365*
	(0.177)	(0.144)	(0.168)	(0.173)	(0.435)	(0.186)
Meeting 3	0.177	0.143	-0.123	0.094	-0.401	0.090
	(0.147)	(0.144)	(0.170)	(0.097)	(0.332)	(0.161)
Meeting 4	0.114	0.096	0.308**	0.175	-0.196	0.434**
	(0.184)	(0.149)	(0.143)	(0.243)	(0.391)	(0.200)
R^2	0.303	0.255	0.265	0.246	0.320	0.272
N (Total)	1517	1517	1517	1515	1448	1521
N (F-UP 1)	313	313	313	313	274	313
N (F-UP 2)	302	302	302	302	297	302
N (F-UP 3)	292	292	292	292	289	292
N (F-UP 4)	296	296	296	299	282	300
Control Mean F-UP 1	-0.051	-0.174	0.027	-0.015	-0.047	-0.114
Control Mean F-UP 2	0.069	-0.133	0.016	0.118	-0.210	-0.046
Control Mean F-UP 3	0.238	-0.032	0.096	0.020	-0.097	0.125
Control Mean F-UP 4	-0.004	0.102	-0.254	-0.063	0.069	-0.186
Individual FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey Wave FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Cohort characteristics	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Panel B. IDPs with high baseline social integration						
Meeting 1	-0.191	-0.001	0.092	0.272**	0.596	0.089
	(0.188)	(0.122)	(0.142)	(0.117)	(0.438)	(0.139)
Meeting 2	-0.099	-0.037	0.017	0.305**	0.039	0.021
	(0.209)	(0.156)	(0.167)	(0.119)	(0.439)	(0.151)
Meeting 3	-0.116	-0.076	0.119	-0.074	0.168	-0.050
	(0.165)	(0.155)	(0.168)	(0.131)	(0.439)	(0.139)
Meeting 4	-0.145	0.027	-0.020	0.269	0.214	0.064
	(0.188)	(0.158)	(0.174)	(0.225)	(0.451)	(0.175)
R^2	0.270	0.296	0.252	0.223	0.320	0.262
N (Total)	1504	1504	1504	1502	1437	1511
N (F-UP 1)	312	312	312	312	284	312
N (F-UP 2)	300	300	300	300	292	300
N (F-UP 3)	294	294	294	290	286	294
N (F-UP 4)	288	288	288	293	273	295
Control Mean F-UP 1	-0.006	-0.047	-0.095	-0.094	-0.173	-0.145
Control Mean F-UP 2	0.146	0.007	0.124	-0.056	-0.180	0.139
Control Mean F-UP 3	0.250	-0.045	-0.056	0.000	0.115	-0.008
Control Mean F-UP 4	0.069	0.145	-0.120	-0.072	0.212	-0.063
Individual FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey Wave FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Cohort characteristics	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Panel estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at the cohort and survey date levels are presented in parentheses, following the multi-way clustering procedure proposed by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011), Cameron and Shah (2015). All specifications include controls for individual characteristics and neighborhood dummies. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% critical level.

Table 9: Heterogeneous effects on IDPs, according to their low or high baseline level of social integration in host neighborhoods, as presented in Figures 17 and 18.

B Sample Attrition

C Additional analyses

C.1 Pooled Results: Locals and IDPs

Figure 19 presents the treatment effects of the four community meetings, pooling both locals and IDPs. Adjusted p-values accounting for multiple hypothesis testing are reported within squared brackets.



Figure 19: Pooled results: locals and IDPs.

Column (1) reveals that community meetings did not significantly alter religious tolerance when both groups are pooled. Estimates range from 0.045 (fourth meeting) to 0.16 standard deviations (second meeting), statistically insignificant at any common level.

In Column (2), preferences regarding reconciliation with insurgents also show null results, with effects fluctuating modestly between -0.057 (third meeting) and 0.097 (first meeting), none statistically significant. This aligns with separate results for both locals and IDPs, indicating that reconciliation remains an attitude displaying less reaction to the intervention.

Column (3), reporting explicit survey-based attitudes against insurgents, shows statistically

significant positive effects after the third meeting (0.19 standard deviations, significant at the 5% level). This result is consistent with previous findings on locals, which highlighted the effectiveness of ideologically explicit dialogue in reshaping explicit attitudes. The smaller coefficient size compared to locals' (0.5 standard deviations, after the third meeting) suggests that the effect is being driven by this group.

