

The Perils of Building Democracy in Africa*

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Abstract

Prior to the 2013 elections in Kenya, the Electoral Commission sent 11 million non-partisan text messages to registered voters in an effort to boost electoral participation. The messages had a positive effect on turnout but also *decreased* trust in Kenyan electoral institutions. We show that the information campaign backfired because the Electoral Commission failed to deliver a transparent and peaceful election. This failure, combined with the signal of high institutional capacity sent by the campaign, led treated individuals to negatively update their beliefs about the fairness of the election, as we show in a simple model. The decrease in trust is stronger in areas that experienced election-related violence, and for individuals affiliated (via their ethnicity) with the side that lost the presidential election. These results highlight the trade-offs associated with mobilizing voters in fragile democracies. Sending signals of high institutional capacity may inadvertently affect voters' beliefs about the fairness of the election if the electoral outcome fails to match their expectations.

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1 Introduction

Democracy remains fragile in many developing countries. In Sub-Saharan Africa, less than a third of individuals surveyed across twenty countries considered their nation to be a full democracy in 2008.¹ A key challenge faced by these societies is how to organize fair and transparent elections that solidify, rather than undermine, the degree to which citizens trust electoral institutions. In the long term, the participation and trust of citizens are both essential for the consolidation of democracy (Lipset, 1959; Powell, 1982). There is historical evidence (e.g. in Prewar Germany, see Adena et al. (2015)) that public information campaigns can affect attitudes towards democratic institutions. In addition, a large literature links trust with economic outcomes (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Stevenson and Wolfers, 2011).

In light of these challenges, vast resources are being spent to make elections more transparent and to increase electoral participation in developing countries. The related research has focused primarily on the impact of various forms of information provision to target issues of clientelism (Wantchekon, 2003), vote-buying (Vicente, 2014) and violence (Collier and Vicente, 2014), or to reveal information about the qualifications of candidates (Banerjee et al., 2010; Chong et al., 2015). However, the findings from this literature are generally limited to short-term electoral outcomes. By contrast, there is a dearth of evidence on the medium-run effects of information campaigns on citizens' trust in the electoral system itself and democracy. These effects are likely to matter especially in recent democracies, where voter mobilization can build up expectations about the election, but these expectations cannot always be fulfilled.

In this paper, we show that basic information provided via short message service (SMS) and resulting in small turnout increases can have a large effect on attitudes towards electoral institutions. This effect was *negative* in the context of our study because, we argue, the Kenyan Electoral Commission was unable to fulfill its commitment to implement a fully transparent and peaceful election. We provide a simple model to show that a signal about the electoral commission's capacity can increase people's perception that the election was unfair if the election fails to match their expectations. Since voters form beliefs about both institutional capacity and fairness, the model shows that voter mobilization campaigns can backfire in contexts where institutions have no established reputation or credentials. Consistent with the model, we also find that treated voters in constituencies that experienced election-related violence, as well as voters affiliated *ex ante* (via their tribe) with the losing side of the election, report an even larger decrease in trust towards Kenyan electoral institutions.

These results come from a text messaging experiment conducted before the 2013 general elections in Kenya. Our sample was composed of 12,160 polling stations covering more than

¹Estimated from the Afrobarometer survey (round 4). The exact figure is 31%.

half of the country's population of registered voters.² This election was the first to take place after the adoption of a new Constitution (in 2010), and the first to be organized by a new electoral commission, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC). The IEBC replaced a defunct institution, the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK), which had been dissolved after the previous election led to large-scale interethnic violence in 2007-08. As the body in charge of ensuring free and fair elections, the IEBC was under intense public scrutiny during the electoral period. Unfortunately, the Commission encountered a variety of problems, including massive equipment failures, on the day of the election. These problems led to widespread confusion and forced the IEBC to abandon its plan for a fully electronic tallying of the results in favor of a manual counting that seemed to lack transparency. In addition, some areas experienced outbursts of election-related violence. As a result, the election widely appeared to be a substantial failure.

The experiment was implemented by SMS in the six days leading up to the election. In this short timeframe, the IEBC sent approximately eleven million SMS to slightly less than two million registered voters (approximately 14% of the electorate) across Kenya. Text messages were sent to individuals who provided their phone number to the electoral administration in randomly selected polling stations. The messages gave either basic encouragements to vote, information on the positions to be voted for on Election Day,³ or information on the IEBC and its efforts to organize free, fair and peaceful elections. A mobilization component was also present in all treatment groups. To test for the presence of spillovers in information diffusion, we also randomized whether all registered phone numbers, or only half of phone numbers received the SMS in each polling station.^{4,5}

We use official electoral data, as well as survey data collected with a subset of our experimental sample to measure treatment effects on electoral outcomes. Our estimates show that the text messages had a positive and significant effect on voter turnout, and no effects on candidate vote shares. Among our survey respondents, turnout was raised not only for the presidential ballot, but also for the five other ballots conducted on the same day, by approximately two percentage points. Our key results relate to political attitudes, measured after the Commission failed to deliver an election perceived as transparent and entirely peaceful. While our messages were designed to improve transparency and trust in the IEBC, they had the opposite effect. We find

²Our experimental sample consisted of all polling stations where more than 25% of registered voters had provided their phone number to the electoral administration.

³Kenyan voters had to elect six different representatives on the same day for the first time in 2013. Three of these positions were established by the new Constitution.

⁴We only randomized among individuals who provided their phone number to the IEBC and had an account with Safaricom, the dominant telecom operator in Kenya with a market share of approximately 80% in 2013. We provide more details in section 4.

⁵We provide evidence that individuals in our treatment groups recalled receiving significantly more messages from the IEBC. The average number of election-related SMS that individuals in our control group recalled receiving was 4.2, including 3.4 SMS from the IEBC itself. All other messages from the IEBC were sent during a nationwide registration drive conducted several months before the election, in November 2012.

that on average, our SMS treatments decreased trust in the IEBC and satisfaction with the way democracy works in Kenya, both by a large magnitude. These effects are stronger for voters in constituencies that experienced some election-related violence, and for individuals who can be associated with the losing side of the election.⁶ This makes our results highly consequential, as losers may in general be more prone to contest results of the election, making their trust in the system essential to ensure democratic stability. This applies especially to recent democracies such as Kenya, where every election contributes to solidify individuals' preferences and beliefs towards a particular political system. Our results (fortunately) do not suggest that the intervention reduced support for democracy in general; but there is also no evidence that dissatisfaction with the Kenyan electoral process translated into the emergence of "critical democrats" within the country's electorate.

We provide a simple model to account for our empirical results. The model highlights a trade-off involved with voter mobilization campaigns in contexts where institutions must still build a reputation of fairness. In this model, institutional capacity and fairness (or "honesty") are the two ingredients of a successful election. The text messages sent by the IEBC could have been interpreted as signalling high capacity, fairness, or both. Our model shows that the failure of the election after receiving a signal of high capacity leads citizens to re-evaluate their belief that the election was fair, while a signal of fairness would yield the opposite effect. In addition, the citizens most exposed to symptoms of electoral failure are most likely to update their priors in this way. The results we find are consistent with these mechanisms, in particular with voters interpreting the campaign as a signal of high institutional capacity. First, treated voters report lower trust in the IEBC and in the fairness of the 2013 election, especially in the two treatment groups where messages did not emphasize the IEBC's commitment to a free and fair election. Second, treated individuals on the winning side do not revise their prior (or revise it positively), while individuals on the losing side, who were predictably most disappointed with the electoral outcome and most likely to consider the election was a failure, update their prior negatively. Third, individuals exposed to election-related violence in their constituency are also most likely to lose trust in electoral institutions.

1.1 Contribution to the literature

The 2013 Kenyan election took place in a context of broad institutional change initiated by the 2010 constitutional referendum. A large literature emphasizes the correlation between electoral outcomes and the nature of political institutions, such as the voting system (Blais, 2006; Baland and Robinson, 2008). There is less evidence on the role played by the institutions responsible for organizing and supervising elections, such as Electoral Commissions and Supreme Courts,

⁶We refer here to voters self-identified as Luos. The main opposition candidate was a Luo himself, and ethnic voting is extremely prevalent in Kenya (Ferree et al., 2014).

despite the prominent role that these institutions play in recent democracies. This paper fills this gap by focusing on an institution, the IEBC, that was entirely new at the time of our experiment. We evaluate the impact of information disseminated by the IEBC in an effort to increase institutional trust and participation.

Beyond the direct influence of political institutions, trust and satisfaction with these institutions also matter for the functioning of democracy (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Diamond, 1999). Since Easton (1965), the literature has distinguished general support for the democratic ideal from satisfaction with the way democracy works in a particular society. While support for democracy is relatively high and stable over time (Klingemann, 1999), satisfaction with democracy and trust in institutions are in general much lower, both in older and newer democracies (Norris, 2011; Doorenspleet, 2012). Yet these attitudes matter for the quality and stability of democracy. Trust and political efficacy result in higher electoral participation (Blais, 2000; Blais and Rubenson, 2013) and increase system stability (Lipset, 1959; Powell, 1982; Levi et al., 2009). Conversely, dissatisfaction with the democratic process can lead to violent forms of protests, as individuals feel they have no other option to make their voices heard (Nadeau and Blais, 1993).

Ensuring that all citizens, including losers of elections, trust the electoral outcome as well as the institutions implementing this outcome is particularly important in young democracies (Mishler and Rose, 1997). However, descriptive studies have consistently found that losing is negatively associated with trust and related attitudes (Banducci and Karp, 2003; Cho and Bratton, 2006; Howell and Justwan, 2013). Several mechanisms explain this finding. First and foremost, elected governments are less likely to pursue the preferred policies of the losers (Singh et al., 2012), in particular when voting and redistribution follow ethnic lines, as is often the case in Africa (Eifert et al., 2010; Burgess et al., 2015).⁷ Second, the outcomes of elections can induce psychological effects. Losers may be relatively less satisfied with democracy than winners due to the positive feeling (Anderson et al., 2005) and the sense of political efficacy associated with winning (Lane, 1959; Balch, 1974).

A comprehensive review of the determinants of institutional trust and satisfaction with democracy is beyond the scope of this paper – for this we refer the reader to Mattes and Bratton (2007). Of most direct relevance for our study are studies focusing on the input side of the political system (how democracy works), as opposed to outputs of the political system (such as economic performance and policy). A first avenue to increase satisfaction with democracy is to improve the administration of elections. Free and fair elections can go a long way towards increasing trust in democracy (Elklit, 1999) by improving citizens' confidence that their vote was actually counted (Atkeson and Saunders, 2007), their perception of the electoral outcome (Rose and Mishler, 2009), and their assessment of government performance (Dahlberg et al., 2015).

⁷In very recent work, Berge et al. (2015) use lab experiments to show that there may be little true ethnic bias amongst ordinary Kenyans, implying that the political system and institutions create observed ethnic divisions.

For example, [Berman et al. \(2014\)](#) show that an experimental intervention reducing electoral misconduct in Afghanistan increased individuals' perception that the country is a democracy.⁸

A second avenue to improve satisfaction with democracy is to adopt higher quality institutions ([Wagner et al., 2009](#)) and to inform the public about these institutional reforms. Several studies have found that losers display higher levels of satisfaction under high-quality institutions and under consensual (e.g., decentralized) institutions which protect minorities from the rule of the majority ([Bernauer and Vatter, 2012](#)). However, regardless of quality, new institutions may need to establish a reputation of fairness and neutrality. While the existing literature studies electoral institutions through the lens of cross-country comparisons and descriptive evidence, we provide causal evidence on the role of different types of information provision about institutions in determining attitudes towards the electoral system.

Independently of its effects on political attitudes, a large experimental literature shows that information can affect electoral outcomes. Building on the seminal study of [Gerber and Green \(2000\)](#) in the United States, a series of recent papers focus on developing countries ([Wantchekon, 2003](#); [Guan and Green, 2006](#); [Giné and Mansuri, 2011](#); [Fafchamps and Vicente, 2013](#); [Fujiwara and Wantchekon, 2013](#); [Collier and Vicente, 2014](#); [Vicente, 2014](#)). These studies generally report experimental effects of information provision or other types of interventions on short-term electoral outcomes, such as voter turnout and candidate vote shares.⁹ We contribute to this literature in three main ways. First, beyond immediate effects of our intervention on turnout, we look at a different outcome – the evolution of public attitudes towards electoral institutions after the election has taken place. Second, we highlight the potential trade-off between building up expectations about the democratic process (via increased mobilization of voters) and increasing the probability of disappointing these expectations and disenfranchising losers. Third, building on [Dale and Strauss \(2009\)](#) and [Malhotra et al. \(2011\)](#), we provide evidence about the effectiveness of text messages as a medium to convey information in a developing country, and we assess the extent to which information conveyed by text messages disseminates, since we varied the fraction of phone holders that received the messages.¹⁰

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide background on electoral institutions in Kenya. Section 3 provides a simple model to illustrate our empirical

⁸Other recent field experiments by [Ichino and Schündeln \(2012\)](#) and [Callen and Long \(2015\)](#) find that improved monitoring of elections can successfully reduce fraud.

⁹While we do not find treatment effects of our intervention on vote shares, providing information can in theory affect whom individuals vote for. [Pande \(2011\)](#) distinguishes two types of information in this respect: specific information about the platform or performance of individual candidates, as in [Banerjee et al. \(2010\)](#) and [Chong et al. \(2015\)](#), or more general information about the importance of politics, as in our study.

