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Benjamin Marx, Vincent Pons, and Tavneet Suri
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ABSTRACT

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Benjamin Marx
Sciences Po
Department of Economics
28 Rue des Saints-Peres
75007 Paris
France
benjamin.marx@sciencespo.fr

Tavneet Suri
MIT Sloan School of Management
100 Main Street, E62-517
Cambridge, MA 02142
and NBER
tavneet@mit.edu

Vincent Pons
Harvard Business School
Morgan Hall 289
Soldiers Field
Boston, MA 02163
and NBER
vpons@hbs.edu

A randomized controlled trials registry entry is available at https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/30

Voter Mobilization and Trust in Electoral Institutions: Evidence from Kenya*

Benjamin Marx† Vincent Pons‡ Tavneet Suri§

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Abstract

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Keywords: Elections, Electoral Institutions, Trust, Field Experiment, Kenya

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†Sciences Po Department of Economics and CEPR. Email: benjamin.marx@sciencespo.fr.

‡Harvard Business School and NBER. Email: vpons@hbs.edu.

§MIT Sloan School of Management and NBER. Email: tavneet@mit.edu. Corresponding author: E62-517, 100 Main Street, Cambridge MA 02142.

1 Introduction

A key challenge faced by democracies is to organize transparent elections that reinforce citizens' trust in their electoral system. At the same time, electoral institutions are responsible for ensuring that all citizens are enfranchised and participate in the democratic process. Voter mobilization in these contexts comes at a potential risk: mobilized citizens are more likely to observe, and (potentially) to be disappointed with the shortcomings of election administration. These trade-offs are likely to be most salient in settings with a newly established or fragile electoral institutions.

In the long term, voter participation and trust are essential for the consolidation of democracy (Lipset, 1959; Powell, 1982). Trust may also be a fundamental determinant of institutional quality and development (Nunn, 2009; Algan and Cahuc, 2013; Acemoglu et al., 2020). As a result, vast resources are being spent to make elections more transparent and to increase participation in developing countries, including a recent emphasis on digital voting and reporting technologies. Previous studies have focused on the impact of various forms of information provision and monitoring to target clientelism and vote-buying (Fujiwara and Wantchekon, 2013; Vicente, 2014) or voter fraud (Callen and Long, 2015). However, the findings from this literature are generally limited to short-run electoral outcomes. There is less evidence about the impacts of voter mobilization on attitudes towards elections and democracy.

In this paper, we show that basic information provided via mobile phone can increase electoral participation whilst simultaneously affecting attitudes towards the electoral system. These findings were obtained from a text messaging experiment conducted before the 2013 general elections in Kenya. In the six days leading up to the election, the Kenyan Electoral Commission (IEBC) sent eleven million SMS to slightly less than two million registered voters (14% of the electorate) across 12,160 randomly selected polling stations. The messages gave either basic encouragements to vote, information on the positions to be voted for on Election Day, or detailed information on the IEBC. Messages were sent to registered voters who provided their phone number to the IEBC. Unfortunately, the IEBC encountered numerous technical problems, signalling to the electorate the shortcomings of Kenya's electoral institutions.

We use official electoral data and survey data to measure the effects of this SMS campaign on voter participation, as well as attitudes and trust in institutions. Our estimates show that the text messages had a positive effect on voter turnout, and no effects on candidate vote shares. While the campaign's effects on administrative turnout are small in magnitude (0.3 percentage points, or 0.04 SD), our unusually large sample size allows us to precisely measure these effects. We then show that the treatments substantially decreased trust in Kenya's electoral institutions. Eight months after the election, recipients of the text messages report lower levels of trust towards the IEBC and lower satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in Kenya. However, the mobilization campaign did not reduce support for democratic ideals. The negative effects on trust are stronger for individuals associated with the losing side of the election, and for voters in constituencies that experienced some election-related violence.

We explore several mechanisms that could be driving these unexpected effects on attitudes. First, the SMS campaign could have raised voters' demands and turned them into "critical democrats" (Norris, 2011) displaying more skepticism towards their electoral institutions as well as greater engagement with politics. We show that this explanation is unlikely to hold since, overall, treated voters did not

report higher levels of information about politics after the election. Second, the diminished trust towards the IEBC could be driven by voters who turned out *because of the mobilization campaign*, and were disappointed by this voting experience. We test this mechanism by estimating trust and turnout effects among individuals who voted in previous elections and were therefore highly likely to turn out in 2013.[1] Among these voters, the mobilization campaign had no effect on turnout but a negative effect on trust of the same magnitude as that observed in the entire sample. Thus, "compliers" to the mobilization experiment are unlikely to be driving the campaign's negative effects on trust. Third, these effects could have resulted from increased expectations and disappointment caused by the mobilization campaign. However, this mechanism is at odds with our heterogeneous results among voters for whom the failures of election administration were more or less salient. We provide a detailed discussion of these potential mechanisms in Section 7.

Our preferred interpretation is that the IEBC's mobilization campaign sent mixed signals about the capacity and impartiality of Kenya's electoral institutions. On the one hand, the campaign reinforced voters' perceptions that the main role of Kenya's Electoral Commission was to guarantee free and fair elections, while it did not increase knowledge of the IEBC's other key missions (conduct elections, count votes, demarcate boundaries, voter registration, and voter education). On the other hand, individuals who received messages from the IEBC could observe that it had the resources to conduct a mass texting campaign—conveying a signal of high capacity. We show in a simple model that election failures observed after receiving a signal of capacity would have led citizens to re-evaluate their belief that the election was fair. Our empirical results suggest that, overall, the capacity signal trumped other signals, at the cost of undermining citizens' beliefs about the impartiality of their electoral institutions. Thus, mobilization campaigns conveying simple messages face complex trade-offs in contexts where electoral institutions must still build a reputation of impartiality. Mobilization signals ultimately have the potential to decrease trust in democratic institutions in fragile democracies.

Our paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, we build on a growing literature exploring the determinants of electoral capacity in developing countries. Previous work in this literature has emphasized issues of voter registration and voter fraud. For example, Ichino and Schündeln (2012) and Ascencio and Rueda (2019) study the effects of independent and partisan election observers in Ghana and Mexico, respectively. Harris et al. (2020) find little evidence that SMS reminders (or civic education messages) on their own improve voter registration outcomes in Kenya. Neggers (2018) randomizes the identity of polling station observers in India and shows that the religious and caste composition of the electoral personnel affects electoral outcomes. Berman et al. (2019) show that decreasing electoral misconduct improves attitudes towards government institutions in Afghanistan.

We report the findings from an unusally large policy experiment implemented in collaboration with Kenya's newly established electoral commission, the IEBC. Our study was unique not only in terms of scale, but also for the context in which it took place. The 2013 Kenyan election took place in the midst of broad institutional change initiated by the 2010 constitutional referendum. The 2013 election was also the first major election conducted in Kenya since the 2007-08 post-electoral violence, in which hundreds

[1] In the control group, 97% of citizens who voted in the 2007 election and the 2010 referendum also voted in 2013.

of thousands of individuals were displaced and thousands lost their lives. This setting allows us to study how a new electoral institution establishes its credibility in fragile settings. This also speaks to the literature on elections conducted in post-conflict or transitional societies (Lyons, 2004; Finkel et al., 2012; Driscoll and Hidalgo, 2014; Arriola et al., 2017). There is little rigorous evidence on the work done by electoral commissions in these contexts, despite the prominent role that these institutions aim to play in fostering peace and reconciliation. This paper fills this gap by showing the tradeoffs faced by the IEBC in consolidating the democratic process in Kenya.

Beyond the direct influence of institutions on the electoral process, trust and satisfaction with these institutions also matter for the functioning of democracy (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Diamond, 1999). The literature distinguishes between general support for democratic ideals and satisfaction with the way democracy works in a particular society. While support for democracy is relatively high and stable over time (Klingemann, 1999), satisfaction with democracy and trust in institutions are in general much lower, both in older and newer democracies (Norris, 2011; Doorenspleet, 2012). Yet these attitudes matter for the quality and stability of democracy. Trust and political efficacy have been associated with higher electoral participation (Blais and Rubenson, 2013; Gerber et al., 2013) and system stability (Lipset, 1959; Powell, 1982). Conversely, dissatisfaction with the democratic process (especially among losers of elections) can lead to violent forms of protests (Nadeau and Blais, 1993).[2] In this literature, we relate in particular to studies that show that improving election administration can increase satisfaction with democracy (Berman et al., 2019) by improving citizens' confidence that their vote was actually counted (Atkeson and Saunders, 2007) and their assessment of government performance (Dahlberg et al., 2015).

Finally, a large experimental literature (starting with the seminal study of Gerber and Green (2000)) shows that information can affect electoral outcomes and enfranchise underrepresented groups of citizens (Braconnier et al., 2017). Several of these studies focus on developing countries (Wantchekon, 2003; Fujiwara and Wantchekon, 2013; Vicente, 2014). These studies generally report experimental effects on short-term electoral outcomes, such as voter turnout and candidate vote shares. We make three contributions to this literature. First, beyond immediate effects of our intervention on turnout, we look at a different outcome—the evolution of attitudes towards electoral institutions after the election has taken place. Second, we highlight the potential trade-off between building up expectations about the democratic process (via increased mobilization of voters) and increasing the probability of disappointing these expectations and disenfranchising losers. Third, building on Dale and Strauss (2009), Malhotra et al. (2011), and Bhatti et al. (2017), we provide evidence about the effectiveness of text messages as a medium to convey information in a developing country.[3]

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on electoral institutions in Kenya. We describe our experimental design in section 3 and our data in section 4. Section 5 presents our empirical framework and Section 6 our main findings. Section 7 explores potential mechanisms and Section 8 concludes.

[2] Mattes and Bratton (2007) provide a review of the determinants of institutional trust and satisfaction with democracy.

[3] In addition, we assess the extent to which information conveyed by text messages disseminates, since we varied the fraction of phone holders that received the message. Existing evidence on the impact of SMS on electoral participation is mixed: initial studies in the GOTV literature highlighted the importance of face-to-face interactions, but subsequent research (Aker et al., 2017) found that text messages could be effective.

2 Background

2.1 The IEBC

The 2013 Kenyan election took place in a context of broad institutional change initiated by the 2010 constitutional referendum. The new Constitution established an Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) in lieu of the defunct ECK, which was disbanded in the aftermath of the divisive and controversial 2007 election. From the outset, establishing a reputation of credibility and impartiality was a major challenge for the IEBC. Appendix Figure C.1 shows that support for the previous Commission was more than halved between 2005 and 2008, and that satisfaction with democracy in Kenya did not improve in that timeframe, in contrast to other countries in the Afrobarometer sample.

The 2013 elections were considered "the first real test of Kenya's new Constitution and new electoral framework" (EU Observation Mission, 2013). For the first time, Kenyan voters were asked to vote for six different positions on the same day: President, Member of Parliament, Ward Representative, Governor, Senator, and Women's Representative. A key step taken by the IEBC to reduce electoral fraud in these elections was the purchase of Biometric Voter Registration (BVR) kits and Electronic Voter Identification (EVI) machines to mitigate identification issues in the voter register. These devices were designed to make sure that every individual in the new IEBC register could be uniquely identified from their fingerprints and photographs. The system would process the biometrics electronically and match every person turning up at the polls to a registered voter in its database. In addition, the IEBC relied on an Electronic Transmission of Results System (ETRS) that would make available online, in real time, the polling station-level results, allowing the public to monitor the tallying of votes across the country.

2.2 The 2013 Election

Eight candidates contested the 2013 presidential election, two of which were considered frontrunners: the incumbent Deputy Prime Minister, Uhuru Kenyatta (a Kikuyu), and the sitting Prime Minister, Raila Odinga (a Luo), who had narrowly lost the 2007 election. Voters from the Kikuyu and Luo ethnic groups (often referred to in Kenya as tribes) were expected to support their respective candidates; and estimates based on exit polls suggest this was indeed the case (Ferree et al., 2014). In addition, each candidate built a coalition with one other major tribe through their choice of running mate. Kenyatta formed a ticket with a Kalenjin (William Ruto) under the banner of the Jubillee Alliance, while Odinga formed a coalition with a Kamba (Kalonzo Musyoka), called the Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD).

Five days after the election, Kenyatta was declared the winner of the presidential ballot with 50.07% of the vote. Odinga, who garnered 43.7% of the vote, filed a petition with the Kenyan Supreme Court to contest the outcome of the election. The petition claimed that the ballot should be declared null and void due to the failures of the BVR kits and of the electronic tallying system. The case was denied on March 30, 2013, which triggered localized outbursts of violence (Raleigh et al., 2010).

The IEBC encountered major difficulties in organizing the ballot. First, "the Electronic Voter Identification Devices (EVIDs) were not working or not used in about half the polling stations observed" (EU Observation Mission (2013), 1) because there were insufficient generators and extension cords to power

the devices required for identification. As a result, in many polling stations IEBC officials had to identify voters and to count ballots manually. Second, the Electronic Transmission of Results System "stalled, for a number of technical reasons" (ibid, 31) and "eventually delivered just less than half of polling station results, much later than originally envisaged. (...) The failure to operate [the technology] successfully led to delays and ignited suspicion about the IEBC's management of the elections" (ibid, 2). Finally, "the processing of official results lacked the necessary transparency" (ibid, 2) as a result of the various problems encountered. For example, a controversy arose from the fact "a programming error had caused entries for rejected votes to be multiplied by eight" (ibid, 32).

In the assessment of the election observers, "following Election Day, trust in the IEBC was in a precarious state, after the failure of electoral technology and the lack of transparency during the tallying process, both of which left it open to rumours and speculation" (ibid, 29). There was significant media coverage of the IEBC's errors in the aftermath of the election.[4] In several instances, local IEBC officials were physically assaulted, and IEBC premises were attacked (Raleigh et al., 2010).

3 Experimental Design

3.1 Design

In partnership with the IEBC, we designed a text messaging intervention to promote public interest and knowledge about the election, and to raise voter turnout.[5] For the IEBC, the intervention addressed two main goals. First, anticipating that the electoral results would be contested if the election was perceived to not be free and fair, the Commission wanted to increase the confidence of the public in the electoral outcome. Second, in view of its recent creation, the IEBC wanted to explore different ways to establish itself as a capable and neutral institution. This justified exploring variations in the content of the text messages.

The experiment was conducted by SMS between February 27 and March 4, 2013. The experimental sample was composed of cell phone holders who 1) had registered to vote during the 2012 countrywide biometric registration drive, 2) had a Safaricom cell phone number, and 3) had provided this phone number to the IEBC during registration. Safaricom is the dominant telecom operator in Kenya, with more than 20 million subscribers and a market share of approximately 80% in 2013. Randomization was conducted at the polling station level and stratified by county. Our sampling frame was composed of all polling stations where the fraction of registered voters with a Safaricom cell phone number exceeded 25%. This represented 12,160 polling stations across the country out of 24,560 stations set up for the election. In total, 8,073,144 individuals were registered to vote across the polling stations in our study sample. Among these, 4,908,975 voters (61%) provided their (Safaricom) phone number to the IEBC.

[4] We conducted a Lexis Nexis search of one of the two main Kenyan newspapers, *the Nation*. In the period between the election and the Supreme Court ruling that settled it, *the Nation* had a total of 1,233 articles on Lexis Nexis, of which 136 (11%) were about the IEBC, and 473 (38%) were about the election. Many of these articles focused on the failures described above.

[5] The experiment is listed in the American Economic Association's registry for randomized controlled trials. See https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/30.

Our intervention involved two levels of experimental variation. First, each of the 12,160 polling stations was randomly allocated to either one of four groups: one control group and three treatment groups defined by the content of the messages they received. We later refer to the three treatment groups as T1, T2 and T3, respectively. Second, we randomly varied the fraction of treated voters within each polling station. Appendix Table A.1 provides the exact number of polling stations contained in each group and Appendix Table A.2 shows the content of all text messages, which were sent in English. We verified that the randomization produced balanced groups—randomization balance checks are discussed in Appendix B and shown in Appendix Tables B.1 through B.6.

In the first treatment group (T1), registered voters received reminders about the election as well as general encouragements to vote. For example, the first message sent in this group mentioned: "It is your duty to vote. Please make sure you vote in the March 4 General Election." Other basic encouragements and reminders in this group included "You have a duty to vote for good leaders (...) and "Remember the General Election is next Monday (...)."

In the second group (T2), messages provided information on each position to be voted for on Election Day, i.e. they described the responsibilities involved with each position excluding the President (MP, Senator, Governor, Ward Representative and Women's Representative), and encouraged recipients to vote for each of the six positions. For example, the role of a senator was described in the following manner: "Your senator will help determine how many resources your county receives from the central government. Vote for a competent candidate on March 4."

In the third group (T3), messages highlighted the transparency and neutrality of the IEBC, its successful record in organizing by-elections, its efforts to create a reliable voter register via biometrics, and its efforts to conduct a peaceful election. For example, the first message sent in this group stated: "Free and fair Elections are important for democracy. The IEBC is committed to strengthening the democracy. Vote on March 4."

The second level of randomization varied the fraction of voters treated within each polling station. For each treatment, a polling station was either allocated to a group where every Safaricom phone number in the polling station would receive our text messages (in the remainder of the paper, we refer to these treatment cells as "100% treatment"); or where only half of these phone numbers would receive the text messages (hereafter referred to as "50% treatment" cells). The objective of this randomization was to test for the presence of spillovers in the diffusion of information contained in our text messages. Importantly, even in the "100% treatment" cells, not all voters were treated: voters who did not have a Safaricom cell phone number or did not provide it to the IEBC did not receive text messages.

3.2 Implementation

The text messages were broadcast via Safaricom's mass texting technology. Phone numbers in our treatment groups received a total of six messages—one per day over the six last days prior to Election Day. Safaricom reported to us the rate of delivery of the text messages, by day and by treatment cell (delivery implies that the SMS was successfully transmitted to the client's device, not necessarily that it was read). When a text message was not successfully delivered on the first attempt, Safaricom would keep

attempting to deliver the message as many times as needed until the close of business on that day. We report these delivery rates in Appendix Figure C.2. The success rate of the text messages was slightly over 70% on the first day of the experiment, and approximately 90% in the following five days.[6]

4 Data

4.1 Administrative Data

To measure the impact of our text messages on participation, we first use official electoral results. The IEBC reported for each polling booth the number of registered voters, the number of votes cast, the number of spoilt, rejected, objected, and disputed ballots, the number of valid votes, and the vote tally for each presidential candidate. Unfortunately, we were not able to obtain similar data for the other five ballots.

The data from the presidential ballot was made available online in the form of scanned images—a sample image of a typical polling sheet is shown in Appendix Figure A.1. Since all the results were hand-written, we relied on a U.S.-based software company to process and digitize the data from these scanned images. The final dataset contains official results from 11,257 polling stations across all provinces of Kenya, out of the original 12,160 in our sample. This attrition (7%) comes from 903 polling stations for which the IEBC did not make scanned polling sheets publicly available after the election. The top panel of Appendix Table C.1 presents summary statistics from the electoral data. Note that turnout for the presidential ballot was generally high, averaging 88% of registered voters based on votes cast.

4.2 Survey Data

We conducted an endline phone survey drawing a random subset of individuals from the IEBC/Safaricom Database in November-December 2013—approximately eight months after the election. The survey targeted a total of 14,400 individuals across 7,200 randomly selected polling stations. The survey sample was drawn as follows. First, we randomly drew 1,800 polling stations from each treatment group (totalling 5,400 stations) and 1,800 stations from the control group. Second, two phone numbers to call were drawn randomly from each polling station. In total, 7,400 of all phone numbers sampled (51%) across 5,389 polling stations were successfully reached and surveyed. The numbers of sampled polling stations and survey respondents in each group are described in Appendix Table A.1.

In our main analysis, we focus on voter participation as well as two sets of political attitudes.[7] The first includes questions related to trust and satisfaction with democracy specifically in Kenya, and the second includes questions related to democratic principles more generally. The bottom panel of Appendix Table C.1 presents summary statistics from the survey data, and the complete endline survey is available as an Appendix.[8] To alleviate concerns about experimenter demand effects, the survey did not

[6] Individual delivery data was not stored by Safaricom.

[7] We did not collect data on individual vote choice as this was deemed too politically sensitive, but we measure effects on aggregate vote shares based on the administrative data.

[8] In addition, Appendix Table C.2 compares average characteristics in our polling station sample and our endline survey with

reference the experiment conducted by the IEBC, nor did it specifically ask about the messages sent as part of the experiment.