Column (4) displays results from the IAT, indicating significant reductions in implicit preference for insurgents after the third meeting (0.22 standard deviations, significant at the 1% level). This result seems to be driven by both locals and IDPs, as each group individuals showed a significant decrease in implicit preference for insurgents following the second meeting (as presented in Figures 9 and 10).

The graphical list experiment in Column (5) shows no statistically significant shifts for any of the meetings, with estimates varying narrowly and remaining insignificant, echoing previous individual-group findings.

Finally, Column (6) presents an aggregate index combining outcomes from Columns (1)-(4). The results reveal statistically significant cumulative positive attitudinal shifts following the first (0.19 standard deviations, significant at the 5% level), second (0.27 standard deviations, significant at the 1% level), and fourth meetings (0.22 standard deviations, significant at the 1% level). This comprehensive measure suggests that while isolated outcomes exhibit mixed responsiveness, the overall effect of the community meetings consistently produced significant positive attitudinal changes across both locals and IDPs.

Taken together, the pooled analysis highlights that explicitly addressing ideological narratives (third meeting) is particularly effective in shaping explicit and implicit attitudes towards insurgents. Meanwhile, cumulative indices illustrate meaningful, lasting changes across multiple attitudinal dimensions, reinforcing the value of structured, repeated community dialogues as a counterinsurgency policy.

Overall, these findings indicate that structured community dialogues significantly shape attitudes toward insurgents and religious tolerance, though the effectiveness varies considerably between locals and IDPs. Explicit discussions directly challenging ideological justifications for violence notably reduced explicit and implicit support for insurgents, primarily among locals. Meanwhile, IDPs exhibited smaller and less consistent shifts at the individual outcome level, yet

cumulatively experienced meaningful attitudinal changes, particularly reflected in reduced implicit preferences for insurgents. The pooled results reinforce that ideologically explicit content has the strongest impact, while repeated dialogue sessions collectively generate robust and lasting attitudinal shifts across groups, underscoring their potential as effective community-based counterinsurgency interventions.

D Protocol of Community Meetings

Community meetings protocol

in the next page

BROWN

Script

FIRST COMMUNITY MEETING

Version: March 21, 2023

Duration: 3 hours.

Desired number of participants: 13 people (7 displaced and 6 natural).

DEVELOPMENT OF THE MEETING

[Chronological Order]

1. Moderator's initial message [duration: 5 minutes]

a) MODERATOR: Start by welcoming participants. Let them know that the meeting is intended to give participants the opportunity to develop a **open and constructive dialogue between all parties involved, in order to improve coexistence in the neighborhood where they live.**

b) MODERATOR: detail your role, the duration of the meeting (3 hours), and other practical information (for example, that the light meal can be provided later, at a time to be defined by the moderator or by all participants). The objective is for the moderator to be able to manage, from the beginning of the meeting, the expectations of the participants.

2. Definition of rules of coexistence [duration: 5 minutes]

a) MODERATOR: inform participants about the rules of coexistence and participation that must be followed by everyone during the meeting (for example, only speak after putting your hand in the air, do not interrupt whoever is speaking, follow the moderator's instructions).
b) MODERATOR: yeah **very important** to inform that in this meeting all participants:
    i) will be **treated equally**
    ii) Do you want all participants **share the same common goal of having an open and inclusive conversation**, about his life in the neighborhood.
    iii) It will be essential that **all participants cooperate throughout the meeting** (not interrupting others, listening with attention and understanding and trying to put yourself in the other person's position).
c) MODERATOR: take advantage of this moment to define in which languages people will communicate during the meeting, taking into account the profile of all participants (natural and displaced), and the extreme importance that all participants understand what is said during the meeting. MODERATOR, it is your responsibility to translate the participants' interventions, if necessary.

3. Introductions and expectations [duration: 18 minutes]

a) MODERATOR: use this moment to give participants the opportunity to introduce themselves and talk a little about themselves:
   i) **Where are they from, age, their occupation, how long ago they arrived in Pemba, etc.**
   ii) **Other details you want to share with the rest of the group**
   iii) **Say what you think will happen during the meeting**.

b) MODERATOR: To set an example, start by introducing yourself.

c) MODERATOR: let each participant speak for approximately 2 minutes. You can start with the person on your left or right and so on. If someone isn't ready to talk when it's their turn, skip to the next person. At the end of the round, give voice again to the person who skipped their turn to speak.

