Attracting Good People into Public Service: Evidence from a Field Experiment in the Philippines*

Nico Ravanilla†

October 27, 2016

Abstract

This paper evaluates a policy intervention designed to attract good political candidates – competent and honest ones – to public service. Inspired by the idea that schooling can act as a screening mechanism, and that non-monetary status awards can be a cost-effective tool to incentivize individuals, we evaluate whether a leadership training workshop with performance-based awards can screen and incentivize good people to serve in public office. In the context of a randomized field experiment among aspirants for the village youth councils in the Philippines, we find that this policy intervention is effective in terms of attracting individuals with above-median measures of public service motivation, intellectual ability, integrity, and aspiration.

Keywords: political selection, public service motivation, incentives, screening, leadership training workshop, political elite behavior

JEL Code: H11

---

*I am grateful for financial support from Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (JPAL) - Governance Initiative, The Angara Centre for Law and Economics, Rackham Graduate School, Ford School International Policy Center, and MCubed Initiative - University of Michigan. I thank my advisors Anna Grzymala-Busse, Allen Hicken, Arthur Lupia, and Dean Yang for their guidance. I am grateful for the feedback from Don Emerson, Eddy Malesky, Tom Pepinsky, Sarah Sahir-Rosenfield, Paul Schuler, Dan Slater, Meredith Weiss, and all the participants of the Southeast Asia Research Group Meeting 2015. I also benefitted from comments by Claire Adida, Bill Clark, Michael Davidson, Mark Dincecco, Mai Hassan, Nahomi Ichino, Kenneth McElwain, Noah Nathan, Jim Morrow, Iain Osgood, Lior Sheffer, and seminar participants at the University of Michigan, the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting in 2015, and Southern Political Science Association Annual Meeting in 2016. I thank the staff of Innovations for Poverty Action - Philippines (IPA) for their unparalleled field management. This study received ethical approval from the UM-IRB (HUM00074256). Pre-analysis plans for this study are documented at e-gap.org and AEA RCT registry.

†Assistant Professor - University of California San Diego - School of Global Policy & Strategy. E-mail: nravanilla@ucsd.edu.

"The nature of the workings of government depends ultimately on the men who run it. Let there be emphasis on those we elect to office (V.O. Key 1956)."

1 Introduction

Bad politicians – incompetent and dishonest ones – are resident features of governments in developing democracies. Yet among scholars seeking to address the ubiquity of corruption and poor governance, few look to the quality of politicians for answers. Those who do take bad politicians as given, and offer theoretical explanations for their pervasion (Bernheim and Kartik, 2014; Besley and Coate, 1997, 1998; Caselli and Morelli, 2004) or provide empirical evidence for their adverse consequences (Chemin, 2012; Eggers and Hainmueller, 2009; Gehlbach and Sonin, 2010).[1] Some scholars recognize the "need to form a political class that is competent and honest enough to discharge its duties (Besley and Ghatak, 2005; Mansbridge, 2009), but so far, none have sought to evaluate the efficacy of screening and incentivizing able and moral citizens to stand for public office.

Policies that come closest to the notion of attracting good people into public service and are at the frontier of research in modern political economy come in the form of reforms in political institutions (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Pande, 2003), or improvements in wage and remuneration schemes (Ferraz and Finan, 2009; Gagliarducci and Nannicini, 2013) – policies that attract a more qualified pool of elected officials and motivate them to perform better. However, such policies are difficult to implement, especially in developing democracies. Reforms in political institutions face opposition from existing power holders who see their economic or political rents threatened, or create perverse incentives for those who see new ways to increase such rents (Acemoglu, 2010; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). At the same time, pecuniary benefits that attract good politicians also attract bad ones. Without mechanisms that can screen-out bad politicians, incentives might only worsen adverse selection in politics.

Would a policy that screens and incentivizes competent and honest citizens to serve in public office play a catalytic role in improving the quality of the political class? Inspired by the notion

[1] Other scholars, instead, provide empirical evidence of the favorable effects of good politicians (Besley, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2011; Congleton and Zhang, 2013; Dreher, Lamlac and Somogyic, 2009; Jones and Olken, 2005).

of schooling as a screening device (Arrow, 1973; Johnson, 1978; Layard and Psacharopoulos, 1974; Spence, 1973; Taubman and Wales, 1973), and non-monetary status awards as a cost-effective tool to incentivize individuals (Akerlof and Kranton, 2005; Besley and Ghatak, 2005, 2008; Moldovanu, Sela and Shi, 2007), we set out to evaluate whether a leadership training workshop with awards can work to screen and incentivize good people to public office.

Partnering with the Angara Centre for Law and Economics (ACLE), a local nonprofit research organization in the Philippines, and Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA), we implemented such a policy intervention where it had immediate application – among individuals considering running for the *Sangguniang Kabataan* (SK), a governing body comprised of elected village youth leaders in the Philippines. All *barangays* (villages) in the country are mandated by law to establish a SK. The SK has the authority to appropriate 10% of internal revenue allotment for youth programs and it often serves as a jump-off point for a career in politics for many young Filipinos. In recent years, however, SK has been censured by policymakers and civil society for being a breeding ground for corruption.[2]

We implemented the experiment in the Province of Sorsogon, Philippines. Recruitment, baseline survey and workshop interventions occurred in three months leading up to the originally scheduled October 2013 SK Elections. 720 qualified applicants expressed interest and were then invited to attend a pre-workshop session. The pre-workshop session involved exams designed to measure several dimensions of baseline candidate quality: public service motivation (Perry, 1996), intellectual ability based on Wechsler's test of memory for digit span (Wechsler, 1987), personality using the Big Five Inventory (John, 1990), aspiration (Kasser and Ryan, 1996)), and survey-based measure of integrity. 569 applicants attended and completed the pre-workshop session and were then enrolled as study subjects.

We randomly assigned study subjects into three groups: no workshop (C), workshop with unconditional awards (T1), and workshop with performance-based awards (T2). The leadership training workshop had two goals: Provide basic leadership skills and serve as a screening mechanism by which participants can signal quality as they performed in the various workshop tasks. To

[2]See for example this article that appeared in a national newspaper on how, "SK, hope of motherland, but 'breeding ground for political dynasties'."

prevent differential take-up across treatment arms, participants invited to the workshop were not informed of the awards until after the workshop was over. Moreover, unbeknownst to participants, performance in the workshop was monitored, evaluated, and assigned scores. Participants in T1 received the awards regardless of workshop performance. On the other hand, participants in T2 received the awards if their workshop performance scores were above a pre-determined cutoff, which was known only to the Principal Investigator (PI). The awards were a combination of two things: (1) a plaque of merit awarded at the end of the workshop, (2) and our promise to donate a few standard-sized campaign posters should they decide to file an official certificate of candidacy for the SK.

Shortly after the workshop interventions, the Philippine House of Representatives legislated the deferment of the October 2013 SK Elections to October 2016. In lieu of an elected youth council, all barangays were required to form an appointive body of youth leaders called the Task Force on Youth Development, which took on the roles and responsibilities of the youth council in the interim. Hence, we conducted a follow-up survey and collected administrative data to find out if the workshop interventions had any effect on political attitudes and behavior among study subjects, in particular, on whether they were nominated and designated to the interim Task Force, on whether they engaged in village youth programs a year after the workshop interventions, and on their interest in standing in the 2016 SK elections.

Our empirical analysis is governed by a publicly registered pre-analysis plan. Empirical results based on a sample of 559 individuals (so there is 2% end-line attrition) provide evidence for political selection, in which subjects with above (below) median levels of public service motivation (PSM) in both T1 and T2 are more (less) interested in standing in election, more (less) likely to engage in village youth programs, and more (less) likely to be nominated and designated as village youth leaders than their counterparts in C.

It is possible that screening out those with low PSM comes at a cost of losing high aptitude individuals (a concern for many scholars such as **????**)). However, our results also show that those in T2 and are above (below) the median of aptitude score are also more (less) likely to be nominated and designated to the Task Force, are more (less) interested in running for SK elections in the future, and are more (less) likely to participate in village youth programs.

We also find that those in T2 and are above (below) the median of aspiration index, and integrity

index, are more (less) likely to be nominated and designated to the Task Force, are more (less) interested in running for SK elections in the future, and are more (less) likely to participate in village youth programs. We find little evidence for heterogeneity in workshop treatment effects in the dimension of personality.

These results are remarkable given that the only incentive at work was the plaque of merit (since the campaign posters were not handed out given the election deferment), moreover, the nomination and designation of members of the Task Force were held as late as June 2014, several months after the workshop interventions, and the follow-up survey, a year after the workshop interventions. Yet subjects with above– (below–) median measures of candidate quality are more (less) likely to select into politics after attending a leadership training workshop with conditional awards (T2), highlighting its efficacy in motivating able and moral individuals to seek public office while at the same time discouraging candidates who do not meet these criteria.

The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides background on local politics in the Philippines. Section 3 explains the experimental design. Section 4 presents a simple model that frames the empirical exercise and specifies the hypotheses to be tested. Section 5 describes the candidate quality measures. Section 6 presents the results and discussion, and Section 7 concludes.

2 Context

To date, the Philippines is the only country in the world that popularly elects youth representatives. All 42,028 *barangays* (smallest political unit; a village) in the country are mandated by law to establish a *Sangguniang Kabataan* (SK), a governing body comprised of 8 elected youth leaders.

2.1 Brief history

The SK is an offshoot of the *Kabataang Barangay* (Village Youth; KB), which was established in 1975, during the authoritarian rule of President Ferdinand Marcos. In writing, KB was intended to afford the youth opportunity for expression and democratic representation[3], however, in practice, it was an instrument to pacify both in-school and out-of-school youth and to limit the recurrence

[3]Presidential Decree No. 684, April 15, 1975

of student demonstrations against the dictatorship (Wurfel, 1977).

In 1991, KB was formally abolished and replaced by the *Katipunan ng Kabataan* (League of Youth; KK) under Republic Act 7160. KK includes all 15–17 years old, Filipino citizens, who are registered residents of a barangay for at least 6 months. The Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) is its elected governing body. Since 1992, five SK elections have been held nationwide.[4]

In October 2013, the House of Representatives passed a law (Republic Act No. 10632) that defered the SK Elections from October 2013 to February 2015 (and with a subsequent law, to October 2016 while reforms in SK are underway).[5] Shortly after, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) released the Implementing Rules and Regulation of R.A. 10632, which created the Task Force on Youth Development in lieu of the SK in the interim.

The Task Force is composed of a chairperson, and 7 members nominated by the Katipunan ng Kabataan and other youth organizations operating within the barangay. They are designated through a resolution of the Sangguniang Barangay, and have the following qualifications: (1) 15–17 years old at the date of designation as member of the Task Force; (2) of good moral character; (3) a resident of the barangay for at least 6 months before appointment; and (4) should not be related to the officials of the Sangguniang Barangay (Village Council), up to the 4^{th} degree of consanguinity and affinity.

2.2 Powers and privileges of SK

The Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) has several powers. They have the mandate to appropriate 10% of the barangay's Internal Revenue Allotment for youth development programs. The SK Chairman automatically sits on the Barangay Council, and is automatically designated as Chairman of the Committee on Youth and Sports. Barangay level SKs form municipal and city federations, which

[4]Elections were held in 1992, 1996, 2002, 2007, and 2010. The term limit for SK offficials has changed over the years and ranged between 3 and 5 years.

[5]This law had four other provisions: (1) No holdover - all incumbent SK officials shall remain in office until their end of term on November 30, 2013; (2) No appointment - the SK positions shall remain vacant until the elections of a new set of officials; (3) Use of 10% SK fund - until the election of new officers, the Sangguniang Barangay (Village Council) shall use the funds solely for youth development programs; and (4) Implementing Rules and Regulations - COMELEC and the Department of Interior and Local Government shall implement the rules and regulations of the law.

then form provincial federations. Elected presidents of these federations sit on the Municipal and City Councils and Provincial Board, alongside elected Council and Board Members. Local federations then form a national federation, the president of which sits as a Commissioner of the National Youth Commission. The SK also has privileges. As incumbents, SK Officials are exempt from payment of tuition while enrolled in state colleges and public universities nearest their jurisdiction.

2.3 A breeding ground for bad governance?

Allegations of corruption and poor governance beleaguer SK (UNICEF, 2007). Anecdotes of SK's lack of transparency, vote-buying, bribery, corruption and nepotism abound, so much so that former Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the main author of Republic Act 7160 which created the SK, called for SK's abolition.

Instead of abolition, however, lawmakers have decided to defer the 2013 SK Elections to make way for reforms. In his sponsorship speech for the passage of the SK Reform Bill, Senator Bam Aquino noted that, "it is urgent and important that we reform the Sangguniang Kabataan, as a platform for engaging the youth in the grassroots level, and where the youth will be honed to become better and more effective public servants in the future."

3 Experiment

The latest round of SK Elections was originally scheduled in October 28, 2013 so recruitment and the workshop interventions were implemented from August to early October that year. It involved three stages. In the first stage, calls for application were made to the leadership training workshop. Eligible applicants were then invited to attend a pre-workshop session in which the study team took measures of candidate quality (to be described in the next section). Finally, applicants who successfully completed the pre-workshop session were selected at random to be invited to attend the workshop. Invitees were also selected at random to receive either conditional or unconditional awards (more on this below), however, none of them were informed of the awards at the time of invitation. Figure 1 presents the study timeline and intervention flowchart.