4.3 Election Violence Data

We use geocoded data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) to measure the intensity of election-related violence during the 2013 electoral period. We aggregated the ACLED data in two steps. First, we coded all election-related violent events recorded in Kenya between February 27, 2013 (the beginning of our intervention) and November 10, 2013 (the beginning of our endline survey). We define as "election-related" any event for which the ACLED description contains one or several following words: IEBC, polling center, polling station, tallying centre, election, candidate, CORD, Jubilee, TNA, Kenyatta, Odinga.[9] Second, we plotted these events on the 2013 constituency map of Kenya, and we aggregated the number of violent events by constituency. Overall, 10.4% of constituencies in our sample experienced some election-related violence over the period considered. We show the spatial distribution of these constituencies in Appendix Figure C.3.

5 Empirical Framework

This section describes the specifications we use to estimate average effects of the mobilization campaign (section 5.1), as well as heterogenous effects (5.2) and spillover effects (section 5.3).

5.1 Main Analysis

Our estimation strategies leverage the different levels of randomization in our experimental design. First, we measure treatment effects in polling stations in the 100% cells (all phone numbers were contacted) and polling stations in the 50% cells (half of phone numbers contacted) using the following specification:

$$y_{ij} = \alpha + \beta T_j^{100\%} + \gamma T_j^{50\%} + \delta_l + \varepsilon_{ij} \tag{1}$$

where y_{ij} is an outcome measured at the level of individual i in polling station j assigned to any treatment group (T_j). The δ_l are fixed effects for the strata used in the randomization. In the administrative

country-level averages measured in the 2009 census. Column (1) reports averages from the 2009 census averaged across constituencies. Column (2) reports averages of the same variables, where the data is at the constituency-level and weighted by the number of polling stations in our intervention sample. Our 12,160 polling stations are spread across 204 of the country's 210 constituencies. Column (3) report averages of the same variable collected in our endline phone survey (averaged by constituency). In total, 7,400 respondents answered the survey across 198 constituencies. Overall, there are few differences between our SMS campaign sample and countrywide characteristics measured in 2009. On the other hand, our survey respondents tend to be younger, more educated, and own more assets and amenities relative to the average census respondent.

[9] We systematically reviewed all events in the ACLED database to ensure these classifications were appropriate. After this review, we included 5 additional election-related events where none of the above terms appeared: namely one event in which a former MP was attacked by the supporters of an opponent, one event in which a campaign staff member for a local MP-elect was killed, one instance of an armed group attacking villagers for political revenge, and two instances of politically motivated attacks committed by an unknown group.

data, we look at electoral outcomes at the level of polling station j—the corresponding equation is identical to equation (1) but has no i subscript. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered at the level of polling station j throughout the analysis. We also report Romano-Wolf p-values to adjust for multiple testing. The multiple testing p-values are computed for every outcome in a given family of outcomes (i.e. across all dependent variables within each table).

We then estimate a specification including three dummies for assigment to one of the three main treatment groups ($k = 3$) described in section 3.1:

$$y_{ij} = \alpha + \sum_{k} \beta_k T_j^k + \delta_l + \varepsilon_{ij} \tag{2}$$

where $T_j^k = 1$ if polling station j was assigned to treatment group k. Here each of the T1, T2, and T3 groups pool the 100% and 50% treatment cells. In Appendix Tables C.6 and C.7, we also show a version of equation (2) that includes six dummies for assignment to one of the six treatment cells, including both the T1/T2/T3 dimension and the 100%/50% treatment dimension.

5.2 Heterogeneity Analysis

We test whether treatment effects vary with whether individuals were affiliated with the winning or the losing side of the election:

$$y_{ij} = \alpha + \beta_1 T_j + \beta_2 win_i + \beta_3 lose_i + \beta_4 T_j \times win_i + \beta_5 T_j \times lose_i + \delta_l + \varepsilon_{ij} \tag{3}$$

where T_j denotes assignment to any treatment group at the level of polling station j, win_i denotes whether the individual belongs to the tribe of the winning coalition in the presidential ballot (Kikuyus and Kalenjins) and $lose_i$ denotes belonging to the tribe of the losing coalitions (Luos and Kambas). In Appendix Tables C.10 through C.12, we also run an alternative version of equation (3) where we look at the tribes of the top two presidential candidates, the Kikuyus and the Luos. The main coefficients of interest are the coefficients on the interactions, β_4 and β_5.

Finally, to test for heterogeneous treatment effects based on the intensity of local election-related violence, we use the following specification:

$$y_{ijc} = \alpha + \beta_1 T_{jc} + \beta_2 V_c + \beta_3 T_{jc} \times V_c + \delta_l + \varepsilon_{ijc} \tag{4}$$

where T_{jc} denotes assignment to any treatment group, V_c denotes election-related violence measured at the level of constituency c, and the other variables are defined as before. We have aggregated treatments for simplicity of presentation—in Appendix Tables C.12 and C.13, we show full specifications interacted with any treatment in a 100% cell and any treatment in a 50% cell. In this specification, we cluster standard errors at the constituency level since the variation in violence is measured at that level. The coefficient of interest is the coefficient on the interaction, β_3.

5.3 Spillovers

In the Appendix, we also study whether the intervention generated spillovers from recipients of the text messages towards other individuals voting in the same polling station. In this case, we run a specification of the form:

$$y_{ij} = \alpha + \beta_1 Treat_{ij} + \beta_2 Spillover_{ij} + \delta_l + \varepsilon_{ij} \tag{5}$$

where $Treat_{ij}$ denotes individual treatment status (individual i in polling station j was treated) and $Spillover_{ij}$ denotes spillover status (individual i was not treated inside polling station j that was treated). This specification leverages the individual randomization inside the 50% treatment cells. Other terms are defined as in equation (1), and standard errors are clustered by polling station j.

6 Results

In this section, we show that our text messages were received (section 6.1) and increased participation in the 2013 election (section 6.2). However, the text messages also decreased trust towards Kenya's electoral institutions (section 6.3), especially for voters on the losing side of the election and in constituencies that experienced violence (section 6.4).

Figure 1: Treatment Effects on Turnout and Trust



Note: This figure reports average treatment effects of the SMS campaign estimated from equation (2). The corresponding coefficients are reported in Appendix Table C.3. Official turnout is measured as the fraction of registered voters who cast either a vote or a valid vote in the administrative data at the polling station level. All other estimates are computed using the survey data. All dependent variables are standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1 in the control group. The bars indicate 90% confidence intervals. Robust standard errors clustered by polling station.

Figure 1 summarizes the key insights from this section: the intervention increased voter turnout at the cost of diminished trust towards electoral institutions. The corresponding coefficients, estimated

from equation (2), are reported in Appendix Table C.3. Text messages increased administrative turnout by approximately 0.03 SD and self-reported turnout by 0.05 SD in the first treatment group. Treatment effects are slightly smaller in magnitude and fall short of statistical significance in T2 and T3. On the other hand, the messages negatively affected various measures of trust in electoral institutions, such as trust in the IEBC, beliefs as to whether the election was fair, and satisfaction with democracy in Kenya.

6.1 The Text Messages Were Received

In Table 1, we provide evidence that treated individuals remembered the SMS campaign. In columns (1) and (2), we show that treated individuals were 4 to 5 percentage points more likely to report receiving a text message (with a control mean of 76% – recall that both treated and control individuals received messages from the IEBC, especially during the registration period). Column (2) shows this holds across all three treatment groups. In columns (3) and (4) we report treatment effects on the number of SMS survey respondents reported receiving from the IEBC. This is set to zero for individuals who did not report receiving any text message. Overall, individuals reported receiving between a half and one more text message (a 15% to 30% increase) than the control. In columns (5) and (6), we show that treated individuals were 4 to 6 percentage points more likely to remember the content of the SMS they received.

The survey also elicited what individuals remembered about the messages. We test whether respondents described the SMS as mentioning some form of encouragement to vote in columns (7)-(8). We find positive, statistically significant effects of the intervention on all these outcomes. Across the board, there is evidence that the respondents remembered and discussed the messages, in spite of the high number of messages received in the control group.

Table 2 shows the extent to which the mobilization campaign affected voters' perception of the IEBC. All dependent variables in this table are constructed based on the same open-ended question contained in our endline survey instrument, which asked: "What are the main missions of the IEBC?". We then construct indicators equal to one if the respondent stated that the IEBC is responsible for: conducting or supervising elections (columns 1-2), counting votes and announcing winners (columns 3-4), demarcating electoral boundaries (columns 5-6), voter registration (columns 7-8), voter education (columns 9-10), and ensuring the election was free, fair and peaceful (columns 11-12). Responses are not mutually exclusive as respondents could provide up to four answers. Appendix Table A.4 provides the list of keywords and phrases used to construct these categories. Table 2 shows that the mobilization campaign reinforced voters' perceptions that the main role of Kenya's Electoral Commission was to guarantee free and fair elections, while it did not increase knowledge of the IEBC's other key missions (conduct elections, count votes, voter registration, and voter education). As a result, voters who would perceive the election to not be free and fair may ultimately hold the IEBC responsible—a result we discuss in section 6.3.

6.2 The Text Messages Boosted Turnout

In Table 3, we report treatment effects on turnout in the 2013 elections. Columns (1)-(4) present results using the administrative data and columns (5)-(8) using the survey data. We report coefficients from

equations (1) and (2), which estimate the average treatment effects across all 100% cells and all 50% cells, and treatment effects across the three groups (T1, T2, and T3), respectively. Appendix Table C.4 reports treatment effects on self-reported turnout for each of the six ballots organized in 2013, while Appendix Table C.5 report treatment effects of the SMS campaign on candidate vote shares for the top two candidates in the presidential election. Finally, Appendix Table C.6 reports treatment effects across all 6 treatment cells (T1/T2/T3 and the 100%/50% dimension).

Administrative Data. In columns (1) through (4) of Table 3, we use two different measures of turnout: the first is based on the number of votes cast, and the second on the number of valid votes. Results using either measure are similar. We find that the dummy for any treatment in 100% cells has a positive, significant effect on turnout of about 0.3 percentage points (about a 0.5% effect). This effect is robust to adjusting for multiple testing, with a Romano-Wolf p-value of 0.04. Treatment in 50% cells has no significant effect on turnout. Looking at the three treatment groups separately, we find that the Encouragement group dummy (T1) has a significant effect on turnout, also of 0.3 percentage points (the Romano-Wolf p-value is 0.08). The coefficients on the other two treatment dummies (T2 and T3) are positive but fall short of statistical significance.

Survey Data. In columns (5)-(8), we report treatment effects on turnout among our survey respondents. In addition to asking respondents whether they voted in the 2013 election (columns 5 and 6), we also asked them if they voted for each of the six ballots conducted on Election Day. We use this to create a measure of whether a respondent voted for all six positions (columns 7 and 8). In columns (5) and (7), we find a positive, statistically significant effect of any treatment in the 100% cells on turnout, of about 2 percentage points. This effect is robust to adjusting for multiple testing. The effect of any treatment in the 50% cells is positive but not statistically significant.

In columns (6) and (8), we find significant effects of T1 and T2 on participation, with magnitudes larger than those in columns (1)-(4). In addition, the mean participation in the control group is slightly larger than turnout in the administrative data (93% versus 88%). We are not concerned by these differences, for the following reasons. First, as shown in Figure 1, standardized effect sizes in each group are of similar magnitude across the administrative and the self-reported data. For example, text messages increased administrative turnout by approximately 0.03 SD and self-reported turnout by 0.05 SD in T1. Second, the phone survey is limited to individuals with phones (as was the intervention itself), while the administrative data covers all individuals in a polling station. The average fraction of Safaricom phone numbers in the register is 56%, which implies that in the absence of any spillovers we would expect the effects in the survey data to be about 1.8 times larger than those in the administrative data for this reason alone. In addition, phone owners may have a different propensity to vote than others, explaining the difference in our mean participation measures. Third, there is attrition in the survey. Attrition is likely higher among people who use their phone less or whose phone number was misreported during registration, i.e. people that were less likely to be mobilized by the SMS campaign.[10]

[10] Appendix Table C.17 shows Lee bounds on this effect. Combining these two mechanisms, we find that our treatment effect on administrative turnout is not statistically different from the lower Lee bound of the treatment effect on self-reported turnout.

Vote Shares. In Appendix Table C.5, we report impacts on the vote shares of the top two candidates in the election, who together garnered 94% of all valid votes in the country. As in Table 3, we report estimates from equations (1) and (2), but here we weight these specifications by the number of voters in each polling station so that they roughly replicate the overall results of the election. Overall, although the treatments affected turnout, they had no significant effects on vote shares.

6.3 The Text Messages Reduced Trust in Kenya's Electoral Institutions

Table 4 reports treatment effects on trust in electoral institutions and satisfaction with democracy in Kenya. In columns (1)-(2), we look at trust in the IEBC. Across the 100% cells, treatment reduced trust in the IEBC by four percentage points, a 5% drop relative to the control group (column 1). This effect (unlike others in this table) is robust to adjusting for multiple testing, with a Romano-Wolf p-value of 0.01. All three coefficients in column (2) are negative, although the coefficient on T3 is not statistically different from zero.

In columns (3) and (4), we report results for trust in the Supreme Court, which settled the result of the presidential ballot after the main opposition candidate filed a petition against the IEBC. We find negative effects of the treatments on trust in the Supreme Court, but none of the coefficients are statistically different from zero. In columns (5) and (6), we report impacts of the treatment on whether the survey respondent considered that the 2013 election was fair and transparent. We find negative, significant effects across the 100% groups of about two percentage points (column 5). In columns (7) and (8), where we ask whether the 2013 Supreme Court ruling that settled the election was fair, all but one coefficient are negative, but none of the coefficients are significantly different from zero.

In columns (9) and (10), we report effects on a dummy variable for individuals responding "very satisfied" to the question: "Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Kenya?" We find a negative, significant treatment effect on this variable. This holds across the 100% groups, 50% groups (column 9), in T1 and in T2 (column 10). The coefficient on T3 is also negative but not significant (note again that the coefficients across treatments are not significantly different from each other). The magnitude of these effects is sizeable: individuals in the 100% groups were 2.6 percentage points less likely to report being very satisfied with Kenyan democracy. Relative to a control mean of 32%, this corresponds to a 8% decrease.

Finally, in columns (11) and (12), we report treatment effects on a standardized index (denoted "index") of each of the previous five outcomes. We follow the procedure in Kling et al. (2007). We find that the 100% treatment decreases the standardized index of these outcomes (significant at the 1% level; see column 11). These effects are driven by treatments T1 and T2: the decrease in trust in both these groups is significant at 5%, while the effect is smaller in magnitude and non-significant in T3 (column 12).

These results suggest that text message recipients were on average more likely to mistrust Kenyan electoral institutions after the election. The sign of these effects is opposite to what we anticipated at the onset of the campaign. This is true particularly for trust in the IEBC, which the intervention was intended to reinforce: the messages were designed to enhance the transparency of the election and to improve the reputation of the Electoral Commission. The backlash in voters' attitudes that we observe

instead may have resulted from the fact that the IEBC did not deliver on its promise of a transparent and orderly election. The model presented in Section D rationalizes these results by showing how this observed failure may have interacted with text messages to generate a negative update of voters' beliefs on fairness.

Spillovers. Appendix Table C.8 looks at spillover effects of the intervention on turnout and trust. In this table, we estimate spillovers in two specifications. First, as described in equation (5), we create a dummy variable for treated individuals within treated polling stations, and another dummy for non-treated individuals within treated polling stations. The latter estimates average spillover effects of the campaign. The estimates from this specification are reported in odd-numbered columns. In even-numbered columns, we estimate a slightly different model including separate indicators for the 100% and the 50% group, as well as the individual spillover indicator. Both specifications deliver similar results.

Column (1) through (4) of Appendix Table C.8 show that the intervention had no spillover effects on (self-reported) participation. Non-treated individuals within treated polling stations were not more likely to turn out than individuals in the control group. The evidence from columns 5 through 8, which look at 3 measures of trust (the same measures as in Figure 1) is more mixed. There is some evidence of negative spillovers in columns (5)-(6) and (9)-(10).

It is possible that the campaign had limited spillovers on turnout, but more substantial spillovers on attitudes. Only a few days elapsed between the SMS campaign and the date at which voters would decide whether or not to participate. In contrast to mobilization effects, the negative impacts on trust in electoral institutions could have spread over a longer period of time (between the mobilization campaign and the endline survey, which took place 8 months later), with treated and non-treated individuals exchanging ideas about this topic after the outcome of the election became known.

To further explore this hypothesis, Appendix Table C.9 estimates treatment effects of the SMS campaign on the extent to which voters discussed text messages with each other and also lost trust in the IEBC. Overall, the decline in trust towards electoral institutions seems driven by individuals who discussed election-related messages received as part of the mobilization campaign. The campaign increased the likelihood that individuals both discussed election-related messages and lost trust in the IEBC (column 2) or that they both discussed the messages and lost trust towards their electoral institutions overall (column 4). However, there was no negative impact on trust when individuals did not also discuss messages with others (columns 3 and 5). This suggests that conversations and interactions about the text messages contributed to the decline in trust towards electoral institutions, and that the SMS campaign affected political attitudes beyond the original recipients of the text messages.

6.4 Heterogeneity Analysis

Exposure to the various shortcomings of election administration was not uniform across the Kenyan electorate. If the negative effect we observe on trust came from a backlash caused by the failures of the electoral process, one would expect this effect to be larger among voters for whom the failure was most salient: in particular, voters on the losing side of the election, and those voting in locations that

experienced election-related violence.

6.4.1 Heterogeneous Effects on Winners and Losers

To explore the first of these predictions, we exploit proxy variation capturing political preferences of individuals in our sample. Specifically, in Table 5 we look at heterogeneity in our treatment effects by whether the individual was on the winning or the losing side of the election. We use tribes to proxy for winners and losers. Exploiting this dimension of heterogeneity is reasonable given the high prevalence of ethnic voting in Kenya: as members of specific tribes typically align with specific candidates, tribes can be used to predict whether an individual was likely on the winning or the losing side of the election. In the 2013 election, Ferree et al. (2014) estimated using exit polls that 83% of Kikuyu voters (and 74% of Kalenjin voters) sided with the Kikuyu candidate, and that 94% of Luo voters (and 63% of Kambas) voted for the Luo candidate.

In Table 5, we use political coalitions formed for the 2013 election. Specifically, we code Kikuyu and Kalenjin voters as being part of the winning coalition (the Jubilee Alliance) and Luo and Kamba voters as being part of the losing coalition (CORD). In Appendix Table C.10, we also look at Kikuyu voters and Luo voters separately from all other tribes to proxy for winners and losers. The bottom panel of Table 5 reports the F-statistic on the test that the treatment coefficient for the winners is not different from the treatment coefficient for the losers. In all columns we control for the interactions of treatment with education and wealth to make sure that our results are not driven by education and wealth differences across tribes. In Appendix Table C.11, we show that these results are unchanged when we do not control for education and wealth and their interactions with the treatment dummy. Appendix Table C.12 further shows heterogeneity with treatment in the 100% groups and the 50% groups.

Column (1) of Table 5 looks at heterogeneous impacts on trust in the IEBC. Trust in the IEBC is reduced for treated individuals who are neither in the winning nor the losing coalition, though this effect falls short of statistical significance. Trust is reduced further for voters on the losing side, but the interaction is positive (parly offsetting the main effect) for those on the winning side. We can reject (at 1%) that the effects for losers and winners are identical: tribes from the losing coalition are more likely to lose trust in the IEBC.[11] Note that the main effects of being on the winning or the losing coalition are large and significant—members of the losing coalition are substantially less likely to trust the IEBC, whereas members of the winning coalition are more likely to do so.

In column (2), we report results for trust in the Supreme Court. The interaction coefficients have the expected sign, and the interaction with being in the losing coalition is significant at 5%. We can again reject that the treatment impact on winners and losers is identical. The same holds for the impacts on whether individuals thought the election was fair and transparent (column 3), where we can also reject that the impact on winners and losers is identical. In column (4), we show heterogeneous effects on whether the Supreme Court's ruling on the election was considered fair. Members of the losing coalition were less likely to consider this was the case, and the difference between effects on losers and winners is again statistically significant. Overall, across columns (1)-(4), we reject the null that treatment effects are

[11] These effects are not driven by differential effects on turnout across tribes (results available upon request).

the same for winners and losers of the election.

In column (5), we look at heterogeneous impacts on whether the respondent is very satisfied with how democracy works in Kenya. Here the relevant interactions are not different from zero, and we cannot reject that treatment effects for the winning and losing coalitions are the same. Finally in column (6), we report effects on a standardized index of all previous five outcomes (computed as above). The interaction of treatment with being in the losing coalition yields a negative, significant effect.