4. Question 1 [duration: 26 minutes]

a) The purpose of this question is to invite participants to connect their perspectives on the relationship between displaced people and natives with their own life experiences.

b) MODERATOR: ask a different question to displaced people and another to natives:
   i) **DISPLACED: Compared to the life you had in your home village, how has your life changed here in Pemba?**
   ii) **NATURALS: how did your life change with the arrival of displaced people here in the neighborhood?**

c) MODERATOR: After reading the questions, **give about 1 minute** participants to think and reflect on what they think. Then, start the participation round and give each person approximately 3 minutes to speak.

d) MODERATOR: If the participant does not yet trust the rest of the group to share their experiences and perspectives, please try to build their trust by creating a welcoming environment for all participants.

5. **Question 2** [duration: 20 minutes]

a) This question aims to address what, for the participants, is the main obstacle to the good integration of displaced people in the neighborhood.

b) MODERATOR: ask:

   i) **For you, what is the main difficulty in integrating displaced people in this neighborhood?**

c) MODERATOR: Let participants think for 1 minute. Then start the participation round by choosing someone to be the first to speak. Give each participant 2 to 3 minutes to speak. Let participants introduce their own topics.

d) MODERATOR: if no one wants to speak first, suggest some topics (for example, differences in customs, hygiene standards, differences in the way of speaking and communicating, etc.).

6. Question 3 [duration: 20 minutes]

a) This question asks participants to reflect on positive things they have received from the other group.

b) MODERATOR: ask the following questions to displaced people and natives of the neighborhood:

i) **For displaced people: can you tell me one positive thing about your life in this neighborhood, in relation to the life you had in your home villages?**

ii) **To the natural people: Can you tell me one positive thing that displaced people have brought to this neighborhood?**

c) MODERATOR: Give each person about 2 minutes to speak. Insist if no one says anything. There are always positive things that can be said.

6. **Question 4** [duration: 20 minutes]

a) <u>This question will be directed to participants who are displaced</u>.

b) MODERATOR: ask the displaced:

i) **Can you share with us a little of your story? In other words, what led you to leave your home village and come to Pemba and what was that trip like? What you saw and experienced, can you share a little with us?**

c) MODERATOR: give each displaced person a maximum of 4 minutes to speak. let all displaced people speak first. Then, let local participants ask questions of the displaced.

d) MODERATOR: It is very important to ensure that the privacy and well-being of displaced people is respected, because these topics are sensitive and difficult for displaced people to talk about.

7. **Question 5** [duration: 26 minutes]
   a) MODERATOR: This will be a question defined by **YOU,** and based on what you heard during the meeting. Try to identify the most relevant idea to be addressed, with the purpose of promoting the integration of displaced people and natives. This question may differ from meeting to meeting and from neighborhood to neighborhood. **Moderator: It depends on your own judgment to decide what is the best question to ask at this time.**

8. Open conversation [duration: 30 minutes]
   a) At this stage, participants have already shared their experiences and perspectives, guided by you MODERATOR. The trust of the various meeting participants in both you MODERATOR and the other participants must also have improved.
   b) Now, it's time to open the dialogue to a more natural and less structured format. Introduce a question or topic that prompts

dialogue, and then let the conversation flow freely. **Intervene only when strictly necessary.**

c) Some suggestions on how to start the dialogue. MODERATOR: Start by asking all participants:

   i) **So far, have you heard anything that has led you to think in a new and different way? What was that? <u>OR</u>**

   ii) **Is there anything you would like to add to something that has already been said? <u>OR</u>**

   iii) **Did you hear something that differed from your opinion and disturbed you in some way?**

9. Last words [duration: 10 minutes]

a) MODERATOR: Invite participants to say something they haven't had the opportunity to say yet, but would like to share before the meeting ends.

b) MODERATOR: **STRONGLY encourage** people exchange telephone contacts with each other, so that they can build personal relationships from this meeting.

c) INFORM PARTICIPANTS THAT THEY WILL BE INVITED TO A NEW COMMUNITY MEETING IN APPROXIMATELY 2 MONTHS FROM NOW.

d) MODERATOR: say a few words that summarize the meeting and say goodbye to the participants.