¹⁰A growing development literature finds that text messages can effectively disseminate information at a small cost ([Jensen, 2007](#); [Aker, 2010](#)). The evidence on their impact on electoral participation is more mixed: initial studies in the GOTV literature (e.g. [Gerber and Green \(2000\)](#)) highlighted the importance of face-to-face interactions, but subsequent research found that SMS reminders could be effective. In developing countries, the evidence so far is limited to [Aker et al. \(2015\)](#) who find a positive impact of text messages on turnout in Mozambique.

results. We describe our experimental design in section 4, and the data we use in section 5. Section 6 presents our empirical framework and section 7 shows various experimental checks, including randomization balance checks and evidence that the text messages were received. Section 8 presents and discusses our main findings. Section 9 concludes.

2 Background

2.1 Previous Elections in Kenya

Having experienced a single-party regime for most of its history, Kenya was one of many countries experiencing a transition to democracy in the early 1990s. The country held its first multi-party presidential election since independence in 1992, and held subsequent elections in 1997, 2002, and 2007. Most of these elections were tarnished by ethnic violence ([Human Rights Watch \(2008\)](#)). The last presidential election held prior to our experiment (in 2007) led to a particularly violent episode of civil strife. After six months of a tense electoral campaign, the country erupted into civil conflict when the election results were officially announced on December 30, 2007. Mwai Kibaki, the incumbent, was declared the winner with a margin of 232,000 votes over his main opponent Raila Odinga, after Odinga's own party had claimed victory one day earlier. Adding to the confusion was the indecisiveness of the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) over the outcome of the election. The two months of ethnic violence that ensued left more than 1,000 people dead, and 300,000 to 500,000 internally displaced ([Human Rights Watch \(2008\)](#), [International Crisis Group \(2008\)](#)). The crisis began to wind down in late February 2008 with the signature of a power-sharing agreement between the two parties. The ECK itself was disbanded in November 2008 in the wake of its inappropriate handling of the election.

Ethnic politics provide the background behind much of the violence that occurred in 2007-08. The incumbent was believed to represent the interests of his own tribe, the majority Kikuyu community, while the main opposition candidate had overwhelming support from members of the Luo tribe (the fourth largest tribe in the country based on the 2009 census).¹¹ To this day, Kenyan politics remain organized along ethnic lines, as very few individuals "cross" these lines to vote for individuals representing other tribes. There is a vast literature in economics and political science documenting the prevalence of ethnic voting in Kenya (e.g. [Eifert et al. \(2010\)](#)).

2.2 The 2010 Constitution

In keeping with the terms of the power-sharing agreement signed in 2008, a new Constitution was adopted by referendum in 2010. 67% of voters approved the document. The Constitution

¹¹There are five main tribes in Kenya (as defined in the census): the Kalenjins, Kambas, Kikuyus, Luhyas and Luos.

consolidated the democratic reforms achieved in the 1990s, and implemented further major changes in the organization of the Kenyan state.

These changes had important implications for the 2013 elections, which were considered (quote) “the first real test of Kenya’s new Constitution, new electoral framework and reformed Judiciary” (EU Election Observation Mission (2013), 1). The Presidential Election, National Assembly Elections, Gubernatorial Elections, and Senatorial Elections were all held on the same day in March 2013. In addition, Kenyan voters had to elect a Women’s Representative sitting in Parliament and a Ward Representative. As a result, Kenyan voters were asked to vote for six different positions on the same day in March 2013: President, Member of Parliament (elected at the level of a constituency, and sitting in the National Assembly), and Ward Representative, as well as a Governor, Senator, and Women’s Representative. Conducting these six different ballots on the same day constituted a major logistical challenge for the electoral administration.

2.3 The IEBC

In addition to the changes just described, the new Constitution created an Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) in lieu of the defunct ECK. The IEBC was tasked to demarcate new electoral boundaries and to create a new comprehensive register of voters across the country. This registration process began on November 19, 2012, and lasted for one month. The IEBC managed to register 14.3 million voters – short of its own target of 18 million corresponding to the estimated number of Kenyan adults eligible to vote.

In the months leading up to the election, the IEBC sought to educate voters through a variety of methods, including poster campaigns and mass text messaging about the new voter registration process. Nevertheless, the IEBC faced an uphill battle to establish its reputation as a credible institution and an impartial arbitrator of the 2013 election. Data from the Afrobarometer surveys collected in 2004 and 2008 shows that support for the previous Commission was more than halved among Kenyans in that timeframe (while it increased for comparable electoral commissions in the rest of Africa), and that satisfaction with the state of Kenyan democracy did not improve among Kenyans, in contrast to the rest of Africa (Figure 1).

A key step taken by the IEBC to reduce voter fraud and ensure fairness of the election was the purchase of Biometric Voter Registration (BVR) kits and EVID (Electronic Voter Identification) machines to mitigate identification issues in the voter register. The purchase of this equipment meant the 2013 election was by far the most expensive one ever organized in Kenya.¹² The devices were used to make sure that every individual in the new IEBC register could be uniquely identified from their biometrics (fingerprints and photographs). The IEBC envisioned that every voter would be required to provide their biometrics before being allowed to vote. The system

¹²A corruption case related to the procurement of these kits was filed against IEBC officials after the election.

would process the biometrics electronically and match every person turning up at the polls to a registered voter in its central database. In addition, the IEBC invested in an Electronic Transmission of Results System (ETRS) that would make available online, in real time, the polling station-level results, allowing the public to monitor the tallying of votes across the country.

2.4 The 2013 Election

Eight candidates contested the 2013 presidential election. Two of these candidates were considered frontrunners: the incumbent Deputy Prime Minister, Uhuru Kenyatta (a Kikuyu), and the sitting Prime Minister, Raila Odinga (a Luo), who had narrowly lost the 2007 election. Voters from both these tribes were expected to support their respective candidates; and estimates based on exit polls suggest this was indeed the case (Ferree et al. (2014)). In addition, each candidate built a coalition with one other major tribe by picking a running mate representing a different tribe. Kenyatta formed a ticket with a member of the Kalenjin tribe (William Ruto) under the banner of the Jubilee Alliance, while Odinga formed a coalition with a member of the Kamba tribe (Kalonzo Musyoka), called the Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD).¹³ Five days after the election, Kenyatta was declared the winner of the presidential ballot with more than half of the vote (50.07%), meaning a run-off would not be needed. Odinga, who garnered 43.7% of the vote, filed a petition with the Kenyan Supreme Court to contest the outcome of the election, but the case was denied on March 30, 2013. At least five fatalities were recorded in clashes between rioters and the police on the day of the Supreme Court's decision (Raleigh et al. (2010)). Uhuru Kenyatta was sworn in as the fourth President of Kenya on April 9, 2013.

The election itself took place on the scheduled date (March 4, 2013), but the IEBC encountered major difficulties in organizing the ballot. First, "the Electronic Voter Identification Devices (EVIDs) were not working or not used in about half the polling stations observed" (EU Election Observation Mission (2013), 1), partly because there were insufficient generators and extension cords to power the devices required for identification. As a result, in many polling stations IEBC officials had to identify voters and to count ballots manually. Second, the Electronic Transmission of Results System (ETRS) "stalled, for a number of technical reasons" (ibid, 31) and "eventually delivered just less than half of polling station results, much later than originally envisaged. (...) The failure to operate [the technology] successfully led to delays and ignited suspicion about the IEBC's management of the elections" (ibid, 2). Finally, "the processing of official results lacked the necessary transparency" (ibid, 2) as a result of the various problems encountered. For example, a controversy arose from the fact "a programming error had caused entries for rejected votes to be multiplied by eight" (ibid, 32). In the assessment of the EU's Observation Mission, "following Election Day, trust in the IEBC was in a precarious state, after the

¹³These coalitions were unusual from the standpoint of historical ethnic alignments in Kenya (Ferree et al. (2014)).

failure of electoral technology and the lack of transparency during the tallying process, both of which left it open to rumours and speculation” (ibid, 29). There was significant media coverage of the IEBC’s errors in the aftermath of the election.¹⁴ In several instances, local IEBC officials were physically assaulted, and IEBC premises were attacked (Raleigh et al. (2010).

3 Model

In this section, we provide a simple theoretical framework to illustrate our empirical results. The model highlights how communication efforts by the electoral administration can backfire if the administration (in our case, the IEBC) fails to organize a successful election. A successful election has two ingredients in the model: institutional capacity (the level of “resources” allocated to the organization of the election, broadly defined) and institutional fairness or “honesty” (the extent to which the final official results correspond to the choice of voters). If voters interpret messages from the IEBC as a signal of high capacity, i.e., a signal that enough resources were devoted to the organization of the election, then they are more likely to conclude, upon observing electoral turmoil, that the election was unfair or rigged. However, if messages are interpreted as a signal of fairness, then they will draw the opposite conclusion.

In our model, citizens observe the quality of the administration of the election: $S = 1$ describes a success, and $S = 0$ describes a failure. Failure may entail problems in the logistics of the ballot, delays in the announcement of the results, or election-related violence. Such problems occurred in the 2013 Kenyan election, as described in section 2. Two factors affect the quality of the election: R , the resources available to the IEBC; and F , fairness – of the election, the IEBC, or Kenyan democracy as a whole. The resources can be high ($R = H$) or low ($R = l$) and the election can be fair ($F = 1$) or unfair ($F = 0$). If citizens believe that $F = 1$, they report in our survey data that they trust the IEBC, that the election was fair, and that they are satisfied with the way democracy works in Kenya. Citizens know that R and F are independent and they have identical priors about F and R , denoted as $P(F = 1) = p$, $P(R = H) = q$. They also know the conditional probabilities $P(S = 0 | R, F)$, which fully describe how different values of R and F affect the likelihood of success and failure. We assume the following regarding these conditional probabilities when the election is a failure:

Assumption 1. $\frac{P(S = 0 | F = 0, R = H)}{P(S = 0 | F = 1, R = H)} > \frac{P(S = 0 | F = 0, R = l)}{P(S = 0 | F = 1, R = l)}$

¹⁴We conducted a Lexis Nexis search of one of the two main Kenyan newspapers, *the Nation* (the second, *the Standard* is not available on Lexis Nexis). In the five-week period between the election and the Supreme Court ruling that settled it, *the Nation* had a total of 1,233 articles on Lexis Nexis, of which 136 (11%) were about the IEBC, and 473 (38%) were about the election. Many of these articles focused on the failures described above. As a comparison, only 29 articles were about the main staple in the country (maize), during a period when agriculture, rains and projected harvests are a topic of widespread discussion (the period covered by these five weeks was the rainy season).

This assumption means that when resources are low, the fairness of the election does not have much influence on the likelihood of a failed election (because failure is almost inevitable). Instead, when resources are high, success is much more likely when the election is fair than when it is unfair.

Citizens do not observe R and F directly. Before the election, a fraction of citizens observe a signal $\delta = \{\delta_l, \delta_H\}$ on the level of resources, and a fraction of citizens observe a signal $\gamma = \{\gamma_0, \gamma_1\}$ on the fairness of electoral institutions. We assume that these signals are informative:

Assumption 2.

2A. δ is independent of F , and $P(\delta = \delta_H | R = H) = \alpha > \beta = P(\delta = \delta_H | R = l)$.

2B. γ is independent of R , and $P(\gamma = \gamma_1 | F = 1) = \mu > \eta = P(\gamma = \gamma_1 | F = 0)$.

Lemma 1. People who receive δ_H positively update their prior on the level of resources allocated to the organization of the election.

Proof. See Appendix. □

Lemma 2. People who receive γ_1 positively update their prior on the fairness of the election.

Proof. The proof is identical to the proof of Lemma 1. □

Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the following two propositions hold.

Proposition 1. $P(F = 1 | S = 0) > P(F = 1 | S = 0, \delta = \delta_H)$: in case of an electoral failure, citizens who received the signal that resources were high ($\delta = \delta_H$) have a lower posterior about the fairness of the election than those who did not receive any signal.

Proof. See Appendix. □

The intuition behind Proposition 1 is simple. By sending a signal of its own high capacity to conduct elections ($\delta = \delta_H$), the IEBC sets high expectations in terms of the quality of the actual election. But voters know that capacity is not the only determinant of electoral success – the honesty of the Commission can also affect the election’s outcome. Upon observing electoral turmoil, such as election-related violence or logistical problems at the polling stations, recipients of the messages infer that the election is unlikely to have been fair. This result does not hold, however, if voters primarily interpret the campaign as a signal of fairness ($\gamma = \gamma_1$):

Proposition 2. $P(F = 1 | S = 0) < P(F = 1 | S = 0, \gamma = \gamma_1)$: in case of an electoral failure, citizens who received the signal that the election was fair ($\gamma = \gamma_1$) have a higher posterior about the fairness of the election than those who did not receive any signal.

Proof. See Appendix. □

Whether the campaign leads to an increase or a decrease in trust in the IEBC therefore depends on how treated voters interpreted the messages they received. In other words, the sign of our treatment effects on trust in the IEBC is informative about the way these messages were understood: conditional on observing signals of electoral failure, a signal of high institutional capacity will lead to a decrease in trust on average (Proposition 1), while a signal of fairness will have the opposite effect (Proposition 2). The question of which interpretation prevailed empirically is ambiguous. On the one hand, individuals who received the messages from the IEBC must have observed that it had the resources to conduct a mass texting campaign, suggesting the campaign sent a signal of high capacity ($\delta = \delta_H$). On the other hand, some messages (in particular those included in Treatment 3, which provided information about the IEBC) emphasized the IEBC's role in ensuring the election would be free and fair – a signal of honesty ($\gamma = \gamma_1$). The results we provide in section 8 thus provide evidence on which interpretation prevailed. Note that when the signal received by voters contains information on both F and R , we cannot derive any general result on the relationship between $P(F = 1 | S = 0)$ and $P(F = 1 | S = 0, \gamma = \gamma_1)$ absent any further assumptions. Then, the sign of the combined effect on citizens' perception of F is informative about which of the two signals was more salient.