[Figure 1 about here.]

3.1 Call for applications for the leadership training workshop

Calls for application to the workshop took place in the months of August and September 2013, in the 8 largest municipalities (out of 15 total) of the Province of Sorsogon, Philippines. Sorsogon Province is located at the southern tip of Luzon island, roughly 12 hours by road from the national capital, Manila. Sorsogon City, with a population of roughly 150,000, is the provincial capital, and is slightly below the median across Philippine municipalities in terms of economic development. With a municipal poverty rate of 35%, it is slightly worse than the median (the 45th percentile, to be exact) poverty rate among Philippine municipalities.[6]

In each of the 8 municipalities, the team visited barangays that are approximately 3 kilometers away from the main highway and handed out posters and invitation letters to schools and offices of barangay officials, to capture as many applicants as possible.

The calls for application is for an all-expense-paid, three-day workshop entitled, "Foundational Training for Aspiring Young Politicians." Posters and letters of invitation provided a general description of the workshop, application guidelines, as well as directions on how to submit applications (see sample poster in Figure 23 in the Appendix).

Applicants were required to be 15–17 years old, Filipino citizen, residing in the Province of Sorsogon, and a registered member or plan to register as member of the *Katipunan ng Kabataan* (League of Youth). These are the same eligibility requirements to stand for election for the SK (Youth Council).

Along with the posters and invitation letters were paper copies of the application form. The application included consent and parental permission forms, which applicants were required to sign and have signed by their parent. It also indicated that successful applicants were required to attend a pre-workshop session. Finally, all applicants were informed that, because spots are limited, workshop participants will be chosen randomly. In the end, we received 720 valid applications with signed consent and parental permission forms.

---

[6] Poverty rates are from 2003. The Philippines' overall poverty incidence is 29% (National Statistical Coordination Board 2009).

3.2 Pre-workshop session

The pre-workshop session was conducted so the study team could administer exams designed to measure personal characteristics of applicants before any random assignment to treatment groups occurred. The study team conducted 7 sessions in several sites that were convenient for applicants to reach.[7]

At the start of the pre-workshop session, applicants were reminded that selection to the workshop was completely random. Applicants were also told that we were not looking for any particular answers; they just needed to be honest when answering questions.

The session involved a series of tests designed to measure several dimensions of candidate quality: (1) public service motivation, (2) aptitude, (3) personality, (4) aspiration, and (5) integrity, to be discussed in the Data section below.

Out of the 720 eligible applicants, 569 attended and completed the pre-workshop session and were enrolled as study subjects. These study subjects represented 109 barangays from 9 municipalities in the Province of Sorsogon. Subjects were then randomly assigned into one of three treatment groups.[8] The three treatment groups are: control (C), workshop with unconditional awards (T1), and workshop with conditional awards (T2). The results of the random selection of workshop participants were communicated to the study subjects by phone call and text messaging.

3.3 Leadership training workshop

Using a leadership training workshop primarily as a screening mechanism, to our knowledge, is a novel policy idea. But conducting leadership training to expose and prepare the youth for public service and political careers is certainly nothing new. In the United States, for instance, there are nonpartisan educational institutions (e.g. leadershipinstititute.org) and political party sponsored institutions (e.g. Democratic Leadership Institute in Wisconsin) that have institutionalized some form of leadership training for youth interested in joining politics. In the Philippines, the *Kaya*

[7] In particular, we conducted 3 sessions in Sorsogon City, 1 session in the Municipality of Casiguran, 1 session in the Municipality of Gubat, 1 session in the Municipality of Bulan, and 1 session in the Municipality of Matnog.

[8] Computer randomization was done in the office using Stata software.

Natin! (trans. We can do it!) national movement, regularly conducts leadership training among youth leaders in university settings to promote good governance, ethical leadership and support effective and ethical leaders in government.

The leadership training workshop that we designed and implemented called, "Foundational Training for Aspiring Young Politicians," was held in Sorsogon City, the namesake capital of the Province of Sorsogon. There were four batches of the workshop, each one held over a weekend, from Friday afternoon to Sunday afternoon. The dates of the workshops were as follows: Batch 1 (Sep. 20-22), Batch 2 (Sep. 27-29), Batch 3 (Oct. 4-6), and Batch 4 (Oct. 11-13).

Study subjects selected to participate in the workshop were given a new set of consent and parent's permission forms to sign and have signed by their parent. Both participants and parents were also asked to read and agree to the house rules of the workshop.

The workshop was conducted by a hired consultant who specializes in conducting leadership training workshops for both private and public organizations in the Philippines, and has PEERRS certification from the University of Michigan IRB to conduct research on human subjects.

3.3.1 Workshop content

The Foundational Training for Aspiring Young Politicians (FTAYP) workshop provides aspiring young leaders a shared platform to interact with each other, to be grounded on servant–leadership principles that found application in the corporate and public sectors, and to evolve a plan of action that they can readily implement and deploy in their immediate community in the context of their prospective roles as elected youth council members. The workshop is a combination of plenary sessions, individual activities and small group discussions, and structured learning exercises (see Figure 24 in the Appendix).

3.3.2 Scoring

Unbeknownst to the study participants, performance in the workshop was monitored and evaluated, and participants were assigned scores based on an established scoring rubric (see Figure 25 in the Online Appendix). Study team members serving as small group leaders were the ones who assigned workshop participation and worksheet scores.

Each small group was assigned two leaders. Each leader graded each member of the small group

for participation during Days 2 and 3 of the workshop. Participation score is the average of all the grades received by the participant. Workshop participation score is 20% of a participant's overall performance score.

Worksheets were anonymized and randomly redistributed to small group leaders for grading. Participants each had to accomplish 3 worksheets. Each worksheet is graded by two randomly assigned group leaders. The worksheet score is based on the average of the two grades. Worksheets 1 and 2 are each worth 20% of the participant's overall performance score. Worksheet 3 is worth 40%.

If a participant was assigned to a workshop with unconditional award, then he received the award regardless of his overall performance score. However, if a participant was assigned to a workshop with performance-based award, then he received the award only if his performance score was above a pre-determined cutoff, which is known only to the Principal Investigator (PI).

3.3.3 Awards

At the end of every workshop, all respondents receiving the award were given a plaque of merit. The study team also promised to donate 5 pieces of standard-sized campaign posters should they decide to file an official certificate of candidacy for the SK.

3.4 Deferment of the 2013 SK Elections

With the creation of the Task Force on Youth Development in the interim, we gathered administrative data and conducted a follow-up survey among subjects a year after the workshop interventions to measure several outcomes of interest: (1) who got nominated to the Task Force; (2) who got designated to the Task Force; (3) change since baseline in interest in running for the next SK elections; and (4) engagement in village youth programs since the workshop interventions.

Until the elections are next held and subjects decide whether to file a candidacy, we cannot distribute the campaign posters as part of the awards, hence the only incentive at work is the plaque of merit that was awarded during the leadership training workshops. At the end of the follow-up survey, we did remind subjects who received the awards that our promise to donate campaign posters still stands, should they subsequently file for candidacies in the next SK elections.

4 Theoretical Framework

To inform the empirical exercise, we use a Principal–Agent model of political selection and screening which is a variation of the Spence (1973) signaling model of educational investment. The model elucidates the effects of the workshop with awards interventions on agents' decision to serve in public office. The model assumes heterogeneous types of agents in the qualities of an effective public servant – for simplicity – low-types (L) and high-types (H). A key result is that a leadership training workshop with awards induces low-types to select out of, and high-types to be nudged into, serving in public office.

4.1 Assumptions

A Principal, which could be the electorate, a political party, or a non-governmental institution, cares about having a better pool of agents selecting into public office. The policy instrument available to the Principal is a leadership training workshop with awards.

Agents – prospective politicians – are heterogeneous in quality. Without loss of generality, agents are either high-types (H) or low-types (L). H-types are inherently more productive than L-types, that is, they have desirable qualities such as public service motivation, intellectual ability, good personality, aspirations, and integrity, which allow them to efficiently deliver public goods and services while in office. In this sense, our model is akin to the selection model conceptualized and contrasted with those of the sanctions model by Mansbridge (2009). Unlike in sanctions model, here, the agent is at least in part motivated to do public service. Moreover, an alignment of objectives between principal and agent is possible, based on the agent's public service motivation. Finally, the model requires reliable mechanisms of selection and sorting and that the principal's energy is concentrated on the selection process and not on the sanctioning post selection.

Agents would like to pursue a political career, but as first-time candidates, they are imperfectly informed about their own type. That is, whether they have the preferences and qualities suitable for a career in politics will likely be apparent to themselves only *after* some exposure to public service or learning about what it means to serve in public office. Much like taking specialized classes or on–the–job–training (OJT) helps agents "try out" jobs (Johnson, 1978)), we allow for the possibility that the leadership training workshop helps agents learn their own tastes and qualities with respect

to serving in public office.

We further assume that the leadership training workshop helps the Principal learn agent types. The leadership training workshop incorporates individual and group tasks which, by design, are easier (less costly) for H-types to perform than L-types. This is the screening mechanism of the workshop that induces type revelation and allows the Principal, with some margin of error, to identify H-types and confer awards conditional on revealed type. (We test this key assumption in the results section by examining whether H-types tend to achieve higher scores than L-types.)

4.2 Model setup

The Principal has the policy instrument of a leadership training workshop with awards. Agents attend the workshop and perform in the various individual and group tasks. The Principal then evaluates performance in the workshop, assigns score s to each agent, and confers award I with the following condition:

$$I = \mathbb{1}[s \geq \nu] \tag{1}$$

where $\mathbb{1}[.]$ is an indicator function so that a candidate with score s above a pre-determined cutoff score ν is given an award.

Agents are either H-types or L-types. Each agent i's decision problem is:

$$\max_{s} \quad P + B_i(i, \phi) + I_i(s) - C_i(s), \qquad i = H, L \tag{2}$$

where P is the pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits of standing for office; and

$$B_i(i, \phi) = -\phi \mathbb{1}[i = L] \tag{3}$$

is how we incorporate the "self-learning" mechanism of the workshop, which is a negative payoff for L-types as they learn about their type in the workshop, with $\phi \geq 0$ as an intensity parameter of learning; and

$$C_i(s) = \begin{cases} s & \text{if } i = L \\ s/2 & \text{if } i = H \end{cases} \tag{4}$$

is the "cost" of performing and achieving a certain score in the workshop.

The task of the Principal is to find the threshold value ν such that only H-types can and have the incentive to meet the cutoff score and are selectively incentivized, while the L-types may meet the cutoff score but have the incentive not to, and are therefore not incentivized. In short, the goal of the model is to find a separating equilibrium characterized by the parameters (ϕ, ν, s).

Take as given the value of $P = 3$ and $\phi = 1$. For a H-type agent, the payoff to performing well in the workshop such that he meets the cutoff score and obtains the incentive is $3+0+1-s/2 = 4-s/2$. On the other hand, his payoff for not bothering to meet the cutoff score in the workshop is 3. Hence, it is worthwhile for H-type to make an effort to meet the cutoff score if $\nu \leq 2$.

Meanwhile, for a L-type agent, the payoff to performing well in the workshop and obtaining the incentive is $3-1+1-s = 3-s$. On the other hand, his payoff for not bothering to meet the cutoff score is 2. Hence, it is not worthwhile for L-type to pretend to be H-type to receive the incentive if $\nu \geq 1$.

Therefore, in this example, if the Principal sets the cutoff score $\nu \in (1, 2)$, then it achieves a separating equilibrium in which L-types select out of public office and H-types are nudged into running for office. For as long as there are enough agents for which the set cutoff score induces a separating equilibrium, then the Principal can use a leadership training workshop with conditional incentives to attract a better pool of agents into public office.

Note that the model allows for the possibility that simply attending the workshop helps L-types realize that they may not be well-suited for a career in politics. For example, keeping all parameter values as given, set $\phi = 4$. This would be true, for example, for an L-type candidate who, before the workshop, only considers the rewards of being in office, P, but after having attended the workshop, realizes that being in office requires a certain level of intrinsic public service motivation and competence that they do not have.

The experiment has a control group and two treatment arms designed to test the "self-learning" mechanism as well as the "screening and incentives" mechanism of the leadership training workshop, which we formalize into hypotheses tests in the following subsection.

4.3 Hypotheses and econometric framework

We registered the pre-analysis plan (PAP) governing this analysis with Experiments in Governance and Politics (egap.org) on August 19, 2013 before recruitment and baseline survey was conducted. We also lodged the PAP in the American Economic Associations randomized control trial registry on May 5, 2014 (and modified on August 5, 2014), just before the follow-up survey began. This latter PAP took note of the deferment of the SK elections and the measurement of new outcomes on political attitudes and behavior in lieu of the original election-related outcomes.

Given the sample size, we do not have power to adjust for multiple hypothesis testing as we investigate the impact of the workshop interventions on many potential outcomes of interest and as we conduct subgroup heterogeneity analyses in the different measures of quality. Our approach, instead, is to specify and pre-commit in the PAP the three key outcomes that we will look at: (1) Interest in joining SK, (2) indicator for being nominated to the Task Force on Youth Development, and (3) indicator for being designated to the Task Force. We look at a fourth outcome, which is an indicator for having engaged in village youth programs, but we note that this is not in our PAP and should be taken as an exploratory analysis.