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END OF MEETING

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Script

SECOND COMMUNITY MEETING

Version: June 30, 2023

Duration: 3 hours.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE MEETING

[Chronological Order]

1. Moderator's initial message [duration: 5 minutes]

a) MODERATOR: Start by welcoming participants. Let them know that the meeting is intended to give participants the opportunity to develop a **open and constructive dialogue between all parties involved, in order to improve coexistence in the neighborhood where they live.**

b) MODERATOR: remind us of your role, the duration of the meeting (3 hours), and other practical information (for example, that a light meal can be provided later, at a time to be defined by the moderator or by all participants).

BROWN

2. Definition of rules of coexistence [duration: 5 minutes]

a) MODERATOR: Remember the rules of coexistence that you had already mentioned in the first meeting.

b) MODERATOR: yeah **very important** to inform that in this meeting all participants:

   i) will be **treated equally**

   ii) Do you want all participants **share the same common goal of having an open and inclusive conversation**, about his life in the neighborhood.

   iii) It will be essential that **all participants cooperate throughout the meeting** (not interrupting others, listening with attention and understanding and trying to put yourself in the other person's position).

c) MODERATOR: take advantage of this moment to define in which languages people will communicate during the meeting, taking into account the profile of all participants (natural and displaced), and the extreme importance that all participants understand what is said during the meeting. MODERATOR, it is your responsibility to translate the participants' interventions, if necessary.

BROWN

3. Introductions and expectations [duration: 18 minutes]

a) MODERATOR: detail the topic of today's meeting:

   i) **Prejudice towards those displaced by the conflict who live in this neighborhood and those born in this neighborhood.**

b) use this moment to give participants the opportunity to share some news about themselves

   i) **Has anything changed in your lives since the last meeting?**

   ii) **Do you have any news to share with the rest of the group?**

   iii) **How have you been feeling?**

c) MODERATOR: To set an example, start by giving updates about yourself. For example something light, fun.

d) MODERATOR: let each participant speak for approximately 2 minutes. You can start with the person on your left or right and so on. If someone isn't ready to talk when it's their turn, skip to the next person. At the end of the round, give voice again to the person who skipped their turn to speak.

BROWN

PREJUDICE EXERCISE

The objective of this exercise is for participants to reflect on how they think they are seen by people in the other group (natural or displaced).

4. Prejudices that hurt and sadden [duration: 26 minutes]

a) MODERADOR: ask a different question to displaced people and another to natives:
   i) **DISPLACED: Talk a little about the prejudice you feel that local people apply to displaced people, in front of you or behind your back, and which you consider to be THE MOST OFFENSIVE.**
   ii) **NATURAL: Tell us a little about a prejudice that you feel that displaced people apply to natural people, in front of you or behind your back, and that you consider to be THE MOST OFFENSIVE.**

b) MODERATOR: After reading the questions, **GIVE 1 MINUTE** participants to think and reflect on what they think. Then, start the participation round and give each person approximately 3 minutes to speak. Ask participants to elaborate and elaborate on their answers.

c) MODERATOR: If the participant does not yet trust the rest of the group to share their experiences and perspectives, please try to build their trust by creating a welcoming environment for all participants.

5. Prejudices that are wrong [duration: 26 minutes]

d) MODERATOR: ask a different question to displaced people and another to natives:

i) **DISPLACED: What prejudices held by those living in the neighborhood in relation to displaced people are especially WRONG? Can you share with us details about this prejudice and how displaced people are different from this prejudice?**

ii) **NATURALS: What prejudices of the displaced in this neighborhood in relation to the natives are especially WRONG? Can you share with us details about this prejudice and how natural people are different from this prejudice?**

e) MODERATOR: After reading the questions, **GIVE 1 MINUTE** participants to think and reflect on what they think. Then, start the participation round and give each person approximately 3 minutes to speak. Ask participants to elaborate and elaborate on their answers.

f) MODERATOR: If the participant does not yet trust the rest of the group to share their experiences and perspectives, please try to build their trust by creating a welcoming environment for all participants.