Given Proposition 1 and the risk that an unsuccessful election would alienate voters, why would the IEBC ever want to send signals of high capacity? Under one additional assumption, text messages may actually reinforce institutional trust after a *successful* election. We make the following assumption regarding voters' beliefs in case the election is a success:

Assumption 3.
$$\frac{P(S = 1 | F = 1, R = H)}{P(S = 1 | F = 0, R = H)} > \frac{P(S = 1 | F = 1, R = l)}{P(S = 1 | F = 0, R = l)}$$

As under Assumption 1, the mapping between electoral success and fairness is stronger when resources are high – fairness yields electoral success relatively more often when resources are high. Under Assumptions 2 and 3, the following proposition holds:

Proposition 3. $P(F = 1 | S = 1) < P(F = 1 | S = 1, \delta = \delta_H)$: *in case of an electoral success, citizens who received the signal that resources were high ($\delta = \delta_H$) have a higher posterior about the fairness of the election than those who did not receive any signal.*

Proof. See Appendix. □

Proposition 3 implies two additional predictions. First, the sign of the average treatment effect on trust depends on the relative fractions of citizens who observe electoral failure, and of those who do not. As we documented in section 2, in the 2013 Kenyan election, there was a perception that the election was indeed a failure because of electronic implementation problems. As a result, our model predicts the average treatment effect on trust to be negative, conditional on the messages being interpreted primarily as a signal on R . Second, the magnitude of the

decrease in trust should be largest among citizens who directly received a signal of electoral failure (such as those voting in areas affected by violence) or among those who lost the election and, as a result, are more likely to show disappointment and to consider the election was a failure (on psychological effects induced by the outcomes of elections, see e.g. [Anderson et al. \(2005\)](#); [Balch \(1974\)](#); [Lane \(1959\)](#)). In other words, the interaction of treatment status with measures of exposure to, or perception of the electoral failure should be negative. We test these predictions directly in Section 8.

4 Experimental Design

4.1 Design

In partnership with the IEBC, we designed a text messaging intervention to promote public interest and knowledge about the election, and to raise voter turnout for all six ballots organized on March 4, 2013. For the IEBC, the intervention addressed two main goals. First, anticipating that the electoral results would be contested on the streets if the election was perceived to not be free and fair, the Commission wanted to increase the confidence of the public in the official electoral outcome. Second, in view of its recent creation, the IEBC wanted to explore different ways to establish itself as a capable and neutral institution. This justified exploring variations in the content of the text messages broadcast to the experimental sample.

The experiment was conducted exclusively by SMS over a period of six days between February 27 and March 4, 2013. The experimental sample was composed of cell phone holders who 1) had registered to vote during the 2012 countrywide biometric registration drive, 2) had a Safaricom cell phone number, and 3) had provided this phone number to the IEBC as part of the registration process. Safaricom is the dominant telecom operator in Kenya, with more than 20 million subscribers and a market share of approximately 80% in 2013. Randomization was conducted at the level of a polling station and stratified by county.¹⁵ Our sampling frame was composed of all Kenyan polling stations where the fraction of registered voters with a Safaricom cell phone number exceeded 25%. This represented 12,160 polling stations across the country (covering over 8 million of registered voters, more than half of the Kenyan electorate) out of 24,560 stations set up for the election. The number of registered voters with a (Safaricom) phone number in our sampling frame was 4.9 million.

Our intervention involved two levels of experimental variation. First, each of the 12,160 polling stations was allocated to either one of four groups: one control group and three treatment groups defined by the content of the six messages they received. In the first group, we sent basic reminders about the election, as well as general encouragements to vote. In the sec-

¹⁵There are 47 counties in Kenya under the 2010 Constitution.

ond group, the messages primarily provided information on each position to be voted for on Election Day. In the most succinct way possible, the text messages described the responsibilities involved with each position excluding the President (MP, Senator, Governor, Ward Representative and Women’s Representative), and encouraged recipients to vote for each of the six positions. In the third treatment group, the messages highlighted the transparency and neutrality of the IEBC, as well its successful record in organizing by-elections, its efforts to create a reliable voter register via biometrics, and its efforts to conduct a peaceful election. In the remainder of the paper, we refer to these three groups as T1, T2 and T3, respectively. The average numbers of characters per message were 91, 121 and 114 for T1, T2 and T3, respectively. Text messages were all sent in English. Table 1 shows the exact content of all text messages sent to each treatment group.

The second level of experimental variation was the fraction of registered voters (cell phone numbers) treated within each polling station. For each treatment, a polling station was either allocated to a group where every Safaricom phone number in the polling station would receive our text messages (in the remainder of the paper, we refer to these treatment cells as “full treatment”); or where only half of these phone numbers would receive the text messages (hereafter referred to as “half treatment” cells). The objective of this aspect of the design was to test for the presence of spillovers in the diffusion of information contained in our text messages.¹⁶ Overall, we found limited evidence in favor of spillovers – we show these results separately in the Appendix.

4.2 Implementation

Text messages were broadcast to the experimental sample using Safaricom’s mass texting technology. Phone numbers in our treatment groups received a total of six messages – one per day over the six last days prior to Election Day. Safaricom reported to us the rate of delivery of the text messages, by day and by treatment cell (delivery implies that the SMS was successfully transmitted to the client’s device, not necessarily that it was read). When a text message was not successfully delivered on the first attempt, Safaricom would keep attempting to deliver the message as many times as needed until the close of business on any given day. We report these delivery rates in Figure 2. The success rate of the text messages was slightly over 70% on the first day of the experiment, and hovered around 90% in the following five days.¹⁷

¹⁶Even in the “full treatment” cells, not all voters were treated. Voters who did not have a Safaricom cell phone number or did not provide it to the IEBC did not receive text messages.

¹⁷Individual delivery data was not stored by Safaricom – only the frequency of messages delivered per treatment group was.

5 Data

5.1 Administrative Data

To measure the impact of our text messages on participation, we first use official electoral data from the IEBC. Electoral results were reported on official polling sheets at the level of a stream, corresponding to a polling booth within a polling station. There were approximately 33,400 polling sheets for Kenya as a whole. All the polling sheets were made publicly available on the IEBC's website after the election. For each stream the IEBC reported the number of registered voters, the number of votes cast, the number of spoilt, rejected, objected, and disputed ballots, the number of valid votes (equal to the number of votes cast minus each of the categories just listed), and the vote tally for each of the eight presidential candidates.¹⁸ Unfortunately, we were not able to obtain similar polling sheets for the other five ballots conducted on March 4, 2013.

The data on the Presidential election was initially posted online in the form of scanned images (a sample image of a typical polling sheet is shown in Figure 1 of the Appendix). Since all the station-level results were handwritten, we relied on a U.S.-based software company to process and digitize the data from these scanned images. The final dataset contains official results from 11,257 polling stations across all provinces of Kenya, out of the 12,160 that were part of our sampling frame. The slight attrition (7%) comes from our inability to process the scanned polling sheets for a little over 900 polling stations, either due to illegible handwriting, or because the polling sheets were not scanned properly or simply missing.

Table 2a presents summary statistics from the electoral data. Turnout for the presidential ballot was generally high, averaging 88% of registered voters (based on votes cast) across the sample of polling stations. Only two of the 11,257 polling stations had less than 25% turnout. The fractions of the vote obtained in our data by the top two candidates, Uhuru Kenyatta and Raila Odinga, were 51% and 44%, respectively (weighting polling stations by the number of votes cast).¹⁹

5.2 Survey Data

We conducted a phone survey drawing a random subset of individuals from the IEBC/Safaricom Database in November-December 2013 – approximately eight months after the results of the election were announced. The survey targeted a total of 14,400 individuals across 7,200 ran-

¹⁸The polling sheets also provided the name of the officer in charge, as well as general comments on the proceedings of the election in each polling station. We do not use this data in the analysis presented in this paper.

¹⁹These figures roughly correspond to the official results proclaimed by the IEBC and the Kenyan Supreme Court in March 2013. Note however that we do not exactly replicate these official results in these columns as our results only apply to polling stations in our experimental sample. Even though this sample covered half the country, the experimental sample was not a random half, but the half of the country with a higher fraction of registered phone numbers.

domly selected polling stations. The survey sample was drawn as follows. First, 900 polling stations were drawn randomly from each treatment group (totalling 5,400 stations), and 1,800 stations were drawn randomly from the control group. Second, two phone numbers to call were drawn randomly from within each polling station. In total, 7,400 of all phone numbers sampled (51%) across 5,189 polling stations were successfully reached and surveyed.

The endline survey collected three types of information: individual location, demographic characteristics, education and wealth; political participation; and political attitudes. Note that we are not concerned about experimenter demand effects since the survey did not reference the experiment conducted by the IEBC, nor did it specifically ask about the messages sent as part of the experiment. Table 1 of the Appendix lists the questions on political attitudes that we collected. For the purpose of the analysis presented in this paper, we report results for two sets of political attitudes (effects on the remaining attitudinal variables are reported in the Appendix). The first are questions related to trust and satisfaction with democracy specifically in Kenya, and the second are questions related to democratic principles more generally. Table 2b presents summary statistics from the survey data. Respondents were 36 years old and had 9 years of education on average. 61% of respondents were male; 18% were Kikuyu, and 12% Luo. 29% were members of tribes affiliated with the winning coalition (Jubilee), and 30% were affiliated with the losing coalition (CORD). 94% of respondents said they voted in 2013, and 93% reported voting for all six ballots. The survey also collected data on the number of SMS received and their content. On average, 79% of respondents said they received an election-related text message, with about 4 messages in total received from the IEBC (this includes zeros for those that did not receive any message). 70% of respondents reported remembering the content of the messages, and 25% reported that the messages were encouraging them to turnout and vote. 70% of respondents mentioned the texts to others and 69% reported having the texts mentioned to them by others.

Looking at political attitudes, 78% reported trusting the IEBC and 71% trusted the Supreme Court of Kenya (SCK). In addition, 71% thought the 2013 election was fair and transparent, and 68% thought the Supreme Court ruling on the election was fair. 30% reported being either very satisfied or fairly satisfied with how democracy works in Kenya (the top two categories on a scale of five). Looking at broader attitudes towards democracy, aside from the specific 2013 election, 90% stated democracy is preferable to any other kind of government, 83% said leaders should be actively questioned, 92% believed that all people should be allowed to vote, and 93% believed that the use of violence is never justified in politics. The final set of variables relates to the level of information of respondents. 82% could identify the month of the election correctly, and 79% the day. 47% correctly identified the role of the Women's Representative, 93% correctly identified the party or the winning coalition of the President, and 96% correctly named the President of Uganda. Finally, 87% of respondents reported having been well-informed about

the election.

5.3 Election Violence Data

We use geocoded data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) to measure the intensity of election-related violence during the 2013 electoral period. The ACLED project collects high-resolution data on the nature and the location of conflict events throughout the world based on local media sources (see [Raleigh et al. \(2010\)](#) for a description of the methodology). For the purpose of our study, the ACLED data was aggregated in two steps. First, we coded all election-related violent events recorded in Kenya between February 27, 2013 (the beginning of our intervention) and November 10, 2013 (the beginning of our endline survey). We define as “election-related” any event for which the ACLED description contains one or several following words: IEBC, polling center, polling station, tallying centre, election, candidate, CORD, Jubilee, TNA, Kenyatta, Odinga.²⁰ Second, we plotted these events on the 2013 constituency map of Kenya, and we aggregated the number of violent events, as well as the number of fatalities, in every constituency represented in our sample. Overall, 10.4% of constituencies in our sample experienced some election-related violence over the period considered. We show the spatial distribution of these constituencies in Figure 3.

6 Estimation Strategy

6.1 Main Specification

Our estimation strategy is straightforward given the study was a randomized experiment. In the administrative (polling station-level) data we run:

$$y_j = \alpha + \sum_k \beta_k T_{jk} + \delta_l + \varepsilon_j \quad (1)$$

where y_j is an electoral outcome (voter turnout or candidate vote shares) measured at the level of polling station j , T_{jk} denotes assignment of polling station j to treatment group k , and the δ_l are fixed effects for the strata used in the randomization. We present intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates throughout and we use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Throughout we also show Sidak-Holm p -values to adjust for multiple testing.²¹ We run different versions of

²⁰We systematically reviewed all events in the ACLED database to ensure these classifications were appropriate. After this review, we included 5 additional election-related events where none of the above terms appeared: namely one event in which a former MP was attacked by the supporters of an opponent, one event in which a campaign staff member for a local MP-elect was killed, one instance of an armed group attacking villagers for political revenge, and two instances of politically motivated attacks committed by an unknown group.

²¹The Sidak-Holm p -values are slightly less conservative than those obtained from a Bonferroni adjustment.

equation (1) where we either include three dummies for assignment to one of the three main treatment groups ($k = 3$), or two dummies for assignment to any treatment (pooling T1, T2 and T3) in a 100% cell, and any treatment in a 50% cell, respectively. In the Appendix, we also show a version of equation (1) that includes six dummies for assignment to one of the six treatment cells, including both the T1/T2/T3 dimension and the full/half treatment dimension.