We also specified four dimensions of quality in our PAP: (1) Digit span score index as proxy for aptitude/intellectual ability, (2) public service motivation (PSM) index, (3) personality index based on the big five inventory (BFI), and (4) aspiration index developed by Kasser and Ryan (1996). We take each of these indexes as a family of hypotheses (e.g. PSM has six sub-components). By aggregating sub-components into indexes, we deal with the issue of multiple inference which is an approach taken in other studies (e.g. Casey, Glennerster and Miguel (2012); Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007)). However, we do not adjust across the four quality domains. To the four aforementioned quality domains, we add a fifth one, integrity index, which is based on a set of baseline survey questionnaires (details in the next section). Again, because this fifth dimension is not in our PAP, the analysis on it is only exploratory.

To estimate the effects of the workshop interventions on political attitudes and behavior of respondents by type, we estimate the following equation:

$$outcome_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T1_i + \beta_2 T2_i + \beta_3 T1_i^* HighType_i + \beta_4 T2_i^* HighType_i + \beta_5 HighType_i + \mathbf{X_i'\Gamma} + \epsilon_i \quad (5)$$

The dependent variable, $outcome_i$ is either: (1) change in interest in running for SK since

baseline; (2) indicator variable for engaging in village youth programs; (3) indicator for being nominated as a youth leader; or (4) an indicator for being actually designated as a youth leader.

$T1$ is an indicator variable for being assigned to the workshop with unconditional incentives treatment arm. Likewise, $T2$ is an indicator variable for being assigned to the workshop with conditional incentives treatment arm.[9]

As specified in the PAP, $HighType_i$ is an indicator for being above the median in the sample distribution of the quality index measures: public service motivation, intellectual ability, personality, aspiration, and integrity.

X_i is a vector of controls including demographic characteristics such as gender, age, weight, height, body mass index, and baseline interest in joining SK (on a scale of 0–10). We also control for village fixed effects to account for heterogeneity in outcomes across the level of elective office (i.e. village youth council). ϵ_i is an error term.

The hypotheses that we test are detailed in the pre-analysis plan and replicated here as follows:

$\beta_1 \lesseqgtr 0$	Low-types in T1 learn type but are unconditionally incentivized.
$\beta_2 < 0$	Low-types in T2 learn type and are screened-out and dis-incentivized.
$\beta_3 > 0$	High-types in T1 are unconditionally incentivized.
$\beta_4 > 0$	High-types in T2 are screened-in and incentivized.
$\beta_5 \leq 0$	High-types in C have lower outcome than low-types in C.
$\beta_4 - \beta_2 > 0$	Combined effect of screening-out low-types and screening-in high-types in T2.
$[\beta_4 - \beta_2] - [\beta_3 - \beta_1] \lesseqgtr 0$	Workshop with conditional incentives is more potent as a screening mechanism.

Where the hypothesis involves an ambiguous sign (i.e. $\lesseqgtr$) the test is two-sided, otherwise the test is one-sided in the direction indicated in the statement of the hypothesis.

[9]Ideally, we would have another treatment arm for workshop with no incentives so we can isolate the pure "learning" effect. But due to budget constraint, we decided to maximize power by dropping this treatment arm in the design.

5 Candidate qualities

The dimensions of quality that we consider in this study roughly corresponds to the four domains of personal variability according to Roberts (2006), and characterizes competent and honest politicians (Caselli and Morelli, 2004; Mansbridge, 2009). These dimensions are: (1) public service motivation, (2) intellectual ability, (3) personality, (4) aspiration, and (5) integrity. In what follows, we discuss how these were measured and describe the respondent pool.

5.1 Public service motivation

Research indicates that public sector workers have a different motivation profile in terms of values, inclination to public service activities, and volunteering (Bright 2005; Rotolo and Wilson 2006). Scholars of public administration have explored the idea that public service motivation is central to the effective delivery of public goods and services (Perry and Wise, 1990). Individuals with a strong desire to serve the public interest or who have higher levels of altruism are thought to not only be more attracted to public sector employment but also perform better on the job. While estimating the extent to which public service motivation affects job performance remains an active area of research, recent meta-studies suggest that public service motivation is positively correlated with job performance in the public sector, broadly defined (Petrovsky, 2009).

We measured subjects' public service motivation using Perry's 1996 scale of Public Service Motivation (Perry, 1996), which has become the gold standard in the literature on PSM. This index is constructed based on a questionnaire in which the subject must express agreement or disagreement with each of 40 statements. The questionnaire elicits opinions on the attractiveness of politics, public service, and prosocial activities. The questionnaire is subdivided into six modules labeled "Attraction to Policy Making," "Commitment to Policy Making," "Social Justice," "Civic Duty," "Compassion," and "Self-Sacrifice." Each dimension is an average of responses to several statements that are measured on a 5-point Likert scale, where a 5 represents strong agreement with the statement, and a 1 denotes strong disagreement.

We construct a public service motivation index, which is an equally weighted average of the z-scores of each dimension. Each dimension is standardized based on the mean and standard deviation of all subjects.

5.2 Intellectual ability

We take the view that a key aspect of competence relates to personal characteristics that make politicians more productive and valuable in public office. Given that the subjects are in their high school years (or early college at the latest) we could not measure wages as a signal of their ability (as valued by the market). Instead, we measured raw aptitude/intellectual ability and personality based on a vast body of research in psychology that documents the importance of both cognitive and non-cognitive traits for predicting earnings, job status, and job performance (Schmidt and Hunter, 1998).

To evaluate a study participant's intellectual or cognitive ability, the pre-workshop session involved a Test of Memory for Digit Span. In this test, the examiner reads out loud in one-second interval, a series of digits (e.g., '4, 8, 7') which participants must immediately repeat back. If participants are able to do so without mistake, they are given a longer list (e.g., '6, 3, 1, 0'). There are two rounds of the test. In the first round, participants are asked to repeat the digits in the same order as read (forward digit span), and in the second round, they are asked to repeat the digits in reverse order as read (backward digit span). The sum of the longest forward and backward digits a participant can recall without making two consecutive mistakes is that participant's digit span.

The digit span measures short-term memory, but it is a subcomponent of full-scale IQ tests, including the widely used Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS), and correlates well with the overall IQ measure. This is because a way to expand memory is to generate patterns as one repeats back the numbers, so more intelligent people can stretch their memory longer. Short-term memory, in turn, is involved in many everyday tasks, from remembering a friend's telephone number while entering it into a phone, to understanding long and difficult sentences.

5.3 Personality

To measure non-cognitive attributes, we examined a set of personality traits that, over time, psychologists have grouped into five categories labeled "the Big 5." These traits are openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism. We measured the Big 5 personality traits using the Big Five Inventory (BFI) developed by John (1990). This is a 44-item questionnaire. John, Naumann and Soto (2008) report on extensive studies validating the BFI

both for internal consistency in terms of test-retest reliability, as well as convergence with other personality inventories such as the NEO Five Factor scale (McCrae and Costa, 1992).

In the analysis to follow, we report results on an index of the Big 5. As with PSM, this index is constructed as an equally weighted average of the z-scores of each dimension, reverse-coding neuroticism, which is widely considered to be a negative characteristic (the negative of neuroticism is usually labeled "emotional stability"). The standardization was based on the mean and standard deviation of all study subjects.

5.4 Aspiration

Aspiration includes both intrinsic (affiliation, community feeling, self-acceptance) and extrinsic (financial success) goals. Kasser and Ryan (1993) developed an extensive measure of individual's aspirations with the aforementioned four goal contents. *Affiliation* aspirations concern the importance and realization of having a family life and good friends. *Community feeling* aspirations concern making the world a better place through one's actions. *Self-acceptance* aspirations concern individual psychological growth, self-esteem and autonomy. Lastly, *financial success*, refers to the aspiration to attain wealth and material success. We construct the aspiration index as an equally weighted average of the z-scores of each of these four goal contents.

5.5 Integrity

To capture a respondent's integrity level we construct an equally weighted average of two measures developed and used by Dal Bo, Finan and Rossi (2013): (1) Integrity - direct and (2) integrity - indirect. We then turn this average measure into a z-score. The direct measure of integrity is an indicator for whether or not the individual agrees with the statement that "laws are made to be broken", which is also a common proxy for a lack of respect for laws and moral standards. The indirect measure tracks a person's view about the likelihood that others will engage in honest behavior. In particular, the questions asked, "if you dropped a wallet with 200 pesos, what is the likelihood on a scale of 1 to 5, that a (neighbor, police, stranger) would return it intact." A pessimistic attitude towards the moral behavior of others is thought to correlate with weakness of one's own moral standards due to what psychologists' have termed projection bias (the belief that others must conform to our own inclinations.)

5.6 Summary statistics and baseline balance tests

We also measured respondent demographics and baseline interest in joining the youth council (SK). We have data on their gender, age, weight and height from which we construct the body mass index. Finally, we asked all respondents, on a scale of 0–10 (10 being most interested), how interested were they in standing for election for SK.

Table 1 presents summary statistics and baseline balance tests. The average age of subjects is 16. Sixty percent of the subjects are female. The average height and weight are 61.82 inches and 101.28 pounds, which implies an average body mass index (BMI) of 18.65.

The average baseline interest in joining the youth council (SK) is very high at 8.46 (out of 10). This is reassuring in that we are attracting individuals who are, to begin with, already inclined to pursue careers in politics. This allays concerns about the policy intervention attracting individuals who have no political aspirations. All baseline variables are well balanced across the treatment arms.

[Table 1 about here.]

6 Results

We begin this section by examining whether the leadership training workshop works as a screening mechanism. We show that the workshop and the simple scoring system do remarkably well in revealing the qualities of respondents. Next, we examine the average treatment effects of the workshop interventions T1 and T2 on political attitudes and behavior. We then test for heterogeneous treatment effects in each of the quality measures to provide empirical evidence that workshops with conditional incentives screen-out individuals below the median of the quality measures and nudge those above the median to select into public service.

6.1 Is the leadership training workshop an effective screening mechanism?

A central premise of the screening theory presented earlier is that the leadership training workshop works as a screening mechanism by which better qualified individuals can be selectively given incentives. Figure 2 provide evidence that this is in fact the case.

[Figure 2 about here.]

As expected, subjects with below-median quality measures in T1 are just as likely to receive incentives as their above-median counterparts. In fact, all respondents in T1, by definition, receive the incentives.[10] On the other hand, subjects with below-median quality measures in T2 are significantly less likely to receive incentives than their above-median counterparts. Results hold across all quality measures, although the magnitude of difference is much less pronounced in the case of aspiration and integrity indexes. In short, the leadership training workshop with a simple scoring system to evaluate performance is an effective screening mechanism.

6.2 Average treatment effects of the leadership training workshop interventions

Table 2 presents summary results regarding the average treatment effects of the two workshop interventions: a workshop with unconditional incentives (T1) and a workshop with conditional incentives (T2). We do not find any evidence for T1's average treatment effects on the four outcomes of interest. In contrast, while we also do not find any average treatment effect of T2 on being nominated to the Task Force, we do find evidence that, on average, subjects in T2 are less likely to be designated to the Task Force, are less interested in running for the youth council (SK), and are less likely to engage in village youth programs.

[Table 2 about here.]

These results may lead us to believe that leadership training workshops with conditional incentives discourage individuals from serving in public office and hence, may adversely impact political selection (for example, if the "average" individual is a well qualified candidate for office). However, these average treatment effects mask heterogeneity among subjects within each treatment arm, in the dimensions of quality that are of interest to us. Recall that our primary goal is to investigate

[10]The graphs show that only about 60% of below- and above-median respondents in T1 received the incentives (instead of 100% each), but this is because only 115 out of 190 respondents in T1 actually came to the workshop. Similarly, only 115 out of 190 respondents in T2 actually came to the workshop. All our analyses look at Intent–to–Treat (ITT) effects and so we look at the efficacy of the workshop as a screening device by treatment assignment. Looking only at treatment "takers" (i.e. those who actually attended the workshops) (not shown here) provide stronger evidence of its efficacy as a screening mechanism.

whether the workshop interventions cause a better quality of individuals to select into public service (and the relatively less qualified individuals to be screened-out of public office). To this end, we need to examine how the effects of the workshop interventions differ between subjects below and above the median of the quality measures.

6.3 Treatment effects heterogeneity in the dimensions of quality

We implement an OLS estimation of Eq. 5 to investigate the heterogeneous treatment effects of T1 and T2 on the four outcomes of interest, in each of the five dimension of quality of interest, namely, public service motivation, intellectual ability, personality, aspiration, and integrity.

6.3.1 Do the workshop interventions cause individuals with high Public Service Motivation (PSM) index to select into public service?

Figures 3, 4, 5, and 6 present summary results of the heterogeneous treatment effects of T1 and T2 in the dimension of public service motivation (PSM index), on being nominated as a youth leader, being designated as a youth leader, change in interest in running for the youth council since baseline, and engagement in village youth programs, respectively.