6. Prejudices that have a reason [duration: 26 minutes]

g) MODERATOR: say:
   i) **“Some prejudices have some degree of truth, however small.”**

h) MODERATOR: ask a different question to displaced people and another to natives:
   i) **DISPLACED: Which prejudices of the natives of this neighborhood in relation to displaced people have some degree of truth? Can you explain to us?**
   ii) **NATURALS: What prejudices do the displaced people in this neighborhood have in relation to the natives have some degree of truth? Can you explain to us?**

i) MODERATOR: After reading the questions, **GIVE 1 MINUTE** participants to think and reflect on what they think. Then, start the participation round and give each person approximately 3 minutes to speak. Ask participants to elaborate and elaborate on their answers.

j) MODERATOR: If the participant does not yet trust the rest of the group to share their experiences and perspectives, please try to build their trust by creating a welcoming environment for all participants.

8. Open conversation [duration: 45 minutes]

a) At this stage, participants have already shared their experiences and perspectives, guided by you MODERATOR. The trust of the various meeting participants in both you MODERATOR and the other participants must also have improved.

b) Now, it's time to open the dialogue to a more natural and less structured format. Introduce a question or topic that prompts dialogue, and then let the conversation flow freely. **Intervene only when strictly necessary.**

c) Some suggestions on how to start the dialogue. MODERATOR: Start by asking all participants:

   i) **After the exercise we just did, is there anything that makes you think in a new and different way? What was that? OR**

   ii) **Is there anything you would like to add to something that has already been said? OR**

   iii) **Did you hear something that differed from your opinion and disturbed you in some way?**

9. Last words [duration: 10 minutes]

a) MODERATOR: Invite participants to say something they haven't had the opportunity to say yet, but would like to share before the meeting ends.

b) MODERATOR: **STRONGLY encourage** people exchange telephone contacts with each other, so that they can build personal relationships from this meeting.

c) INFORM PARTICIPANTS THAT THEY WILL BE INVITED TO A NEW COMMUNITY MEETING IN APPROXIMATELY 2 MONTHS FROM NOW.

d) MODERATOR: say a few words that summarize the meeting and say goodbye to the participants.

END OF MEETING

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Script

THIRD COMMUNITY MEETING

Version: August 24, 2023

Duration: 3 hours.

Desired number of participants: 14 people (8 displaced people and 6 natives).

Additional materials needed: Quran

DEVELOPMENT OF THE MEETING

[Chronological Order]

1. Moderator's initial message [duration: 5 minutes]

a) MODERATOR: Start by welcoming participants. Let them know that the meeting is intended to give participants the opportunity to develop a **open and constructive dialogue between all parties involved, in order to improve coexistence in the neighborhood where they live.**

b) MODERATOR: remind us of your role, the duration of the meeting (3 hours), and other practical information (for example, that a light meal can be provided later, at a time to be defined by the moderator or by all participants).

2. Definition of rules of coexistence [duration: 5 minutes]

a) MODERATOR: Remember the rules of coexistence that you had already mentioned in the first meeting.

b) MODERATOR: yeah **very important** to inform that in this meeting all participants:

   i) will be **treated equally**

   ii) Do you want all participants **share the same common goal of having an open and inclusive conversation**, about his life in the neighborhood.

   iii) It will be essential that **all participants cooperate throughout the meeting** (not interrupting others, listening with attention and understanding and trying to put yourself in the other person's position).

c) MODERATOR: take advantage of this moment to define in which languages people will communicate during the meeting, taking into account the profile of all participants (natural and displaced), and the extreme importance that all participants understand what is said during the meeting. MODERATOR, it is your responsibility to translate the participants' interventions, if necessary.

3. Introductions and expectations [duration: 18 minutes]

a) MODERATOR: detail the topic of today’s meeting:

i) **Religious tolerance and how religion is a vehicle for peace in the world.**

b) use this moment to give participants the opportunity to share some news about themselves

i) **Has anything changed in your lives since the last meeting?**

ii) **Do you have any news to share with the rest of the group?**

iii) **How have you been feeling?**

c) MODERATOR: To set an example, start by giving updates about yourself.

d) MODERATOR: let each participant speak for approximately 2 minutes. You can start with the person on your left or right and so on. If someone isn't ready to talk when it's their turn, skip to the next person. At the end of the round, give voice again to the person who skipped their turn to speak.