In the survey data we run the following regressions:

$$y_{ij} = \alpha + \sum_k \beta_k T_{jk} + \delta_l + \varepsilon_{ij} \quad (2)$$

where y_{ij} is an outcome measured for individual i sampled from polling station j , and the other terms are defined as above. Here we cluster standard errors by polling station, and we again show Sidak-Holm p -values to adjust for multiple testing. We show the absence of significant spillovers on our main outcomes separately in Table 5 of the Appendix.²²

6.2 Heterogeneity Analysis

We test whether treatment effects vary with the intensity of local election-related violence using the following specification:

$$y_{ijc} = \alpha + \beta_1 T_{jc} + \beta_2 V_c + \beta_3 T_{jc} \times V_c + \delta_l + \varepsilon_{ijc} \quad (3)$$

where T_{jc} denotes assignment to any treatment group, V_c denotes election-related violence measured at the level of constituency c , and the other variables are defined as before (and c denotes constituency throughout). We have aggregated treatments for simplicity of presentation – in Appendix Tables 6a and 6b, we show full specifications interacted with any treatment in a 100% cell and any treatment in a 50% cell. In this specification, we cluster standard errors at the constituency level. The coefficient of interest is the coefficient on the interaction, β_3 .

Finally, to test for heterogeneous treatment effects based on whether individuals were affiliated with the winning or the losing side of the election, we run:

$$y_{ij} = \alpha + \beta_1 T_j + \beta_2 win_{ij} + \beta_3 lose_{ij} + \beta_4 T_j \times win_{ij} + \beta_5 T_j \times lose_{ij} + \delta_l + \varepsilon_{ij} \quad (4)$$

²²In this table, we look at spillovers in two specifications. We first use the individual randomization in the 50% treatment groups to create a dummy for whether an individual was treated (as opposed to a polling station treated). The turnout effect is reported in column (1). In column (2), we then split the treatment indicators into an indicator for individual treatment but in a polling station where everyone was treated, an indicator for individual treatment but in a polling station where only 50% of people were treated and an indicator for being a spillover individual (i.e. a non-treated individual in a 50% treated polling station). As can be seen, there is no evidence of statistically significant spillover effects on turnout in column (2). The same is true in columns (3) and (4), where we use as an outcome the dummy variable for individuals reporting voting for all six positions in 2013.

where T_j denotes assignment to any treatment group at the level of polling station j , win_{ij} denotes whether the individual belongs to the tribe of the winning candidate in the presidential ballot (the Kikuyu tribe) and $lose_{ij}$ denotes belonging to the tribe of the losing candidate (Luo). We also run an alternative version of equation (4) where win_{ij} equals one for all tribes that formed a coalition around the winning candidate (the Kikuyus and Kalenjins) and $lose_{ij}$ equals one for all tribes that formed a coalition around the losing candidate (the Luos and Kambas) in the 2013 presidential election.²³ The main coefficients of interest are the coefficients on the interactions, β_4 and β_5 .

7 Experimental Checks

7.1 Randomization Balance Checks

We first show that the experimental randomization produced balanced samples. Table 3a reports these results for the administrative data. We report balance checks for all the data we have access to from the IEBC, i.e. the number of registered voters per polling station, the number and fraction of registered voters who submitted their phone number, and the number of streams per polling station. In addition, we check attrition across treatment cells: as was mentioned above, some of the polling sheets could not be processed or were returned empty, resulting in the fact that we do not observe outcomes for 7% of polling stations in the administrative data.

In columns (1) and (2) of Table 3a, we test whether the missing data is correlated with treatment status. We report two specifications, one with two treatment dummies for the 100% and 50% treatment cells (pooling together T1, T2 and T3), and one with the three main treatment groups. In column (2), the IEBC information group has a marginally significant coefficient, but the p -value of the test of joint significance across all three treatment coefficients does not allow us to reject that these coefficients are zero. In columns (3) through (10), we show balance for the polling station-level covariates described above. Of the 12 coefficients tested across these specifications, none are statistically different from zero. At the bottom of the table, we also report the p -value on the joint F-test for all treatment group coefficients. Across all four outcomes we cannot reject that these coefficients are jointly zero.

In Table 3b, we report balance checks for the survey data. In columns (1) and (2) we show that survey attrition is balanced across treatment groups. In columns (3) through (14), since we did not collect any baseline data, we look at time-invariant variables collected at endline, such as the gender, age, and years of education of respondents, whether they reported voting in the 2007 election, whether they reported voting in the 2010 constitutional referendum, and

²³The fifth of the country's main tribes, the Luhyas, did not coalesce around a specific candidate. The Luhya vote was roughly equally split between the Luo candidate, Raila Odinga, and a Luhya candidate, Musalia Mudavadi, who only obtained 4% of the total vote (Ferree et al. (2014)).

whether they reported having registered to vote for the 2013 election (registration ended before the beginning of our experiment, as described in section 2). Across the 12 specifications and 30 coefficients, only one coefficient is significantly different from zero. At the bottom of the table we report the p -value of the F-test that the treatment coefficients are jointly zero. We cannot reject this for 11 of the 12 regressions (one is rejected at 10%).

7.2 The Text Messages Were Received

In Table 4, we provide evidence from the endline survey that treated individuals remembered receiving the text messages, as well as the content of the messages. We report the same two specifications as in the earlier tables: one with two treatment dummies for the 100% and 50% treatment cells (pooling together T1, T2 and T3), and one with the three main treatment groups. We also report the Sidak-Holm p -values to account for multiple testing for the family of variables presented in this table.

In columns (1) and (2), we show that treated individuals were between 4 and 5 percentage points more likely to report receiving a text message in the run-up to the election (with a control mean of 76% – recall that both treated and control individuals received messages from the IEBC, especially during the registration period). Column (2) shows this holds across all three treatment groups. In columns (3) and (4) we report treatment effects on the number of SMS survey respondents reported receiving from the IEBC.²⁴ This is set to zero for individuals who did not report receiving any text message. Overall, individuals reported receiving between a half and one more text message than the control. On a base of 3.4 messages in the control group, this is between a 15% and 30% increase in the number of messages received.²⁵ In columns (5) and (6), we show that treated individuals were between 4 and 6 percentage points more likely to report remembering the content of the SMS they received before the election.

The survey also elicited what individuals remembered about the messages. In columns (7) and (8), we check whether respondents described the SMS as mentioning some form of encouragement to turn out, to vote, or telling them it was their duty to vote. Only respondents in T1 (the “encouragement” treatment) and T3 (the “IEBC info” treatment, where the messages also included an encouragement to vote) were significantly more likely to report that the messages they received provided such encouragement, by a magnitude of approximately 4 percentage points.²⁶

²⁴We also asked for the total number of election-related SMS received. The results are very similar.

²⁵Note that the number of observations is lower in columns (3) and (4). This is due to a malfunction in the electronic survey instrument which caused some devices to skip this question. As we report in the notes to Table 4, we can bound the effects in columns (3) and (4) using Lee bounds. We do this for the any treatment indicator (i.e. was an individual randomly allocated to any of the treatment groups) – the Lee bounds range from 0.311 at the lower bound and 1.589 at the upper bound, with both bounds statistically different from zero.

²⁶Since the experiment had effects on the probability that an individual received a text message, we do not condi-

Finally, in columns (9) through (12), we look at whether individuals discussed these messages with others. In columns (9) and (10) we report treatment effects on whether individuals mentioned the messages to others, which seems to have been the case. These effects are statistically significant in the 100% groups and in T1 (in general, the coefficients are not significantly different from each other across treatment groups). In columns (11) and (12), we report the effects on whether others mentioned messages related to the election to the respondent, which appear to be similar. These results are all the more striking given the high number of messages received in the control group, most of which were related to registration.

8 Main Results

In this section, we present the effects of our experimental treatments on voter turnout, vote shares, political attitudes, political participation, information, and trust in institutions. We listed these outcomes for our experiment under the American Economic Association’s registry for randomized controlled trials.²⁷

8.1 Effects on Participation and Vote Shares

In Table 5, we report treatment effects on participation and vote shares, using both administrative measures and self-reported measures. Columns (1)-(8) present results using the administrative data and columns (9)-(12) using the survey data. We report results for two different specifications: (i) the pooled treatment effects across all 100% cells and all 50% cells, and (ii) treatment effects across the three groups (Encouragement, Positions information, and IEBC information).

8.1.1 Administrative Data

In columns (1) through (4), we use two different measures of turnout: the first is based on the number of votes cast, and the second on the number of valid votes. Results using either measure are extremely similar. We find that the dummy for any treatment in 100% cells has a positive, significant effect on turnout of about 0.3 percentage points (about a 0.5% effect). This effect is robust to adjusting for multiple testing, with a Sidak-Holm p -value of 0.09. Treatment in 50% cells has no significant effect on turnout. Looking at the three treatment groups separately, we find that the Encouragement group dummy (T1) has a significant effect on turnout, also of 0.3 percentage points (note however that the Sidak-Holm p -value is 0.29). The coefficients on the other two treatment dummies (T2 and T3) are positive but not statistically different from zero.

tion these regressions on receiving a text, so if zero texts were received, then zero texts about turnout were received.

²⁷Available at <https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/30>. Implementation outcomes were already covered in sections 4 and 7.

Based on these estimates of the turnout effect, we compute the persuasion rate in our experiment using the method proposed by Della Vigna and Gentzkow (2010). We divide the treatment effect by the fraction of phone holders (who were targeted by the treatments) multiplied by the proportion of voters that could potentially be mobilized to vote by the treatment (i.e., 1 minus the fraction of non-voters in the control group). We obtain persuasion rates of 4.0% for treatment T1, 2.2% across all groups, and 4.3% across all 100% groups. Across all treatment cells, the implied cost-effectiveness is high: the intervention generated one additional voter for every \$10.²⁸ By comparison, door-to-door canvassing methods are estimated to generate one additional voter for every \$31 (Green and Gerber, 2015).

In columns (5) through (8), we look at vote shares. We report the impacts on the vote shares of the top two candidates in the election, Uhuru Kenyatta and Raila Odinga, who together garnered 94% of all valid votes in the country. These specifications are weighted by the number of voters in each polling station so that they roughly replicate the overall results of the election. Overall, although the treatments affected turnout, they had no significant effects on vote shares.

8.1.2 Survey Data

In columns (9)-(12), we report treatment effects on turnout among our survey respondents. In addition to simply asking respondents whether they voted in the 2013 election (columns (9) and (10)), we also asked them if they voted for each of the six ballots conducted on Election Day: President, MP, Senator, Governor, Women's Representative and Ward Representative. We use this to create a measure of whether a respondent voted for all six positions (columns (11) and (12)). In columns (9) and (11), we find a positive, statistically significant effect of any treatment in the 100% cells on turnout, of about 2 percentage points. This effect is robust to adjusting for multiple testing. The effect of any treatment in the 50% cells is positive but not statistically different from zero.

In columns (10) and (12), we find significant effects of T1 and T2 on participation, with magnitudes larger than those in columns (1)-(4). In addition, the mean participation in the control group is slightly larger than turnout in the administrative data (93% versus 88%). We do not consider these differences to be a concern, for the following reasons. First, the phone survey is limited to individuals with phones (as was the intervention itself), while the administrative data covers all individuals in a polling station. The average fraction of Safaricom phone numbers in the register is 56%, which implies that in the absence of any spillovers we would expect the effects in the survey data to be about 1.8 times larger than those in the administrative data for this reason alone. In addition, phone owners may have a different propensity to vote than

²⁸We calculate the implied cost-effectiveness as follows. The treatment effect in each of the 3 groups (Table 5, column 2) is multiplied by the number of registered voters in each group. This yields a total of 6,186 additional voters, which we then divide by the total cost of the text messaging intervention (\$61,870).

others, explaining the difference in our mean participation measures. Second, there is attrition in the survey. Attrition is likely higher among people who use their phone less or whose phone number was misreported during registration, i.e. people that were less likely to be mobilized by the SMS campaign. Table 11 of the Appendix shows Lee bounds on this effect. Combining these two mechanisms, we find that our treatment effect on administrative turnout is not statistically different from the lower Lee bound of the treatment effect on self-reported turnout. Third, even if the magnitude of this effect reflected some social desirability bias,²⁹ the sign of our treatment effects on political attitudes is inconsistent with such a bias. We now turn to the discussion of these effects.

8.2 Effects on Political Attitudes

8.2.1 Average Effects on Trust

Table 6 reports treatment effects on trust and satisfaction with democracy in Kenya, obtained from the survey data (see section 5 for details). We report the same two specifications as in the earlier tables. Again, we report the Sidak-Holm p -values to account for multiple testing for the group of variables presented in this table.

In columns (1)-(2), the outcome we look at is trust in the IEBC. Across the 100% cells, treatment reduced trust in the IEBC by four percentage points, a 5% drop relative to the control group (column (1)). This effect (unlike others in this table) is robust to adjusting for multiple testing, with a Sidak-Holm p -value of 0.01. All three coefficients in column (2) are negative, although the coefficient on T3 is not statistically different from zero.

In columns (3) and (4), we report results for trust in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court was heavily involved in the 2013 election since it settled the result of the presidential ballot after the main opposition candidate filed a petition against the IEBC. The petition claimed that the ballot should be declared null and void due to the failures of the BVR kits and of the electronic tallying system. Several riots occurred throughout the country on the day the Supreme Court announced its decision. We find negative effects of the treatments on trust in the Supreme Court, but none of the coefficients are statistically different from zero. In columns (5) and (6), we report impacts of the treatment on whether the survey respondent considered that the 2013 election was fair and transparent. We find negative, significant effects across the 100% groups of about two percentage points (column (5)). In columns (7) and (8), where we ask whether the 2013 Supreme Court ruling that settled the election was fair, all but one coefficient are negative, but none of the coefficients are significantly different from zero.