6.4.2 Heterogeneity with Election Violence

We then test for heterogeneity in our treatment effects by a measure of election-related violence, constructed from the ACLED data as described in section 4. Specifically, we interact our treatment variable with a binary variable indicating whether any violent events were recorded in the constituency. In Appendix Table C.13, we find no evidence that our treatment effects on electoral outcomes differed by the intensity of local violence. The coefficient on the interaction of treatment with violence is a precisely estimated zero when the dependent variable is turnout (columns 1-2) or vote shares (columns 3-4), both measured in the administrative data. This coefficient is negative, but not statistically different from zero, when the outcome is self-reported turnout (columns 5-6).[12]

In Table 6, however, we find evidence that the impacts on trust are heterogeneous across our measure of violence (column (1)). The coefficient on the interaction of interest is negative, statistically significant, and large in magnitude (7 percentage points, or 9% of the control group mean). This suggests that individuals exposed to *both* election-related violence in their constituency and to our SMS treatment were significantly more likely to update their beliefs on the IEBC negatively. In columns (2) and (3), the coefficient on the interaction of interest is negative but not statistically significant. Finally, there is no evidence for the same kind of heterogeneity in columns (4) and (5), where we look at individuals' perceptions of the Supreme Court ruling, and at satisfaction with democracy in Kenya (in column (5), the main effect of any treatment remains negative and significant). In column (6), we report treatment effects on the same standardized index used in columns (11)-(12) of Table 4. The effect of the interaction of any treatment with violence on this index is negative, but not statistically significant.

7 Mechanisms

The evidence presented so far suggests that the intervention succeeded in boosting participation, but failed to improve the reputation of Kenya's electoral institutions. In this section, we explore four potential mechanisms that could have led to these unexpected effects on attitudes. First, the SMS campaign coud have turned voters into "critical democrats" displaying more skepticism towards their electoral institutions as well as greater engagement with politics (section 7.1). Second, the diminished trust towards the IEBC could be driven by voters who turned out because of the mobilization campaign, and were disappointed by this voting experience (section 7.2). Third, these effects could have resulted from increased expectations caused by the mobilization campaign, followed by disappointment (section 7.3). Fourth,

[12]We also show violence interacted with treatment in the 100% groups and the 50% groups in Appendix Table C.13.

the intervention may inadvertently have sent mixed signals about Kenya's electoral institutions—our preferred interpretation (section 7.4). We address each of these explanations in turn.

7.1 "Critical Democrats"

The negative effects we found on attitudes may have been compensated by increased information or changes in preferences towards democracy more generally, to the extent that the SMS campaign succeeded in creating a group of "informed citizens". To test for this, in Table 7 we look at different measures of political knowledge and support for democratic ideals. The survey questionnaire collected objective measures of information about practical details of the election, offices elected on that day, as well as details of local politics. In addition, we asked whether respondents felt well-informed about the election overall, and whether they agreed with statements describing the fundamental characteristics of democracy.

Columns 1 through 4 of Table 7 look at treatment impacts on political information. In columns 1-2, the dependent variable is whether respondent answered yes to: "Overall do you feel you were well informed about the election?" We use this as a measure of subjective information about the election. In columns 3-4, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if respondents correctly answered a series of questions on the election and national politics.[13] We use this as a measure of subjective information about politics. We largely do not find effects on these measures of information, suggesting that the campaign did not incentivize participants to seek more information about politics.[14]

The remaining columns of Table 7 look at support for democratic ideals as they pertain to Kenyan politics.[15] In columns 5-6, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for survey respondents who agree with the statement: "Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government." In columns 7-8, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for survey respondents who agree with the statement: "We should choose our leaders through regular, open and honest elections." In columns 9-10, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for survey respondents who agree with the statement: "All people should be permitted to vote". Across all outcomes, we largely find small and statistically insignificant results—reassuringly, while the mobilization campaign decreased trust in Kenya's electoral institutions, it did not reduce support for democratic ideals generally. Overall, Table 7 suggests the effects we found in earlier tables pertain to satisfaction with specific institutions (the IEBC and, to some extent, the Supreme Court), but not to general support for the democratic ideal as an organizing principle of Kenyan society.

[13] These questions asked about the month and the day of the 2013 election, the role of a Women's Representative, the name of the party of the President, and the name of the Ugandan President.

[14] In addition, the survey included questions on how often the respondent listens to the radio, watches TV and reads the newspaper. The text messages had no effects on these outcomes (results available on request), implying that the texts did not create a set of more engaged citizens based on this metric.

[15] The statements were prefaced with the question: Do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding politics in Kenya?

7.2 Effects of Participation on Trust

Alternative interpretations could explain the negative effect of the text messages on attitudes. First, the campaign could have affected trust through electoral participation: voters who received the messages were more likely to vote and, as a result, to observe the multiple failures of voting systems. Individuals who voted as a result of receiving the messages may also have paid more attention to election-related news, including those covering implementation failures and instances of election-related violence. In light of the relative magnitudes of our effects on trust and turnout, this participation channel seems unlikely to fully explain our results: the decrease in trust in the IEBC is 1.5 percentage points (117%) larger than the increase in turnout.

Nonetheless, we investigate this hypothesis more formally in Table 8, where we show the effects on trust are not entirely driven by those individuals that were induced to vote by the text messages. We report the average effects of any treatment, assigned either at the polling station level (panel a) or at the individual level (b). Columns 1 and 2 of this table reports our baseline estimates—the reduced form effects of the messages on participation and trust towards the IEBC. In columns 3 and 4, we run the same regression in column 1 but we restrict the sample to respondents who reported to have voted in the 2007 election. These individuals are not, rigorously speaking, "always takers" but they would likely have voted in the absence of any treatment: 96.4% of 2007 voters in the control group also voted in 2013. The effect of the text messages is again unchanged in this specification. We reproduce similar tests in columns 5-6, where we look at voters who voted in the 2010 constitutional referendumn, and columns 7-8, where we look at voters who voted in both 2007 and 2010.

Overall, Table 8 suggests that the SMS campaign did not increase turnout among likely voters, but it did reduce trust towards the IEBC among this group—by a magnitude similar to that of the effect measured in the full sample. Because of this, the campaign's negative impacts on attitudes are unlikely to be solely driven by the "compliers" who were induced to vote by the campaign. Negative trust effects may have spread towards the "always-takers", as well as individuals who did not themselves vote.

7.3 Voter Disappointment

Another alternative interpretation is a simple model of voter disappointment. In this model, each voter forms expectations about the quality of the electoral administration, $\tilde{q}_i$. On the day of the election, she receives a signal about the election's actual quality, q_i. The difference between voters' expectations and actual observation, $(q_i - \tilde{q}_i)$, determines their level of satisfaction or disappointment and affects their answer to the survey questions on trust. For example, the text messages raise people's expectations by some δ, to $\tilde{q}_i + \delta$ and, thus, decrease their satisfaction by the same δ: upon observing the same degree of electoral failure, voters who received a message are more likely to hold a negative view of electoral institutions. Having set relatively higher expectations, treated voters are relatively more disappointed.

We cannot formally rule out that this interpretation contributed to the negative effect we observe on trust in the IEBC, but note that according to this interpretation, the intervention did not affect people's actual level of trust. In other words, this interpretation amounts to assuming that voters answer a slightly

different question (the extent to which the IEBC's action matched their expectations) than the one they are asked (their level of trust towards the IEBC). In addition, in this interpretation stated in its simplest form, the size of the effect is entirely determined by the extent to which the messages raise people's prior (δ), irrespective of the realized quality. For instance, even if the election is a success, we should still expect people who received a message to be relatively less positively surprised, and, thus, to report a lower level of satisfaction. Thus absent additional assumptions (e.g. regarding some asymmetry between voters' reaction to good or bad news), this interpretation cannot explain our heterogeneous results by the extent to which the election is a success or a failure (and voters observe it).

7.4 Mixed Signals of Capacity and Fairness

As we documented in section 2, the 2013 Kenyan election was widely perceived to have been a failure because of a variety of implementation problems. A majority of Kenyan citizens had the opportunity to witness this failure – either because they were directly confronted with problems at the polling station, or because they were dissatisfied with the electoral outcome, or both. Under these circumstances, recipients of the text messages could have negatively updated their beliefs about the fairness of the election if they interpreted the campaign as a signal of high institutional capacity; while they would have updated positively if they understood the campaign of a signal of honesty and transparency.

In Appendix D, we provide a simple theoretical framework to explain our empirical results. We provide this framework as a way to understand and interpret our empirical results, since the effects on trust were negative rather than positive (as was expected during the design of the experiment)—we wrote this model after conducting the main analysis, and the experiment was not specifically designed to test its core predictions. The model highlights how communication efforts by the electoral administration can backfire if the administration (in our case, the IEBC) fails to organize a successful election. A successful election has two ingredients in the model: institutional capacity (the level of "resources" allocated to the organization of the election, broadly defined) and institutional fairness or impartiality (the extent to which the final official results correspond to the choice of voters). If voters interpret messages from the IEBC as a signal of high capacity, i.e., a signal that enough resources were devoted to the organization of the election, then they are more likely to conclude, upon observing electoral turmoil, that the election was unfair or rigged. However, if messages are interpreted as a signal of fairness, then they will draw the opposite conclusion.

Our results are consistent with the former mechanism (highlighted in Proposition 1)—whether these beliefs are measured in terms of trust in the IEBC, satisfaction with the way democracy works in Kenya, or the perception that the election was fair. This result is intuitive: recipients of the messages were more likely to update their beliefs on the capacity of the electoral commission (because they observed the IEBC had the resources to conduct a mass texting campaign) than on the fairness of the commission or the election, which would require more than the simple information communicated in the messages. Note, however, that the negative treatment effects on trust is particularly pronounced in groups T1 and T2 which did not emphasize the IEBC's commitment to conduct a free and fair election. Treatments T1 and T2 only conveyed information about institutional capacity: the messages sent to these groups do

not make any claim about the fairness of the election; but in and of themselves they send a signal of high resources to conduct the election. Instead, treatment T3 repeatedly mentions the IEBC's commitment to fair elections: it is the only treatment which conveys both a signal of resources and of fairness (see Table 2 for the details of messages sent to each group). Consistent with our model, we find suggestive (though not statistically significant) evidence that the negative effect on trust is mainly driven by T1 and T2.[16] Finally, the results of our heterogeneity analysis are consistent with the predictions of the model: the magnitude of the decrease in trust towards the IEBC increases with exposure to election-related violence, and with being on the losing side of the election.

8 Conclusion

This paper evaluates the impact of information disseminated by the Kenyan Electoral Commission in an effort to increase voter participation and trust in a set of new electoral institutions. Shortly before the election, the IEBC sent eleven million text messages to approximately two million registered voters—14% of the Kenyan electorate. The messages provided either basic encouragements to vote, information on the positions to be voted for, or information on the IEBC itself. We measure treatment effects using official electoral results as well as survey data collected several months after the information campaign.

The intervention increased voter turnout by 0.3 percentage points overall in treated polling stations, in administrative data which includes individuals who did not themselves receive text messages. The self-reported increase in turnout among treated individuals is approximately two percentage points. However, the intervention also *decreased* trust in the Electoral Commission and institutions that were similarly involved in the electoral process.

While this outcome was certainly unexpected, should we also deem it undesirable? Decreased trust in the Electoral Commission was associated with decreased satisfaction with how democracy works in Kenya, but it did not undermine support for democratic principles: citizens who received the text messages remained equally likely to find democracy preferable to any other kind of government, to agree that leaders should be chosen through regular, open, and honest elections, and to disapprove of the use of violence in politics. A possible interpretation is that the information campaign contributed to the emergence of critical dissatisfied democrats (Norris, 2011). We do not find much empirical support for this interpretation: eight months after the election, citizens are neither more informed nor more engaged in the treatment groups than in the control group. The simple model we provide suggests another interpretation. If voters interpreted the IEBC's SMS campaign as a signal of high institutional capacity, then under plausible assumptions, witnessing electoral failure could have led them to believe that the election was unfair or rigged, or that the IEBC was corrupt. Our results suggest treated voters interpreted the campaign in this way.

The decrease in trust towards the Electoral Commission and the larger effects we find among losers of the election are a cause for concern. In the long run, systematic differences in institutional trust be-

[16] Looking at the last column of Table 4 (which compares effects across groups on a trust index), a test of the null that the effect of T3 differs from the average effect of T1 and T2 yields a p-value of 0.17.

tween different ethnic groups could make it harder to build consensus around important reforms. In addition, growing dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy among repeated losers may result in social unrest, if the losers feel they do not have any other option to have their voices heard. Overall, this implies that mobilizing voters comes at a risk when the quality and the transparency of the election cannot be guaranteed. Failure by the electoral administration to deliver such an election may dramatically reinforce distrust in institutions. These results may hold validity beyond the context of this study: across emerging and developing countries, elections are often used as a tool to foster peaceful political transitions and regime stability. Our results show that in young democracies, voter mobilization is a complex, and potentially perilous task.

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Tables

Table 1: Recollection of SMS Received, Survey Data

	Received SMS		Received from IEBC		Remember Content		Mentioned Turnout	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Any 100% Treatment	0.050***		0.944***		0.057***		0.052***	
	[0.012]		[0.175]		[0.014]		[0.014]	
Any 50% Treatment	0.036***		0.340**		0.038***		0.016	
	[0.013]		[0.162]		[0.014]		[0.013]	
Encouragement		0.042***		0.565***		0.048***		0.045***
		[0.014]		[0.183]		[0.015]		[0.015]
Positions Info		0.036***		0.755***		0.044***		0.024
		[0.014]		[0.189]		[0.015]		[0.015]
IEBC Info		0.050***		0.594***		0.051***		0.034**
		[0.013]		[0.185]		[0.015]		[0.015]
Control Mean	0.759	0.759	3.371	3.371	0.658	0.658	0.221	0.221
100% Romano-Wolf	0.00		0.00		0.00		0.00	
50% Romano-Wolf	0.01		0.09		0.01		0.25	
T1 Romano-Wolf		0.00		0.00		0.00		0.00
T2 Romano-Wolf		0.02		0.00		0.01		0.11
T3 Romano-Wolf		0.00		0.01		0.00		0.03
R-squared	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.01	.01
Observations	7324	7324	5879	5879	7400	7400	6608	6608

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on the respondents' recollection of the SMS campaign in endline survey data. Odd-numbered columns report estimates from equation (1). Even-numbered columns report estimates from equation (2). All regressions include strata fixed effects. In columns 1-2, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for respondents answering Yes to the question: "Did you receive any text messages related to the election after getting registered and before the election?" In columns 3-4, the dependent variable is the number of text messages respondents report receiving from the IEBC. In columns 5-6, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for respondents answering Yes to the question: "Do you remember what these messages were about?", in reference to messages received from the IEBC. In columns 7-8, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for respondents mentioning that the text messages mentioned voter turnout. The bottom panel reports the p-value from a Romano-Wolf multiple testing correction with 500 bootstrap replications across all outcomes in this table. In columns 3-4, there are fewer observations due to a malfunction in the electronic survey instrument. The Lee bounds on the Any 100% treatment dummy are [0.666 1.084].

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by polling station in brackets.

Table 2: Knowledge of the IEBC

	Conduct Elections		Count Votes		Boundaries		Voter Registration		Voter Education		Free & Fair Elections	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Any 100% Treatment	-0.009		0.006		0.010		0.008		0.008		0.028***	
	[0.014]		[0.011]		[0.012]		[0.013]		[0.010]		[0.008]	
Any 50% Treatment	-0.013		0.006		0.016		-0.003		0.008		0.018**	
	[0.014]		[0.011]		[0.012]		[0.013]		[0.010]		[0.008]	
Encouragement		-0.011		0.021		0.002		0.009		-0.005		0.025***
		[0.015]		[0.013]		[0.013]		[0.014]		[0.010]		[0.009]
Positions Info		-0.025		-0.003		0.020		0.002		0.018		0.024***
		[0.015]		[0.012]		[0.014]		[0.014]		[0.011]		[0.009]
IEBC Info		0.002		0.001		0.017		-0.003		0.011		0.021**
		[0.015]		[0.012]		[0.014]		[0.014]		[0.011]		[0.009]
Control Mean	0.705	0.705	0.159	0.159	0.218	0.218	0.221	0.221	0.115	0.115	0.065	0.065
100% Romano-Wolf	0.95		0.95		0.95		0.95		0.95		0.00	
50% Romano-Wolf	0.81		0.81		0.83		0.81		0.65		0.16	
T1 Romano-Wolf		0.89		0.34		0.89		0.89		0.89		0.06
T2 Romano-Wolf		0.40		0.96		0.96		0.40		0.40		0.06
T3 Romano-Wolf		0.99		0.99		0.99		0.77		0.71		0.14
R-squared	.01	.01	.02	.02	.01	.01	.02	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01
Observations	7400	7400	7400	7400	7400	7400	7400	7400	7400	7400	7400	7400

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on respondents' perceptions of the missions of the IEBC. Odd-numbered columns report estimates from equation (1). Even-numbered columns report estimates from equation (2). All regressions include strata fixed effects. In all columns, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for respondents stating the IEBC is responsible for: conducting or supervising elections (columns 1-2), counting votes and announcing winners (columns 3-4), demarcating boundaries (columns 5-6), voter registration (columns 7-8), voter education (columns 9-10), and ensuring the election was free and fair (columns 11-12) in response to the question: "What are the main missions of the IEBC?". See Appendix Table A.4 for a detailed list of the words used to construct these categories. The bottom panel reports the p-value from a Romano-Wolf multiple testing correction with 500 bootstrap replications across all outcomes examined in this table.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by polling station in brackets.

Table 3: Effects on Voter Turnout

	Administrative Data				Survey Data			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Votes Cast		Valid Votes		Voted in 2013		Voted all positions	
Any 100% Treatment	0.003**		0.003**		0.020***		0.025***	
	[0.001]		[0.001]		[0.007]		[0.008]	
Any 50% Treatment	0.000		0.000		0.007		0.008	
	[0.001]		[0.001]		[0.007]		[0.008]	
Encouragement		0.003*		0.003*		0.014*		0.018**
		[0.001]		[0.002]		[0.008]		[0.009]
Positions Info		0.001		0.001		0.015*		0.017**
		[0.002]		[0.002]		[0.008]		[0.009]
IEBC Info		0.001		0.000		0.011		0.014
		[0.002]		[0.002]		[0.008]		[0.009]
Control Mean	0.877	0.877	0.869	0.869	0.934	0.934	0.917	0.917
100% Romano-Wolf	0.03		0.03		0.00		0.00	
50% Romano-Wolf	0.99		0.99		0.36		0.36	
T1 Romano-Wolf		0.06		0.06		0.06		0.04
T2 Romano-Wolf		0.51		0.49		0.06		0.06
T3 Romano-Wolf		0.77		0.89		0.16		0.14
R-squared	.48	.48	.49	.49	.02	.02	.02	.02
Observations	11254	11254	11255	11255	7341	7341	7254	7254

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on voter turnout measured in the administrative data (columns 1-4) or self-reported in the survey data (columns 5-8). Odd-numbered columns report estimates from equation (1). Even-numbered columns report estimates from equation (2). All regressions include strata fixed effects. In columns 1-2, the dependent variable is the fraction of registered voters per polling station who cast a vote. In columns 3-4, the dependent variable is the fraction of registered voters who cast a valid vote. In columns 5-6, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for survey respondents answering Yes to the question: "Did you vote in the 2013 elections?". In columns 7-8, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for survey respondents reporting that they cast a vote in each of the six ballots organized in March 2013. The bottom panel reports the p-value from a Romano-Wolf multiple testing correction with 500 bootstrap replications across the two measures of turnout in either the administrative data (columns 1-4) or the survey data (columns 5-8).
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by polling station in brackets.