4. **Question 1** [duration: 20 minutes]

a) This question aims to address the issue of violence as a misrepresentation of Islam.

b) MODERATOR: **Start by telling a story to introduce the theme of violence in Islam. Above all, the story must contain a dilemma that makes participants reflect on whether or not violence can be justified in the name of Islam.**

c) MODERATOR: After telling the story, ask:
    i) **In what situations does Islam justify destroying property or physically harming someone?**
d) MODERATOR: Let participants think for 1 minute. Then start the participation round by choosing someone to be the first to speak. Give each participant 2 to 3 minutes to speak. Let participants introduce their own topics.
e) MODERATOR: if no one wants to speak first, suggest some topics (for example, differences in customs, hygiene standards, differences in the way of speaking and communicating, etc.).
f) MODERATOR: **conclude by reading what the Quran says about the justification of violence.**

5. Question 2 [duration: 20 minutes]

a) This question aims to address the topic of radicalization, especially within Islam.
b) MODERATOR: start by saying:
    i) **So far we have said that Islam promotes peace, and that any form of violence in the name of Islam is unjustified.**
c) MODERATOR: Then ask:
    i) **So, what do you think is going through the minds of people who join radical groups and who are dedicated to promoting destruction in the name of religion?**
d) MODERATOR: Give each person about 2 minutes to speak. Insist if no one says anything.

e) MODERATOR: lead the conversation. Avoid responses like “they are possessed” or “crazy.” Try **rationalize** the conversation. The goal is to try **understand what’s really going on in these people’s heads** and that **justifications they find for their behaviors.**

6. Question 3 [duration: 20 minutes]

a) This question aims to address the topic of religious tolerance.

b) MODERATOR: ask

i) Some of you may be Muslims, while others may be Christians or even have another or no religion. To what extent do you think there are religions that are more right than others?

ii) What is your opinion about there being a single religion for everyone? Should people all follow the same religion, or should they be free to choose which religion they want to follow, or not to follow any? Can you detail your opinion?

c) MODERATOR: give each participant a maximum of 4 minutes to speak.

d) MODERATOR: conclude **telling the story of the Prophet about religious tolerance.**

7. Question 4 [duration: 26 minutes]

a) The purpose of this question is to explain how religion, especially Islam, does not prohibit any person from accessing services that can

improve their life – such as **Health** and others **Education.** Especially, access for ladies.

b) MODERATOR: **Start by telling a story that helps put the topic of access to healthcare or education for Muslim women into context. For example, a woman who needs urgent medical treatment would be seen by a male doctor.**

c) MODERATOR: then ask the same question to natives and displaced people:

   i) **Now that you've heard this story, in your opinion, what does religion say about access to healthcare? Especially women.**

d) MODERATOR: After reading the questions, **give about 1 minute** participants to think and reflect on what they think. Then, start the participation round and give each person approximately 3 minutes to speak.

e) MODERATOR: If the participant does not yet trust the rest of the group to share their experiences and perspectives, please try to build their trust by creating a welcoming environment for all participants.

f) MODERATOR: **After all participants have spoken, close the topic by reading what the Quran says exactly about access to health and education.**

8. **Question 5** [duration: 26 minutes]

a) MODERATOR: This will be a question defined by **YOU,** and based on what you heard during the meeting. Try to identify the most relevant idea to be addressed, with the purpose of promoting religious tolerance among participants. This question may differ from meeting to meeting and from neighborhood to neighborhood. **Moderator: It depends on your own judgment to decide what is the best question to ask at this time.**

9. Open conversation [duration: 45 minutes]

a) At this stage, participants have already shared their experiences and perspectives, guided by you MODERATOR. The trust of the various meeting participants in both you MODERATOR and the other participants must also have improved.

b) Now, it's time to open the dialogue to a more natural and less structured format. Introduce a question or topic that prompts dialogue, and then let the conversation flow freely. **Intervene only when strictly necessary.**

c) Some suggestions on how to start the dialogue. MODERATOR: Start by asking all participants:

   i) **After the conversation we just had, is there anything that makes you think in a new and different way? What was that? <u>OR</u>**

   ii) **Is there anything you would like to add to something that has already been said? <u>OR</u>**

iii) **Did you hear something that differed from your opinion and disturbed you in some way?**

10. Last words [duration: 10 minutes]

a) MODERATOR: Invite participants to say something they haven't had the opportunity to say yet, but would like to share before the meeting ends.

b) MODERATOR: **STRONGLY encourage** people exchange telephone contacts with each other, so that they can build personal relationships from this meeting.

c) INFORM PARTICIPANTS THAT THEY WILL BE INVITED TO A NEW COMMUNITY MEETING IN APPROXIMATELY 2 MONTHS FROM NOW.

d) MODERATOR: say a few words that summarize the meeting and say goodbye to the participants.