In columns (9) and (10), we report effects on a dummy variable for individuals responding “very satisfied” to the question: “Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works

²⁹Aker et al. (2015) provide a discussion of reporting biases in experimental studies of voter behavior.

in Kenya?” We find a negative, significant treatment effect on this variable. This holds across the 100% groups, 50% groups (column (9)), in T1 and in T2 (column (10)). The coefficient on T3 is also negative but not significant (note again that the coefficients across treatments are not significantly different from each other). The magnitude of these effects is sizeable: individuals in the 100% groups were 2.6 percentage points less likely to report being very satisfied with Kenyan democracy. Relative to a control mean of 32%, this corresponds to a 8% decrease.

Finally, in columns (11) and (12), we report treatment effects on a variable (denoted “index”) that is simply the average of all previous five outcomes shown in Table 6 (trust in the IEBC, trust in the Supreme Court, whether the election was perceived to be fair, whether the Supreme Court’s ruling was perceived to be fair, whether the respondent reports being satisfied with democracy in Kenya). The average of this index in the control group is 0.65. We find that 100% treatment lead to 2.5 percentage point decrease in the value of this index (significant at the 1% level; see column (11)). These effects are driven by treatments T1 and T2: the decrease in trust in both these groups is significant at 5%, while the effect is smaller in magnitude and non-significant in T3 (column (12)).

These results suggest that the recipients of the text messages, on average, were more likely to mistrust Kenyan electoral institutions after the election. The sign of these treatment effects is opposite to what we anticipated at the onset of the campaign. This is true particularly for trust in the IEBC, which the intervention was intended to reinforce: the messages, all sent and signed by the IEBC, were in part designed to advertize the transparency of the electoral process and to improve the reputation of the Electoral Commission. We, along with the IEBC, expected that simple communication with voters about the election and electoral institutions would signal transparency and increase voters’ trust.

However, the model presented in section 3 showed that this would only happen if the IEBC had been able to deliver a successful election, or if the campaign had successfully convinced voters about the fairness of electoral institutions. In practice, as documented in section 2, the election was perceived to be a failure overall. A majority of Kenyan citizens had the opportunity to witness this failure – either because they were directly confronted with problems at the polling station, or because they were dissatisfied with the electoral outcome, or both. Under these circumstances, we showed that recipients of the text messages would negatively update their beliefs about the fairness of the election if they interpreted the campaign as a signal of high institutional capacity; while they would update positively if they understood the campaign of a signal of honesty and transparency.

Our results are consistent with the former mechanism (highlighted in Proposition 1) – whether these beliefs are measured in terms of trust in the IEBC, satisfaction with the way democracy works in Kenya, or the perception that the election was fair. This result is intuitive: recipients of the messages were more likely to update their beliefs on the capacity of the electoral commission

(e.g., because they observed the IEBC had the resources to conduct a mass texting campaign) than on the fairness of the commission or the election, which would require more than the simple information communicated in the messages. Note, however, that the negative treatment effects on trust is particularly pronounced in groups T1 and T2 which did not emphasize the IEBC's commitment to conduct a free and fair election. Treatments T1 and T2 only conveyed information about institutional capacity: the messages sent to these groups do not make any claim about the fairness of the election; but in and of themselves they send a signal of high resources to conduct the election. Instead, treatment T3 repeatedly mentions the IEBC's commitment to fair elections: it is the only treatment which conveys both a signal of resources and of fairness (see Table 1 for the details of messages sent to each group). Consistent with our model, we find suggestive evidence that the negative effect on trust is mainly driven by T1 and T2.³⁰

8.3 Heterogeneity Analysis

8.3.1 Heterogeneity with Election Violence

However, exposure to the various shortcomings of the IEBC was not uniform across the Kenyan electorate. For example, treated voters who experienced election-related violence in their constituency were more likely to observe or consider the election was indeed a failure, relative to voters who did not witness such violence. Based on our model, we should thus expect the impact of the messages on trust outcomes to be larger (more negative) for these voters. To explore this mechanism, in Tables 7a and 7b we test for heterogeneity in our treatment effects by a measure of election-related violence, constructed from the ACLED data (Raleigh et al. (2010)) as described in section 5. Specifically, we interact our treatment variable (here a dummy for any treatment) with a binary variable indicating whether any violent events were recorded in the constituency (such violence was recorded in 10.5% of constituencies in our sample). We show violence interacted with treatment in the 100% groups and the 50% groups in Table 6a of the Appendix. In terms of outcomes, we look at turnout and vote shares in Table 7a, and at trust in electoral institutions in Table 7b.

In Table 7a, we find no evidence that our treatment effects on electoral outcomes differed by the intensity of local violence. The coefficient on the interaction of treatment with violence is a precisely estimated zero when the dependent variable is turnout (columns (1)-(2)) or vote shares (columns (3)-(4)), both measured in the administrative data. This coefficient is negative, but not statistically different from zero, when the outcome is self-reported turnout (columns (5)-(6)). Overall, the estimates in Table 7a suggest our treatment effects on turnout were no different across different levels of election-related violence.³¹

³⁰Looking at the last column of Table 6 (which compares effects across groups on a trust index), a test of the null that the effect of T3 differs from the average effect of T1 and T2 yields a *p*-value of 0.17.

³¹Note the main effect of violence is negative. Our measure of violence includes events recorded by ACLED

In Table 7b, however, we find evidence that the impacts on trust are heterogeneous across our measure of violence (column (1)). The coefficient on the interaction of interest is negative, statistically significant, and large in magnitude (7 percentage points, or 9% of the control group mean). This suggests that individuals exposed to *both* election-related violence in their constituency and to our SMS treatment were significantly more likely to update their beliefs on the IEBC negatively. In this case, the SMS campaign (a signal that the IEBC had the capacity to organize a successful election) interacted with other evidence that the election was a failure, including any political violence witnessed locally, leading treated individuals in those constituencies to further lose trust in the electoral administration. In columns (2) and (3), the coefficient on the interaction of interest is negative but not statistically significant. Finally, there is no evidence for the same kind of heterogeneity in columns (4) and (5), where we look at individuals' perceptions of the Supreme Court ruling, and at satisfaction with democracy in Kenya (in column (5), the main effect of any treatment remains negative and significant). In column (6), we report treatment effects on the same index used in columns (11)-(12) of Table 6 (the index simply averages the previous five outcomes shown in this table). The effect of the interaction of any treatment with violence on this index is negative, but not statistically significant.

8.3.2 Heterogeneous Effects on Winners and Losers

We now look at complementary variation capturing political preferences of individuals in our sample. Specifically, in Table 8 we look at heterogeneity in our treatment effects by whether the individual was on the winning or the losing side of the election.³² To the extent that psychological effects associated with being on the losing side decrease the likelihood of perceiving the election as a success, our model again predicts a stronger (more negative) impact of the text messages on trust outcomes among losers. We use tribes to proxy for winners and losers. Exploiting this dimension of heterogeneity is reasonable given the high prevalence of ethnic voting in Kenya: as members of specific tribes typically align with specific candidates, tribes can be used to predict whether an individual was likely on the winning or the losing side of the election. In the 2013 election, Ferree et al. (2014) estimated using exit polls that 83% of Kikuyu voters (and 74% of Kalenjin voters) sided with the Kikuyu candidate, and that 94% of Luo voters (and 63% of Kambas) voted for the Luo candidate.

We first look at the Kikuyus (the tribe of the winner of the election, Uhuru Kenyatta) and the Luos (the tribe of the main opposition candidate, Raila Odinga) separately from all other tribes. We single out Kikuyu and Luo voters as these were the only two tribes with viable Presidential candidates running. We then look at a similar specification where, instead of using the Kikuyu/Luo dimension to proxy for winners and losers, we use political coalitions formed

starting on February 27, 2013 (one week before the election), making it possible that violence affected turnout.

³²In Table 6b of the Appendix we show heterogeneity with treatment in the 100% groups and the 50% groups.

for the 2013 election. We code Kikuyu and Kalenjin voters as being part of the winning coalition (Jubilee), and Luo and Kamba voters as being part of the losing coalition (CORD). In addition, at the bottom of Table 8, we report the F-statistic on the test that the treatment coefficient for the winners is not different from the treatment coefficient for the losers (winners and losers are defined by Kikuyu and Luo tribes in the odd-numbered columns and by tribes from the winning and losing coalitions in the even-numbered columns). Finally, in all columns we control for the interactions of treatment with education and wealth to make sure that our results are not driven by education and wealth differences across tribes.³³

In columns (1) and (2), we look at heterogeneous impacts on trust in the IEBC. Trust in the IEBC is reduced for individuals who are neither Kikuyu nor Luo in response to the messages. Trust is reduced further for the Luos, but the interaction is positive (partly offsetting the main effect) for Kikuyus. While the individual interactions are not statistically different from zero, we can reject (at 10%) that the effects for Luos and Kikuyus are identical. The estimates in column (2), obtained using winning and losing coalitions, are qualitatively similar. Here too, we can reject (at 1%) that the effects for losers and winners are identical: tribes from the losing coalition are more likely to lose trust in the IEBC.³⁴ Note that the main effects of Luo and Kikuyu are extremely strong – Luos (and other members of the losing coalition) are less likely to trust the IEBC, whereas Kikuyus (and other members of the winning coalition) are more likely to do so. Of course, these last estimates are only correlations and do not have a causal interpretation.

In columns (3) and (4), we report results from similar regression specifications for trust in the Supreme Court. The interaction coefficients have the expected sign, and the interaction with being a Luo, as well as the interaction with being in the losing coalition, are both significant at 5%. We can again reject that the treatment impact on winners and losers is identical. The same holds for the impacts on whether individuals thought the election was fair and transparent (columns (5) and (6)). We can reject that the impact on winners and losers is identical, in column (6). In columns (7) and (8), we show heterogeneous effects on whether the Supreme Court's ruling on the election was considered fair. Members of the Luo tribe and of the losing coalition were less likely to consider this was the case, and the difference between effects on losers and winners is statistically significant in both columns. Overall, across columns (1)-(8), we reject the null that treatment effects are the same for winners and losers of the election. In columns (9) and (10), we look at heterogeneous impacts on whether the respondent is very satisfied with how democracy works in Kenya. Here the relevant interactions are not different from zero, and we cannot reject that treatment effects for Luos and Kikuyus, as well as treatment effects for the winning and losing coalitions are the same. Finally in columns (11)-(12), we report effects on the

³³In Table 7 of the Appendix we report the results for specifications where we do not control for education and wealth and their interactions with the treatment dummy. The results are extremely similar.

³⁴These effects are not driven by differential effects on turnout across tribes (results available upon request).

average of all previous five outcomes. The interaction of treatment with being a Luo, or being in the losing coalition yields a negative, significant effect in both columns.

8.4 Other Outcomes

8.4.1 Support for Democratic Principles

The evidence presented so far suggests that the information campaign backfired: the messages *decreased* trust in the Electoral Commission on average. This effect is most pronounced for constituencies where some election-related violence was recorded, and for individuals on the losing side of the political spectrum. In this section, we ask whether the backlash against electoral institutions affected preferences towards democracy more generally. Fortunately, this does not seem to have been the case.

In Table 9, we look at measures of support for democratic principles and ideals as they pertain to Kenyan politics (the statements were prefaced with the question: Do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding politics in Kenya?). To do this, we focus on five survey questions on political attitudes (see Table 1 of the Appendix for exact definitions and descriptions of these variables). We ask whether the respondent agrees with the following statements: (i) democracy is preferable to any other kind of government, (ii) leaders should be chosen through regular, open and honest elections, (iii) leaders should be actively questioned, (iv) all individuals should be permitted to vote, and (v) violence is never justified in politics.³⁵ We report average effects in Table 9 and heterogeneous effects across Luos/Kikuyus and across tribes of the winning and losing coalitions in Tables 8 and 9 of the Appendix. Across all outcomes, we largely find small and statistically insignificant results. Table 9 suggests the effects we found in earlier tables pertain to satisfaction with specific institutions (the IEBC and, to some extent, the Supreme Court), but not to general support for the democratic ideal as an organizing principle of Kenyan society.

8.4.2 Effects on Information

The negative effects we found on trust in Kenyan electoral institutions may have been compensated by increased information, to the extent that the campaign succeeded in creating a group of “informed citizens”. To test for this, in Table 10 we look at different measures of information

³⁵In Appendix Table 10, we report some additional results for political attitudes that are less related to elections or trust in electoral institutions. We report the treatment effects of the texts on the following additional outcomes where we largely find no effects of the texts: (i) whether the respondent trusts the police, (ii) whether the respondent trusts members of their own tribe, (iii) whether the respondent trusts members of other tribes, (iv) whether the respondent thinks the world is not run by a few, (v) whether the respondent feels like politics is complicated, (vi) whether the respondent believes that women can make good politicians, and (vii) whether the respondent thinks it is normal to pay a bribe (again, see Appendix Table 1 for complete definitions of these variables).

of the survey respondents. The survey questionnaire asked respondents about practical details of the election (i.e., to name the day and month the election was held), about a particular institution elected on that day (i.e., to describe the role of the Women’s Representative), as well as details of local politics (i.e., to name the party of the elected President, and to name the President of Uganda). We use these variables as objective measures of information. In addition, we asked whether respondents felt well-informed about the election overall.