In both T1 and T2, we find evidence that subjects who are below the median of PSM index are significantly less likely to be nominated as youth leaders than their counterparts in the control group. In particular, relative to the mean probability of being nominated among low-PSM subjects in the control group (0.43), low-PSM subjects in T1 are 13 percentage points less likely to be nominated, while low-PSM subjects in T2 are 16.3 percentage points less likely to be nominated. Likewise, we find evidence that subjects in both T1 and T2 who are above the median of PSM index are significantly more likely to be nominated as youth leaders. In particular, relative to the mean probability of being nominated among high-PSM subjects in the control group (0.31), high-PSM subjects in T1 are 18.1 percentage points more likely to be nominated, while high-PSM subjects in T2 are 15.1 percentage points more likely to be nominated. The difference in the probability of being nominated between low– and high–PSM subjects in both T1 and T2 is 31.4 percentage points and are statistically significant. These results imply that, in terms of subjects being nominated as village youth leaders, both T1 and T2 are effective in screening-out the low-PSM subjects and nudging the high-PSM ones into public service.

[Figure 3 about here.]

In terms of being actually designated as youth leaders, both T1 and T2 provide evidence for the screening-out of low-PSM subjects. In particular, compared to a control group mean of 0.34, low-PSM subjects in T1 are 13.4 percentage points less likely to be designated, and low-PSM subjects in T2 are 12.8 percentage points less likely to be designated. Only T1 provides evidence of the nudging of high-PSM subjects into public service. Compared to a control group mean of 0.26, high-PSM subjects in T1 are 13.5 percentage points more likely to be designated. T2 subjects who are high-PSM are no more likely than their control group counterparts to be designated as youth leaders.

[Figure 4 about here.]

In terms of change in interest in running for the youth council, only T2 provide evidence for the screening-out of low-PSM subjects and the nudging of high-PSM subjects into public service. Compared to a control group mean of 0.02, low-PSM subjects in T2 are 23.5 percentage points less likely to be interested in running for office since baseline. Moreover, the difference in interest between high– and low-PSM subjects in T2 is statistically significant compared to the control group as well as compared to T1. These results imply that, as far as attitudes toward public service is concerned, T2 is effective in screening-out the low-PSM individuals and nudging the high-PSM individuals into public service.

[Figure 5 about here.]

Lastly, in terms of engagement in village youth programs, only T2 provides evidence for the screening-out of low-PSM subjects, but both T1 and T2 provide evidence for the nudging of high-PSM subjects. In addition, the difference in engagement in youth programs between high– and low-PSM subjects in T2 (but not in T1) is statistically significant compared to the control group.

[Figure 6 about here.]

So far, these set of results implies that, if the goal of policy were to attract a pool of individuals with high levels of public service motivation, then a leadership training workshop – with or without

performance-based awards – generally does the job. However, nudging high-PSM individuals into public service (and screening-out low-PSM ones) may come at a a cost of losing high-aptitude individuals. Although we make no normative claim as to whether it is better to have high-PSM individuals than high-aptitude ones, we would like to investigate the extent to which there is a tradeoff, to inform policymaking. In the next subsection, we examine workshop treatment effects heterogeneity in our measure of aptitude / intellectual ability – the digit span score index.

6.3.2 Do the workshop interventions cause individuals with high aptitude (Digit Span Score) index to select into public service?

Figures 7, 8, 9, and 10 present summary results of the heterogeneous treatment effects of T1 and T2 in the dimension of aptitude / intellectual ability (Digit Span Score index), on being nominated as a youth leader, being designated as a youth leader, change in interest in running for the youth council since baseline, and engagement in village youth programs, respectively.

Only in T2, do we find evidence that subjects who are below the median of aptitude index are significantly less likely to be nominated as youth leaders than their counterparts in the control group. In particular, relative to the mean probability of being nominated among low-aptitude subjects in the control group (0.36), low-aptitude subjects in T2 are 16.4 percentage points less likely to be nominated. Likewise, only in T2 do we find evidence that subjects who are above the median of aptitude index are significantly more likely to be nominated as youth leaders. In particular, relative to the mean probability of being nominated among high-aptitude subjects in the control group (0.32), high-aptitude subjects in T2 are 14.2 percentage points more likely to be nominated. The difference in the probability of being nominated between low– and high–PSM subjects in T2 is 30.6 percentage points and is statistically significant.

[Figure 7 about here.]

In terms of the three other outcomes of interest – being designated as youth leader, change in interest in running for the youth council, as well as engagement in village youth programs, we find that only in T2 do we find generally consistent evidence that low-aptitude subjects are screened-out and high-aptitude ones are nudged into serving in public office.

[Figure 8 about here.]

[Figure 9 about here.]

[Figure 10 about here.]

Reassuringly, these results imply that attracting high-PSM individuals do not come at a cost of losing high-aptitude individuals. However, note that it is only in workshop with conditional incentives (T2) that we see a consistent evidence for low-aptitude subjects being screened-out and high-aptitude subjects being nudged into serving in public office. If policymakers were to care about attracting not only high-PSM individuals but also those with relatively high intellectual ability, then incentives ought to be made conditional on performance, since they reinforce the self-selection and sorting mechanism of the leadership training workshop.

6.3.3 Do the workshop interventions cause individuals with high personality (Big Five Inventory) index to select into public service?

We also investigate the workshop treatment effects heterogeneity in three other dimensions of candidate quality: personality (measured by the Big Five Inventory index), aspiration (measured by Kasser and Ryan (1993) index) and integrity (an index based on a set of baseline survey questionnaires).

Figures 11, 12, 13, and 14 present summary results of the heterogeneous treatment effects of T1 and T2 in the dimension of personality (Big Five Inventory index), on being nominated as a youth leader, being designated as a youth leader, change in interest in running for the youth council since baseline, and engagement in village youth programs, respectively.

Overall, we find little evidence for systematic heterogeneity in the dimension of personality. Across the four outcomes of interest, only in the change in interest in running for the youth council since baseline do we find that T2 has heterogeneous effects. In particular, we find that low-personality subjects in T2 are less interested in running for office than their counterparts in the control group.

[Figure 11 about here.]

[Figure 12 about here.]

[Figure 13 about here.]

[Figure 14 about here.]

6.3.4 Do the workshop interventions cause individuals with high aspiration index to select into public service?

Figures 15, 16, 17, and 18 present summary results of the heterogeneous treatment effects of T1 and T2 in the dimension of aspiration (Kasser and Ryan (1993) index), on being nominated as a youth leader, being designated as a youth leader, change in interest in running for the youth council since baseline, and engagement in village youth programs, respectively.

Only in T2, do we find evidence that subjects who are below the median of aspiration index are significantly less likely to be nominated as youth leaders than their counterparts in the control group. In particular, relative to the mean probability of being nominated among low-aspiration subjects in the control group (0.46), low-aptitude subjects in T2 are 13.5 percentage points less likely to be nominated. In contrast, only in T1 do we find evidence that subjects who are above the median of aspiration index are significantly more likely to be nominated as youth leaders. In particular, relative to the mean probability of being nominated among high-aspiration subjects in the control group (0.37), high-aptitude subjects in T1 are 18.0 percentage points more likely to be nominated. The difference in the probability of being nominated between low– and high–aspiration subjects in T1 and T2 are 30.7 and 25.0 percentage points, respectively, and both are statistically significant.

[Figure 15 about here.]

In terms of the three other outcomes of interest – being designated as youth leader, change in interest in running for the youth council, as well as engagement in village youth programs, our findings mirror the heterogeneity of effects in aptitude. That is, we find that only in T2 do we find generally consistent evidence that low-aspiration subjects are screened-out and high-aspiration ones are nudged into serving in public office.

[Figure 16 about here.]

[Figure 17 about here.]

[Figure 18 about here.]

6.3.5 Do the workshop interventions cause individuals with high integrity index to select into public service?

Lastly, we investigate heterogeneity of workshop treatment effects in the dimension of integrity. As mentioned earlier, we did not include this dimension of quality in our pre-analysis plan, hence, our analyses here are exploratory. Scholars of political selection (e.g. Besley and Coate, 1997; Caselli and Morelli, 2004; Mansbridge, 2009) note that there are two broad categories of quality of politicians that ought to be considered – competence and honesty. One may view the four previous qualities as dimensions of competence, but not of honesty. Our analyses below attempts to get at heterogeneity in treatment effects in the dimension of integrity/honesty.

Figures 19, 20, 21, and 22 present summary results of the heterogeneous treatment effects of T1 and T2 in the dimension of integrity, on being nominated as a youth leader, being designated as a youth leader, change in interest in running for the youth council since baseline, and engagement in village youth programs, respectively.

We find that only in T2, do we find evidence that subjects who are below the median of integrity index are significantly less likely to be nominated as youth leaders than their counterparts in the control group. In particular, relative to the mean probability of being nominated among low-integrity subjects in the control group (0.44), low-integrity subjects in T2 are 16.3 percentage points less likely to be nominated. In contrast, only in T1 do we find evidence that subjects who are above the median of integrity index are significantly more likely to be nominated as youth leaders. In particular, relative to the mean probability of being nominated among high-integrity subjects in the control group (0.35), high-integrity subjects in T1 are 15.6 percentage points more likely to be nominated. The difference in the probability of being nominated between low– and high–aspiration subjects in T2 (but not in T1) is 28.6 percentage points and is statistically significant.

[Figure 19 about here.]

In terms of the three other outcomes of interest – being designated as youth leader, change in interest in running for the youth council, as well as engagement in village youth programs, our findings mirror the heterogeneity of effects in aptitude. That is, we find that only in T2 do we find generally consistent evidence that low-integrity subjects are screened-out and high-integrity ones are nudged into serving in public office.

[Figure 20 about here.]

[Figure 21 about here.]

[Figure 22 about here.]

7 Conclusion

Using a novel data set combining survey data on respondent characteristics with data on behavior in a leadership training workshop as well as with survey and administrative data on interest and actual decisions to serve in public office, we show that individuals who attend a workshop with performance-based awards and are below the median of quality measures are less interested in standing in election, less likely to engage in youth programs and are less likely to be nominated and designated as youth leaders in their respective villages, and that those above the median of quality measures behave in the opposite way.

These findings offer two insights in our quest for improving governance. First, we need not wait for incompetent and dishonest individuals to hold public office before holding them accountable, especially since "punishing" corrupt politicians can be difficult and can have adverse consequences (c.f. Bobonis, Camara-Fuertes and Schwabe (2013); Ramalho (2007)). Instead, we can influence political selection at the outset, by screening individuals that hold desirable qualities – public service motivation, ambition (but not avarice), aptitude, and integrity.

Second, we need to reevaluate policies that incentivize good politicians. Even small rewards such as a plaque of merit or campaign posters can be very effective in nudging individuals to stand for office. But with imperfect information, incompetent and dishonest ones can pretend to be otherwise, and this adverse selection can undermine the efficacy of incentives. While recent studies have shown that incentives work in motivating good quality citizens to respond to the call to public service (Dal Bo, Finan and Rossi, 2013; Besley, 2004; Gagliarducci and Nannicini, 2013) there is room for improving efficiency by designing mechanisms that can screen-in good types and implementing incentives conditional on revealed quality.

In particular, there is scope for political parties, nonprofit, and civic organizations to develop and scale up programs that can selectively nudge competent and honest political aspirants, especially at the onset of their careers. These can be in the form of leadership training workshops with

performance-based incentives (pecuniary and non-pecuniary), merit-based endorsements, and competitive internships and scholarships to attend specialized training for aspiring politicians, among others. To be sure, more evaluations are needed to test their generalizability. The point is, such policies that employ screening mechanisms and use conditional incentives to improve political selection can complement policies that improve citizens' ability to hold politicians accountable and, ultimately, improve governance in developing democracies.

References

Acemoglu, Daron. 2010. "Theory, General Equilibrium, and Political Economy in Development Economics." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 24(3):17–32.

Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson. 2012. *Why Nations Fail*. New York: Crown Business.

Akerlof, George and Rachel Kranton. 2005. "Identity and Economics of Organization." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 19(1):9–32.

Arrow, Kenneth. 1973. "Higher Education as a Filter." *Journal of Public Economics* 2(3):193–216.

Bernheim, Doug and Navin Kartik. 2014. "Candidates, Character, and Corruption." *American Economic Journal: Microeconomics* 6(2):205–246.

Besley, Timothy. 2004. "Joseph Schumpeter Lecture: Paying Politicians: Theory and Evidence." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 2(2):193–215.

Besley, Timothy, Jose Montalvo and Marta Reynal-Querol. 2011. "Do Educated Leaders Matter?" *Economic Journal* 121:205–207.

Besley, Timothy and Maitreesh Ghatak. 2005. "Competition and Incentives Motivated Agents." *American Economic Review* 95(3):616–636.

Besley, Timothy and Maitreesh Ghatak. 2008. "Status incentives." *American Economic Review* 98(2):206–211.

Besley, Timothy and Stephen Coate. 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 108(1):85–114.

Besley, Timothy and Stephen Coate. 1998. "Sources of Inefficiency in a Representative Democracy: A Dynamic Analysis." *American Economic Review* 88(1):139–156.

Bobonis, Gustavo, Luis Camara-Fuertes and Rainer Schwabe. 2013. "Monitoring Corruptible Politicians." *Manuscript.* .

Caselli, Francesco and Massimo Morelli. 2004. "Bad Politicians." *Journal of Public Economics* 88:759–782.

Casey, Katherine, Rachel Glennerster and Edward Miguel. 2012. "Reshaping Institutions: Evidence on Aid Impacts Using a Preanalysis Plan." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 127(4):1755–1812.

Chattopadhyay, Raghabendra and Esther Duflo. 2004. "Women as Policymakers: Evidence from a India-Wide Randomized Policy Experiment." *Econometrica* 72(5):1409–1443.