Table 4: Effects on Trust in Kenyan Electoral Institutions

	Trust IEBC		Trust SCK		Fair Election		Fair SCK Ruling		Satisf Democracy		Index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Any 100% Treatment	-0.037***		-0.019		-0.021*		-0.012		-0.026*		-0.052**	
	[0.012]		[0.013]		[0.013]		[0.013]		[0.014]		[0.021]	
Any 50% Treatment	-0.020*		-0.009		0.004		-0.004		-0.024*		-0.023	
	[0.012]		[0.013]		[0.013]		[0.013]		[0.014]		[0.021]	
Encouragement		-0.042***		-0.016		-0.011		-0.009		-0.028*		-0.048**
		[0.013]		[0.015]		[0.014]		[0.014]		[0.015]		[0.024]
Positions Info		-0.022*		-0.014		-0.014		-0.020		-0.030**		-0.048**
		[0.013]		[0.014]		[0.014]		[0.014]		[0.015]		[0.023]
IEBC Info		-0.021		-0.011		-0.000		0.005		-0.017		-0.017
		[0.013]		[0.015]		[0.014]		[0.014]		[0.015]		[0.023]
Control Mean	0.800	0.800	0.721	0.721	0.715	0.715	0.688	0.688	0.320	0.320	-0.000	-0.000
100% Romano-Wolf	0.01		0.28		0.20		0.35		0.20			
50% Romano-Wolf	0.28		0.84		0.93		0.93		0.28			
T1 Romano-Wolf		0.01		0.52		0.65		0.65		0.20		
T2 Romano-Wolf		0.25		0.50		0.50		0.36		0.17		
T3 Romano-Wolf		0.37		0.77		0.96		0.90		0.67		
R-squared	.1	.1	.07	.07	.16	.16	.15	.15	.04	.04	.16	.16
Observations	7327	7327	7227	7227	7287	7287	7204	7204	7309	7309	7034	7034

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on trust in electoral institutions. Odd-numbered columns report estimates from equation (1). Even-numbered columns report estimates from equation (2). All regressions include strata fixed effects. In columns 1-2, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for survey respondents answering Yes to the question: "Do you trust the IEBC?". In columns 3-4, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for respondents answering Yes to the question: "Do you trust the Supreme Court of Kenya?". In columns 5-6, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for respondents answering Yes to the question: "Do you think the elections were fair and transparent?". In columns 7-8, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for respondents answering Yes to the question: "Do you think the ruling of the Supreme Court on the election was fair?" In columns 9-10, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for respondents answering 'Very Satisfied' to the question: "Overall, how satisfied are you with how democracy works in Kenya?" In columns 11-12, we report effects on an index of all previous 5 outcomes computed as in Kling et al. (2007). See Appendix Table A.3 for a detailed description of all variables. The bottom panel reports the p-value from a Romano-Wolf multiple testing correction with 500 bootstrap replications across all outcomes examined in this table (excluding the index in columns 11-12).

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by polling station in brackets.

Table 5: Winners and Losers: Effects on Trust in Kenyan Electoral Institutions

Heterogeneity by Electoral Coalitions

	Trust IEBC	Trust SCK	Fair Election	Fair SCK Ruling	Satisf Democracy	Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Any Treatment*Win	0.012	0.002	0.001	-0.018	-0.015	0.001
	[0.022]	[0.027]	[0.024]	[0.025]	[0.032]	[0.041]
Any Treatment*Lose	-0.055*	-0.070**	-0.075**	-0.094***	0.005	-0.128***
	[0.029]	[0.030]	[0.031]	[0.031]	[0.029]	[0.050]
Winning Coalition	0.127***	0.137***	0.187***	0.224***	0.104***	0.354***
	[0.024]	[0.030]	[0.027]	[0.028]	[0.033]	[0.046]
Losing Coalition	-0.063**	-0.033	-0.086***	-0.081**	-0.041	-0.131**
	[0.031]	[0.033]	[0.033]	[0.034]	[0.031]	[0.054]
Any Treatment	-0.035	0.026	0.067*	0.065	-0.057	0.031
	[0.034]	[0.039]	[0.038]	[0.040]	[0.041]	[0.064]
Win = Lose F-stat	6.85***	5.90**	7.64***	7.27***	0.35	8.31***
Win = Lose p-val	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.55	0.00
Control Mean	0.801	0.722	0.714	0.687	0.322	-0.001
R-squared	.12	.08	.18	.18	.06	.2
Observations	7137	7043	7101	7019	7119	6859

Notes: This table reports estimates from equation (3). All regressions include strata fixed effects. 'Win' equals one for all respondents whose self-reported tribe formed a coalition around the winning candidate (the Kikuyus and Kalenjins) in the 2013 Presidential election. 'Lose' equals one for all respondents from tribes that formed a coalition around the losing candidate (the Luos and Kambas). In column 1, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for survey respondents answering Yes to the question: "Do you trust the IEBC?". In column 2, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for respondents answering Yes to the question: "Do you trust the Supreme Court of Kenya?". In column 3, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for respondents answering Yes to the question: "Do you think the elections were fair and transparent?". In column 4, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for respondents answering Yes to the question: "Do you think the ruling of the Supreme Court on the election was fair?" In column 5, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for respondents answering 'Very Satisfied' to the question: "Overall, how satisfied are you with how democracy works in Kenya?" In column 6, we report effects on an index of all previous 5 outcomes computed as in Kling et al. (2007). We also report the F-stat and corresponding p-value from a test of equality of the two interaction terms in the top panel: Any Treatment*Win = Any Treatment*Lose.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by polling station in brackets.

Table 6: Election Violence: Effects on Trust in Kenyan Electoral Institutions

Heterogeneity by Election Violence

	Trust IEBC	Trust SCK	Fair Election	Fair SCK Ruling	Satisf Democracy	Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Any Treatment*Violence	-0.068**	-0.045	-0.029	0.007	-0.000	-0.082
	[0.029]	[0.035]	[0.035]	[0.037]	[0.042]	[0.058]
Any Treatment	-0.021*	-0.008	-0.004	-0.008	-0.024*	-0.027
	[0.011]	[0.012]	[0.011]	[0.013]	[0.013]	[0.020]
Violence	0.026	-0.016	-0.036	-0.075**	-0.030	-0.044
	[0.030]	[0.040]	[0.031]	[0.037]	[0.037]	[0.059]
Control Mean	0.800	0.721	0.715	0.688	0.320	-0.000
R-squared	.1	.07	.16	.15	.04	.16
Observations	7327	7227	7287	7204	7309	7034

Notes: This table reports estimates from equation (4). All regressions include strata fixed effects. Violence is a dummy variable equal to 1 if any election-related violence occurred in the constituency (see section 4 for details). In column 1, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for survey respondents answering Yes to the question: "Do you trust the IEBC?". In column 2, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for respondents answering Yes to the question: "Do you trust the Supreme Court of Kenya?". In column 3, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for respondents answering Yes to the question: "Do you think the elections were fair and transparent?". In column 4, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for respondents answering Yes to the question: "Do you think the ruling of the Supreme Court on the election was fair?" In column 5, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for respondents answering 'Very Satisfied' to the question: "Overall, how satisfied are you with how democracy works in Kenya?" In column 6, we report effects on an index of all previous 5 outcomes computed as in Kling et al. (2007).

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by constituency in brackets.

Table 7: Null Effects on Information and Support for Democracy

	Informed, Subjective		Informed, Objective		Democracy Preferable		Open Elections		All Permitted to Vote	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Any 100% Treatment	0.010		0.004		0.004		0.002		0.004	
	[0.010]		[0.007]		[0.009]		[0.005]		[0.008]	
Any 50% Treatment	0.008		0.006		-0.001		0.003		-0.006	
	[0.010]		[0.007]		[0.009]		[0.005]		[0.008]	
Encouragement		0.005		0.010		0.005		0.004		-0.000
		[0.011]		[0.008]		[0.010]		[0.005]		[0.009]
Positions Info		0.010		0.003		-0.003		-0.001		-0.004
		[0.011]		[0.008]		[0.010]		[0.005]		[0.009]
IEBC Info		0.011		0.003		0.002		0.003		0.002
		[0.011]		[0.008]		[0.010]		[0.005]		[0.009]
Control Mean	0.865	0.865	0.114	0.114	0.898	0.898	0.972	0.972	0.918	0.918
100% Romano-Wolf	0.86		0.96		0.96		0.96		0.96	
50% Romano-Wolf	0.92		0.92		0.92		0.92		0.92	
T1 Romano-Wolf		0.95		0.67		0.95		0.89		0.99
T2 Romano-Wolf		0.89		0.99		0.99		0.99		0.99
T3 Romano-Wolf		0.84		0.99		0.99		0.96		0.99
R-squared	.02	.02	.01	.01	.02	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01
Observations	7369	7369	14400	14400	7321	7321	7359	7359	7371	7371

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on political information and support for democracy. Odd-numbered columns report estimates from equation (1). Even-numbered columns report estimates from equation (2). All regressions include strata fixed effects. In columns 1-2, the dependent variable is whether respondent answered yes to: "Overall do you feel you were well informed about the election?" We use this as a measure of subjective information about the election. In columns 3-4, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if respondents correctly answered questions on: the month and the day of the election, the role of a Women's Representative, the name of the party of the President, and the name of the Ugandan President. We use this as a measure of objective information about politics. In columns 5-6, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for survey respondents who agree with the statement: "Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government." In columns 7-8, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for survey respondents who agree with the statement: "We should choose our leaders through regular, open and honest elections." In columns 9-10, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for survey respondents who agree with the statement: "All people should be permitted to vote". See Appendix Table A.3 for a detailed description of all variables. The bottom panel reports the p-value from a Romano-Wolf multiple testing correction with 500 bootstrap replications across the two measures of turnout in either the administrative data (columns 1-4) or the survey data (columns 5-8).
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by polling station in brackets.

Table 8: Did the Decrease in Trust Come from Increased Turnout?

	Full Sample		2007 voters		2010 voters		2007 & 2010 voters	
	(1) Turnout	(2) Trust	(3) Turnout	(4) Trust	(5) Turnout	(6) Trust	(7) Turnout	(8) Trust
	(a) Polling station-level Treatment							
Treatment (any)	0.012*	-0.029***	0.003	-0.027**	0.007	-0.027**	0.003	-0.025*
	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.013)
	(b) Individual Treatment							
Individual treatment	0.014***	-0.027***	0.001	-0.020*	0.006	-0.022**	-0.000	-0.021*
	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.011)
R^2	0.03	0.10	0.02	0.11	0.03	0.11	0.02	0.12
Control Mean	0.934	0.802	0.964	0.803	0.958	0.805	0.967	0.804
Observations	7308	7295	5365	5341	5491	5469	4744	4725

Notes: This table reports average treatment effects of the SMS campaign on participation and trust in the IEBC measured in the survey data. All regressions control for age and include strata fixed effects. Panel (a) reports effects of treatment at the polling station level and panel (b) reports individual treatment effects (respondents in a treated polling station who themselves received text messages).
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by polling station in brackets.

Online Appendix

List of Figures

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A Experimental Design and Data Construction

Figure A.1: Sample Polling Sheet in 2013 Election



FORM 34 (r.79(2)(a),83)

34 PR 00150576

INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL AND BOUNDARIES COMMISSION

DECLARATION OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS AT A POLLING STATION

POLLING STATION: KABETE VETLAB PRIMARY SCHOOL (001)

STREAM: 1

CONSTITUENCY: WESTLANDS (274)

1.	Total number of registered voters for the polling station	776
2.	Number of spoilt ballot papers	0
3.	Total number of votes cast	660
4.	Number of rejected votes	6
5.	Number of disputed votes	0
6.	Number of rejected objected to votes	0
7.	Total number of valid votes cast (in figures and words)	654

The number of valid votes cast in favour of each candidate:

	Name of Candidate	No. of Valid Votes Cast
1	JAMES LEGILISHO KIYIAPI	0
2	MARTHA WANGARI KARUA	1
3	MOHAMED ABDUBA DIDA	0
4	MUSALIA MUDAVADI	23
5	PAUL KIBUGI MUITE	0
6	PETER KENNETH	8
7	RAILA ODINGA	325
8	UHURU KENYATTA	297
9	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXX
10	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXX
11	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXX
12	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXX
13	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXX
14	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXX
15	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXX
16	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXX
17	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXX
18	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXX
19	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXX
20	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXX
21	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXX

8. **Declaration**

We, the undersigned, being present when the results of the count were announced, do hereby declare that the results shown above are true and accurate count of the ballots in:

KABETE VETLAB PRIMARY SCHOOL (001) Polling Station,

WESTLANDS (274) Constituency.

(i) **Presiding Officer:**

Name: AGNES A ALO[illegible]

ID No. / Passport: 276233[illegible]

Signature: [signature] Date: 4th March 2013

I.E.B.C. PRESIDING OFFICER

Table A.1: Sample Size by Treatment Group

Group	Polling Stations in Experiment	Polling Stations in Survey Sample (Target)	Respondents in Survey Sample (Target)	Polling Stations in Survey Sample (Actual)	Respondents in Survey Sample (Actual)
Encouragement	2,016	1,800	3,600	1,325	1,852
Positions Info	2,035	1,800	3,600	1,359	1,875
IEBC Info	2,023	1,800	3,600	1,357	1,848
Control	6,086	1,800	3,600	1,348	1,825
Total	**12,160**	**7,200**	**14,400**	**5,389**	**7,400**

Table A.2: Content of the Text Messages by Treatment Group

Group	Content	Date
1	It is your duty to vote. Please make sure you vote in the March 4 General Election	Feb 27
1	You have a duty to vote for good leaders for your country. Please vote on March 4	Feb 28
1	Don't just complain about leaders, do something. Make sure you vote for good leaders on March 4	March 1
1	A good citizen helps promote democracy in his country by participating in the elections. Please vote on March 4	March 2
1	Remember the General Election is next Monday, on March 4. Please make sure you vote	March 3
1	Make sure you have your original ID or passport when you go to the polling station on March 4	March 4
2	Vote for all 6 ballots on March 4: Governor, County Assembly Ward Rep, Member of Parliament, Women Rep, Senator, President	Feb 27
2	Your governor will manage funds on your behalf. Choose the right person for this important job. Vote wisely on March 4	Feb 28
2	Your senator will help determine how many resources your county receives from the central government. Vote for a competent candidate on March 4	March 1
2	Your member of National Assembly will be responsible for making laws for Kenya. Vote for a true nationalist on March 4	March 2
2	Every voter, male or female, votes for the Women's Rep on March 4. She will represent your county at the National Assembly	March 3
2	Your Ward Rep ensures that your interests are represented at the County Assembly. Vote for an accessible leader on March 4	March 4
3	Free and fair Elections are important for democracy. The IEBC is committed to strengthening the democracy. Vote on March 4	Feb 27
3	Credible elections require a peaceful environment. The IEBC is committed to free and fair elections; please keep the peace	Feb 28
3	Elections are organized by the IEBC, an independent body created by the new Constitution to ensure free and fair elections	March 1
3	Show your confidence in the IEBC by voting in the election next Monday, March 4th 2013	March 2
3	The IEBC has managed 12 successful by-elections and the Constitutional referendum. Help us make this election a success	March 3
3	As part of its mission, the IEBC has established a clean voter register. You are in the register. Now, go and vote	March 4

Table A.3: Description of Political Attitude Variables

Question	Response Options
How do you feel about the outcome of the last elections?	1=Very satisfied, 2=Satisfied, 3=Indifferent, 4=Dissatisfied, 5=Very dissatisfied
Do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding politics in Kenya:	
Politics and government sometimes seem so complicated that you can't really understand what is going on.	1=Strongly agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neither agree nor disagree, 4=Disagree, 5=Strongly disagree
The world is run by few people in power, and there is not much that someone like me can do about it.	1=Strongly agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neither agree nor disagree, 4=Disagree, 5=Strongly disagree
We should choose our leaders in this country through regular, open and honest elections.	1=Strongly agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neither agree nor disagree, 4=Disagree, 5=Strongly disagree
Which of the following statements is closest to your own opinion?	1=Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government, 2=In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable, 3=For someone like me, it doesn't matter what government we have
Overall how satisfied are you with how democracy works in Kenya?	1=Very satisfied, 2=Fairly satisfied, 3=Not very satisfied, 4=Not at all satisfied, 5=Kenya is not a democracy
For each of the following pairs of statements, tell me which of the two is closest to your view about Kenyan politics:	
1: The use of violence is never justified in politics.	2: In this country it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause.
1: As citizens we should be more active in questioning the actions of our leaders.	2: In our country these days we should show more respect for authority.
1: All people should be permitted to vote, even if they do not fully understand all the issues in an election.	2: Only those who are sufficiently well educated should be allowed to choose our leaders.
1: Women can be good politicians and should be encouraged to stand in elections.	2: Women should stay at home to take care of their children.
1: In our country, it is normal to pay a bribe to a government official to encourage them.	2: It is wrong to pay a bribe to any government official.
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?	1=Most people can be trusted, 2=Need to be careful
In general, can you trust members of your tribe?	1=Yes, 2=No
In general, can you trust members in other tribes?	1=Yes, 2=No
Do you trust the IEBC, the electoral commission of Kenya?	1=Yes, 2=No
Do you trust the Supreme court?	1=Yes, 2=No
Do you trust the police?	1=Yes, 2=No
Do you think the elections this year were fair and transparent?	1=Yes, 2=No
In general, in your life, are you very happy, somewhat happy or not happy?	1=Very happy, 2=Somewhat happy, 3=Not happy

Table A.4: Missions of the IEBC (Table 2): Keywords and Phrases

Mission	Keywords
Conduct Elections	conduct+election, control+election, carry out+election, coordinate+election, supervise+election, organise+election manage+election, oversee+election, prepare+election, preside+election, run+election, in charge+election, deal with+election, materials, ballot papers, ballot boxes
Count Votes	count, tally, calculate, announce+winner, declare+winner, annouce+result, declare+result, announce+election
Boundaries	boundary, boundari, demarcate, demarcating
Voter Education	voter education, educate, education, teach, assist, guide, kufundisha (teach)
Voter Registration	voter registration, register, registr, regestration
Free and Fair Elections	free, fair, integrity, independence, independent, transparent, transparency, trustworthy, unbiased, peace, safety, security, no rigging, no stealing, prevent rigging, prevent election rigging, anti corruption, no corruption, prevent corruption, guard against corruption during voting, fight corruption, check on corruption, amani (peace)

Notes: This table lists all the keywords, phrases, and roots used to construct the mission categories used in Table 2. The '+' sign denotes instances where we require both terms to be included in the respondent's answer to the question: "What are the main missions of the IEBC?".

B Randomization Checks

This appendix shows that the experimental randomization produced balanced samples. Table B.1 reports these results for the administrative data. We report balance checks for all the data we have access to from the IEBC, i.e. the number of registered voters per polling station, the number and fraction of registered voters who submitted their phone number, and the number of streams per polling station. In addition, we check attrition across treatment cells: as was mentioned above, some of the polling sheets could not be processed or were returned empty, resulting in the fact that we do not observe outcomes for 7% of polling stations in the administrative data.

In columns (1) and (2) of Table B.1, we test whether the missing data is correlated with treatment status. We report two specifications, one with two treatment dummies for the 100% and 50% treatment cells (pooling together T1, T2 and T3), and one with the three main treatment groups. In column (2), the IEBC information group has a marginally significant coefficient, but the p-value of the test of joint significance across all three treatment coefficients does not allow us to reject that these coefficients are zero. In columns (3) through (10), we show balance for the polling station-level covariates described above. Of the 12 coefficients tested across these specifications, none are statistically different from zero. At the bottom of the table, we also report the p-value on the joint F-test for all treatment group coefficients. Across all four outcomes we cannot reject that these coefficients are jointly zero.

In Table B.2, we report balance checks for the survey data. In columns (1) and (2) we show that survey attrition is balanced across treatment groups. In columns (3) through (14), since we did not collect any baseline data, we look at time-invariant variables collected at endline, such as the gender, age, and years of education of respondents, whether they reported voting in the 2007 election, whether they reported voting in the 2010 constitutional referendum, and whether they reported having registered to vote for the 2013 election (registration ended before the beginning of our experiment). Across the 12 specifications and 30 coefficients, only one coefficient is significantly different from zero. At the bottom of the table we report the p-value of the F-test that the treatment coefficients are jointly zero. We cannot reject this for 11 of the 12 regressions (one is rejected at 10%).

We report balance checks for the variables we use in the heterogeneity analysis in Table B.3. These variables are a dummy variable indicating the incidence of election-related violence in the constituency (columns (1)-(2)), and dummy variables indicating whether the respondent belongs to one of the following tribes: Luos (columns (3)-(4)), Kikuyus (columns (5)-(6)), tribes in the winning electoral coalition (columns (7)-(8)), and tribes in the losing coalition (columns (9)-(10)). Two out of the 25 coefficients appear significant at the 10% level.

Finally, we report balance checks across all sub-cells (including 100% and 50% cells) in Tables B.4 through B.6. We present these estimates for the administrative data (with the same variables as in Table B.1) in B.4, for the survey data (with the same variables as in Table B.2) in Table B.5, and for the heterogeneity variables (with the same variables as in Table B.3) in Table B.6. These checks suggest that the randomization produced balanced samples across all the sub-cells, except perhaps for ACLED violence (Table B.6).