In columns (1) and (2), we show treatment effects on whether the survey respondent could correctly identify the day of the election (the fourth). Columns (3) and (4) report the effects on whether the respondent could correctly identify the month of the election (March). We largely do not find effects of the treatment on these measures of information. The same is true for whether the respondent could correctly identify the role of the Women’s Representative (columns (5) and (6)), whether they could correctly identify the party of the President (columns (7) and (8)) and whether they could correctly name the President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni (columns (9) and (10)). Across these columns, there is no evidence that the treatments had any effects on our objective measures of information about the election and politics. In columns (11)-(12), we look at subjective beliefs on information. The treatment had no effect on these self-reports. Finally, we should note that the survey included questions on how often the respondent listens to the radio, watches TV and reads the newspaper. The text messages had no effects on these outcomes (results not reported but available on request), implying that the texts did not create a set of more engaged citizens based on this metric. In particular, they did not seem to encourage respondents to source more information on politics in the country.

9 Conclusion

The 2013 Kenyan election took place in a context of broad institutional change. This paper evaluates the impact of information disseminated by the Electoral Commission in an effort to increase voter participation and trust in a set of new electoral institutions. Shortly before the election, the IEBC sent approximately eleven million text messages to a large sample of registered voters (two million individuals, 14% of the Kenyan electorate). Text messages were sent in randomly selected polling stations, to either all or half of voters registered with a phone number. The messages provided either basic encouragements to vote, information on the positions to be voted for on Election Day, or information on the IEBC itself. We measure treatment effects using official electoral results as well as survey data collected several months after the information campaign.

The intervention increased voter turnout by 0.3 percentage points overall in treated polling stations, when we include individuals who did not themselves receive text messages. The self-reported increase in turnout among treated individuals is approximately two percentage points. The cost-effectiveness implied by these effects compares favorably with recent estimates of the

impact of get-out-the-vote interventions in electoral campaigns (Green and Gerber, 2015). However, the intervention also *decreased* trust in the Electoral Commission and institutions that were similarly involved in the electoral process.

While this outcome was certainly unexpected, should we also deem it undesirable? Decreased trust in the Electoral Commission was associated with decreased satisfaction with how democracy works in Kenya, but it did not undermine support for democratic principles: citizens who received the text messages remained equally likely to find democracy preferable to any other kind of government, to agree that leaders should be chosen through regular, open, and honest elections, and to disapprove of the use of violence in politics. A possible interpretation is that the information campaign contributed to the emergence of critical dissatisfied democrats who, as a result of their enhanced expectations, demand democratic reforms and improvements (Moehler, 2008; Norris, 2011). We do not find much empirical support for this interpretation: eight months after the election, citizens are neither more informed nor more engaged in the treatment groups than in the control group. The simple model we provided suggests another interpretation. If voters interpreted the IEBC's text messages as a signal of high institutional capacity, then under plausible assumptions, witnessing electoral failure could have led them to believe that the election was unfair or rigged, or that the IEBC was corrupt. Our results suggest treated voters interpreted the campaign in this way.

The decrease in trust towards the Electoral Commission across the board, and the gap in trust between winners and losers of the election are worrisome, especially under the interpretation we provide. In the long run, systematic differences in institutional trust between different ethnic groups could make it harder to build consensus around important reforms. In addition, growing dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy among repeated losers may result in social unrest and demand for radical changes, if the losers feel they do not have any other option to have their voices heard. Overall, this implies that mobilizing voters comes at a risk when the quality and the transparency of the election cannot be guaranteed. Failure by the electoral administration to deliver such an election may dramatically reinforce distrust in institutions. In fragile regimes, building democracy is challenging, and perilous.

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Appendix

Proof of Lemma 1

Lemma. *People who receive δ_H positively update their prior on the level of resources allocated to the organization of the election.*

$$\begin{aligned} P(R = H \mid \delta = \delta_H) &= \frac{P(\delta = \delta_H, R = H)}{P(\delta = \delta_H, R = H) + P(\delta = \delta_H, R = l)} \\ &= \frac{P(\delta = \delta_H \mid R = H) P(R = H)}{P(\delta = \delta_H \mid R = H) P(R = H) + P(\delta = \delta_H \mid R = l) P(R = l)} \\ &= \frac{\alpha q}{\alpha q + \beta(1 - q)} \\ &> q \end{aligned}$$

since $\alpha > \beta$ by assumption.

Q.E.D.

Proof of Proposition 1

Proposition 1. $P(F = 1 \mid S = 0) > P(F = 1 \mid S = 0, \delta = \delta_H)$.

Sketch of the proof:

1. We first show that:

$$\begin{aligned} P(F = 1 \mid S = 0) &> P(F = 1 \mid S = 0, \delta = \delta_H) \\ &\Leftrightarrow P(\delta = \delta_H \mid F = 0, S = 0) > P(\delta = \delta_H \mid F = 1, S = 0) \end{aligned}$$

2. We then show that:

$$\begin{aligned} P(\delta = \delta_H \mid F = 0, S = 0) &> P(\delta = \delta_H \mid F = 1, S = 0) \\ &\Leftrightarrow \frac{P(S = 0 \mid F = 0, R = H)}{P(S = 0 \mid F = 1, R = H)} > \frac{P(S = 0 \mid F = 0, R = l)}{P(S = 0 \mid F = 1, R = l)} \end{aligned}$$

where the last inequality is true by Assumption 1. This completes the proof.

Detailed proof (Step 1):

Note that:

$$\begin{aligned}
 P(F = 1 | S = 0, \delta = \delta_H) &= \frac{P(F = 1, S = 0, \delta = \delta_H)}{P(S = 0, \delta = \delta_H)} \\
 &= \frac{P(F = 1, S = 0) P(\delta = \delta_H | F = 1, S = 0)}{P(S = 0) P(\delta = \delta_H | S = 0)} \\
 &= P(F = 1 | S = 0) \frac{P(\delta = \delta_H | F = 1, S = 0)}{P(\delta = \delta_H | S = 0)}
 \end{aligned}$$

Thus,

$$\begin{aligned}
 &P(F = 1 | S = 0) > P(F = 1 | S = 0, \delta = \delta_H) \\
 \Leftrightarrow &P(\delta = \delta_H | S = 0) > P(\delta = \delta_H | F = 1, S = 0) \\
 \Leftrightarrow &P(\delta = \delta_H | F = 1, S = 0) P(F = 1 | S = 0) + P(\delta = \delta_H | F = 0, S = 0) P(F = 0 | S = 0) \\
 &> P(\delta = \delta_H | F = 1, S = 0) \\
 \Leftrightarrow &P(\delta = \delta_H | F = 0, S = 0) P(F = 0 | S = 0) > P(\delta = \delta_H | F = 1, S = 0) [1 - P(F = 1 | S = 0)] \\
 \Leftrightarrow &P(\delta = \delta_H | F = 0, S = 0) P(F = 0 | S = 0) > P(\delta = \delta_H | F = 1, S = 0) P(F = 0 | S = 0) \\
 \Leftrightarrow &P(\delta = \delta_H | F = 0, S = 0) > P(\delta = \delta_H | F = 1, S = 0)
 \end{aligned}$$

Detailed proof (Step 2):

$$\begin{aligned}
 &P(\delta = \delta_H | F = 0, S = 0) > P(\delta = \delta_H | F = 1, S = 0) \\
 \Leftrightarrow &P(\delta = \delta_H | F = 0, S = 0, R = H) P(R = H | F = 0, S = 0) \\
 &\quad + P(\delta = \delta_H | F = 0, S = 0, R = l) P(R = l | F = 0, S = 0) \\
 &> P(\delta = \delta_H | F = 1, S = 0, R = H) P(R = H | F = 1, S = 0) \\
 &\quad + P(\delta = \delta_H | F = 1, S = 0, R = l) P(R = l | F = 1, S = 0) \\
 \Leftrightarrow &P(\delta = \delta_H | R = H) P(R = H | F = 0, S = 0) + P(\delta = \delta_H | R = l) P(R = l | F = 0, S = 0) \\
 &> P(\delta = \delta_H | R = H) P(R = H | F = 1, S = 0) + P(\delta = \delta_H | R = l) P(R = l | F = 1, S = 0)
 \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 \Leftrightarrow &P(\delta = \delta_H | R = l) [P(R = l | F = 0, S = 0) - P(R = l | F = 1, S = 0)] \\
 &> P(\delta = \delta_H | R = H) [P(R = H | F = 1, S = 0) - P(R = H | F = 0, S = 0)] \\
 \Leftrightarrow &[P(\delta = \delta_H | R = l) - P(\delta = \delta_H | R = H)] [P(R = H | F = 1, S = 0) - P(R = H | F = 0, S = 0)] > 0 \\
 \Leftrightarrow &P(R = H | F = 0, S = 0) > P(R = H | F = 1, S = 0) \\
 \Leftrightarrow &\frac{P(R = H, F = 0, S = 0)}{P(F = 0, S = 0)} > \frac{P(R = H, F = 1, S = 0)}{P(F = 1, S = 0)}
 \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&\Leftrightarrow \frac{P(S=0 | F=0, R=H) P(F=0, R=H)}{P(S=0 | F=0, R=H) P(F=0, R=H) + P(S=0 | F=0, R=l) P(F=0, R=l)} \\
&> \frac{P(S=0 | F=1, R=H) P(F=1, R=H)}{P(S=0 | F=1, R=H) P(F=1, R=H) + P(S=0 | F=1, R=l) P(F=1, R=l)} \\
&\Leftrightarrow \frac{P(S=0 | F=0, R=H) P(R=H)}{P(S=0 | F=0, R=H) P(R=H) + P(S=0 | F=0, R=l) P(R=l)} \\
&> \frac{P(S=0 | F=1, R=H) P(R=H)}{P(S=0 | F=1, R=H) P(R=H) + P(S=0 | F=1, R=l) P(R=l)} \quad (3) \\
&\Leftrightarrow P(S=0 | F=0, R=H) P(S=0 | F=1, R=l) \\
&> P(S=0 | F=1, R=H) P(S=0 | F=0, R=l) P(R=l) \\
&\Leftrightarrow \frac{P(S=0 | F=0, R=H)}{P(S=0 | F=1, R=H)} > \frac{P(S=0 | F=0, R=l)}{P(S=0 | F=1, R=l)}
\end{aligned}$$

where:

(1) comes from the fact that δ is only determined by R ,

(2) uses Assumption 2a,

and (3) uses the independence between F and R .

The last inequality is true by Assumption (Assumption 1). We infer that $P(F=1 | S=0) > P(F=1 | S=0, \delta = \delta_H)$.

Q.E.D.

Proof of Proposition 2

The proof is identical to that of Proposition 1:

1. We first show that:

$$\begin{aligned}
P(F=1 | S=0) &< P(F=1 | S=0, \gamma = \gamma_1) \\
&\Leftrightarrow P(\gamma = \gamma_1 | F=0, S=0) < P(\gamma = \gamma_1 | F=1, S=0).
\end{aligned}$$

The proof of this step is identical to the proof of the first step in Proposition 1.

2. We then show that:

$$\begin{aligned}
P(\gamma = \gamma_1 | F=0, S=0) &< P(\gamma = \gamma_1 | F=1, S=0) \\
&\Leftrightarrow P(\gamma = \gamma_1 | F=0) < P(\gamma = \gamma_1 | F=1)
\end{aligned}$$

where the last inequality is true by assumption (Assumption 2b) and the equivalence comes from the fact that γ is only determined by F . This completes the proof.

Proof of Proposition 3

By showing Proposition 1, we have shown that for a variable S affected by two independent variables R and F ,

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{P(S = 0 \mid F = 0, R = H)}{P(S = 0 \mid F = 1, R = H)} > \frac{P(S=0|F=0,R=l)}{P(S=0|F=1,R=l)} \\ \text{and} \quad & P(\delta = \delta_H \mid R = H) = \alpha > \beta = P(\delta = \delta_H \mid R = l) \\ \text{implies} \quad & P(F = 1 \mid S = 0) > P(F = 1 \mid S = 0, \delta = \delta_H) \end{aligned}$$

This is true for any three variables \tilde{S} , \tilde{R} , and \tilde{F} where \tilde{R} and \tilde{F} are independent:

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{P(\tilde{S} = 0 \mid \tilde{F} = 0, \tilde{R} = H)}{P(\tilde{S} = 0 \mid \tilde{F} = 1, \tilde{R} = H)} > \frac{P(\tilde{S}=0|\tilde{F}=0,\tilde{R}=l)}{P(\tilde{S}=0|\tilde{F}=1,\tilde{R}=l)} \\ \text{and} \quad & P(\delta = \delta_H \mid \tilde{R} = H) = \alpha > \beta = P(\delta = \delta_H \mid \tilde{R} = l) \\ \text{implies} \quad & P(\tilde{F} = 1 \mid \tilde{S} = 0) > P(\tilde{F} = 1 \mid \tilde{S} = 0, \delta = \delta_H) \end{aligned}$$

In particular, it is true for $\tilde{S} = 1 - S$, $\tilde{R} = R$, and $\tilde{F} = 1 - F$ (note that the independence of \tilde{R} and \tilde{F} directly comes from the independence between R and F):

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{P(1 - S = 0 \mid 1 - F = 0, R = H)}{P(1 - S = 0 \mid 1 - F = 1, R = H)} > \frac{P(1-S=0|1-F=0,R=l)}{P(1-S=0|1-F=1,R=l)} \\ \text{and} \quad & P(\delta = \delta_H \mid R = H) = \alpha > \beta = P(\delta = \delta_H \mid R = l) \\ \text{implies} \quad & P(1 - F = 1 \mid 1 - S = 0) > P(1 - F = 1 \mid 1 - S = 0, \delta = \delta_H) \end{aligned}$$

which can be rewritten as

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{P(S = 1 \mid F = 1, R = H)}{P(S = 1 \mid F = 0, R = H)} > \frac{P(S=1|F=1,R=l)}{P(S=1|F=0,R=l)} \\ \text{and} \quad & P(\delta = \delta_H \mid R = H) = \alpha > \beta = P(\delta = \delta_H \mid R = l) \\ \text{implies} \quad & P(F = 0 \mid S = 1) > P(F = 0 \mid S = 1, \delta = \delta_H) \end{aligned}$$

But

$$\begin{aligned} & P(F = 0 \mid S = 1) > P(F = 0 \mid S = 1, \delta = \delta_H) \\ \Leftrightarrow & 1 - P(F = 1 \mid S = 1) > 1 - P(F = 1 \mid S = 1, \delta = \delta_H) \\ \Leftrightarrow & P(F = 1 \mid S = 1) < P(F = 1 \mid S = 1, \delta = \delta_H) \end{aligned}$$


Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{P(S = 1 \mid F = 1, R = H)}{P(S = 1 \mid F = 0, R = H)} > \frac{P(S=1|F=1,R=l)}{P(S=1|F=0,R=l)} \\ \text{and} \quad & P(\delta = \delta_H \mid R = H) = \alpha > \beta = P(\delta = \delta_H \mid R = l) \\ \text{implies} \quad & P(F = 1 \mid S = 1) < P(F = 1 \mid S = 1, \delta = \delta_H) \end{aligned}$$

We conclude that Proposition 3 (the third line) derives from Assumption 3 (the first line) and Assumption 2 (the second line).