Chemin, Matthieu. 2012. "Welfare Effects of Criminal Politicians: A Discontinuity-Based Approach." *Journal of Law and Economics* 55(3):667–690.

Congleton, Roger and Yongjing Zhang. 2013. "Is it all about competence? The human capital of US presidents and economic performance." *Constitutional Political Economy* 24(2):108–124.

Dal Bo, Ernesto, Frederico Finan and Martin Rossi. 2013. "Strengthening State Capabilities: The Role of Financial Incentives in the Call to Public Service." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 128(3):1169–1218.

Dreher, Axel, Michael Lamlac and Frank Somogyic. 2009. "The Impact of Political Leaders' Profession and Education On Reforms." *Journal of Comparative Economics* .

Eggers, Andrew and Jens Hainmueller. 2009. "MPs for Sale? Returns to Office in Postwar British Politics." *American Political Science Review* 3(4):513–533.

Ferraz, Claudio and Frederico Finan. 2009. "Motivating Politicians: The Impacts of Monetary Incentives on Quality and Performance." *NBER Working Paper No. 14906* .

Gagliarducci, Stefano and Tommaso Nannicini. 2013. "Do Better Paid Politicians Perform Better? Disentangling Incentives from Selection." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 11:369–398.

Gehlbach, Scott and Konstantin Sonin. 2010. "Businessman Candidates." *American Journal of Political Science* 54(3):718–736.

John, Oliver. 1990. *Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research.* New York: Guilford Press chapter The Big Five Factor Taxonomy: Dimensions of Personality in the Natural Language and in Questionnaires.

John, Oliver, Laura Naumann and Christopher Soto. 2008. *Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research*. 3rd edition ed. New York: Guilford Press chapter Paradigm Shift to the Integrative Big-Five Trait Taxonomy: History, Measurement, and Conceptual Issues.

Johnson, William. 1978. "A Theory of Job Shopping." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 92(2):261–278.

Jones, Benjamin and Benjamin Olken. 2005. "Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth Since World War II." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 120(3):835–864.

Kasser, Tim and Richard Ryan. 1993. "A Dark Side of the American Dream: Correlates of Financial Success as a Central Life Aspiration." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 65(2):410–422.

Kasser, Tim and Richard Ryan. 1996. "Further Examining the American Dream: Differential Correlates of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Goals." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 22:280–287.

Kling, Jeffrey, Jeffrey Liebman and Lawrence Katz. 2007. "Experimental Analysis of Neighborhood Effects." *Econometrica* 75(1):83–119.

Layard, Richard and George Psacharopoulos. 1974. "The Screening Hypothesis and the Returns to Education." *Journal of Political Economy* 82(5):985–998.

Mansbridge, Jane. 2009. "A "Selection Model" of Political Representation." *Journal of Political Philosophy* 17(4):369–398.

McCrae, Robert and Paul Costa. 1992. *NEO PI-R Professional Manual*. Odessa, Florida: Psychological Assessment Resources, Inc.

Moldovanu, Benny, Aner Sela and Xianwen Shi. 2007. "Contests for Status." *Journal of Political Economy* 115:338–363.

Pande, Rohini. 2003. "Can Mandated Political Representation Provide Disadvantaged Minorities Policy Influence? Theory and Evidence from India." *American Economic Review* 93(4):1132–1151.

Perry, James. 1996. "Measuring Public Service Motivation: An Assessment of Construct Reliability and Validity." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 6(1):5–22.

Perry, James and Lois Wise. 1990. "The Motivational Bases of Public Service." *Public Administration Review* 50(3):367–373.

Petrovsky, Nicolai. 2009. "Does Public Service Motivation Predict Higher Public Service Performance? A Research Synthesis," Paper prepared for 10th Public Management Research Association Conference. Ohio State University.

Ramalho, Rita. 2007. "The Persistence of Corruption: Evidence from the 1992 Presidential Impeachment in Brazil." *Manuscript.* .

Roberts, Brent. 2006. *"Personality Development and Organizational Behavior" in Research on Organizational Behavior, B. M. Staw, ed.* Amsterdam: Elsevier Science/JAI Press pp. 1–41.

Schmidt, Frank and John Hunter. 1998. "The validity and utility of selection methods in personnel psychology: Practical and theoretical implications of 85 years of research findings." *Psychological Bulletin* 124(2):262–274.

Spence, Michael. 1973. "Job Market Signaling." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 87(3):355–374.

Taubman, Paul and Terence Wales. 1973. "Higher Education, Mental Ability, and Screening." *Journal of Political Economy* 81(1):28–55.

UNICEF. 2007. *The Impact of Youth Participation in the Local Government Process: The Sangguniang Kabataan Experience.* Makati City: UNICEF.

Wechsler, D. 1987. *WMS-R Wechsler Memory Scale-Revised Manual.* San Antonio: The Psychological Corporation.

Wurfel, David. 1977. "Martial Law in the Philippines: The Methods of Regime Survival." *Pacific Affairs* 50(1):5–30.

Tables

Table 1: Baseline survey summary statistics and balance tests

Variable	Full sample	Control group (C)	Workshop uncond'l (T1)	Workshop cond'l (T2)	P-values C=T1	C=T2	T1=T2	C=T1=T2
Observations	569	189	190	190				
Panel A: Demographic characteristics								
Female (indicator)	0.61	0.61	0.62	0.59	0.802	0.707	0.530	0.819
	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.50)				
Years of age	15.99	15.99	16.04	15.94	0.509	0.502	0.188	0.420
	(0.78)	(0.77)	(0.80)	(0.77)				
Weight (pounds)	101.28	101.77	100.03	102.05	0.282	0.870	0.200	0.374
	(15.81)	(16.78)	(14.58)	(16.01)				
Height (inches)	61.82	61.80	61.51	62.16	0.441	0.337	0.079	0.212
	(3.63)	(3.70)	(3.53)	(3.66)				
Body mass index (BMI)	18.65	18.72	18.64	18.60	0.739	0.621	0.879	0.879
	(2.56)	(2.41)	(2.66)	(2.62)				
Interest in joining SK	8.46	8.39	8.56	8.44	0.371	0.805	0.525	0.649
(scale of 0–10)	(1.96)	(1.99)	(1.86)	(2.02)				
Panel B: Candidate quality (z–scores)								
Public service motivation	0.00	-0.08	0.03	0.06	0.375	0.225	0.780	0.454
	(1.00)	(1.00)	(1.05)	(0.96)				
Intellectual ability	0.00	-0.03	-0.04	0.07	0.929	0.393	0.308	0.546
	(1.00)	(1.09)	(0.94)	(0.98)				
Personality	0.00	-0.05	0.03	0.02	0.517	0.565	0.923	0.776
	(1.00)	(0.99)	(1.05)	(0.97)				
Aspiration	0.00	-0.05	0.10	-0.05	0.157	0.969	0.160	0.260
	(1.00)	(0.98)	(0.96)	(1.05)				
Integrity	0.00	-0.07	0.02	0.05	0.403	0.246	0.785	0.487
	(1.00)	(0.99)	(1.05)	(0.96)				

Notes: Variables in Panels A and B are collected at baseline, administered from August 26 to September 14, 2013, prior to treatment assignment. Respondents randomized with equal (1/3) probability into the control group (C), workshop with unconditional incentives group (T1), or workshop with conditional incentives group (T2). Numbers reported are means. Numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations. P-values are for F-tests that mean of variables is equal across the specified treatment conditions. A test of joint orthogonality, an alternative balance test, based on a multinomial logit regression of treatment on baseline variables reported in panels A & B above gives a p-value of 0.8299.

Table 2: Reduced form effects of workshop treatments (Intent-to-Treat)

	Nominated to Task Force (1)	Designated to Task Force (2)	Change in interest in joining SK (3)	Engagement in youth programs (4)
T1: (Unconditional)	-0.04	-0.06	-0.07	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.05)
T2: (Conditional)	-0.08	-0.10*	-0.20**	-0.09*
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.05)
Observations	559	559	559	535
C: No workshop (mean)	0.34	0.31	0.04	0.78

Notes: Each column is from a separate OLS regression of the outcome specified on the treatments. Controls include village fixed effects and variables in panels A and B in Table 1. Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.01, ^{**}p < 0.05, ^{*}p < 0.1$ based on two-sided hypothesis tests.

Figures

Figure 1: Study timeline and intervention flowchart.



Figure 2: Is the leadership training workshop an effective screening mechanism?



Notes: Each graph is from a separate OLS regression of the outcome, which is an indicator for receiving the incentives, on the treatments and their interactions with an indicator for being above the median of each of the five dimensions of quality. PSM, aptitude, personality, aspiration and integrity are z-scores based on the PSM index, digit span scores, BFI index, aspiration index, and survey questions on integrity, respectively. Controls include village fixed effects and variables in panels A and B in Table 1. Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals from two-sided hypothesis tests.

Figure 3: Heterogeneous effects of workshop treatments on nomination as a youth leader, among individuals with low and high public service motivation.



$$nominated_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T1_i + \beta_2 T2_i + \beta_3 T1_i^* HighPSM_i + \beta_4 T2_i^* HighPSM_i + \beta_5 HighPSM_i + X_i'\Gamma + \epsilon_i$$

Hypothesis Test	Graphical Test	Result
$\beta_1 \lessgtr 0$	[(3) - (1)]	-0.133 [0.0798]*
$\beta_2 < 0$	[(5) - (1)]	-0.163 [0.0766]**
$\beta_3 > 0$	[(4) - (2)]	0.181 [0.109]**
$\beta_4 > 0$	[(6) - (2)]	0.151 [0.108]*
$\beta_5 \leq 0$	[(2) - (1)]	-0.123 [0.081]*
$\beta_3 - \beta_1 \lessgtr 0$ [1]	[(4) - (2)] - [(3) - (1)]	0.314 (0.072)*
$\beta_4 - \beta_2 > 0$	[(6) - (2)] - [(5) - (1)]	0.314 (0.032)**
$[\beta_4 - \beta_2] - [\beta_3 - \beta_1] \lessgtr 0$	[(6) - (5)] - [(4) - (3)]	-0.000 (0.999)

Notes: Graph is from a separate OLS regression of the outcome, which is an indicator for nomination as youth leader on the treatments and their interactions with an indicator for being above the median of the PSM index. Controls include village fixed effects and variables in panels A and B in Table 1. Huber-White robust standard errors in brackets in third column of table. Prob > F based on Wald tests in parentheses in third column of table. Vertical lines in the graph represent 90% confidence intervals based on two-sided hypothesis tests. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$ in the table are from two-sided hypothesis tests when hypothesis has ambiguous sign and from one-sided hypothesis tests when hypothesis has an unambiguous sign. [1]Test not indicated in pre-analysis plan.

Figure 4: Heterogeneous effects of workshop treatments on designation as a youth leader, among individuals with low and high public service motivation.



$$designated_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T1_i + \beta_2 T2_i + \beta_3 T1_i^* HighPSM_i + \beta_4 T2_i^* HighPSM_i + \beta_5 HighPSM_i + X_i'\Gamma + \epsilon_i$$

Hypothesis Test	Graphical Test	Result
$\beta_1 \lessgtr 0$	[(3) - (1)]	-0.134 [0.073]*
$\beta_2 < 0$	[(5) - (1)]	-0.128 [0.073]**
$\beta_3 > 0$	[(4) - (2)]	0.135 [0.097]*
$\beta_4 > 0$	[(6) - (2)]	0.059 [0.010]
$\beta_5 \leq 0$	[(2) - (1)]	-0.074 [0.074]
$\beta_3 - \beta_1 \lessgtr 0$ [1]	[(4) - (2)] - [(3) - (1)]	0.269 (0.090)*
$\beta_4 - \beta_2 > 0$	[(6) - (2)] - [(5) - (1)]	0.187 (0.121)
$[\beta_4 - \beta_2] - [\beta_3 - \beta_1] \lessgtr 0$	[(6) - (5)] - [(4) - (3)]	-0.082 (0.595)

Notes: Graph is from a separate OLS regression of the outcome, which is an indicator for designation as youth leader on the treatments and their interactions with an indicator for being above the median of the PSM index. Controls include village fixed effects and variables in panels A and B in Table 1. Huber-White robust standard errors in brackets in third column of table. Prob > F based on Wald tests in parentheses in third column of table. Vertical lines in the graph represent 90% confidence intervals based on two-sided hypothesis tests. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$ in the table are from two-sided hypothesis tests when hypothesis has ambiguous sign and from one-sided hypothesis tests when hypothesis has an unambiguous sign. [1]Test not indicated in pre-analysis plan.