END OF MEETING

BROWN

Script

FOURTH COMMUNITY MEETING

Version: October 30, 2023

Approximate duration: 3 hours.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE MEETING

[Chronological Order]

1. Moderator's initial message [duration: 5 minutes]

a) MODERATOR: Start by welcoming participants. Let them know that the meeting is intended to give participants the opportunity to develop a **open and constructive dialogue between all parties involved, in order to improve coexistence in the neighborhood where they live.**

b) MODERATOR: remind us of your role, the duration of the meeting (3 hours), and other practical information (for example, that a light meal can be provided later, at a time to be defined by the moderator or by all participants).

2. Definition of rules of coexistence [duration: 5 minutes]

a) MODERATOR: Remember the rules of coexistence that you had already mentioned in the first meeting.
b) MODERATOR: yeah **very important** to inform that in this meeting all participants:
    i) will be **treated equally**
    ii) Do you want all participants **share the same common goal of having an open and inclusive conversation**, about his life in the neighborhood.
    iii) It will be essential that **all participants cooperate throughout the meeting** (not interrupting others, listening with attention and understanding and trying to put yourself in the other person's position).
c) MODERATOR: take advantage of this moment to define in which languages people will communicate during the meeting, taking into account the profile of all participants (natural and displaced), and the extreme importance that all participants understand what is said during the meeting. MODERATOR, it is your responsibility to translate the participants' interventions, if necessary.

3. Introductions and expectations [duration: 18 minutes]

a) MODERATOR: detail the topic of today’s meeting:

i) **Today we're going to talk about forgiveness and reconciliation, and we're going to think about what we want for our future.**

ii) **This will also be our last community meeting, and so we will talk about what we brought to life and how we can continue together in the future.**

b) use this moment to give participants the opportunity to share some news about themselves

i) **Has anything changed in your lives since the last meeting?**

ii) **Do you have any news to share with the rest of the group?**

iii) **How have you been feeling?**

c) **MODERATOR: To set an example, start by giving updates about yourself.**

d) MODERATOR: let each participant speak for approximately 2 minutes. You can start with the person on your left or right and so on. If someone isn't ready to talk when it's their turn, skip to the next person. At the end of the round, give voice again to the person who skipped their turn to speak.

4. Question 1 [duration: 26 minutes]

a) The purpose of this question is to address how reconciliation and forgiveness are important conditions for relaunching our future.

b) MODERATOR: **Start by framing the topic: nowadays there is a lot of debate about whether insurgents who are repentant deserve to be forgiven. Both Islam and Christianity say that we should always forgive those who repent, but doing so is very difficult. Many times we suffer a lot and are not able to forgive.**

c) MODERATOR: then ask the following questions to natives and displaced people:

   i) **What is your opinion on forgiving insurgents who are repentant?**

   ii) **Would you be able to forgive any repentant insurgent? Whether you say yes or no, please explain a little bit why you are giving that answer.**

d) MODERATOR: After reading the questions, **give about 1 minute** participants to think and reflect on what they think. Then, start the participation round and give each person approximately 3 minutes to speak.

e) MODERATOR: If the participant does not yet trust the rest of the group to share their experiences and perspectives, please try to build their trust by creating a welcoming environment for all participants.