Q.E.D.

Figure 1: Trust and Democracy in Kenya



Note: Figures computed using rounds 2 through 4 of Afrobarometer Data.

Figure 2: Success Rates of SMS Broadcast





Figure 3: ACLED Election-Related Violence By Constituency



Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED).

We coded all election-related events recorded by ACLED between February 27, 2013 and November 10, 2013 (see text for details).

Table 1: Content of the Text Messages by Treatment Group

Group	Content	Date
1	It is your duty to vote. Please make sure you vote in the March 4 General Election	Feb 27
1	You have a duty to vote for good leaders for your country. Please vote on March 4	Feb 28
1	Don't just complain about leaders, do something. Make sure you vote for good leaders on March 4	March 1
1	A good citizen helps promote democracy in his country by participating in the elections. Please vote on March 4	March 2
1	Remember the General Election is next Monday, on March 4. Please make sure you vote	March 3
1	Make sure you have your original ID or passport when you go to the polling station on March 4	March 4
2	Vote for all 6 ballots on March 4: Governor, County Assembly Ward Rep, Member of Parliament, Women Rep, Senator, President	Feb 27
2	Your governor will manage funds on your behalf. Choose the right person for this important job. Vote wisely on March 4	Feb 28
2	Your senator will help determine how many resources your county receives from the central government. Vote for a competent candidate on March 4	March 1
2	Your member of National Assembly will be responsible for making laws for Kenya. Vote for a true nationalist on March 4	March 2
2	Every voter, male or female, votes for the Womens Rep on March 4. She will represent your county at the National Assembly	March 3
2	Your Ward Rep ensures that your interests are represented at the County Assembly. Vote for an accessible leader on March 4	March 4
3	Free and fair Elections are important for democracy. The IEBC is committed to strengthening the democracy. Vote on March 4	Feb 27
3	Credible elections require a peaceful environment. The IEBC is committed to free and fair elections; please keep the peace	Feb 28
3	Elections are organized by the IEBC, an independent body created by the new Constitution to ensure free and fair elections	March 1
3	Show your confidence in the IEBC by voting in the election next Monday, March 4th 2013	March 2
3	The IEBC has managed 12 successful by-elections and the Constitutional referendum. Help us make this election a success	March 3
3	As part of its mission, the IEBC has established a clean voter register. You are in the register. Now, go and vote	March 4

Table 2a: Summary Statistics: Administrative Data

	Mean	SD	N
Registered voters	689.1	1002.2	11257
Votes cast	587.4	818.0	11257
Turnout, cast votes	.878	.082	11254
Valid votes	581.9	810.7	11257
Turnout, valid votes	.870	.083	11255
Non-valid votes	6.9	21.1	12160
Non-valid votes, fraction	.011	.014	11257
Election-related violence	.105	.306	12160
Kenyatta vote	.510	.389	11252
Odinga vote	.435	.362	11253

Note: The Kenyatta and Odinga vote shares are weighted by the number of votes cast in each polling station.

Table 2b: Summary Statistics: Survey Data

	Mean	SD	N
Age, years	36.3	12.5	7365
Gender (1=Male)	.606	.489	7399
Years of education	8.9	4.7	7364
Kikuyu	.176	.380	7356
Luo	.117	.321	7356
Winning coalition	.293	.455	7356
Losing coalition	.299	.458	7356
Voted in elections	.944	.229	7341
Voted for all six positions	.930	.255	7254
Received election-related SMS	.793	.405	7324
Total SMS received from IEBC	3.9	5.0	5879
Remember SMS content	.695	.460	7400
Texts encouraged turnout	.246	.431	6608
Mentioned texts to others	.704	.457	6103
Others mentioned texts	.687	.464	7196
Trust the IEBC	.781	.414	7327
Trust the Supreme Court (SCK)	.711	.453	7227
Elections were fair	.712	.453	7287
SCK decision on election fair	.684	.465	7204
Satisfied with democracy	.303	.459	7309
Democracy preferable	.900	.300	7321
Elect through open elections	.975	.157	7359
Actively question leaders	.834	.372	7364
All allowed to vote	.918	.275	7371
Violence never justified	.930	.256	7320
Month of election correct	.824	.381	6712
Day of election correct	.785	.411	5475
Role of Women Rep correct	.473	.499	6595
Party of President correct	.926	.262	6652
Ugandan President correct	.963	.188	6442
Well informed about election	.872	.334	7369

Note: See the text and Appendix table 1 for the full definitions of the trust and political attitudes variables.

Table 3a: Randomization Checks, Administrative Data

	Data Missing		# Registered Voters		# Phones		% Phones		# Streams	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Any 100% Treatment	0.005 [0.005]		5.487 [17.910]		1.541 [12.660]		-0.007 [0.007]		0.010 [0.021]	
Any 50% Treatment	0.005 [0.005]		6.615 [17.460]		4.485 [12.320]		-0.003 [0.007]		0.009 [0.020]	
Encouragement		0.008 [0.006]		16.018 [22.701]		14.109 [15.888]		-0.002 [0.009]		0.015 [0.026]
Positions Info		-0.003 [0.006]		10.374 [19.348]		4.376 [13.930]		-0.009 [0.007]		0.010 [0.023]
IEBC Info		0.011* [0.006]		-8.326 [19.365]		-9.412 [13.544]		-0.004 [0.009]		0.003 [0.023]
F-test p-value	0.49	0.16	0.91	0.77	0.94	0.63	0.63	0.61	0.87	0.94
Control Mean	0.07	0.07	685.99	689.06	402.21	403.70	0.56	0.56	1.40	1.40
R-squared	.14	.14	.43	.43	.42	.42	.06	.06	.43	.43
Observations	12160	12160	11257	11257	12160	12160	12160	12160	11191	11191

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust Standard errors reported in brackets. All regressions include strata fixed effects.

In each column we report the p-value of a F-test of joint significance of all the treatment dummies in each regression.

Registered voters denotes the number of registered voters per polling station.

Phones denotes the number of registered voters with a valid Safaricom phone number per polling station.

% Phones denotes the fraction of registered voters with a valid Safaricom phone number per polling station.

Streams denotes the number of polling booths per polling station.

Table 3b: Randomization Checks, Survey Data

	Non-Response		Gender		Age		Years of Educ		Voted 2007		Voted 2010		Registered 2013	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
Any 100% Treatment	-0.006		-0.009		0.553		-0.178		0.010		0.011		-0.000	
	[0.011]		[0.015]		[0.371]		[0.142]		[0.013]		[0.013]		[0.003]	
Any 50% Treatment	-0.013		-0.003		0.596		-0.142		0.020		0.012		-0.003	
	[0.011]		[0.015]		[0.374]		[0.143]		[0.013]		[0.013]		[0.003]	
Encouragement		-0.008		-0.025		0.714*		-0.104		0.008		0.023		0.000
		[0.012]		[0.016]		[0.410]		[0.156]		[0.015]		[0.014]		[0.003]
Positions Info		-0.014		0.017		0.532		-0.127		0.016		0.005		-0.005
		[0.012]		[0.016]		[0.412]		[0.157]		[0.015]		[0.014]		[0.003]
IEBC Info		-0.006		-0.010		0.478		-0.249		0.020		0.007		0.000
		[0.012]		[0.016]		[0.408]		[0.155]		[0.015]		[0.014]		[0.003]
F-test p-value	0.49	0.69	0.81	0.07	0.22	0.34	0.43	0.46	0.32	0.52	0.60	0.40	0.57	0.43
Control Mean	0.49	0.49	0.61	0.61	35.89	35.89	9.06	9.06	0.73	0.73	0.75	0.75	0.99	0.99
R-squared	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.02	.02	.01	.01
Observations	14400	14400	7399	7399	7365	7365	7364	7364	7332	7332	7261	7261	7339	7339

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by polling station. All regressions include strata fixed effects.

In each column we report the p-value of a F-test of joint significance of all the treatment dummies in each regression.

Table 4: Recollection of SMS Received, Survey Data

	Received SMS		Received from IEBC		Remember Content		Turnout		Mentioned SMS		Others Mentioned SMS	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Any 100% Treatment	0.050*** [0.012]		0.944*** [0.175]		0.057*** [0.014]		0.052*** [0.014]		0.037** [0.016]		0.042*** [0.014]	
Any 50% Treatment	0.036*** [0.013]		0.340** [0.162]		0.038*** [0.014]		0.016 [0.013]		0.018 [0.016]		0.023 [0.014]	
Encouragement		0.042*** [0.014]		0.565*** [0.183]		0.048*** [0.015]		0.045*** [0.015]		0.031* [0.017]		0.023 [0.015]
Positions Info		0.036*** [0.014]		0.755*** [0.189]		0.044*** [0.015]		0.024 [0.015]		0.024 [0.017]		0.034** [0.015]
IEBC Info		0.050*** [0.013]		0.594*** [0.185]		0.051*** [0.015]		0.034** [0.015]		0.027 [0.017]		0.041*** [0.015]
Control Mean	0.759	0.759	3.371	3.371	0.658	0.658	0.221	0.221	0.682	0.682	0.662	0.662
100% Sidak-Holm p-val	0.00		0.00		0.00		0.00		0.02		0.01	
50% Sidak-Holm p-val	0.02		0.14		0.03		0.40		0.40		0.27	
T1 Sidak-Holm p-val		0.01		0.01		0.01		0.01		0.13		0.14
T2 Sidak-Holm p-val		0.03		0.00		0.02		0.20		0.20		0.08
T3 Sidak-Holm p-val		0.00		0.01		0.00		0.05		0.11		0.02
R-squared	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.02	.02
Observations	7324	7324	5879	5879	7400	7400	6608	6608	6103	6103	7196	7196

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by polling station in brackets. All regressions include strata fixed effects

In columns (3)-(4), there are fewer obs due to a malfunction in the electronic survey instrument. The Lee bounds on Any 100% Treatment are [0.666 1.084].

In columns (7)-(8), we report whether respondents mentioned that the text messages were about encouraging them to turnout or to vote.

In columns (9)-(10), we report on whether respondents reported mentioning the texts to others.

In columns (11)-(12), we report on whether respondents reported that others mentioned the texts to them.

Table 5: Effects on Turnout and Vote Shares

	Turnout (%): Admin Data				Vote Shares (%): Admin Data				Turnout (%): Survey Data			
	(1) Cast	(2) Cast	(3) Valid	(4) Valid	(5) Kenyatta	(6) Kenyatta	(7) Odinga	(8) Odinga	(9) Voted	(10) Voted	(11) All	(12) All
Any 100% Treatment	0.003** [0.001]		0.003** [0.001]		0.006 [0.007]		-0.006 [0.007]		0.020*** [0.007]		0.025*** [0.008]	
Any 50% Treatment	0.000 [0.001]		0.000 [0.001]		0.000 [0.007]		-0.002 [0.007]		0.007 [0.007]		0.008 [0.008]	
Encouragement		0.003* [0.001]		0.003* [0.002]		-0.000 [0.008]		-0.000 [0.008]		0.014* [0.008]		0.018** [0.009]
Positions Info		0.001 [0.002]		0.001 [0.002]		0.004 [0.009]		-0.007 [0.009]		0.015* [0.008]		0.017** [0.009]
IEBC Info		0.001 [0.002]		0.000 [0.002]		0.005 [0.008]		-0.006 [0.008]		0.011 [0.008]		0.014 [0.009]
Control Mean	0.877	0.877	0.869	0.869	0.458	0.494	0.481	0.450	0.934	0.934	0.917	0.917
100% Sidak-Holm p-val	0.09		0.09		0.55		0.55		0.03		0.01	
50% Sidak-Holm p-val	1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00		0.89		0.89	
T1 Sidak-Holm p-val		0.29		0.29		1.00		1.00		0.29		0.18
T2 Sidak-Holm p-val		0.89		0.89		0.89		0.89		0.26		0.26
T3 Sidak-Holm p-val		0.92		0.92		0.89		0.89		0.64		0.51
R-squared	.48	.48	.49	.49	.83	.83	.82	.82	.02	.02	.02	.02
Observations	11254	11254	11255	11255	11252	11252	11253	11253	7341	7341	7254	7254

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust in col. (1)-(8) and clustered by polling station in col. (9)-(12).

All regressions include strata fixed effects.

We use administrative data at the polling station level in col. (1)-(8), and self-reported data at the individual level in col. (9)-(12).