Figure 5: Heterogeneous effects of workshop treatments on change in interest in joining SK since baseline, among individuals with low and high public service motivation.



$$interest\_change_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T1_i + \beta_2 T2_i + \beta_3 T1_i^* HighPSM_i + \beta_4 T2_i^* HighPSM_i + \beta_5 HighPSM_i + X_i'\Gamma + \epsilon_i$$

Hypothesis Test	Graphical Test	Result
$\beta_1 \lesseqgtr 0$	[(3) - (1)]	0.059 [0.152]
$\beta_2 < 0$	[(5) - (1)]	-0.235 [0.094]***
$\beta_3 > 0$	[(4) - (2)]	-0.260 [0.231]
$\beta_4 > 0$	[(6) - (2)]	0.068 [0.151]
$\beta_5 \leq 0$	[(2) - (1)]	0.130 [0.149]
$\beta_3 - \beta_1 \lesseqgtr 0$ [1]	[(4) - (2)] - [(3) - (1)]	-0.318 (0.389)
$\beta_4 - \beta_2 > 0$	[(6) - (2)] - [(5) - (1)]	0.303 (0.084)*
$[\beta_4 - \beta_2] - [\beta_3 - \beta_1] \lesseqgtr 0$	[(6) - (5)] - [(4) - (3)]	0.622 (0.063)*

Notes: Graph is from a separate OLS regression of the outcome, which is the percentage point change in interest in joining SK since baseline, on the treatments and their interactions with an indicator for being above the median of the PSM index. Controls include village fixed effects and variables in panels A and B in Table 1. Huber-White robust standard errors in brackets in third column of table. Prob > F based on Wald tests in parentheses in third column of table. Vertical lines in the graph represent 90% confidence intervals based on two-sided hypothesis tests. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$ in the table are from two-sided hypothesis tests when hypothesis has ambiguous sign and from one-sided hypothesis tests when hypothesis has an unambiguous sign. [1]Test not indicated in pre-analysis plan.

Figure 6: Heterogeneous effects of workshop treatments on engagement in village youth programs, among individuals with low and high public service motivation.



$$youth\_engage_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T1_i + \beta_2 T2_i + \beta_3 T1_i^* HighPSM_i + \beta_4 T2_i^* HighPSM_i + \beta_5 HighPSM_i + X_i'\Gamma + \epsilon_i$$

Hypothesis Test	Graphical Test	Result
$\beta_1 \lessgtr 0$	[(3) - (1)]	-0.079 [0.066]
$\beta_2 < 0$	[(5) - (1)]	-0.149 [0.065]***
$\beta_3 > 0$	[(4) - (2)]	0.139 [0.096]*
$\beta_4 > 0$	[(6) - (2)]	0.132 [0.096]*
$\beta_5 \leq 0$	[(2) - (1)]	-0.128 [0.075]**
$\beta_3 - \beta_1 \lessgtr 0$ [1]	[(4) - (2)] - [(3) - (1)]	0.218 (0.147)
$\beta_4 - \beta_2 > 0$	[(6) - (2)] - [(5) - (1)]	0.281 (0.028)**
$[\beta_4 - \beta_2] - [\beta_3 - \beta_1] \lessgtr 0$	[(6) - (5)] - [(4) - (3)]	0.064 (0.685)

Notes: Graph is from a separate OLS regression of the outcome, which is an indicator for engagement in village youth programs on the treatments and their interactions with an indicator for being above the median of the PSM index. Controls include village fixed effects and variables in panels A and B in Table 1. Huber-White robust standard errors in brackets in third column of table. Prob > F based on Wald tests in parentheses in third column of table. Vertical lines in the graph represent 90% confidence intervals based on two-sided hypothesis tests. $^{***}p < 0.01$,$^{**}p < 0.05$,$^{*}p < 0.1$ in the table are from two-sided hypothesis tests when hypothesis has ambiguous sign and from one-sided hypothesis tests when hypothesis has an unambiguous sign. [1]Test not indicated in pre-analysis plan.

Figure 7: Heterogeneous effects of workshop treatments on nomination as a youth leader, among individuals with low and high aptitude.



$$nominated_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T1_i + \beta_2 T2_i + \beta_3 T1_i^* HighAptitude_i + \beta_4 T2_i^* HighAptitude_i + \beta_5 HighAptitude_i + X_i'\Gamma + \epsilon_i$$

Hypothesis Test	Graphical Test	Result
$\beta_1 \lessgtr 0$	[(3) - (1)]	-0.063 [0.081]
$\beta_2 < 0$	[(5) - (1)]	-0.164 [0.085]**
$\beta_3 > 0$	[(4) - (2)]	0.047 [0.110]
$\beta_4 > 0$	[(6) - (2)]	0.142 [0.109]*
$\beta_5 \leq 0$	[(2) - (1)]	-0.028 [0.080]
$\beta_3 - \beta_1 \lessgtr 0$ [1]	[(4) - (2)] - [(3) - (1)]	0.109 (0.536)
$\beta_4 - \beta_2 > 0$	[(6) - (2)] - [(5) - (1)]	0.306 (0.046)**
$[\beta_4 - \beta_2] - [\beta_3 - \beta_1] \lessgtr 0$	[(6) - (5)] - [(4) - (3)]	0.196 (0.266)

Notes: Graph is from a separate OLS regression of the outcome, which is an indicator for nomination as youth leader on the treatments and their interactions with an indicator for being above the median of the Digit Span Score index. Controls include village fixed effects and variables in panels A and B in Table 1. Huber-White robust standard errors in brackets in third column of table. Prob > F based on Wald tests in parentheses in third column of table. Vertical lines in the graph represent 90% confidence intervals based on two-sided hypothesis tests. $^{***}p < 0.01$,** $p < 0.05$,* $p < 0.1$ in the table are from two-sided hypothesis tests when hypothesis has ambiguous sign and from one-sided hypothesis tests when hypothesis has an unambiguous sign. [1]Test not indicated in pre-analysis plan.

Figure 8: Heterogeneous effects of workshop treatments on designation as a youth leader, among individuals with low and high aptitude.



$$designated_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T1_i + \beta_2 T2_i + \beta_3 T1_i^* HighAptitude_i + \beta_4 T2_i^* HighAptitude_i + \beta_5 HighAptitude_i + X_i'\Gamma + \epsilon_i$$

Hypothesis Test	Graphical Test	Result
$\beta_1 \lessgtr 0$	[(3) - (1)]	-0.078 [0.073]
$\beta_2 < 0$	[(5) - (1)]	-0.139 [0.078]**
$\beta_3 > 0$	[(4) - (2)]	0.029 [0.098]
$\beta_4 > 0$	[(6) - (2)]	0.080 [0.101]
$\beta_5 \leq 0$	[(2) - (1)]	-0.052 [0.073]
$\beta_3 - \beta_1 \lessgtr 0$ [1]	[(4) - (2)] - [(3) - (1)]	0.107 (0.499)
$\beta_4 - \beta_2 > 0$	[(6) - (2)] - [(5) - (1)]	0.219 (0.094)*
$[\beta_4 - \beta_2] - [\beta_3 - \beta_1] \lessgtr 0$	[(6) - (5)] - [(4) - (3)]	0.112 (0.481)

Notes: Graph is from a separate OLS regression of the outcome, which is an indicator for designation as youth leader on the treatments and their interactions with an indicator for being above the median of the Digit Span Score index. Controls include village fixed effects and variables in panels A and B in Table 1. Huber-White robust standard errors in brackets in third column of table. Prob > F based on Wald tests in parentheses in third column of table. Vertical lines in the graph represent 90% confidence intervals based on two-sided hypothesis tests. $^{***}p < 0.01$,** $p < 0.05$,* $p < 0.1$ in the table are from two-sided hypothesis tests when hypothesis has ambiguous sign and from one-sided hypothesis tests when hypothesis has an unambiguous sign. [1]Test not indicated in pre-analysis plan.

Figure 9: Heterogeneous effects of workshop treatments on change in interest in joining SK since baseline, among individuals with low and high aptitude.



$$interest\_change_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T1_i + \beta_2 T2_i + \beta_3 T1_i^* HighAptitude_i + \beta_4 T2_i^* HighAptitude_i + \beta_5 HighAptitude_i + X_i'\Gamma + \epsilon_i$$

Hypothesis Test	Graphical Test	Result
$\beta_1 \lessgtr 0$	[(3) - (1)]	-0.025 [0.122]
$\beta_2 < 0$	[(5) - (1)]	-0.216 [0.0918]***
$\beta_3 > 0$	[(4) - (2)]	-0.092 [0.159]
$\beta_4 > 0$	[(6) - (2)]	0.032 [0.150]
$\beta_5 \leq 0$	[(2) - (1)]	-0.074 [0.143]
$\beta_3 - \beta_1 \lessgtr 0$ [1]	[(4) - (2)] - [(3) - (1)]	-0.067 (0.801)
$\beta_4 - \beta_2 > 0$	[(6) - (2)] - [(5) - (1)]	0.247 (0.128)
$[\beta_4 - \beta_2] - [\beta_3 - \beta_1] \lessgtr 0$	[(6) - (5)] - [(4) - (3)]	0.314 (0.239)

Notes: Graph is from a separate OLS regression of the outcome, which is the percentage point change in interest in joining SK since baseline, on the treatments and their interactions with an indicator for being above the median of the Digit Span Score index. Controls include village fixed effects and variables in panels A and B in Table 1. Huber-White robust standard errors in brackets in third column of table. Prob > F based on Wald tests in parentheses in third column of table. Vertical lines in the graph represent 90% confidence intervals based on two-sided hypothesis tests. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$ in the table are from two-sided hypothesis tests when hypothesis has ambiguous sign and from one-sided hypothesis tests when hypothesis has an unambiguous sign. [1]Test not indicated in pre-analysis plan.

Figure 10: Heterogeneous effects of workshop treatments on engagement in village youth programs, among individuals with low and high aptitude.



$$youth\_engage_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T1_i + \beta_2 T2_i + \beta_3 T1_i^* HighAptitude_i + \beta_4 T2_i^* HighAptitude_i + \beta_5 HighAptitude_i + X_i'\Gamma + \epsilon_i$$

Hypothesis Test	Graphical Test	Result
$\beta_1 \lessgtr 0$	[(3) - (1)]	-0.075 [0.071]
$\beta_2 < 0$	[(5) - (1)]	-0.158 [0.073]**
$\beta_3 > 0$	[(4) - (2)]	0.125 [0.096]*
$\beta_4 > 0$	[(6) - (2)]	0.129 [0.095]*
$\beta_5 \leq 0$	[(2) - (1)]	-0.035 [0.067]
$\beta_3 - \beta_1 \lessgtr 0$ [1]	[(4) - (2)] - [(3) - (1)]	0.199 (0.204)
$\beta_4 - \beta_2 > 0$	[(6) - (2)] - [(5) - (1)]	0.287 (0.036)**
$[\beta_4 - \beta_2] - [\beta_3 - \beta_1] \lessgtr 0$	[(6) - (5)] - [(4) - (3)]	0.088 (0.594)

Notes: Graph is from a separate OLS regression of the outcome, which is an indicator for engagement in village youth programs on the treatments and their interactions with an indicator for being above the median of the Digit Span Score index. Controls include village fixed effects and variables in panels A and B in Table 1. Huber-White robust standard errors in brackets in third column of table. Prob > F based on Wald tests in parentheses in third column of table. Vertical lines in the graph represent 90% confidence intervals based on two-sided hypothesis tests. $^{***}p < 0.01, ^{**}p < 0.05, ^{*}p < 0.1$ in the table are from two-sided hypothesis tests when hypothesis has ambiguous sign and from one-sided hypothesis tests when hypothesis has an unambiguous sign. [1]Test not indicated in pre-analysis plan.

Figure 11: Heterogeneous effects of workshop treatments on nomination as a youth leader, among individuals with low and high personality.



$$nominated_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T1_i + \beta_2 T2_i + \beta_3 T1_i^* HighPersonality_i + \beta_4 T2_i^* HighPersonality_i + \beta_5 HighPersonality_i + X_i'\Gamma + \epsilon_i$$

Hypothesis Test	Graphical Test	Result
$\beta_1 \lessgtr 0$	[(3) - (1)]	-0.045 [0.079]
$\beta_2 < 0$	[(5) - (1)]	-0.085 [0.077]
$\beta_3 > 0$	[(4) - (2)]	0.008 [0.108]
$\beta_4 > 0$	[(6) - (2)]	0.001 [0.111]
$\beta_5 \leq 0$	[(2) - (1)]	0.042 [0.082]
$\beta_3 - \beta_1 \lessgtr 0$ [1]	[(4) - (2)] - [(3) - (1)]	0.053 (0.758)
$\beta_4 - \beta_2 > 0$	[(6) - (2)] - [(5) - (1)]	0.086 (0.309)
$[\beta_4 - \beta_2] - [\beta_3 - \beta_1] \lessgtr 0$	[(6) - (5)] - [(4) - (3)]	0.032 (0.850)

Notes: Graph is from a separate OLS regression of the outcome, which is an indicator for nomination as youth leader on the treatments and their interactions with an indicator for being above the median of the Big Five Inventory index. Controls include village fixed effects and variables in panels A and B in Table 1. Huber-White robust standard errors in brackets in third column of table. Prob > F based on Wald tests in parentheses in third column of table. Vertical lines in the graph represent 90% confidence intervals based on two-sided hypothesis tests. $^{***}p < 0.01$,** $p < 0.05$,* $p < 0.1$ in the table are from two-sided hypothesis tests when hypothesis has ambiguous sign and from one-sided hypothesis tests when hypothesis has an unambiguous sign. [1]Test not indicated in pre-analysis plan.