5. **Question 2** [duration: 20 minutes]

a) This question aims to think about the future, framing it within the scope **of forgiveness.**

b) MODERATOR: **start by counting: imagine now that you are living here in the neighborhood or in the areas of origin and one day you gain new neighbors…insurgents who are remorseful and who the Government has authorized to return. In your everyday life, you pass each other on the street, meet at the fountain or even at community meetings. I repeat, we are just imagining!**

c) MODERATOR: After telling the story, ask everyone:

   i) **What do you think your life would be like living side by side with repentant insurgents?**

   ii) **When you imagine this situation, under what conditions do you think it would be possible to live peacefully? Or do you think it would be impossible?**

   iii) **What are the reasons for and against reconciling with insurgents who are repentant?**

   iv) MODERATOR: Let participants think for 1 minute. Then start the participation round by choosing someone to be the first to speak. Give each participant 2 to 3 minutes to speak. Let participants introduce their own topics.

d) MODERATOR: if no one wants to speak first, give some examples, or attract those more talkative participants.

7. Question 4 [duration: 20 minutes]

a) This question aims to address the future, specifically **the most definitive presence of displaced people here in Pemba**.

b) MODERATOR: start by introducing the topic: Many of the natives of this neighborhood were not actually born here, having come from the districts at some point in their lives. Just like these natives who settled here in the neighborhood, nowadays there are displaced people who may also prefer to settle here in the neighborhood or Pemba permanently. Imagine that you have children at school, maybe here in Pemba your children have more opportunities than in the districts. Imagine that many displaced people actually have nowhere to go because their villages are not safe or have been destroyed.

c) MODERATOR: Ask natives and displaced persons separately

- **i) NATURALS: How do you imagine life together between natives and displaced people evolving as displaced people begin to settle permanently here in the neighborhood and in Pemba?**
- **ii) DISPLACED: Do you see a positive future in some displaced people permanently settling in Pemba? Do you think it's a legitimate dream?**

d) MODERATOR: give each participant a maximum of 4 minutes to speak.

e) MODERATOR: **do not ask displaced people whether they want to settle permanently in Pemba or not. We do not want to create discord in the group.**

8. **Question 5** [duration: 26 minutes]
   a) MODERATOR: This will be a question defined by **YOU,** and based on what you heard during the meeting. Try to identify the most relevant idea to be addressed within the themes of forgiveness and reconciliation, or the lasting relationship between displaced people and natives here in Pemba. This question may differ from meeting to meeting and from neighborhood to neighborhood. **Moderator: It depends on your own judgment to decide what is the best question to ask at this time.**

9. Open conversation [duration: 45 minutes]
   a) At this stage, participants have already shared their experiences and perspectives, guided by you MODERATOR. The trust of the various meeting participants in both you MODERATOR and the other participants must also have improved.
   b) Now, it's time to open the dialogue to a more natural and less structured format. Introduce a question or topic that prompts dialogue, and then let the conversation flow freely. **Intervene only when strictly necessary.**
   c) Some suggestions on how to start the dialogue. MODERATOR: Start by asking all participants:
      i) **After the exercise we just did, is there anything that makes you think in a new and different way? What was that? <u>OR</u>**

ii) **Is there anything you would like to add to something that has already been said? <u>OR</u>**

iii) **Did you hear something that differed from your opinion and disturbed you in some way?**

10. Continue these conversations in the future:

- **MODERATOR:** start by saying:
  - We are now coming to the end of the community meeting. This is our last meeting, although in 2 months we will still ask you to come back to participate in some more quizzes and activities. However, you have created such a good relationship over the course of these meetings that it would be a shame not to continue talking to each other.
  - **I strongly encourage** that they do not move away from each other. Keep talking and being friends. Exchange phone numbers and addresses and continue seeing each other. Our meetings may end today but our fraternal relationship does not have to end.
  - **Chance determined that you were selected to participate in this project. You are lucky! Don't waste this opportunity.**
  - **MODERATOR:** Offer to help participants build some system for staying in touch (appoint a coordinator who energizes the group, exchange phone numbers, etc.)

11. Last words [duration: 10 minutes]

a) MODERATOR: Invite participants to say something they haven't had the opportunity to say yet, but would like to share before the meeting ends.
b) MODERATOR: **STRONGLY encourage** people exchange telephone contacts with each other, so that they can build personal relationships from this meeting.
c) INFORM PARTICIPANTS THAT THEY WILL BE INVITED TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS AND ACTIVITIES IN 2 MONTHS FROM NOW. THIS WAS THE LAST MEETING.
d) YOU MUST KEEP YOUR PARTICIPANT PASSWORD.
e) MODERATOR: say a few words that summarize the meeting and say goodbye to the participants.

END OF MEETING