Table B.1: Randomization Checks, Administrative Data

	Data Missing		# Registered Voters		# Phones		% Phones		# Streams	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Any 100% Treatment	0.005		5.487		1.541		-0.007		0.010	
	[0.005]		[17.910]		[12.660]		[0.007]		[0.021]	
Any 50% Treatment	0.005		6.615		4.485		-0.003		0.009	
	[0.005]		[17.460]		[12.320]		[0.007]		[0.020]	
Encouragement		0.008		16.018		14.109		-0.002		0.015
		[0.006]		[22.701]		[15.888]		[0.009]		[0.026]
Positions Info		-0.003		10.374		4.376		-0.009		0.010
		[0.006]		[19.348]		[13.930]		[0.007]		[0.023]
IEBC Info		0.011*		-8.326		-9.412		-0.004		0.003
		[0.006]		[19.365]		[13.544]		[0.009]		[0.023]
F-test p-value	0.49	0.16	0.91	0.77	0.94	0.63	0.63	0.61	0.87	0.94
Control Mean	0.07	0.07	685.99	689.06	402.21	403.70	0.56	0.56	1.40	1.40
R-squared	.14	.14	.43	.43	.42	.42	.06	.06	.43	.43
Observations	12160	12160	11257	11257	12160	12160	12160	12160	11191	11191

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust Standard errors reported in brackets. All regressions include strata fixed effects.
In each column we report the p-value of a F-test of joint significance of all the treatment dummies in each regression.
Registered voters denotes the number of registered voters per polling station.
Phones denotes the number of registered voters with a valid Safaricom phone number per polling station.
% Phones denotes the fraction of registered voters with a valid Safaricom phone number per polling station.
# Streams denotes the number of polling booths per polling station.

Table B.2: Randomization Checks, Survey Data

	Non-Response		Gender		Age		Years of Educ		Voted 2007		Voted 2010		Registered 2013	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
Any 100% Treatment	-0.006		-0.009		0.553		-0.178		0.010		0.011		-0.000	
	[0.011]		[0.015]		[0.371]		[0.142]		[0.013]		[0.013]		[0.003]	
Any 50% Treatment	-0.013		-0.003		0.596		-0.142		0.020		0.012		-0.003	
	[0.011]		[0.015]		[0.374]		[0.143]		[0.013]		[0.013]		[0.003]	
Encouragement		-0.008		-0.025		0.714*		-0.104		0.008		0.023		0.000
		[0.012]		[0.016]		[0.410]		[0.156]		[0.015]		[0.014]		[0.003]
Positions Info		-0.014		0.017		0.532		-0.127		0.016		0.005		-0.005
		[0.012]		[0.016]		[0.412]		[0.157]		[0.015]		[0.014]		[0.003]
IEBC Info		-0.006		-0.010		0.478		-0.249		0.020		0.007		0.000
		[0.012]		[0.016]		[0.408]		[0.155]		[0.015]		[0.014]		[0.003]
F-test p-value	0.49	0.69	0.81	0.07	0.22	0.34	0.43	0.46	0.32	0.52	0.60	0.40	0.57	0.43
Control Mean	0.49	0.49	0.61	0.61	35.89	35.89	9.06	9.06	0.73	0.73	0.75	0.75	0.99	0.99
R-squared	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.02	.02	.01	.01
Observations	14400	14400	7399	7399	7365	7365	7364	7364	7332	7332	7261	7261	7339	7339

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by polling station. All regressions include strata fixed effects.
In each column we report the p-value of a F-test of joint significance of all the treatment dummies in each regression.

Table B.3: Randomization Checks, Heterogeneity Variables

	Violence		Luos		Kikuyus		Winners		Losers	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Any 100% Treatment	0.017		-0.009		-0.000		0.002		0.001	
	[0.011]		[0.007]		[0.005]		[0.008]		[0.008]	
Any 50% Treatment	0.015		-0.003		-0.003		0.006		-0.007	
	[0.011]		[0.007]		[0.006]		[0.008]		[0.008]	
Encouragement		0.022*		-0.007		-0.003		-0.003		-0.005
		[0.012]		[0.008]		[0.006]		[0.009]		[0.009]
Positions Info		0.020		-0.012		0.003		-0.003		0.003
		[0.013]		[0.008]		[0.006]		[0.009]		[0.009]
IEBC Info		0.005		0.001		-0.004		0.016*		-0.007
		[0.011]		[0.008]		[0.006]		[0.009]		[0.009]
F-test p-value	0.28	0.13	0.41	0.34	0.83	0.62	0.78	0.11	0.55	0.62
Control Mean	0.10	0.10	0.19	0.19	0.13	0.13	0.29	0.29	0.31	0.31
R-squared	.26	.26	.64	.64	.71	.71	.67	.67	.7	.7
Observations	7327	7327	7356	7356	7356	7356	7356	7356	7356	7356

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by constituency (the level at which violence is measured) in columns (1)-(2) and by polling station in columns (3)-(10). All regressions include strata fixed effects. In each column we report the p-value of a F-test of joint significance of all the treatment dummies in each regression.

Table B.4: Randomization Balance across all treatment cells

	Data Missing	# Registered Voters	# Phones	% Phones	# Streams
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Encouragement, 100%	0.014	10.823	8.616	-0.008	0.006
	[0.009]	[31.812]	[22.363]	[0.009]	[0.036]
Encouragement, 50%	0.003	21.164	19.614	0.005	0.024
	[0.008]	[29.341]	[20.313]	[0.013]	[0.034]
Positions Info, 100%	-0.005	10.966	-1.935	-0.011	0.020
	[0.008]	[24.880]	[17.182]	[0.008]	[0.031]
Positions Info, 50%	-0.002	9.781	10.680	-0.007	-0.000
	[0.008]	[26.203]	[19.579]	[0.008]	[0.031]
IEBC Info, 100%	0.007	-5.385	-2.023	-0.001	0.003
	[0.008]	[26.246]	[18.919]	[0.013]	[0.032]
IEBC Info, 50%	0.015*	-11.285	-16.779	-0.007	0.002
	[0.009]	[24.851]	[16.698]	[0.010]	[0.028]
F-test p-value	0.37	0.97	0.83	0.83	0.99
Control Mean	0.074	689.059	403.699	0.561	1.400
R-squared	.14	.43	.42	.06	.43
Observations	12160	11257	12160	12160	11191

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust Standard errors reported in brackets.
All regressions include strata fixed effects.
In each column we report the p-value of a test of joint significance of all the treatment dummies.
Registered voters denotes the number of registered voters per polling station.
Phones denotes the number of registered voters with a valid phone number per polling station.
% Phones denotes the fraction of registered voters with a valid phone number per polling station.
# Streams denotes the number of polling booths per polling station.

Table B.5: Randomization Balance across all treatment cells

	Non-Response	Gender	Age	Years of Educ	Voted 2007	Voted 2010	Registered 2013
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Encouragement, 100%	0.004	-0.023	0.551	-0.020	-0.006	0.018	0.002
	[0.015]	[0.020]	[0.497]	[0.188]	[0.019]	[0.017]	[0.004]
Encouragement, 50%	-0.019	-0.027	0.870*	-0.183	0.022	0.027	-0.002
	[0.015]	[0.020]	[0.513]	[0.192]	[0.018]	[0.017]	[0.004]
Positions Info, 100%	-0.023	0.003	0.532	-0.315	0.017	0.012	-0.004
	[0.014]	[0.019]	[0.497]	[0.193]	[0.018]	[0.017]	[0.004]
Positions Info, 50%	-0.005	0.031	0.531	0.068	0.015	-0.002	-0.006
	[0.015]	[0.020]	[0.520]	[0.193]	[0.018]	[0.018]	[0.004]
IEBC Info, 100%	0.002	-0.008	0.577	-0.190	0.017	0.002	0.001
	[0.014]	[0.020]	[0.509]	[0.187]	[0.018]	[0.017]	[0.004]
IEBC Info, 50%	-0.014	-0.011	0.382	-0.306	0.023	0.011	-0.001
	[0.014]	[0.020]	[0.495]	[0.192]	[0.018]	[0.017]	[0.004]
F-test p-value	0.50	0.19	0.72	0.39	0.66	0.70	0.65
Control Mean	0.493	0.612	35.894	9.061	0.726	0.751	0.991
R-squared	.02	.02	.02	.01	.01	.02	.01
Observations	14400	7399	7365	7364	7332	7261	7339

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by polling station. All regressions include strata fixed effects.
In each column we report the p-value of a F-test of joint significance of all the treatment dummies in each regression.

Table B.6: Randomization Balance across all treatment cells

	Violence	Luos	Kikuyus	Winners	Losers
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Encouragement, 100%	0.016	-0.012	0.002	-0.005	0.003
	[0.013]	[0.010]	[0.008]	[0.011]	[0.011]
Encouragement, 50%	0.028*	-0.002	-0.008	-0.001	-0.013
	[0.015]	[0.010]	[0.007]	[0.011]	[0.010]
Positions Info, 100%	0.006	-0.015	0.001	-0.004	0.004
	[0.012]	[0.010]	[0.007]	[0.012]	[0.011]
Positions Info, 50%	0.035**	-0.008	0.005	-0.001	0.003
	[0.016]	[0.009]	[0.008]	[0.011]	[0.011]
IEBC Info, 100%	0.029**	-0.000	-0.003	0.014	-0.005
	[0.013]	[0.010]	[0.007]	[0.011]	[0.011]
IEBC Info, 50%	-0.018	0.002	-0.005	0.019*	-0.010
	[0.013]	[0.010]	[0.008]	[0.011]	[0.011]
F-test p-value	0.05	0.63	0.76	0.40	0.70
Control Mean	0.100	0.186	0.125	0.290	0.309
R-squared	.26	.64	.71	.67	.7
Observations	7327	7356	7356	7356	7356

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by constituency (the level at which violence is measured) in col. (1) and by polling station in col. (2)-(5). All regressions include strata fixed effects. In each column we report the p-value of a F-test of joint significance of all the treatment dummies in each regression.

C Additional Empirical Results

Figures

Figure C.1: Trust in Kenya's Electoral Institutions



Note: Figures computed using rounds 2, 3 and 4 of the Afrobarometer conducted in Kenya in 2003, 2005, and 2008, respectively.

Figure C.2: Success Rates of SMS Broadcast



Note: Figure computed and provided by Safaricom. The mass broadcast of text messages was scheduled to begin every day at 10am during the campaign. Safaricom experienced technical difficulties on the first day of the campaign due to *"the system doing a reconciliation of the numbers of persons who opted out"*, according to the information communicated to us. As a result of this reconciliation, the first messages were sent at 11am on February 27, instead of the scheduled time of 10am. This led to a slightly lower delivery rate on the first day of the campaign.

Figure C.3: ACLED Election-Related Violence By Constituency



Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED). We coded all election-related events recorded by ACLED between February 27, 2013 and November 10, 2013 (see text for details).

Tables

Table C.1: Summary Statistics

	Mean	SD	N
Registered voters	689.1	1002.2	11257
Votes cast	587.4	818.0	11257
Turnout, cast votes	.878	.082	11254
Valid votes	581.9	810.7	11257
Turnout, valid votes	.870	.083	11255
Non-valid votes	6.9	21.1	12160
Non-valid votes, fraction	.011	.014	11257
Election-related violence	.105	.306	12160
Kenyatta vote	.510	.389	11252
Odinga vote	.435	.362	11253
	Mean	SD	N
Age, years	36.3	12.5	7365
Gender (1=Male)	.606	.489	7399
Years of education	8.9	4.7	7364
Kikuyu	.176	.380	7356
Luo	.117	.321	7356
Winning coalition	.293	.455	7356
Losing coalition	.299	.458	7356
Voted in elections	.944	.229	7341
Voted for all six positions	.930	.255	7254
Received election-related SMS	.793	.405	7324
Total SMS received from IEBC	3.9	5.0	5879
Remember SMS content	.695	.460	7400
Texts encouraged turnout	.246	.431	6608
Mentioned texts to others	.704	.457	6103
Others mentioned texts	.687	.464	7196
Trust the IEBC	.781	.414	7327
Trust the Supreme Court (SCK)	.711	.453	7227
Elections were fair	.712	.453	7287
SCK decision on election fair	.684	.465	7204
Satisfied with democracy	.303	.459	7309
Democracy preferable	.900	.300	7321
Elect through open elections	.975	.157	7359
Actively question leaders	.834	.372	7364
All allowed to vote	.918	.275	7371
Violence never justified	.930	.256	7320
Month of election correct	.824	.381	6712
Day of election correct	.785	.411	5475
Role of Women Rep correct	.473	.499	6595
Party of President correct	.926	.262	6652
Ugandan President correct	.963	.188	6442
Well informed about election	.872	.334	7369

Note: The Kenyatta and Odinga vote shares are weighted by the number of votes cast in each polling station.

Table C.2: Descriptive Statistics in the SMS Campaign Sample and Survey Sample

	Census 2009 (1)	SMS Campaign Sample (2)	Survey Sample (3)
Age	43.29	43.59	35.47
	(3.36)	(3.17)	(3.62)
Years of schooling	6.42	6.99	10.26
	(2.34)	(1.45)	(1.66)
Own radio	0.714	0.759	0.843
	(0.160)	(0.093)	(0.124)
Own TV	0.216	0.226	0.455
	(0.160)	(0.138)	(0.186)
Piped water	0.046	0.044	0.236
	(0.061)	(0.055)	(0.181)
Electric light	0.146	0.139	0.329
	(0.187)	(0.139)	(0.224)
Iron roof	0.701	0.783	0.846
	(0.259)	(0.176)	(0.138)
Cement floor	0.328	0.353	0.505
	(0.205)	(0.353)	(0.181)
Constituencies	210	204	198
Polling Stations/Individuals		12,160	7,400

Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Column (1) reports average country-level characteristics from the 2009 KNBS census averaged across constituencies. Column (2) reports averages of the same variables, where the data is at the constituency-level and weighted by the number of polling stations in our experimental sample. Column (3) reports averages of the same variable collected in our endline phone survey (averaged by constituency).

Table C.3: Standardized Treatment Effects on Turnout and Trust

	Votes Cast	Valid Votes	Self-Reported	Trust IEBC	Fair Elections	Satisf Democracy
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Encouragement	0.034*	0.033*	0.056*	-0.105***	-0.024	-0.059*
	[0.018]	[0.018]	[0.031]	[0.033]	[0.031]	[0.032]
Positions Info	0.014	0.016	0.060*	-0.056*	-0.031	-0.064**
	[0.019]	[0.019]	[0.032]	[0.032]	[0.031]	[0.032]
IEBC Info	0.007	0.002	0.043	-0.053	-0.001	-0.036
	[0.019]	[0.019]	[0.032]	[0.032]	[0.031]	[0.032]
R^2	0.48	0.49	0.02	0.10	0.16	0.04
Observations	11254	11255	7341	7327	7287	7309

Notes: This table reports estimates from equation (2). All regressions include strata fixed effects. In column 1, the dependent variable is the fraction of registered voters per polling station who cast a vote. In column 2, the dependent variable is the fraction of registered voters who cast a valid vote. In column 3, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for survey respondents answering Yes to the question: "Did you vote in the 2013 elections?". In column 4, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for survey respondents answering Yes to the question: "Do you trust the IEBC?". In columns 5, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for respondents answering Yes to the question: "Do you think the elections were fair and transparent?". In column 6, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for respondents answering 'Very Satisfied' to the question: "Overall, how satisfied are you with how democracy works in Kenya?" All dependent variables are standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1 in the control group.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by polling station in brackets.

Table C.4: Effects on Turnout by Position (Survey Data), Additional Results

	President		MP		Senator		Governor		Women's Rep		Ward Rep	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Any 100% Treatment	0.019***		0.020***		0.020***		0.022***		0.021***		0.023***	
	[0.007]		[0.007]		[0.007]		[0.007]		[0.008]		[0.008]	
Any 50% Treatment	0.008		0.007		0.005		0.007		0.007		0.008	
	[0.007]		[0.008]		[0.008]		[0.008]		[0.008]		[0.008]	
Encouragement		0.014*		0.014*		0.016*		0.016**		0.016*		0.017**
		[0.008]		[0.008]		[0.008]		[0.008]		[0.008]		[0.008]
Positions Info		0.015*		0.014*		0.011		0.014*		0.013		0.016*
		[0.008]		[0.008]		[0.008]		[0.008]		[0.008]		[0.008]
IEBC Info		0.012		0.012		0.010		0.011		0.013		0.013
		[0.008]		[0.008]		[0.008]		[0.008]		[0.009]		[0.009]
Control Mean	0.932	0.932	0.928	0.928	0.928	0.928	0.928	0.928	0.924	0.924	0.923	0.923
R-squared	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02
Observations	7307	7307	7300	7300	7304	7304	7302	7302	7303	7303	7297	7297

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on self-reported turnout in the survey data. Odd-numbered columns report estimates from equation (1). Even-numbered columns report estimates from equation (2). All regressions include strata fixed effects. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent reported casting a vote for the position of: President (columns 1-2), Member of Parliament (columns 3-4), Senator (columns 5-6), Governor (columns 7-8), Women's Representative (columns 9-10) and Ward Representative (columns 11-12).
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by polling station in brackets.

Table C.5: Effects on Candidate Vote Shares

	Administrative Data			
	(1) Kenyatta	(2) Kenyatta	(3) Odinga	(4) Odinga
Any 100% Treatment	0.002		-0.001	
	[0.003]		[0.003]	
Any 50% Treatment	0.002		-0.004	
	[0.003]		[0.003]	
Encouragement		0.000		0.000
		[0.004]		[0.004]
Positions Info		0.005		-0.006
		[0.004]		[0.004]
IEBC Info		-0.000		-0.001
		[0.004]		[0.004]
Control Mean	0.493	0.493	0.451	0.451
R-squared	.87	.87	.87	.87
Observations	11252	11252	11253	11253

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on candidate vote shares measured in the administrative data. Odd-numbered columns report estimates from equation (1). Even-numbered columns report estimates from equation (2). All regressions include strata fixed effects. In columns 1-2, the dependent variable is the fraction of valid votes cast in favor of Uhuru Kenyatta (winner of the election). In columns 3-4, the dependent variable is the fraction of valid votes cast in favor of Raila Odinga, the main challenger. The control mean of each dependent variable is weighted by the number of registered voters in each polling station.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by polling station in brackets.

Table C.6: Effects on Turnout across All Treatment Groups

	Administrative Data		Survey Data	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Encouragement, 100%	0.005**	0.005**	0.024***	0.029***
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.009]	[0.010]
Encouragement, 50%	0.001	0.001	0.005	0.009
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.010]	[0.011]
Positions Info, 100%	0.002	0.003	0.013	0.015
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.009]	[0.011]
Positions Info, 50%	-0.000	0.000	0.017*	0.019*
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.009]	[0.011]
IEBC Info, 100%	0.002	0.001	0.023**	0.031***
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.009]	[0.010]
IEBC Info, 50%	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.010]	[0.011]
Control Mean	0.877	0.869	0.934	0.917
R-squared	.48	.49	.02	.02
Observations	11254	11255	7341	7254

Notes: This table reports the coefficients from a modified version of equation (2) that includes six dummies for assignment to one of the six treatment cells, including both the T1/T2/T3 dimension and the 100%/50% treatment dimension. The dependent variables are defined as in Table 3. All regressions include strata fixed effects.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by polling station in brackets.

Table C.7: Effects on Trust across All Treatment Groups

	Trust IEBC	Trust SCK	Fair Election	Fair SCK Ruling	Satisf Democracy	Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Encouragement, 100%	-0.058***	-0.025	-0.028	-0.017	-0.020	-0.068**
	[0.017]	[0.018]	[0.018]	[0.018]	[0.019]	[0.030]
Encouragement, 50%	-0.027*	-0.008	0.006	-0.002	-0.035**	-0.029
	[0.016]	[0.018]	[0.017]	[0.018]	[0.018]	[0.028]
Positions Info, 100%	-0.020	-0.011	-0.025	-0.018	-0.050***	-0.058**
	[0.016]	[0.018]	[0.017]	[0.018]	[0.018]	[0.028]
Positions Info, 50%	-0.024	-0.017	-0.003	-0.023	-0.009	-0.037
	[0.016]	[0.018]	[0.017]	[0.018]	[0.019]	[0.029]
IEBC Info, 100%	-0.034**	-0.020	-0.011	-0.002	-0.007	-0.030
	[0.016]	[0.018]	[0.017]	[0.018]	[0.019]	[0.028]
IEBC Info, 50%	-0.008	-0.002	0.009	0.012	-0.026	-0.004
	[0.016]	[0.018]	[0.017]	[0.018]	[0.018]	[0.028]
Control Mean	0.800	0.721	0.715	0.688	0.320	-0.000
R-squared	.1	.07	.16	.15	.04	.16
Observations	7327	7227	7287	7204	7309	7034

Notes: This table reports the coefficients from a modified version of equation (2) that includes six dummies for assignment to one of the six treatment cells, including both the T1/T2/T3 dimension and the 100%/50% treatment dimension. The dependent variables are defined as in Table 4. All regressions include strata fixed effects.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by polling station in brackets.