Figure 12: Heterogeneous effects of workshop treatments on designation as a youth leader, among individuals with low and high personality.



$$designated_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T1_i + \beta_2 T2_i + \beta_3 T1_i^* HighPersonality_i + \beta_4 T2_i^* HighPersonality_i + \beta_5 HighPersonality_i + X_i'\Gamma + \epsilon_i$$

Hypothesis Test	Graphical Test	Result
$\beta_1 \lessgtr 0$	[(3) - (1)]	-0.078 [0.070]
$\beta_2 < 0$	[(5) - (1)]	-0.071 [0.071]
$\beta_3 > 0$	[(4) - (2)]	0.023 [0.098]
$\beta_4 > 0$	[(6) - (2)]	-0.061 [0.100]
$\beta_5 \leq 0$	[(2) - (1)]	0.029 [0.076]
$\beta_3 - \beta_1 \lessgtr 0$ [1]	[(4) - (2)] - [(3) - (1)]	0.101 (0.510)
$\beta_4 - \beta_2 > 0$	[(6) - (2)] - [(5) - (1)]	0.010 (0.476)
$[\beta_4 - \beta_2] - [\beta_3 - \beta_1] \lessgtr 0$	[(6) - (5)] - [(4) - (3)]	-0.092 (0.531)

Notes: Graph is from a separate OLS regression of the outcome, which is an indicator for designation as youth leader on the treatments and their interactions with an indicator for being above the median of the Big Five Inventory index. Controls include village fixed effects and variables in panels A and B in Table 1. Huber-White robust standard errors in brackets in third column of table. Prob > F based on Wald tests in parentheses in third column of table. Vertical lines in the graph represent 90% confidence intervals based on two-sided hypothesis tests. $^{***}p < 0.01$,$^{**}p < 0.05$,$^{*}p < 0.1$ in the table are from two-sided hypothesis tests when hypothesis has ambiguous sign and from one-sided hypothesis tests when hypothesis has an unambiguous sign. [1]Test not indicated in pre-analysis plan.

Figure 13: Heterogeneous effects of workshop treatments on change in interest in joining SK since baseline, among individuals with low and high personality.



$$interest\_change_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T1_i + \beta_2 T2_i + \beta_3 T1_i^* HighPersonality_i + \beta_4 T2_i^* HighPersonality_i + \beta_5 HighPersonality_i + X_i'\Gamma + \epsilon_i$$

Hypothesis Test	Graphical Test	Result
$\beta_1 \lesseqgtr 0$	[(3) - (1)]	0.031 [0.142]
$\beta_2 < 0$	[(5) - (1)]	-0.230 [0.090]***
$\beta_3 > 0$	[(4) - (2)]	-0.214 [0.214]
$\beta_4 > 0$	[(6) - (2)]	0.072 [0.136]
$\beta_5 \leq 0$	[(2) - (1)]	0.032 [0.151]
$\beta_3 - \beta_1 \lesseqgtr 0$ [1]	[(4) - (2)] - [(3) - (1)]	-0.245 (0.475)
$\beta_4 - \beta_2 > 0$	[(6) - (2)] - [(5) - (1)]	0.302 (0.067)*
$[\beta_4 - \beta_2] - [\beta_3 - \beta_1] \lesseqgtr 0$	[(6) - (5)] - [(4) - (3)]	0.546 (0.095)*

Notes: Graph is from a separate OLS regression of the outcome, which is the percentage point change in interest in joining SK since baseline, on the treatments and their interactions with an indicator for being above the median of the Big Five Inventory index. Controls include village fixed effects and variables in panels A and B in Table 1. Huber-White robust standard errors in brackets in third column of table. Prob > F based on Wald tests in parentheses in third column of table. Vertical lines in the graph represent 90% confidence intervals based on two-sided hypothesis tests. $^{***}p < 0.01, ^{**}p < 0.05, ^{*}p < 0.1$ in the table are from two-sided hypothesis tests when hypothesis has ambiguous sign and from one-sided hypothesis tests when hypothesis has an unambiguous sign. [1]Test not indicated in pre-analysis plan.

Figure 14: Heterogeneous effects of workshop treatments on engagement in village youth programs, among individuals with low and high personality.



$$youth\_engage_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T1_i + \beta_2 T2_i + \beta_3 T1_i^* HighPersonality_i + \beta_4 T2_i^* HighPersonality_i + \beta_5 HighPersonality_i + X_i'\Gamma + \epsilon_i$$

Hypothesis Test	Graphical Test	Result
$\beta_1 \lessgtr 0$	[(3) - (1)]	0.012 [0.072]
$\beta_2 < 0$	[(5) - (1)]	-0.032 [0.068]
$\beta_3 > 0$	[(4) - (2)]	-0.035 [0.094]
$\beta_4 > 0$	[(6) - (2)]	-0.101 [0.095]
$\beta_5 \leq 0$	[(2) - (1)]	0.069 [0.076]
$\beta_3 - \beta_1 \lessgtr 0$ [1]	[(4) - (2)] - [(3) - (1)]	-0.047 (0.763)
$\beta_4 - \beta_2 > 0$	[(6) - (2)] - [(5) - (1)]	-0.069 (0.324)
$[\beta_4 - \beta_2] - [\beta_3 - \beta_1] \lessgtr 0$	[(6) - (5)] - [(4) - (3)]	-0.022 (0.891)

Notes: Graph is from a separate OLS regression of the outcome, which is an indicator for engagement in village youth programs on the treatments and their interactions with an indicator for being above the median of the Big Five Inventory index. Controls include village fixed effects and variables in panels A and B in Table 1. Huber-White robust standard errors in brackets in third column of table. Prob > F based on Wald tests in parentheses in third column of table. Vertical lines in the graph represent 90% confidence intervals based on two-sided hypothesis tests. $^{***}p < 0.01, ^{**}p < 0.05, ^{*}p < 0.1$ in the table are from two-sided hypothesis tests when hypothesis has ambiguous sign and from one-sided hypothesis tests when hypothesis has an unambiguous sign. [1]Test not indicated in pre-analysis plan.

Figure 15: Heterogeneous effects of workshop treatments on nomination as a youth leader, among individuals with low and high aspiration.



$$nominated_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T1_i + \beta_2 T2_i + \beta_3 T1_i^* HighAspiration_i + \beta_4 T2_i^* HighAspiration_i + \beta_5 HighAspiration_i + X_i'\Gamma + \epsilon_i$$

Hypothesis Test	Graphical Test	Result
$\beta_1 \lessgtr 0$	[(3) - (1)]	-0.127 [0.080]
$\beta_2 < 0$	[(5) - (1)]	-0.135 [0.081]**
$\beta_3 > 0$	[(4) - (2)]	0.180 [0.113]*
$\beta_4 > 0$	[(6) - (2)]	0.114 [0.112]
$\beta_5 \leq 0$	[(2) - (1)]	-0.094 [0.083]
$\beta_3 - \beta_1 \lessgtr 0$ [1]	[(4) - (2)] - [(3) - (1)]	0.307 (0.088)*
$\beta_4 - \beta_2 > 0$	[(6) - (2)] - [(5) - (1)]	0.250 (0.081)*
$[\beta_4 - \beta_2] - [\beta_3 - \beta_1] \lessgtr 0$	[(6) - (5)] - [(4) - (3)]	-0.057 (0.748)

Notes: Graph is from a separate OLS regression of the outcome, which is an indicator for nomination as youth leader on the treatments and their interactions with an indicator for being above the median of the Aspiration index. Controls include village fixed effects and variables in panels A and B in Table 1. Huber-White robust standard errors in brackets in third column of table. Prob > F based on Wald tests in parentheses in third column of table. Vertical lines in the graph represent 90% confidence intervals based on two-sided hypothesis tests. $^{***}p < 0.01$,** $p < 0.05$,* $p < 0.1$ in the table are from two-sided hypothesis tests when hypothesis has ambiguous sign and from one-sided hypothesis tests when hypothesis has an unambiguous sign. [1]Test not indicated in pre-analysis plan.

Figure 16: Heterogeneous effects of workshop treatments on designation as a youth leader, among individuals with low and high aspiration.



$$designated_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T1_i + \beta_2 T2_i + \beta_3 T1_i^* HighAspiration_i + \beta_4 T2_i^* HighAspiration_i + \beta_5 HighAspiration_i + X_i'\Gamma + \epsilon_i$$

Hypothesis Test	Graphical Test	Result
$\beta_1 \lessgtr 0$	[(3) - (1)]	-0.120 [0.076]
$\beta_2 < 0$	[(5) - (1)]	-0.171 [0.075]***
$\beta_3 > 0$	[(4) - (2)]	0.120 [0.102]
$\beta_4 > 0$	[(6) - (2)]	0.159 [0.103]*
$\beta_5 \leq 0$	[(2) - (1)]	-0.074 [0.078]
$\beta_3 - \beta_1 \lessgtr 0$ [1]	[(4) -0 (2)] - [(3) - (1)]	0.241 (0.150)
$\beta_4 - \beta_2 > 0$	[(6) - (2)] - [(5) - (1)]	0.329 (0.024)**
$[\beta_4 - \beta_2] - [\beta_3 - \beta_1] \lessgtr 0$	[(6) - (5)] - [(4) - (3)]	0.088 (0.580)

Notes: Graph is from a separate OLS regression of the outcome, which is an indicator for designation as youth leader on the treatments and their interactions with an indicator for being above the median of the Aspiration index. Controls include village fixed effects and variables in panels A and B in Table 1. Huber-White robust standard errors in brackets in third column of table. Prob > F based on Wald tests in parentheses in third column of table. Vertical lines in the graph represent 90% confidence intervals based on two-sided hypothesis tests. $^{***}p < 0.01$,$^{**}p < 0.05$,$^{*}p < 0.1$ in the table are from two-sided hypothesis tests when hypothesis has ambiguous sign and from one-sided hypothesis tests when hypothesis has an unambiguous sign. [1]Test not indicated in pre-analysis plan.

Figure 17: Heterogeneous effects of workshop treatments on change in interest in joining SK since baseline, among individuals with low and high aspiration.



$$interest\_change_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T1_i + \beta_2 T2_i + \beta_3 T1_i^* HighAspiration_i + \beta_4 T2_i^* HighAspiration_i + \beta_5 HighAspiration_i + X_i'\Gamma + \epsilon_i$$

Hypothesis Test	Graphical Test	Result
$\beta_1 \lessgtr 0$	[(3) - (1)]	-0.058 [0.121]
$\beta_2 < 0$	[(5) - (1)]	-0.193 [0.099]**
$\beta_3 > 0$	[(4) - (2)]	-0.027 [0.219]
$\beta_4 > 0$	[(6) - (2)]	-0.016 [0.167]
$\beta_5 \leq 0$	[(2) - (1)]	0.101 [0.156]
$\beta_3 - \beta_1 \lessgtr 0$ [1]	[(4) - (2)] - [(3) - (1)]	0.032 (0.921)
$\beta_4 - \beta_2 > 0$	[(6) - (2)] - [(5) - (01)]	0.178 (0.231)
$[\beta_4 - \beta_2] - [\beta_3 - \beta_1] \lessgtr 0$	[(6) - (5)] - [(4) - (3)]	0.146 (0.664)

Notes: Graph is from a separate OLS regression of the outcome, which is the percentage point change in interest in joining SK since baseline, on the treatments and their interactions with an indicator for being above the median of the Aspiration index. Controls include village fixed effects and variables in panels A and B in Table 1. Huber-White robust standard errors in brackets in third column of table. Prob > F based on Wald tests in parentheses in third column of table. Vertical lines in the graph represent 90% confidence intervals based on two-sided hypothesis tests. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$ in the table are from two-sided hypothesis tests when hypothesis has ambiguous sign and from one-sided hypothesis tests when hypothesis has an unambiguous sign. [1]Test not indicated in pre-analysis plan.

Figure 18: Heterogeneous effects of workshop treatments on engagement in village youth programs, among individuals with low and high aspiration.



$$youth\_engage_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T1_i + \beta_2 T2_i + \beta_3 T1_i^* HighAspiration_i + \beta_4 T2_i^* HighAspiration_i + \beta_5 HighAspiration_i + X_i'\Gamma + \epsilon_i$$

Hypothesis Test	Graphical Test	Result
$\beta_1 \lessgtr 0$	[(3) - (1)]	-0.061 [0.063]
$\beta_2 < 0$	[(5) - (1)]	-0.119 [0.062]**
$\beta_3 > 0$	[(4) - (2)]	0.109 [0.095]
$\beta_4 > 0$	[(6) - (2)]	0.070 [0.096]
$\beta_5 \leq 0$	[(2) - (1)]	-0.084 [0.071]
$\beta_3 - \beta_1 \lessgtr 0$ [1]	[(4) - (2)] - [(3) - (1)]	0.169 (0.243)
$\beta_4 - \beta_2 > 0$	[(6) - (2)] - [(5) - (1)]	0.188 (0.094)*
$[\beta_4 - \beta_2] - [\beta_3 - \beta_1] \lessgtr 0$	[(6) - (5)] - [(4) - (3)]	0.019 (0.905)

Notes: Graph is from a separate OLS regression of the outcome, which is an indicator for engagement in village youth programs on the treatments and their interactions with an indicator for being above the median of the Aspiration index. Controls include village fixed effects and variables in panels A and B in Table 1. Huber-White robust standard errors in brackets in third column of table. Prob > F based on Wald tests in parentheses in third column of table. Vertical lines in the graph represent 90% confidence intervals based on two-sided hypothesis tests. $^{***}p < 0.01$,$^{**}p < 0.05$,$^{*}p < 0.1$ in the table are from two-sided hypothesis tests when hypothesis has ambiguous sign and from one-sided hypothesis tests when hypothesis has an unambiguous sign. [1]Test not indicated in pre-analysis plan.

Figure 19: Heterogeneous effects of workshop treatments on nomination as a youth leader, among individuals with low and high integrity.



$$nominated_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T1_i + \beta_2 T2_i + \beta_3 T1_i^* HighIntegrity_i + \beta_4 T2_i^* HighIntegrity_i + \beta_5 HighIntegrity_i + X_i'\Gamma + \epsilon_i$$

Hypothesis Test	Graphical Test	Result
$\beta_1 \lessgtr 0$	[(3) - (1)]	-0.139 [0.090]
$\beta_2 < 0$	[(5) - (1)]	-0.163 [0.096]**
$\beta_3 > 0$	[(4) - (2)]	0.156 [0.113]*
$\beta_4 > 0$	[(6) - (2)]	0.123 [0.118]
$\beta_5 \leq 0$	[(2) - (1)]	-0.092 [0.081]
$\beta_3 - \beta_1 \lessgtr 0$ [1]	[(4) - (2)] - [(3) - (1)]	0.295 (0.123)
$\beta_4 - \beta_2 > 0$	[(6) - (2)] - [(5) - (1)]	0.286 (0.079)*
$[\beta_4 - \beta_2] - [\beta_3 - \beta_1] \lessgtr 0$	[(6) - (5)] - [(4) - (3)]	-.010 (0.960)

Notes: Graph is from a separate OLS regression of the outcome, which is an indicator for nomination as youth leader on the treatments and their interactions with an indicator for being above the median of the Integrity index. Controls include village fixed effects and variables in panels A and B in Table 1. Huber-White robust standard errors in brackets in third column of table. Prob > F based on Wald tests in parentheses in third column of table. Vertical lines in the graph represent 90% confidence intervals based on two-sided hypothesis tests. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$ in the table are from two-sided hypothesis tests when hypothesis has ambiguous sign and from one-sided hypothesis tests when hypothesis has an unambiguous sign. [1]Test not indicated in pre-analysis plan.

Figure 20: Heterogeneous effects of workshop treatments on designation as a youth leader, among individuals with low and high integrity.



$$designated_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T1_i + \beta_2 T2_i + \beta_3 T1_i^* HighIntegrity_i + \beta_4 T2_i^* HighIntegrity_i + \beta_5 HighIntegrity_i + X_i'\Gamma + \epsilon_i$$

Hypothesis Test	Graphical Test	Result
$\beta_1 \lessgtr 0$	[(3) - (1)]	-0.111 [0.078]
$\beta_2 < 0$	[(5) - (1)]	-0.170 [0.081]**
$\beta_3 > 0$	[(4) - (2)]	0.079 [0.100]
$\beta_4 > 0$	[(6) - (2)]	0.113 [0.103]
$\beta_5 \leq 0$	[(2) - (1)]	-0.036 [0.074]
$\beta_3 - \beta_1 \lessgtr 0$ [1]	[(4) - (2)] - [(3) - (1)]	0.190 (0.256)
$\beta_4 - \beta_2 > 0$	[(6) - (2)] - [(5) - (1)]	0.283 (0.051)*
$[\beta_4 - \beta_2] - [\beta_3 - \beta_1] \lessgtr 0$	[(6) - (5)] - [(4) - (3)]	0.093 (0.577)

Notes: Graph is from a separate OLS regression of the outcome, which is an indicator for designation as youth leader on the treatments and their interactions with an indicator for being above the median of the Integrity index. Controls include village fixed effects and variables in panels A and B in Table 1. Huber-White robust standard errors in brackets in third column of table. Prob > F based on Wald tests in parentheses in third column of table. Vertical lines in the graph represent 90% confidence intervals based on two-sided hypothesis tests. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$ in the table are from two-sided hypothesis tests when hypothesis has ambiguous sign and from one-sided hypothesis tests when hypothesis has an unambiguous sign. [1]Test not indicated in pre-analysis plan.

Figure 21: Heterogeneous effects of workshop treatments on change in interest in joining SK since baseline, among individuals with low and high integrity.



$$interest\_change_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T1_i + \beta_2 T2_i + \beta_3 T1_i^* HighIntegrity_i + \beta_4 T2_i^* HighIntegrity_i + \beta_5 HighIntegrity_i + X_i'\Gamma + \epsilon_i$$

Hypothesis Test	Graphical Test	Result
$\beta_1 \lessgtr 0$	[(3) - (1)]	-0.059 [0.232]
$\beta_2 < 0$	[(5) - (1)]	-0.292 [0.151]**
$\beta_3 > 0$	[(4) - (2)]	-0.020 [0.269]
$\beta_4 > 0$	[(6) - (2)]	0.135 [0.160]
$\beta_5 \leq 0$	[(2) - (1)]	-0.164 [0.166]
$\beta_3 - \beta_1 \lessgtr 0$ [1]	[(4) - (2)] - [(3) - (1)]	0.038 (0.938)
$\beta_4 - \beta_2 > 0$	[(6) - (2)] - [(5) - (1)]	0.427 (0.079)*
$[\beta_4 - \beta_2] - [\beta_3 - \beta_1] \lessgtr 0$	[(6) - (5)] - [(4) - (3)]	0.388 (0.328)

Notes: Graph is from a separate OLS regression of the outcome, which is the percentage point change in interest in joining SK since baseline, on the treatments and their interactions with an indicator for being above the median of the Integrity index. Controls include village fixed effects and variables in panels A and B in Table 1. Huber-White robust standard errors in brackets in third column of table. Prob > F based on Wald tests in parentheses in third column of table. Vertical lines in the graph represent 90% confidence intervals based on two-sided hypothesis tests. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$ in the table are from two-sided hypothesis tests when hypothesis has ambiguous sign and from one-sided hypothesis tests when hypothesis has an unambiguous sign. [1]Test not indicated in pre-analysis plan.

Figure 22: Heterogeneous effects of workshop treatments on engagement in village youth programs, among individuals with low and high integrity.



$$youth\_engage_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T1_i + \beta_2 T2_i + \beta_3 T1_i^* HighIntegrity_i + \beta_4 T2_i^* HighIntegrity_i + \beta_5 HighIntegrity_i + X_i'\Gamma + \epsilon_i$$

Hypothesis Test	Graphical Test	Result
$\beta_1 \lessgtr 0$	[(3) - (1)]	-0.000 [0.087]
$\beta_2 < 0$	[(5) - (1)]	-0.066 [0.089]
$\beta_3 > 0$	[(4) - (2)]	-0.007 [0.102]
$\beta_4 > 0$	[(6) - (2)]	-0.033 [0.108]
$\beta_5 \leq 0$	[(2) - (1)]	0.083 [0.072]
$\beta_3 - \beta_1 \lessgtr 0$ [1]	[(4) - (2)] - [(3) - (1)]	-0.007 (0.970)
$\beta_4 - \beta_2 > 0$	[(6) - (2)] - [(5) - (1)]	0.033 (0.431)
$[\beta_4 - \beta_2] - [\beta_3 - \beta_1] \lessgtr 0$	[(6) - (5)] - [(4) - (3)]	0.040 (0.831)

Notes: Graph is from a separate OLS regression of the outcome, which is an indicator for engagement in village youth programs on the treatments and their interactions with an indicator for being above the median of the Integrity index. Controls include village fixed effects and variables in panels A and B in Table 1. Huber-White robust standard errors in brackets in third column of table. Prob > F based on Wald tests in parentheses in third column of table. Vertical lines in the graph represent 90% confidence intervals based on two-sided hypothesis tests. $^{***}p < 0.01$,** $p < 0.05$,* $p < 0.1$ in the table are from two-sided hypothesis tests when hypothesis has ambiguous sign and from one-sided hypothesis tests when hypothesis has an unambiguous sign. [1]Test not indicated in pre-analysis plan.

Appendix

Figure 23: Call for applications poster for the leadership training workshop.

Figure 24: Leadership training workshop content.

Foundational Training for Aspiring Young Politicians

PROGRAM

DAY 1		
TIME	ACTIVITY	OUTPUT/ REMARKS
1:00-06:00pm	Arrival and Registration Check-in	Participants are each given a workshop kit with materials needed for the workshop (e.g. pen, sheets of paper, name tag with ID number, program, handouts, and worksheets).
06:00-07:00pm	Dinner	
07:00-08:15pm	Opening Activity • Welcoming of Participants • Orientation to the Summit & House Rules • Expectations Setting • Objectives, Framework, and Program Schedule	Participants will be informed that there will be worksheets that they need to accomplish and submit for each plenary session.
08:15-09:30pm	PLENARY 1 Lead2Serve: The Case for Servant Leadership in Youth Councils • Interactive Exercise: The Evolution Game • Understanding Servant Leadership • Servant Leaders Models in Business • Servant Leadership Models in the Philippine Setting • The Compelling Need for Servant Leaders in Youth Councils Individual Activity/ Group Discussion (IA/GD) • What qualities of servant leaders do I demonstrate? • What can I contribute to our community?	Participants submit filled-in Worksheet 1 with answers to the 2 key questions during the IA/GD. They will need to indicate their ID number on the Worksheet but not their names.
09:30-10:00pm	Announcements for Day 2	Group faciliators will submit score sheets for the day after announcements
DAY 2		
07:00-08:00am	Breakfast	
08:00-10:00am	PLENARY 2 The Four Main Tasks of a Leader: • Personal Growth • Building Relationships • Developing People: The Two-Point Test • Enhancing Momentum in the Community	
10:00-10:30am	Refreshments	
10:30-12:00pm	Individual Activity/ Group Discussion (IA/GD) • What is the present youth situation in our community? • How is the present leadership addressing this situation and is it sufficient?	Participants submit filled-in Worksheet 2 with answers to the 2 key questions during the IA/GD.
12:00-01:15pm	Lunch	
01:15-03:30pm	STRUCTURED LEARNING EXERCISES Series of experiential learning activities, games, and challenges that will serve as practical application of concepts learned in the plenary OIL: Observation, Insight, Learning	
03:30-04:00pm	Refreshments	
04:00-07:00pm	Individual Activity/ Group Discussion (IA/GD) • If I were to assume an elective position in our community's youth council, what can I do differently? What program of action/ platform of government can I espouse?	Participants submit filled-in Worksheet 3 with answers to the 2 key questions during the IA/GD.
07:00-08:00pm	Dinner	
08:30-10:00pm	Synthesis of Day 1 & 2 Suggested Dynamics: Bonfire • Creative Presentation on Selected Program Themes • Burning the Boat Activity	Group faciliators will submit score sheets for the day after synthesis
DAY 3		
07:00-08:00am	Breakfast	
08:00-10:00am	PLENARY 3 THE EXCELLENCE OF A YOUNG LEADER • Defining excellence • The Law of Solid Ground • The Four Human Dimensions • Case Study	
10:00-10:30am	Refreshments	
10:30-12:00nn	Group Discussion • What is the most striking learning point did I encounter in this Summit? • How can I apply this concretely? • What could prevent or stop me from applying my learning?	Participants submit filled-in Worksheet 4 with answers to the 3 key questions during the IA/GD.
12:00-01:30pm	Lunch and Check Out	Group facilitators will submit score sheets for the day during lunch.
01:30-03:00pm	CLOSING • Commitment Ceremony • Closing Remarks: A Commitment to Lead in Order to Serve • Awarding of Certificate of Merit and announcement of recipients of the campaign posters sponsored by the Angara Centre [This information will not show in the actual program. It will be a surprise announcement.]	Worksheets will all be returned to the participants. PI will determine which participants make the cutoff score if the workshop has conditional incentive. All participants will receive the incentive if the workshop has unconditional incentive.

Figure 25: Workshop performance scoring rubric.

Workshop Participation Rubric and Guide

	3	2	1
Peer Interaction	Actively supports, engages, and listens to peers	Makes a sincere effort to interact with peers	Limited or no interaction with peers even when encouraged
Contribution to small group discussion	Comments advance level and depth of dialogue	Comments are relevant and clearly stated	Demonstrates weak level of interest and comments made are vague
Group dynamics	Small group dynamic and level of discussion are often better because of participant's presence	Small group dynamic and level of discussion are occassionally better, but not worse, because of participant's presence	Small group dynamic and level of discussion are sometimes disrupted by participant's presence

Consider upgrading score when:

1. Participant is becoming more active and/or making more effective comments that raise overall level of discussion and set examples for others.
2. Participant is asking thoughtful questions that enhance discussion and engage peers.

Consider downgrading score when:

1. Participant is not present for a significant portion of the time alloted for group discussions.
2. Participant is dominating discussions to the point that others are restricted from participating.
3. Participant is making negative, offensive, and/or disrespectful comments.
4. Participant is using electronic devices for reasons unrelated to the discussion.

Workshop Participation Rubric and Guide

	3	2	1
Content (80%)	Gives thorough and well thought out response. Responses demonstrate intensive thoughts and answers to questions that go beyond primary answers.	Gives a complete and relevant response. Responses demonstrate some thought and answers to questions are adequate.	Response includes extraneous points or completely misses the point of the question. Answers to questions provide little or no evidence of understanding of the questions.
Composition (20%)	Answers are proofread carefully; the point is clear.	There are some spelling and grammatical errors but the point is made with acceptable clarity	Answers have some problems in language and sentence structure that result in lack of clarity