Table C.8: Spillovers

	Voted in 2013		Voted for All Positions		Trust IEBC		Fair Election		Satisf Democracy	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Individual treatment	0.016**		0.021***		-0.033***		-0.017		-0.024*	
	[0.007]		[0.008]		[0.011]		[0.012]		[0.013]	
Treatment, 100% Groups		0.020***		0.025***		-0.037***		-0.021*		-0.026*
		[0.007]		[0.008]		[0.012]		[0.013]		[0.014]
Treatment, 50% Groups		0.009		0.012		-0.026*		-0.009		-0.020
		[0.009]		[0.010]		[0.014]		[0.015]		[0.016]
Spillover	0.004	0.004	0.005	0.005	-0.015	-0.015	0.017	0.017	-0.027*	-0.027*
	[0.009]	[0.009]	[0.010]	[0.010]	[0.014]	[0.014]	[0.015]	[0.015]	[0.016]	[0.016]
Control Mean	0.936	0.936	0.919	0.919	0.796	0.796	0.725	0.725	0.309	0.309
R-squared	.02	.02	.02	.02	.1	.1	.16	.16	.04	.04
Test 100%=50% p-val		0.17		0.12		0.39		0.37		0.69
Observations	7341	7341	7254	7254	7327	7327	7287	7287	7309	7309

Notes: Odd-numbered columns report estimates from equation (5). Even-numbered columns report estimates from a similar specification where we replace the $Treat_{ij}$ indicator with two variables denoting assignment to the 100% treatment group or the 50% treatment group. All regressions include strata fixed effects. In columns 1-2, the dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the respondent reports having voted. In columns 3-4, the dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the respondent reports having voted for all six positions. Across columns 5-10, the dependent variable is a dummy for the following survey answers: in columns 5-6, Yes to: "Do you trust the IEBC?"; in columns 7-8, Yes to: "Do you think the elections were fair and transparent?"; and in columns 9-10, Very satisfied to: "Overall, how satisfied are you with how democracy works in Kenya?".
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by polling station in brackets.

Table C.9: Analysis of Spillovers on Trust

	Discussed SMS with others	Discussed SMS No Trust IEBC	Did not discuss SMS No Trust IEBC	Discussed SMS Trust Index < 0	Did not discuss SMS Trust Index < 0
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Any 100% Treatment	0.028**	0.027**	0.004	0.030*	-0.010
	[0.013]	[0.013]	[0.006]	[0.016]	[0.008]
Any 50% Treatment	0.013	0.007	0.008	0.012	-0.001
	[0.013]	[0.013]	[0.006]	[0.016]	[0.008]
Control Mean	0.822	0.179	0.028	0.335	0.065
R-squared	.01	.09	.01	.12	.02
Observations	6015	5977	5977	5770	5770

Notes: This table reports estimates from equation (1). All regressions include strata fixed effects. All dependent variables are constructed from the survey data. In column 1, we look at a dummy variable equal to 1 is the respondents mention that they discussed election-related text messages with others, or that text messages were mentioned to them. In column 2, the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent discussed SMS with others (the same variable as that in column 1) **and** does not trust the IEBC. In column 3, the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent did **not** discuss SMS with others and does not trust the IEBC. In column 4, the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent discussed SMS with others and the trust index used in columns 11-12 of Table 4 is less than 0. In column 5, the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent did not discuss SMS with others and the trust index used in columns 11-12 of Table 4 is less than 0.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by polling station in brackets.

Table C.10: Winners and Losers: Effects on Trust in Kenyan Electoral Institutions

	Trust IEBC	Trust SCK	Fair Election	Fair SCK Ruling	Satisf Democracy	Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Any Treatment*Kikuyu	0.030	0.001	0.001	-0.015	-0.040	-0.008
	[0.020]	[0.026]	[0.021]	[0.023]	[0.035]	[0.037]
Any Treatment*Luo	-0.048	-0.081**	-0.056	-0.117***	-0.056	-0.168**
	[0.040]	[0.041]	[0.041]	[0.041]	[0.035]	[0.067]
Kikuyu	0.127***	0.160***	0.192***	0.206***	0.126***	0.366***
	[0.024]	[0.029]	[0.025]	[0.026]	[0.036]	[0.044]
Luo	-0.154***	-0.152***	-0.228***	-0.229***	-0.022	-0.348***
	[0.045]	[0.046]	[0.046]	[0.046]	[0.039]	[0.075]
Any Treatment	-0.057*	0.007	0.042	0.037	-0.046	-0.004
	[0.033]	[0.038]	[0.037]	[0.038]	[0.039]	[0.060]
Kikuyu = Luo F-stat	3.67*	3.50*	1.86	5.68**	0.14	5.38**
Kikuyu = Luo p-val	0.06	0.06	0.17	0.02	0.71	0.02
Control Mean	0.801	0.722	0.714	0.687	0.322	-0.001
R-squared	.12	.09	.18	.17	.06	.2
Observations	7137	7043	7101	7019	7119	6859

Notes: This table reports estimates from equation (3). All regressions include strata fixed effects. 'Kikuyu' equals one for Kikuyu survey respondents. 'Luo' equals one for Luo survey respondents. In column 1, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for survey respondents answering Yes to the question: "Do you trust the IEBC?". In column 2, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for respondents answering Yes to the question: "Do you trust the Supreme Court of Kenya?". In column 3, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for respondents answering Yes to the question: "Do you think the elections were fair and transparent?". In column 4, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for respondents answering Yes to the question: "Do you think the ruling of the Supreme Court on the election was fair?" In column 5, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for respondents answering 'Very Satisfied' to the question: "Overall, how satisfied are you with how democracy works in Kenya?" In column 6, we report effects on an index of all previous 5 outcomes computed as in Kling et al. (2007). We also report the F-stat and corresponding p-value from a test of equality of the two interaction terms in the top panel: Any Treatment*Kikuyu = Any Treatment*Luo.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by polling station in brackets.

Table C.11: Effects on Satisfaction with Democracy in Kenya by Tribe, Not Controlling for Other Interactions

	Voted		Trust IEBC		Trust SCK		Fair Election		Satisf Democracy	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Any Treatment*Kikuyu	-0.014		0.021		-0.002		0.003		-0.056	
	[0.015]		[0.019]		[0.025]		[0.020]		[0.035]	
Any Treatment*Luo	-0.009		-0.049		-0.085**		-0.054		-0.055	
	[0.016]		[0.040]		[0.041]		[0.040]		[0.035]	
Any Treatment*Win		-0.020		0.009		0.003		0.002		-0.024
		[0.016]		[0.021]		[0.027]		[0.023]		[0.031]
Any Treatment*Lose		-0.025		-0.056*		-0.071**		-0.074**		-0.004
		[0.016]		[0.028]		[0.030]		[0.031]		[0.029]
Kikuyu	0.011		0.129***		0.163***		0.186***		0.123***	
	[0.018]		[0.023]		[0.028]		[0.024]		[0.036]	
Luo	0.036*		-0.168***		-0.158***		-0.236***		-0.033	
	[0.021]		[0.044]		[0.046]		[0.045]		[0.038]	
Winning Coalition		0.024		0.121***		0.132***		0.182***		0.091***
		[0.019]		[0.024]		[0.029]		[0.026]		[0.033]
Losing Coalition		0.043**		-0.074**		-0.039		-0.093***		-0.045
		[0.017]		[0.031]		[0.033]		[0.033]		[0.030]
Any Treatment	0.017*	0.026**	-0.024*	-0.013	-0.002	0.007	-0.000	0.014	-0.007	-0.016
	[0.009]	[0.012]	[0.013]	[0.018]	[0.015]	[0.020]	[0.015]	[0.019]	[0.015]	[0.019]
Control Mean	0.935	0.935	0.800	0.800	0.721	0.721	0.714	0.714	0.320	0.320
Win = Lose F-stat	0.07	0.10	3.13*	6.44**	3.66*	6.47**	2.08	7.78***	0.00	0.38
Win = Lose p-val	0.80	0.75	0.08	0.01	0.06	0.01	0.15	0.01	0.98	0.53
R-squared	.02	.02	.11	.11	.09	.08	.18	.18	.04	.04
Observations	7304	7304	7289	7289	7192	7192	7251	7251	7271	7271

Notes: This table reports estimates from equation (3). All regressions include strata fixed effects. In odd-numbered columns, 'Kikuyu' equals one for Kikuyu survey respondents and 'Luo' equals one for Luo survey respondents. In even-numbered columns, winning/losing coalitions are defined as in Table 5. All dependent variables are defined as in columns 1-5 of Table C.10. We also report the F-stat and corresponding p-value from a test of equality of the two interaction terms: Any Treatment*Kikuyu = Any Treatment*Luo (odd-numbered columns) and Any Treatment*Winning Coalition = Any Treatment*Losing Coalition (even-numbered columns).

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by polling station in brackets.

Table C.12: Effects on Trust: Heterogeneity with Winners and Losers

	Trust IEBC		Trust SCK		Fair Election		Fair SCK Ruling		Satisf Democracy	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Any Treat 100%*Kikuyu	0.056**		0.020		0.025		0.009		0.003	
	[0.022]		[0.029]		[0.023]		[0.025]		[0.039]	
Any Treat 50%*Kikuyu	0.005		-0.017		-0.023		-0.038		-0.081**	
	[0.022]		[0.029]		[0.024]		[0.026]		[0.039]	
Any Treat 100%*Luo	-0.020		-0.037		-0.013		-0.099**		-0.087**	
	[0.045]		[0.046]		[0.045]		[0.046]		[0.038]	
Any Treat 50%*Luo	-0.077*		-0.128***		-0.098**		-0.136***		-0.024	
	[0.046]		[0.047]		[0.046]		[0.047]		[0.040]	
Any Treat 100%*Win		0.041*		0.027		0.031		0.014		0.038
		[0.024]		[0.031]		[0.026]		[0.028]		[0.035]
Any Treat 50%*Win		-0.016		-0.022		-0.027		-0.048*		-0.066*
		[0.024]		[0.031]		[0.026]		[0.028]		[0.035]
Any Treat 100%*Lose		-0.047		-0.043		-0.053		-0.085**		-0.009
		[0.032]		[0.034]		[0.035]		[0.035]		[0.032]
Any Treat 50%*Lose		-0.063*		-0.096***		-0.095***		-0.103***		0.020
		[0.032]		[0.034]		[0.035]		[0.035]		[0.032]
Any 100% Treatment	-0.082**	-0.064*	0.006	0.016	-0.012	0.004	0.021	0.044	-0.079*	-0.093**
	[0.037]	[0.039]	[0.042]	[0.044]	[0.041]	[0.043]	[0.042]	[0.044]	[0.043]	[0.045]
Any 50% Treatment	-0.031	-0.006	0.008	0.035	0.097**	0.128***	0.053	0.087**	-0.011	-0.020
	[0.037]	[0.038]	[0.042]	[0.044]	[0.041]	[0.042]	[0.042]	[0.044]	[0.044]	[0.046]
Control Mean	0.801	0.801	0.722	0.722	0.714	0.714	0.687	0.687	0.322	0.322
Win = Lose F-stat	2.74*	9.43***	1.34	4.43**	0.69	7.52***	5.15**	9.98***	3.22*	1.72
Win = Lose p-val	0.10	0.00	0.25	0.04	0.41	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.07	0.19
R-squared	.12	.12	.09	.09	.18	.18	.17	.18	.06	.06
Observations	7137	7137	7043	7043	7101	7101	7019	7019	7119	7119

Notes: This table reports estimates from a modified version of equation (3) where we interact proxy for winners/losers separately with two indicators for individuals in the 100% group and those in the 50% group. All regressions include strata fixed effects and controls for education and wealth as well as the interactions of these variables with any treatment. The main effects for Kikuyu, Luo, Winning Coalition and Losing Coalition are included in the regressions but not reported for space reasons. All dependent variables are defined as in columns 1-5 of Table C.10. We also report the F-stat and corresponding p-value from a test of equality of the two interaction terms: Any Treatment*Kikuyu = Any Treatment*Luo (odd-numbered columns) and Any Treatment*Winning Coalition = Any Treatment*Losing Coalition (even-numbered columns). * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by polling station in brackets.

Table C.13: Election Violence and Turnout

Heterogeneity by Election Violence

	Cast Votes	Valid Votes	Kenyatta (%)	Odinga (%)	Voted in 2013	Voted All
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Any Treatment*Violence	0.002	0.002	-0.004	0.006	-0.024	-0.037
	[0.006]	[0.006]	[0.008]	[0.008]	[0.037]	[0.035]
Any Treatment	0.001	0.001	0.002	-0.003	0.016**	0.021***
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.007]	[0.007]
Violence	-0.017**	-0.016**	-0.015	0.014	-0.012	0.000
	[0.008]	[0.008]	[0.022]	[0.021]	[0.032]	[0.030]
Control Mean	0.877	0.869	0.458	0.481	0.934	0.917
R-squared	.48	.49	.87	.87	.02	.02
Observations	11254	11255	11252	11253	7341	7254

Notes: This table reports estimates from equation (4). All regressions include strata fixed effects. In column 1, the dependent variable is the fraction of registered voters per polling station who cast a vote. In column 2, the dependent variable is the fraction of registered voters who cast a valid vote. In column 3, the dependent variable is the fraction of valid votes cast in favor of Uhuru Kenyatta (winner of the election). In column 4, the dependent variable is the fraction of valid votes cast in favor of Raila Odinga, the main challenger. In column 5, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for survey respondents answering Yes to the question: "Did you vote in the 2013 elections?". In column 6, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for survey respondents reporting that they cast a vote in each of the six ballots organized in March 2013.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by polling station in brackets.

Table C.13: Effects on Trust: Heterogeneity with Election Violence

	Trust IEBC	Trust SCK	Fair Election	Fair SCK Ruling	Satisf Democracy
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Any 100% Treatment*Violence	-0.078**	-0.049	-0.037	-0.008	-0.010
	[0.032]	[0.034]	[0.030]	[0.039]	[0.047]
Any 50% Treatment*Violence	-0.057	-0.040	-0.022	0.022	0.009
	[0.040]	[0.047]	[0.046]	[0.048]	[0.043]
Any 100% Treatment	-0.028**	-0.013	-0.016	-0.010	-0.024
	[0.013]	[0.013]	[0.012]	[0.014]	[0.016]
Any 50% Treatment	-0.014	-0.004	0.007	-0.006	-0.024*
	[0.012]	[0.015]	[0.013]	[0.014]	[0.014]
Violence	0.026	-0.016	-0.036	-0.075**	-0.030
	[0.030]	[0.040]	[0.031]	[0.037]	[0.037]
Control Mean	0.800	0.721	0.715	0.688	0.320
R-squared	.1	.07	.16	.15	.04
Observations	7327	7227	7287	7204	7309

Notes: This table reports estimates from a modified version of equation (4) where we interact exposure to violence separately with two indicators for individuals in the 100% group and those in the 50% group. All regressions include strata fixed effects. All dependent variables are defined as in columns 1-5 of Table 4.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by polling station in brackets.

Table C.14: Heterogeneous Effects on Support for Democratic Principles

	Democracy Preferable		Open Elections		Actively Question Leaders		All Permitted to Vote		Violence Never OK	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Any Treatment*Violence	-0.022		0.006		0.020		-0.047**		-0.024	
	[0.026]		[0.014]		[0.029]		[0.022]		[0.015]	
Any Treatment*Kikuyu		0.013		0.011		-0.001		-0.005		-0.017
		[0.023]		[0.011]		[0.027]		[0.019]		[0.016]
Any Treatment*Luo		0.024		-0.011		-0.037		-0.022		-0.031
		[0.024]		[0.015]		[0.031]		[0.026]		[0.021]
Violence	0.020		-0.001		0.008		0.048***		0.025	
	[0.022]		[0.013]		[0.029]		[0.017]		[0.020]	
Kikuyu		-0.026		-0.011		-0.017		0.030		0.024
		[0.025]		[0.013]		[0.028]		[0.020]		[0.017]
Luo		0.016		-0.016		0.043		-0.009		-0.018
		[0.028]		[0.016]		[0.035]		[0.029]		[0.024]
Any Treatment	0.004	0.028	0.001	-0.034**	0.000	0.064*	0.004	-0.032	-0.008	-0.025
	[0.008]	[0.027]	[0.005]	[0.015]	[0.011]	[0.035]	[0.008]	[0.021]	[0.007]	[0.023]
Control Mean	0.898	0.898	0.972	0.972	0.831	0.830	0.918	0.918	0.938	0.938
Win = Lose F-stat		0.15		1.57		0.93		0.29		0.37
Win = Lose p-val		0.70		0.21		0.33		0.59		0.54
Observations	7321	7129	7359	7165	7364	7168	7371	7175	7320	7130

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All regressions include strata fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered by constituency in odd-numbered columns and by polling station in even-numbered columns.
In col. (1)-(2), the dependent variable is whether respondent answered that democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.
In col. (3)-(4), the dependent variable is whether respondent agreed with: We should choose our leaders through regular, open and honest elections.
In col. (5)-(6), the dependent variable is whether respondent sided with: As citizens we should be more active in questioning actions of our leaders.
In col. (7)-(8), the dependent variable is whether respondent sided with: All people should be permitted to vote. See Appendix Table A.3 for full statement.
In col. (9)-(10), the dependent variable is whether respondent sided with: The use of violence is never justified in politics.

Table C.15: Heterogeneous Effects on Information

	Correct Month		Correct Day		Women Role Correct		Party Correct		Museveni Correct		Well Informed	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Any Treatment*Violence	0.008		-0.024		-0.075*		0.019		-0.005		0.004	
	[0.035]		[0.043]		[0.041]		[0.021]		[0.023]		[0.030]	
Any Treatment*Kikuyu		0.010		0.018		-0.013		0.000		0.003		-0.008
		[0.028]		[0.033]		[0.040]		[0.014]		[0.014]		[0.024]
Any Treatment*Luo		0.008		0.052		-0.029		0.015		-0.005		-0.048**
		[0.032]		[0.042]		[0.045]		[0.028]		[0.015]		[0.024]
Violence	-0.017		0.039		0.030		0.002		0.004		0.004	
	[0.036]		[0.031]		[0.035]		[0.016]		[0.021]		[0.025]	
Kikuyu		0.043		0.013		0.012		0.026*		-0.007		0.015
		[0.029]		[0.035]		[0.041]		[0.016]		[0.014]		[0.025]
Luo		0.042		0.045		0.071		-0.015		0.001		0.042
		[0.036]		[0.045]		[0.049]		[0.029]		[0.014]		[0.028]
Any Treatment	0.005	0.027	-0.016	-0.040	-0.002	0.024	-0.008	-0.044*	0.006	-0.017	0.008	0.005
	[0.012]	[0.038]	[0.014]	[0.044]	[0.014]	[0.046]	[0.008]	[0.026]	[0.005]	[0.020]	[0.009]	[0.032]
Control Mean	0.820	0.820	0.800	0.797	0.481	0.478	0.930	0.930	0.960	0.959	0.865	0.868
Kikuyu = Luo p-val		0.95		0.49		0.78		0.61		0.65		0.19
R-squared	.01	.02	.01	.02	.02	.05	.02	.04	.03	.04	.02	.04
Observations	6712	6535	5475	5324	6595	6428	6652	6471	6442	6264	7369	7171

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All regressions include strata fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered by constituency in odd-numbered columns and by polling station in even-numbered columns.
In col. (1)-(2), the dependent variable is whether respondent could correctly name the month of the election.
In col. (3)-(4), the dependent variable is whether respondent could correctly name the day of the election.
In col. (5)-(6), the dependent variable is whether respondent could correctly describe the role of the Women's Rep.
In col. (7)-(8), the dependent variable is whether respondent could correctly name the party of President.
In col. (9)-(10), the dependent variable is whether respondent could correctly name the President of Uganda (Museveni).
In col. (11)-(12), the dependent variable is whether respondent answered yes to: Overall do you feel you were well informed about the election?

Table C.16: Effects on All Other Attitudes

	Trust Police		Trust Own Tribe		Trust Others		Not Run by Few		Complicated		Women		Bribery Normal		Happy?	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Any 100% Treat	0.00		-0.00		-0.02		-0.02		0.00		-0.00		-0.00		-0.02	
	[0.02]		[0.02]		[0.02]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.02]	
Any 50% Treat	-0.01		0.01		-0.01		0.00		0.00		0.00		-0.00		-0.01	
	[0.02]		[0.02]		[0.02]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.02]	
Encouragement		-0.01		0.01		-0.01		-0.01		0.01		-0.00		-0.00		-0.03
		[0.02]		[0.02]		[0.02]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.02]
Positions Info		-0.00		-0.00		-0.02		-0.00		-0.00		-0.00		-0.01		-0.01
		[0.02]		[0.02]		[0.02]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.02]
IEBC Info		0.00		-0.00		-0.00		-0.02		0.01		0.00		0.00		-0.01
		[0.02]		[0.02]		[0.02]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.02]
Control Mean	0.47	0.47	0.53	0.53	0.49	0.49	0.25	0.25	0.80	0.80	0.96	0.96	0.10	0.10	0.51	0.51
R-squared	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.02	.02
Observations	7349	7349	7362	7362	7358	7358	7344	7344	7349	7349	7368	7368	7360	7360	7341	7341

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by polling station in brackets. All regressions include strata fixed effects.

In col. (1)-(2), the dep var is whether respondent answered yes to: Do you trust the police?

In col. (3)-(4), the dep var is whether respondent answered yes to: In general, can you trust members of your tribe?

In col. (5)-(6), the dep var is whether respondent answered yes to: In general, can you trust members of other tribes?

In col. (7)-(8), the dep var is whether respondent agreed with: The world is run by a few people in power. See Appendix Table 1 for full statement.

In col. (9)-(10), the dep var is whether respondent agreed with: Politics and government sometimes seem complicated. See Appendix Table 1 for full statement.

In col. (11)-(12), the dep var is whether respondent sided with: Women can be good politicians and should be encouraged to stand in elections.

In col. (13)-(14), the dep var is whether respondent sided with: In our country, it is normal to pay a bribe. See Appendix Table 1 for full statement.

In col. (15)-(16), the dep var is whether respondent answered very happy to: In general, in your life are you very happy, somewhat happy or unhappy?

Table C.17: Survey Attrition: Lee Bounds

	Voted 2013		Trust IEBC		Trust SCK		Fair Election		Fair SCK Ruling		Satisf Democracy	
	(1) T	(2) T,100%	(3) T	(4) T,100%	(5) T	(6) T,100%	(7) T	(8) T,100%	(9) T	(10) T,100%	(11) T	(12) T,100%
Lower bound	0.013*	0.019**	-0.030***	-0.037***	-0.017	-0.020	-0.009	-0.019	-0.008	-0.010	-0.038**	-0.034*
	[0.007]	[0.008]	[0.011]	[0.013]	[0.012]	[0.013]	[0.013]	[0.015]	[0.013]	[0.017]	[0.016]	[0.017]
Upper bound	0.030*	0.029*	-0.013	-0.027	-0.003	-0.012	0.007	-0.013	0.003	-0.008	-0.017	-0.020
	[0.016]	[0.016]	[0.016]	[0.017]	[0.016]	[0.017]	[0.016]	[0.016]	[0.016]	[0.019]	[0.014]	[0.014]
Lower CI	0.001	0.006	-0.048	-0.059	-0.038	-0.043	-0.031	-0.046	-0.030	-0.043	-0.065	-0.063
Upper CI	0.058	0.056	0.014	0.002	0.024	0.018	0.033	0.016	0.031	0.029	0.006	0.003
Control Mean	0.934	0.934	0.800	0.800	0.721	0.721	0.715	0.715	0.688	0.688	0.320	0.320
Proportion Trimmed	0.018	0.009	0.016	0.010	0.015	0.008	0.016	0.006	0.011	0.003	0.021	0.013
Observations	14400	9000	14400	9000	14400	9000	14400	9000	14400	9000	14400	9000

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All dependent variables orthogonalized from strata fixed effects.
The Lower and Upper CI are the upper and lower bound on the treatment-effect 95% confidence interval.
In odd-numbered columns, we report Lee bounds on Any Treatment.
In even numbered columns, we report Lee bounds on Any 100% Treatment.
In these columns, we compare the Any 100% Treatment and Control by restricting the sample to not include the Any 50% Treatment.

D Model

Main Results

In our model, citizens observe the quality of the administration of the election: $S = 1$ describes a success, and $S = 0$ describes a failure. Failure may entail problems in the logistics of the ballot, delays in the annoucement of the results, or election-related violence. Such problems occurred in the 2013 Kenyan election, as described in section 2. Two factors affect the quality of the election: R, the resources available to the IEBC; and F, fairness – of the election, the IEBC, or Kenyan democracy as a whole. The resources can be high ($R = H$) or low ($R = l$) and the election can be fair ($F = 1$) or unfair ($F = 0$). If citizens believe that $F = 1$, they report in our survey data that they trust the IEBC, that the election was fair, and that they are satisfied with the way democracy works in Kenya. Citizens know that R and F are independent and they have identical priors about F and R, denoted as $P(F = 1) = p$, $P(R = H) = q$. They also know the conditional probabilities $P(S = 0 \mid R, F)$, which fully describe how different values of R and F affect the likelihood of success and failure. We assume the following regarding these conditional probabilities when the election is a failure:

Assumption 1. $$\frac{P(S = 0 \mid F = 0, R = H)}{P(S = 0 \mid F = 1, R = H)} > \frac{P(S = 0 \mid F = 0, R = l)}{P(S = 0 \mid F = 1, R = l)}$$

This assumption means that when resources are low, the fairness of the election does not have much influence on the likelihood of a failed election (because failure is almost inevitable). Instead, when resources are high, success is much more likely when the election is fair than when it is unfair.

Citizens do not observe R and F directly. Before the election, a fraction of citizens observe a signal $\delta = \{\delta_l, \delta_H\}$ on the level of resources, and a fraction of citizens observe a signal $\gamma = \{\gamma_0, \gamma_1\}$ on the fairness of electoral institutions. We assume that these signals are informative:

Assumption 2.

2A. δ is independent of F, and $P(\delta = \delta_H \mid R = H) = \alpha > \beta = P(\delta = \delta_H \mid R = l)$.

2B. γ is independent of R, and $P(\gamma = \gamma_1 \mid F = 1) = \mu > \eta = P(\gamma = \gamma_1 \mid F = 0)$.

Lemma 1. People who receive δ_H positively update their prior on the level of resources allocated to the organization of the election.

Proof. See Appendix. □

Lemma 2. People who receive γ_1 positively update their prior on the fairness of the election.

Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the following two propositions hold.

Proposition 1. $P(F = 1 \mid S = 0) > P(F = 1 \mid S = 0, \delta = \delta_H)$*: in case of an electoral failure, citizens who received the signal that resources were high ($\delta = \delta_H$) have a lower posterior about the fairness of the election than those who did not receive any signal.*

The intuition behind Proposition 1 is simple. By sending a signal of its own high capacity to conduct elections ($\delta = \delta_H$), the IEBC sets high expectations in terms of the quality of the actual election. But voters

know that capacity is not the only determinant of electoral success – the honesty of the Commission can also affect the election's outcome. Upon observing electoral turmoil, such as election-related violence or logistical problems at the polling stations, recipients of the messages infer that the election is unlikely to have been fair. This result does not hold, however, if voters primarily interpret the campaign as a signal of fairness ($\gamma = \gamma_1$):

Proposition 2. $P(F = 1 \mid S = 0) < P(F = 1 \mid S = 0, \gamma = \gamma_1)$*: in case of an electoral failure, citizens who received the signal that the election was fair ($\gamma = \gamma_1$) have a higher posterior about the fairness of the election than those who did not receive any signal.*

Whether the campaign leads to an increase or a decrease in trust in the IEBC therefore depends on how treated voters interpreted the messages they received. In other words, the sign of our treatment effects on trust in the IEBC is informative about the way these messages were understood: conditional on observing signals of electoral failure, a signal of high institutional capacity will lead to a decrease in trust on average (Proposition 1), while a signal of fairness will have the opposite effect (Proposition 2). The question of which interpretation prevailed was ex ante ambiguous. On the one hand, individuals who received the messages from the IEBC must have observed that it had the resources to conduct a mass texting campaign, suggesting the campaign sent a signal of high capacity ($\delta = \delta_H$). On the other hand, some messages (in particular those included in Treatment 3, which provided information about the IEBC) emphasized the IEBC's role in ensuring the election would be free an fair – a signal of honesty ($\gamma = \gamma_1$). Note that when the signal received by voters contains information on both F and R, we cannot derive any general result on the relationship between $P(F = 1 \mid S = 0)$ and $P(F = 1 \mid S = 0, \gamma = \gamma_1)$ absent any further assumptions. Then, the sign of the combined effect on citizens' perception of F is informative about which of the two signals was more salient.

Given Proposition 1 and the risk that an unsuccessful election would alienate voters, why would the IEBC ever want to conduct this kind of campaign? Under one additional assumption, text messages can actually reinforce trust after a *successful* election, even if the messages are understood as a signal of high capacity. We make the following assumption regarding voters' beliefs in case the election is a success:

Assumption 3. $$\frac{P(S = 1 \mid F = 1, R = H)}{P(S = 1 \mid F = 0, R = H)} > \frac{P(S = 1 \mid F = 1, R = l)}{P(S = 1 \mid F = 0, R = l)}$$

As under Assumption 1, the mapping between electoral success and fairness is stronger when resources are high – fairness yields electoral success relatively more often when resources are high. Under Assumptions 2 and 3, the following proposition holds:

Proposition 3. $P(F = 1 \mid S = 1) < P(F = 1 \mid S = 1, \delta = \delta_H)$*: in case of an electoral success, citizens who received the signal that resources were high ($\delta = \delta_H$) have a higher posterior about the fairness of the election than those who did not receive any signal.*

Proposition 3 implies two additional predictions. First, the sign of the average treatment effect on trust depends on the relative fractions of citizens who observe electoral failure, and of those who do not. Second, the magnitude of the decrease in trust should be largest among citizens who directly received

a signal of electoral failure (such as those voting in areas affected by violence) or among those who lost the election and, as a result, are more likely to show disappointment and to consider the election was a failure (on psychological effects induced by the outcomes of elections, see e.g. Anderson et al. (2005)). In other words, as observed in Section 6, the interaction of treatment status with measures of exposure to, or perception of the electoral failure should be negative.

Proofs

Proof of Lemma 1

Lemma. *People who receive δ_H positively update their prior on the level of resources allocated to the organization of the election.*

$$\begin{aligned} P(R = H \mid \delta = \delta_H) &= \frac{P(\delta = \delta_H, R = H)}{P(\delta = \delta_H, R = H) + P(\delta = \delta_H, R = l)} \\ &= \frac{P(\delta = \delta_H \mid R = H) P(R = H)}{P(\delta = \delta_H \mid R = H) P(R = H) + P(\delta = \delta_H \mid R = l) P(R = l)} \\ &= \frac{\alpha q}{\alpha q + \beta (1 - q)} \\ &> q \end{aligned}$$

since $\alpha > \beta$ by assumption.
Q.E.D.

Proof of Proposition 1

Proposition 1. $P(F = 1 \mid S = 0) > P(F = 1 \mid S = 0, \delta = \delta_H)$.

Sketch of the proof:

1. We first show that:

$$\begin{aligned} P(F = 1 \mid S = 0) > P(F = 1 \mid S = 0, \delta = \delta_H) \\ \Leftrightarrow P(\delta = \delta_H \mid F = 0, S = 0) > P(\delta = \delta_H \mid F = 1, S = 0) \end{aligned}$$

2. We then show that:

$$\begin{aligned} P(\delta = \delta_H \mid F = 0, S = 0) > P(\delta = \delta_H \mid F = 1, S = 0) \\ \Leftrightarrow \frac{P(S = 0 \mid F = 0, R = H)}{P(S = 0 \mid F = 1, R = H)} > \frac{P(S = 0 \mid F = 0, R = l)}{P(S = 0 \mid F = 1, R = l)} \end{aligned}$$

where the last inequality is true by Assumption 1. This completes the proof.

Detailed proof (Step 1):

Note that:

$$\begin{aligned} P(F=1 \mid S=0, \delta=\delta_H) &= \frac{P(F=1, S=0, \delta=\delta_H)}{P(S=0, \delta=\delta_H)} \\ &= \frac{P(F=1, S=0)\, P(\delta=\delta_H \mid F=1, S=0)}{P(S=0)\, P(\delta=\delta_H \mid S=0)} \\ &= P(F=1 \mid S=0)\, \frac{P(\delta=\delta_H \mid F=1, S=0)}{P(\delta=\delta_H \mid S=0)} \end{aligned}$$

Thus,

$$\begin{aligned} & P(F=1 \mid S=0) > P(F=1 \mid S=0, \delta=\delta_H) \\ \Leftrightarrow\ & P(\delta=\delta_H \mid S=0) > P(\delta=\delta_H \mid F=1, S=0) \\ \Leftrightarrow\ & P(\delta=\delta_H \mid F=1, S=0)\, P(F=1 \mid S=0) + P(\delta=\delta_H \mid F=0, S=0)\, P(F=0 \mid S=0) \\ & \qquad > P(\delta=\delta_H \mid F=1, S=0) \\ \Leftrightarrow\ & P(\delta=\delta_H \mid F=0, S=0)\, P(F=0 \mid S=0) > P(\delta=\delta_H \mid F=1, S=0)\, [1 - P(F=1 \mid S=0)] \\ \Leftrightarrow\ & P(\delta=\delta_H \mid F=0, S=0)\, P(F=0 \mid S=0) > P(\delta=\delta_H \mid F=1, S=0)\, P(F=0 \mid S=0) \\ \Leftrightarrow\ & P(\delta=\delta_H \mid F=0, S=0) > P(\delta=\delta_H \mid F=1, S=0) \end{aligned}$$

Detailed proof (Step 2):

$$\begin{aligned} & P(\delta=\delta_H \mid F=0, S=0) > P(\delta=\delta_H \mid F=1, S=0) \\ \Leftrightarrow\ & P(\delta=\delta_H \mid F=0, S=0, R=H)\, P(R=H \mid F=0, S=0) \\ & \qquad + P(\delta=\delta_H \mid F=0, S=0, R=l)\, P(R=l \mid F=0, S=0) \\ & \quad > P(\delta=\delta_H \mid F=1, S=0, R=H)\, P(R=H \mid F=1, S=0) \\ & \qquad + P(\delta=\delta_H \mid F=1, S=0, R=l)\, P(R=l \mid F=1, S=0) \\ \Leftrightarrow\ & P(\delta=\delta_H \mid R=H)\, P(R=H \mid F=0, S=0) + P(\delta=\delta_H \mid R=l)\, P(R=l \mid F=0, S=0) \\ & \quad > P(\delta=\delta_H \mid R=H)\, P(R=H \mid F=1, S=0) + P(\delta=\delta_H \mid R=l)\, P(R=l \mid F=1, S=0) \end{aligned} \tag{D.1}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \Leftrightarrow\ & P(\delta=\delta_H \mid R=l)\, [P(R=l \mid F=0, S=0) - P(R=l \mid F=1, S=0)] \\ & \quad > P(\delta=\delta_H \mid R=H)\, [P(R=H \mid F=1, S=0) - P(R=H \mid F=0, S=0)] \\ \Leftrightarrow\ & [P(\delta=\delta_H \mid R=l) - P(\delta=\delta_H \mid R=H)]\, [P(R=H \mid F=1, S=0) - P(R=H \mid F=0, S=0)] > 0 \\ \Leftrightarrow\ & P(R=H \mid F=0, S=0) > P(R=H \mid F=1, S=0) \end{aligned} \tag{D.2}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \frac{P(R=H, F=0, S=0)}{P(F=0, S=0)} > \frac{P(R=H, F=1, S=0)}{P(F=1, S=0)}$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
&\Leftrightarrow \frac{P\left(S=0 \mid F=0, R=H\right) P\left(F=0, R=H\right)}{P\left(S=0 \mid F=0, R=H\right) P\left(F=0, R=H\right)+P\left(S=0 \mid F=0, R=l\right) P\left(F=0, R=l\right)} \\
&\quad>\frac{P\left(S=0 \mid F=1, R=H\right) P\left(F=1, R=H\right)}{P\left(S=0 \mid F=1, R=H\right) P\left(F=1, R=H\right)+P\left(S=0 \mid F=1, R=l\right) P\left(F=1, R=l\right)} \\
&\Leftrightarrow \frac{P\left(S=0 \mid F=0, R=H\right) P\left(R=H\right)}{P\left(S=0 \mid F=0, R=H\right) P\left(R=H\right)+P\left(S=0 \mid F=0, R=l\right) P\left(R=l\right)} \\
&\quad>\frac{P\left(S=0 \mid F=1, R=H\right) P\left(R=H\right)}{P\left(S=0 \mid F=1, R=H\right) P\left(R=H\right)+P\left(S=0 \mid F=1, R=l\right) P\left(R=l\right)} \qquad \text{(D.3)} \\
&\Leftrightarrow P\left(S=0 \mid F=0, R=H\right) P\left(S=0 \mid F=1, R=l\right) \\
&\quad>P\left(S=0 \mid F=1, R=H\right) P\left(S=0 \mid F=0, R=l\right) P\left(R=l\right) \\
&\Leftrightarrow \frac{P\left(S=0 \mid F=0, R=H\right)}{P\left(S=0 \mid F=1, R=H\right)}>\frac{P\left(S=0 \mid F=0, R=l\right)}{P\left(S=0 \mid F=1, R=l\right)}
\end{aligned}
$$

where:

(1) comes from the fact that δ is only determined by R,

(2) uses Assumption 2a,

and (3) uses the independence between F and R.

The last inequality is true by Assumption (Assumption 1). We infer that $P\left(F=1 \mid S=0\right) > P\left(F=1 \mid S=0, \delta=\delta_H\right)$.

Q.E.D.

Proof of Proposition 2

The proof is identical to that of Proposition 1:

1. We first show that:

$$
\begin{aligned}
&P\left(F=1 \mid S=0\right)<P\left(F=1 \mid S=0, \gamma=\gamma_1\right) \\
&\qquad\qquad\Leftrightarrow P\left(\gamma=\gamma_1 \mid F=0, S=0\right)<P\left(\gamma=\gamma_1 \mid F=1, S=0\right).
\end{aligned}
$$

   The proof of this step is identical to the proof of the first step in Proposition 1.

2. We then show that:

$$
\begin{aligned}
&P\left(\gamma=\gamma_1 \mid F=0, S=0\right)<P\left(\gamma=\gamma_1 \mid F=1, S=0\right) \\
&\qquad\qquad\Leftrightarrow P\left(\gamma=\gamma_1 \mid F=0\right)<P\left(\gamma=\gamma_1 \mid F=1\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

   where the last inequality is true by assumption (Assumption 2b) and the equivalence comes from the fact that γ is only determined by F. This completes the proof.

Proof of Proposition 3

By showing Proposition 1, we have shown that for a variable S affected by two independent variables R and F,

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{P(S=0 \mid F=0, R=H)}{P(S=0 \mid F=1, R=H)} > \frac{P(S=0|F=0,R=l)}{P(S=0|F=1,R=l)} \\ \text{and} \quad & P(\delta=\delta_H \mid R=H) = \alpha > \beta = P(\delta=\delta_H \mid R=l) \\ \text{implies} \quad & P(F=1 \mid S=0) > P(F=1 \mid S=0, \delta=\delta_H) \end{aligned}$$

This is true for any three variables $\widetilde{S}$, $\widetilde{R}$, and $\widetilde{F}$ where $\widetilde{R}$ and $\widetilde{F}$ are independent:

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{P\left(\widetilde{S}=0 \mid \widetilde{F}=0, \widetilde{R}=H\right)}{P\left(\widetilde{S}=0 \mid \widetilde{F}=1, \widetilde{R}=H\right)} > \frac{P\left(\widetilde{S}=0|\widetilde{F}=0,\widetilde{R}=l\right)}{P\left(\widetilde{S}=0|\widetilde{F}=1,\widetilde{R}=l\right)} \\ \text{and} \quad & P\left(\delta=\delta_H \mid \widetilde{R}=H\right) = \alpha > \beta = P\left(\delta=\delta_H \mid \widetilde{R}=l\right) \\ \text{implies} \quad & P\left(\widetilde{F}=1 \mid \widetilde{S}=0\right) > P\left(\widetilde{F}=1 \mid \widetilde{S}=0, \delta=\delta_H\right) \end{aligned}$$

In particular, it is true for $\widetilde{S} = 1 - S$, $\widetilde{R} = R$, and $\widetilde{F} = 1 - F$ (note that the independence of $\widetilde{R}$ and $\widetilde{F}$ directly comes from the independence between R and F:

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{P(1-S=0 \mid 1-F=0, R=H)}{P(1-S=0 \mid 1-F=1, R=H)} > \frac{P(1-S=0|1-F=0,R=l)}{P(1-S=0|1-F=1,R=l)} \\ \text{and} \quad & P(\delta=\delta_H \mid R=H) = \alpha > \beta = P(\delta=\delta_H \mid R=l) \\ \text{implies} \quad & P(1-F=1 \mid 1-S=0) > P(1-F=1 \mid 1-S=0, \delta=\delta_H) \end{aligned}$$

which can be rewritten as

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{P(S=1 \mid F=1, R=H)}{P(S=1 \mid F=0, R=H)} > \frac{P(S=1|F=1,R=l)}{P(S=1|F=0,R=l)} \\ \text{and} \quad & P(\delta=\delta_H \mid R=H) = \alpha > \beta = P(\delta=\delta_H \mid R=l) \\ \text{implies} \quad & P(F=0 \mid S=1) > P(F=0 \mid S=1, \delta=\delta_H) \end{aligned}$$

But

$$\begin{aligned} & P(F=0 \mid S=1) > P(F=0 \mid S=1, \delta=\delta_H) \\ \Leftrightarrow \quad & 1 - P(F=1 \mid S=1) > 1 - P(F=1 \mid S=1, \delta=\delta_H) \\ \Leftrightarrow \quad & P(F=1 \mid S=1) < P(F=1 \mid S=1, \delta=\delta_H) \end{aligned}$$

Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{P(S=1 \mid F=1, R=H)}{P(S=1 \mid F=0, R=H)} > \frac{P(S=1|F=1,R=l)}{P(S=1|F=0,R=l)} \\ \text{and} \quad & P(\delta=\delta_H \mid R=H) = \alpha > \beta = P(\delta=\delta_H \mid R=l) \\ \text{implies} \quad & P(F=1 \mid S=1) < P(F=1 \mid S=1, \delta=\delta_H) \end{aligned}$$

We conclude that Proposition 3 (the third line) derives from Assumption 3 (the first line) and Assumption 2 (the second line).

Q.E.D.

HHID: _____

SECTION B: INTERVIEWER INFORMATION/IDENTIFICATION

Enumerator instruction: call the phone number provided. Seek consent from the respondent. Questions 1-3 should be filled in by you. Then ask the respondent the remaining questions. If they fail to answer use the following codes: DK=-99; NA=-98; RTA=-97			
1.	Enumerator name and ID	First: _____ Last: _____	Enumerator ID: _____
2.	Individual's phone number	|____|____|____|____|____|____|____|____|____|____|	
3.	Interview Language	1. English, 2. Swahili, 3. Other specify_____	|____|
4.	Interview Date	Day: |____|____| Month: |____|____| Year: **2013**	
5.	Start Time (24 Hour clock)	Hour: |____|____| Min: |____|____|	
6.	Individual's name	First: _____ Last: _____	
7.	Individual's gender	1=Male, 2=Female	|____|
8.	Where do you live?	Province: 1=Nairobi, 2=Coast, 3=Eastern, 4=Central, 5=Rift Valley, 6=Western, 7=Nyanza, 8 =NE	|____|
		County:	Sub location:
		District:	Village (if rural) : _____ or town (if urban): _____
		Location:	Constituency:
9.	How long have you lived there?	Number of years: |____|____| Number of months:|____|____|	
10.	Where were you born?	Province: 1=Nairobi, 2=Coast, 3=Eastern, 4=Central, 5=Rift Valley, 6=Western, 7=Nyanza, 8 =NE	|____|
		County:	Sub location:
		District:	Village (if rural):_____ or town (if urban): _____
		Location:	Constituency:

HHID: _____

SECTION C: SOCIOECONOMICS

1.	What is your age?	Years: |____|____|____| Months: |____|____|	
2.	What is the highest level of education you have completed?	USE EDUCATION CODES	|____|
3.	Can you read?	1=Yes, 2=No	|____|
4.	What is your marital status?	1=Single, 2=Monogamously married, 3=Polygamous married, 4=Cohabiting, 5=Separated, 6=Widowed, 7=Divorced, 8=Other, specify	|____|
5.	How many children do you have?	|____|____|	
6.	How many people above the age of 18 live with you?	|____|____|	
7.	What is your main occupation?	USE OCCUPATION CODES	|____|
8.	Does your household own or rent the place where you live?	1=Own, 2=Rent, 3=Occupy without ownership or payment, 4=Other, specify	|____|
9.	How much land does your household own, if any? (acres)	|____|____|____|	
10.	Does your household own a TV?	1=Yes, 2=No	|____|
11.	Does your household own a radio?	1=Yes, 2=No	|____|
12.	Does your household own a bicycle?	1=Yes, 2=No	|____|
13.	Does your household own a car/motorbike/truck?	1=Yes, 2=No	|____|
14.	Does your household own a water tank?	1=Yes, 2=No	|____|
15.	Does your household own a car battery?	1=Yes, 2=No	|____|
16.	Does your household own a computer?	1=Yes, 2=No	|____|
17.	Does your household own a generator?	1=Yes, 2=No	|____|
18.	Does your household own a refrigerator?	1=Yes, 2=No	|____|
19.	Does your household own a stove?	1=Yes, 2=No	|____|
20.	Does your household own any livestock?	1=Yes, 2=No	|____|
21.	What is your main source of lighting?	1=Electricity, 2=Lantern, 3=Pressure lamp or tin lamp, 4=Fuel wood, 5=Solar, 6=Other, specify	|____|

HHID: _____

22.	What type of toilet do you use?	1=Own flush toilet, 2=Shared flush toilet, 3=Ventilated Improved Pit (VIP), 4=Traditional pit, 5=bucket, 6=bush/river/stream, 7=Other, specify	|____|
23.	What is your main source of cooking fuel?	1=Firewood, 2=Charcoal, 3=Kerosene, 4=Gas, 5=Electricity, 6=Other, specify	|____|
24.	What is your main source of drinking water?	1=Piped in compound/ House, 2=Public tap, 3=Mechanical well, 4=Ordinary well, 5=Water trucks, 6=Spring, 7= River/stream/pond, 8=Dam, 9=Rainwater, 10=Borehole, 11=Tank, 12=Other, specify	|____|
25.	What is the main type of material that the roof of the main house is made of?	1=Grass/ thatch, 2=Corrugated Iron (mabati), 3=Tiles, 4=Wood, 5= Tarpaulin/plastic sheets, 6= Asbestos, 7=Concrete, 8=Other, specify	|____|
26.	What is the main type of material that the walls of the main house are made of?	1=Stone, 2=Brick, 3=Iron sheet, 4=Mud/dung, 5=Wood, 6=Other, specify	|____|
27.	What is the main type of material that the floor of the main house is made of?	1=Mud/Dung/ Sand (Natural floor), 2=Wood Planks (Rudimentary floor), 3=Polished wood/ vinyl/ tiles (Finished), 4=Cement, 5=Other, specify	|____|
28.	How often do you listen to the radio?	1= Once a day, 2= Once a week, 3= Once a month, 4= Once in two months, 5=Once in six months, 6=Once a year, 7=Never, 8=Other, specify	|____|
29.	What sorts of programs do you usually listen to on the radio?	1=news/current events, 2=talk shows, 3=sports, 4=drama, 5=religious, 6=music, 7=social announcements, 8=other, specify	|____|
30.	How often do you watch TV?	1= Once a day, 2= Once a week, 3= Once a month, 4= Once in two months, 5=Once in six months, 6=Once a year, 7=Never, 8=Other, specify	|____|
31.	What sorts of programs do you usually watch on the TV?	1=news/current events, 2=talk shows, 3=sports, 4=drama, 5=religious, 6=music, 7=social announcements, 8=other, specify	|____|
32.	How often do you read a newspaper?	1= Once a day, 2= Once a week, 3= Once a month, 4= Once in two months, 5=Once in six months, 6=Once a year, 7=Never, 8=Cannot read, 9=Other, specify	|____|
33.	What is your favorite newspaper to read? Enumerator: do not prompt; allow multiple responses	1=Nation, 2=Standard, 3=Taifa Leo, 4=The People Daily, 5=Other, specify, 6=Cannot read, 7=No preference	|____|, |____|, |____|
34.	Are you a member of a community organization or group or of a credit, saving or insurance group (eg cooperatives, SACCO, merry-go-round)?	1=Yes, 2=No	|____|
35.	What is your religious affiliation?	1=Catholic, 2=Protestant, 3=Adventist, 4=Muslim, 5=Atheist (none), 6=Other, specify: _____	|____|
36.	How often do you attend a religious event like Church or Mosque?	1= Once a day, 2= Once a week, 3= Once a month, 4= Once in two months, 5=Once in six months, 6=Once a year, 7=Never, 8=Other, specify	|____|
37.	What is your tribe?	1=Luo, 2=Luhya, 3=Kalenjin, 4=Kamba, 5=Kikuyu, 6=Other, specify	|____|
38.	What is the tribe of your mother?		|____|
39.	What is the tribe of your father?		|____|

OCCUPATION CODES

HHID: _____

1=Farming	6=Conductor	11=Mechanic	16=Watchman	21=Teacher	26=Student
2=Public service	7=Cleaner/househelp	12=Industrial worker	17=Messenger	22=Health worker	27=Business, specify
3=Carpenter/mason	8=Waiter/cook	13=Manager	18=Sales/shopkeeper	23=Doctor	28= Salonist
4=Clerk	9=Driver	14=Dairy farmer	19=Secretary	24=Nurse	29=Retired
5=Policeman	10=Electrician	15=Professional	20=Tailor	25=Unemployed	30=Other, specify

EDUCATION CODES

0=None	10=Form 2	13=Form 5	16=Univ 2	19=Univ 5	22=Adult educ
1-8=Std1-8	11=Form 3	14=Form 6	17=Univ 3	20=Nursery	23=Other, specify
9=Form 1	12=Form 4	15=Univ 1	18=Univ 4	21=Vocational	

SECTION D: POLITICAL ATTITUDES, KNOWLEDGE AND BEHAVIOR/PARTICIPATION

Enumerator instruction: Please say: "Thanks a lot for answering all my questions so far. I will now finish the interview with a few questions regarding the last general election." Do not prompt the answers at all.			
1.	What does IEBC stand for?		
2.	What are the missions of the IEBC? Enumerator: If the respondent provides one answer prompt them a second time to ask if they know of other missions of the IEBC.	1. 2. 3. 4.	
3.	Can you tell me what the date of the last general election was? DD/MM/YYYY	|____|____|/|____|____|/|____|____|____|____|	
4.	Who was elected President? Name and party. Enumerator: do not prompt	Name:	Party:
		1= Uhuru Kenyatta, 2=Other, specify |____|	1=The National Alliance (TNA), 2=Jubilee, 3=Other, specify |____|
		Specify:_____	Specify:_____
5.	Who is your county governor? Name and party	Name:	Party:
6.	Who is your senator? Name and party	Name:	Party:
7.	What is the role of the Women's Rep? Enumerator: prompt	1=She sits with the country governor, 2=She sits in the parliament, 3=She sits in the senate	|____|
8.	Who is the current president of Uganda? If no specify Enumerator: do not prompt	1= Yoweri Museveni, 2=Other, specify	|____|
		Specify if other:_____	
9.	Did you receive any text messages related to the election after getting registered and before the election?	1=Yes, 2=No	|____|
10.	If Q9=Yes, do you remember from whom you received texts? Enumerator: allow multiple responses, do not prompt.	1=IEBC, 2=Political party, specify which, 3=NGO, specify which, 4=Presidential candidate, specify which, 5=Other, specify	|____|, |____|, |____|, |____| Specify: _____

HHID: _____

11.	If Q9=Yes, how many texts did you receive in total from all organizations before the election but after registering to vote?	|____|____|____|	
12.	If Q9=Yes and an answer from Q10=1, how many text messages did you receive from the IEBC?	|____|____|____|	
13.	If Q9=Yes, do you remember what these messages were about? If yes, please specify. Enumerator: allow multiple responses	1=Yes, 2=No	|____|
		Specify 1. _____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____	
14.	If Q9=Yes, did you mention these messages to anyone else?	1=Yes, 2=No	|____|
15.	If Q14=Yes, to whom did you mention these messages? Enumerator: allow multiple responses	1=Nobody, 2=family members, 3=friends, 4=neighbors, 5=other, specify	|____|, |____|, |____|, |____|, |____|
16.	Did anyone else mention to you that they received texts about the election before the election happened?	1=Yes, 2=No	|____|
17.	If Q16=Yes, from whom did you hear about these messages? Enumerator: allow multiple responses	1=Nobody, 2=family members, 3=friends, 4=neighbors, 5=other, specify	|____|, |____|, |____|, |____|, |____|
18.	If Q16=Yes, do you know or remember from whom this person received texts? Enumerator: allow multiple responses, do not prompt.	1=IEBC, 2=Political party, specify which, 3=NGO, specify which, 4=Presidential candidate, specify which, 5=Other, specify	|____|, |____|, |____|, |____|
19.	If Q18=Yes, do you remember what these messages were about? If yes, please specify.	1=Yes, 2=No	|____|
		Specify 1. _____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____	
20.	Before the election, but after registering to vote, did you receive any other information on the elections or any encouragement to vote from some party or organization (eg a phone call, a visit, a flyer)?	1=Yes, 2=No	|____|
21.	If Q20=Yes, of what form/how?	1=Phone call, 2=In person visit, 3=Leaflet or flyer, 4=Went to a political meeting, 5=Radio shows, 6=TV shows, 7=Road shows, 8=Other, specify	|____|
22.	If Q20=Yes, from whom did you receive this information? Enumerator: allow multiple responses	1=IEBC, 2=Political party, specify which, 3=NGO, specify which, 4=Presidential candidate, specify which, 5=Other, specify	|____|, |____|, |____|, |____| Specify: _____

23.	Did you go to a political meeting or a road show?	1=Yes, 2=No	|____|
24.	Did you listen to political radio shows or watch political TV shows?	1=Yes, 2=No	|____|
25.	Overall, do you feel you were well informed about the election?	1=Yes, 2=No	|____|
26.	How much did you follow the campaigns for the election, on a scale of 1-5 where 1 is not at all and 5 is very intensely (such as on a daily basis)?	Enumerator: range is 1-5	|____|
27.	How much did you discuss the elections with your friends, family members and neighbors, on a scale of 1-5 where 1 is not at all and 5 is very intensely (such as on a daily basis)?	Enumerator: range is 1-5	|____|
28.	How many of the presidential debates between the candidates did you watch on TV?	Enumerator: range is 0-2	|____|
29.	Did the last elections affect or change your life in any way?	1=Yes, 2=No	|____|
30.	If Q29=Yes, how?		
31.	How do you feel about the outcome of the last elections?	1=Very satisfied, 2=Satisfied, 3=Indifferent, 4=Dissatisfied, 5=Very dissatisfied	|____|
Do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding politics in Kenya?			
32.	Politics and government sometimes seem so complicated that you can't really understand what is going on.	1=Strongly agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neither agree nor disagree, 4=Disagree, 5=Strongly disagree	|____|
33.	The world is run by few people in power, and there is not much that someone like me can do about it.	1=Strongly agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neither agree nor disagree, 4=Disagree, 5=Strongly disagree	|____|
34.	We should choose our leaders in this country through regular, open and honest elections.	1=Strongly agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neither agree nor disagree, 4=Disagree, 5=Strongly disagree	|____|
35.	Which of the following statements is closest to your own opinion?	1=Democracy is preferable to any other kind of govt, 2=In some circumstances, a non-democratic govt can be preferable, 3=For someone like me, it doesn't matter what govt we have	|____|
36.	Overall how satisfied are you with how democracy works in Kenya?	1=Very satisfied, 2=Fairly satisfied, 3=Not very satisfied, 4=Not at all satisfied, 5=Kenya is not a democracy (Enumerator: don't prompt option 5)	|____|
For each of the following pairs of statements, tell me which of the two is closest to your view about Kenyan politics. Choose either Statement 1 or Statement 2			
37.	1: The use of violence is never justified in politics.	2: In this country it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause.	|____|

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38.	1: As citizens we should be more active in questioning the actions of our leaders.	2: In our country these days we should show more respect for authority.	|____|
39.	1: All people should be permitted to vote, even if they do not fully understand all the issues in an election.	2: Only those who are sufficiently well educated should be allowed to choose our leaders.	|____|
40.	1: Women can be good politicians and should be encouraged to stand in elections.	2: Women should stay at home to take care of their children.	|____|
41.	1: In our country, it is normal to pay a bribe to a government official to encourage them.	2: It is wrong to pay a bribe to any government official.	|____|
Enumerator: Say "Now I am going to ask you some questions on trust."			
42.	Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?	1=Most people can be trusted, 2=Need to be careful	|____|
43.	In general, can you trust members of your tribe?	1=Yes, 2=No	|____|
44.	In general, can you trust members in other tribes?	1=Yes, 2=No	|____|
45.	How important is your ethnic or tribal origin to your life?	1=Very important, 2=Somewhat important, 3=Not important	|____|
46.	Do you trust the IEBC, the electoral commission of Kenya?	1=Yes, 2=No	|____|
47.	Do you trust the Supreme court?	1=Yes, 2=No	|____|
48.	Do you trust the police?	1=Yes, 2=No	|____|
49.	Do you think the elections this year were fair and transparent?	1=Yes, 2=No	|____|
50.	Do you think the IEBC, the electoral commission of Kenya, should be replaced?	1=Yes, 2=No	|____|
51.	Do you think the supreme court decision on the election was fair?	1=Yes, 2=No	|____|
52.	How interested are you in public affairs?	1=Very interested, 2=Somewhat interested, 3=Not interested	|____|
53.	In general, in your life, are you very happy, somewhat happy or not happy?	1=Very happy, 2=Somewhat happy, 3=Not happy	|____|
Enumerator: Say "Now I am going to ask you some questions about your participation in this past election and previous elections."			
54.	Did you register to vote for the 2013 election?	1=Yes, 2=No	|____|
55.	If Q54=Yes, where did you register to vote?	Polling Station:_____ Constituency:_____	Ward: _____
56.	How far is that from where you live?	Distance (km): |____|____|____|____| Minutes to walk: |____|____|____|____| or Hours in a matatu: |____|____|____|____|	

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57.	Is it located in the same town or village as where you live?	1=Yes, 2=No		|____|
58.	Did you vote in the general election this year?	1=Yes, 2=No		|____|
59.	Where did you vote?	Polling station:_____	Constituency: _____	Ward:_____
60.	Did you vote for President?	1=Yes, 2=No		|____|
61.	If Q60=No, why not?	1=Did not know candidates/did not have enough information, 2=Was told not to, 3=Didn't think my vote would matter, 4=Other, specify		|____|
62.	Did you vote for MP?	1=Yes, 2=No		|____|
63.	If Q62=No, why not?	1=Did not know candidates/did not have enough information, 2=Was told not to, 3=Didn't think my vote would matter, 4=Other, specify		|____|
64.	Did you vote for Governor?	1=Yes, 2=No		|____|
65.	If Q64=No, why not?	1=Did not know candidates/did not have enough information, 2=Was told not to, 3=Didn't think my vote would matter, 4=Other, specify		|____|
66.	Did you vote for Senator?	1=Yes, 2=No		|____|
67.	If Q66=No, why not?	1=Did not know candidates/did not have enough information, 2=Was told not to, 3=Didn't think my vote would matter, 4=Other, specify		|____|
68.	Did you vote for Women's Rep?	1=Yes, 2=No		|____|
69.	If Q68=No, why not?	1=Did not know candidates/did not have enough information, 2=Was told not to, 3=Didn't think my vote would matter, 4=Other, specify		|____|
70.	Did you vote for Ward Rep?	1=Yes, 2=No		|____|
71.	If Q70=No, why not?	1=Did not know candidates/did not have enough information, 2=Was told not to, 3=Didn't think my vote would matter, 4=Other, specify		|____|
72.	Did you vote in the previous general election in 2007?	1=Yes, 2=No		|____|
73.	Were you affected by the violence following the last election in 2007/2008?	1=Yes, 2=No		|____|
74.	If Q73=Yes, how were you affected? Enumerator: allow multiple responses	1=Someone in my HH died, 2=Someone in my HH was injured, 3=My HH was displaced, 4=A relative outside my HH was killed, 5=A relative outside my HH was injured, 6=A related HH was displaced, 7=Other, specify		|____|, |____|, |____|, |____|
75.	Did you vote in the 2010 constitutional referendum?	1=Yes, 2=No		|____|

Thank you for your time