In col. (1)-(2), turnout = votes cast/registered voters. In col. (3)-(4), turnout = valid votes/registered voters.

In col. (5)-(8), vote shares are for the top two candidates.

In col. (9)-(10), turnout is whether the respondent reports having voted.

In col. (11)-(12), turnout is whether the respondent reports having voted for all six positions.

Table 6: Effects on Trust in Kenyan Electoral Institutions

	Trust IEBC		Trust SCK		Fair Election		Fair SCK Ruling		Satisf Democracy		Index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Any 100% Treatment	-0.037*** [0.012]		-0.019 [0.013]		-0.021* [0.013]		-0.012 [0.013]		-0.026* [0.014]		-0.025*** [0.009]	
Any 50% Treatment	-0.020* [0.012]		-0.009 [0.013]		0.004 [0.013]		-0.004 [0.013]		-0.024* [0.014]		-0.011 [0.009]	
Encouragement		-0.042*** [0.013]		-0.016 [0.015]		-0.011 [0.014]		-0.009 [0.014]		-0.028* [0.015]		-0.023** [0.010]
Positions Info		-0.022* [0.013]		-0.014 [0.014]		-0.014 [0.014]		-0.020 [0.014]		-0.030** [0.015]		-0.020** [0.010]
IEBC Info		-0.021 [0.013]		-0.011 [0.015]		-0.000 [0.014]		0.005 [0.014]		-0.017 [0.015]		-0.009 [0.010]
Control Mean	0.800	0.800	0.721	0.721	0.715	0.715	0.688	0.688	0.320	0.320	0.648	0.648
100% Sidak-Holm p-val	0.01		0.29		0.26		0.36		0.22			
50% Sidak-Holm p-val	0.36		0.88		0.93		0.93		0.36			
T1 Sidak-Holm p-val		0.01		0.60		0.70		0.70		0.24		
T2 Sidak-Holm p-val		0.30		0.53		0.53		0.42		0.21		
T3 Sidak-Holm p-val		0.41		0.84		0.98		0.93		0.72		
R-squared	.1	.1	.07	.07	.16	.16	.15	.15	.04	.04	.16	.16
Observations	7327	7327	7227	7227	7287	7287	7204	7204	7309	7309	7373	7373

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by polling station in brackets. All regressions include strata fixed effects.

Across all columns the dependent variable is a dummy for the following survey answers:

Col. (1)-(2), Yes to: Do you trust the IEBC?

Col. (3)-(4), Yes to: Do you trust the Supreme Court of Kenya?

Col. (5)-(6), Yes to: Do you think the elections were fair and transparent?

Col. (7)-(8), Yes to: Do you think the ruling of the Supreme Court on the election was fair?

Col. (9)-(10), Very satisfied to: Overall, how satisfied are you with how democracy works in Kenya?

In col. (11)-(12) we report treatment effects on the average of all previous 5 outcomes.

Table 7a: Effects on Turnout and Vote Shares: Heterogeneity with Election Violence

	Cast Votes	Valid Votes	Kenyatta (%)	Odinga (%)	Voted in 2013	Voted All
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Any Treatment*Violence	0.002 [0.006]	0.002 [0.006]	-0.004 [0.008]	0.006 [0.008]	-0.024 [0.037]	-0.037 [0.035]
Any Treatment	0.001 [0.001]	0.001 [0.001]	0.002 [0.003]	-0.003 [0.003]	0.016** [0.007]	0.021*** [0.007]
Violence	-0.017** [0.008]	-0.016** [0.008]	-0.015 [0.022]	0.014 [0.021]	-0.012 [0.032]	0.000 [0.030]
Control Mean	0.877	0.869	0.458	0.481	0.934	0.917
Interaction Sidak-Holm p-val	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.92	0.95	0.87
Anytreat Sidak-Holm p-val	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.08	0.02
Violence Sidak-Holm p-val	0.17	0.17	0.93	0.93	0.93	0.99
R-squared	.48	.49	.87	.87	.02	.02
Observations	11254	11255	11252	11253	7341	7254

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by constituency in brackets.

S-H p-val refers to Sidak-Holm p-values.

We use administrative data at the polling station level in col. (1)-(4).

In columns (1), turnout = votes cast/registered voters and in (2), turnout = valid votes/registered voters.

In columns (5)-(6), we use self-reported turnout from the survey data. All regressions include strata fixed effects.

Table 7b: Effects on Trust: Heterogeneity with Election Violence

	Trust IEBC	Trust SCK	Fair Election	Fair SCK Ruling	Satisf Democracy	Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Any Treatment*Violence	-0.068** [0.029]	-0.045 [0.035]	-0.029 [0.035]	0.007 [0.037]	-0.000 [0.042]	-0.025 [0.026]
Any Treatment	-0.021* [0.011]	-0.008 [0.012]	-0.004 [0.011]	-0.008 [0.013]	-0.024* [0.013]	-0.014 [0.009]
Violence	0.026 [0.030]	-0.016 [0.040]	-0.036 [0.031]	-0.075** [0.037]	-0.030 [0.037]	-0.028 [0.026]
Control Mean	0.800	0.721	0.715	0.688	0.320	0.648
Interaction Sidak-Holm p-val	0.11	0.61	0.78	0.98	0.99	
Anytreat Sidak-Holm p-val	0.27	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.27	
Violence Sidak-Holm p-val	0.78	0.78	0.68	0.20	0.78	
R-squared	.1	.07	.16	.15	.04	.16
Observations	7327	7227	7287	7204	7309	7373

Note: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors clustered by constituency in brackets.

Dependent variables are defined as in the footnote to Table 6. All regressions include strata fixed effects.

In col. (6) we report treatment effects on the average of all previous 5 outcomes.

Table 8: Winners and Losers: Effects on Trust in Kenyan Electoral Institutions

	Trust IEBC		Trust SCK		Fair Election		Fair SCK Ruling		Satisf Democracy		Index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Any Treatment*Kikuyu	0.030 [0.020]		0.001 [0.026]		0.001 [0.021]		-0.015 [0.023]		-0.040 [0.035]		-0.002 [0.017]	
Any Treatment*Luo	-0.048 [0.040]		-0.081** [0.041]		-0.056 [0.041]		-0.117*** [0.041]		-0.056 [0.035]		-0.069** [0.029]	
Any Treatment*Win		0.012 [0.022]		0.002 [0.027]		0.001 [0.024]		-0.018 [0.025]		-0.015 [0.032]		-0.004 [0.018]
Any Treatment*Lose		-0.055* [0.029]		-0.070** [0.030]		-0.075** [0.031]		-0.094*** [0.031]		0.005 [0.029]		-0.058*** [0.022]
Kikuyu	0.127*** [0.024]		0.160*** [0.029]		0.192*** [0.025]		0.206*** [0.026]		0.126*** [0.036]		0.160*** [0.019]	
Luo	-0.154*** [0.045]		-0.152*** [0.046]		-0.228*** [0.046]		-0.229*** [0.046]		-0.022 [0.039]		-0.159*** [0.032]	
Winning Coalition		0.127*** [0.024]		0.137*** [0.030]		0.187*** [0.027]		0.224*** [0.028]		0.104*** [0.033]		0.155*** [0.020]
Losing Coalition		-0.063** [0.031]		-0.033 [0.033]		-0.086*** [0.033]		-0.081** [0.034]		-0.041 [0.031]		-0.062*** [0.023]
Any Treatment	-0.057* [0.033]	-0.035 [0.034]	0.007 [0.038]	0.026 [0.039]	0.042 [0.037]	0.067* [0.038]	0.037 [0.038]	0.065 [0.040]	-0.046 [0.039]	-0.057 [0.041]	-0.007 [0.026]	0.011 [0.027]
Control Mean	0.801	0.801	0.722	0.722	0.714	0.714	0.687	0.687	0.322	0.322	0.648	0.648
Win = Lose F-stat	3.67*	6.85***	3.50*	5.90**	1.86	7.64***	5.68**	7.27***	0.14	0.35	4.97**	7.38***
Win = Lose p-val	0.06	0.01	0.06	0.02	0.17	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.71	0.55	0.03	0.01
R-squared	.12	.12	.09	.08	.18	.18	.17	.18	.06	.06	.19	.19
Observations	7137	7137	7043	7043	7101	7101	7019	7019	7119	7119	7179	7179

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by polling station in brackets. All regressions include strata fixed effects.

Dependent variables are defined as in the footnote to Table 6.

In odd-numbered columns, the Win = Lose F-stat and p-value are from the test: Any Treat*Kikuyu = Any Treat*Luo.

In even-numbered columns, the Win = Lose F-stat and p-value are from the test: Any Treat*Win = Any Treat*Lose.

In all columns, we control for education and wealth as well as the interactions of these variables with any treatment.

Table 9: Null Effects on Support for Democratic Principles

	Democracy Preferable		Open Elections		Actively Question Leaders		All Permitted to Vote		Violence Never OK	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Any 100% Treatment	0.004 [0.009]		0.002 [0.005]		0.001 [0.012]		0.004 [0.008]		-0.008 [0.008]	
Any 50% Treatment	-0.001 [0.009]		0.003 [0.005]		0.005 [0.011]		-0.006 [0.008]		-0.013 [0.008]	
Encouragement		0.005 [0.010]		0.004 [0.005]		-0.012 [0.013]		-0.000 [0.009]		-0.009 [0.008]
Positions Info		-0.003 [0.010]		-0.001 [0.005]		0.007 [0.013]		-0.004 [0.009]		-0.014* [0.009]
IEBC Info		0.002 [0.010]		0.003 [0.005]		0.014 [0.012]		0.002 [0.009]		-0.008 [0.008]
Control Mean	0.898	0.898	0.972	0.972	0.831	0.831	0.918	0.918	0.938	0.938
100% Sidak-Holm p-val	0.98		0.98		0.98		0.98		0.80	
50% Sidak-Holm p-val	0.94		0.94		0.94		0.94		0.42	
T1 Sidak-Holm p-val		0.86		0.81		0.81		0.98		0.81
T2 Sidak-Holm p-val		0.96		0.96		0.96		0.96		0.40
T3 Sidak-Holm p-val		0.96		0.88		0.79		0.96		0.80
R-squared	.02	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.02	.02
Observations	7321	7321	7359	7359	7364	7364	7371	7371	7320	7320

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by polling station in brackets. All regressions include strata fixed effects.

Across all columns, the dependent variable is a dummy for whether the respondent agreed with the following statements:

Col. (1)-(2): Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.

Col. (3)-(4): We should choose our leaders through regular, open and honest elections.

Col. (5)-(6): As citizens we should be more active in questioning actions of our leaders.

Col. (7)-(8): All people should be permitted to vote. See Appendix Table 1 for full statement.

Col. (9)-(10): The use of violence is never justified in politics.

Table 10: Null Effects on Information

	Correct Month		Correct Day		Women Role Correct		Party Correct		Museveni Correct		Well Informed	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Any 100% Treatment	0.005 [0.012]		-0.019 [0.014]		-0.014 [0.016]		-0.007 [0.008]		0.005 [0.006]		0.010 [0.010]	
Any 50% Treatment	0.006 [0.012]		-0.017 [0.014]		-0.005 [0.016]		-0.005 [0.008]		0.006 [0.006]		0.008 [0.010]	
Encouragement		0.007 [0.013]		-0.000 [0.015]		-0.007 [0.018]		-0.004 [0.009]		0.007 [0.007]		0.005 [0.011]
Positions Info		0.015 [0.013]		-0.027* [0.016]		-0.014 [0.017]		-0.008 [0.009]		0.005 [0.007]		0.010 [0.011]
IEBC Info		-0.006 [0.013]		-0.027* [0.016]		-0.008 [0.018]		-0.006 [0.009]		0.003 [0.007]		0.011 [0.011]
Control Mean	0.820	0.820	0.800	0.800	0.481	0.481	0.930	0.930	0.960	0.960	0.865	0.865
100% Sidak-Holm p-val	0.87		0.68		0.87		0.87		0.87		0.87	
50% Sidak-Holm p-val	0.90		0.79		0.90		0.90		0.90		0.90	
T1 Sidak-Holm p-val		0.99		0.99		0.99		0.99		0.83		0.99
T2 Sidak-Holm p-val		0.74		0.40		0.82		0.82		0.82		0.82
T3 Sidak-Holm p-val		0.95		0.41		0.95		0.92		0.95		0.84
R-squared	.01	.01	.01	.01	.02	.02	.02	.02	.03	.03	.02	.02
Observations	6712	6712	5475	5475	6595	6595	6652	6652	6442	6442	7369	7369

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by polling station in brackets. All regressions include strata fixed effects.

In col. (1)-(2), the dependent variable is whether respondent could correctly name the month of the election.

In col. (3)-(4), the dependent variable is whether respondent could correctly name the day of the election.

In col. (5)-(6), the dependent variable is whether respondent could correctly describe the role of the Women's Rep.

In col. (7)-(8), the dependent variable is whether respondent could correctly name the party of President.

In col. (9)-(10), the dependent variable is whether respondent could correctly name the President of Uganda (Museveni).

In col. (11)-(12), the dependent variable is whether respondent answered yes to: Overall do you feel you were well informed about the election?

Appendix Table 1: Description of Political Attitude Variables

Question	Response Options
How do you feel about the outcome of the last elections?	1=Very satisfied, 2=Satisfied, 3=Indifferent, 4=Dissatisfied, 5=Very dissatisfied
Do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding politics in Kenya: Politics and government sometimes seem so complicated that you can't really understand what is going on. The world is run by few people in power, and there is not much that someone like me can do about it. We should choose our leaders in this country through regular, open and honest elections.	1=Strongly agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neither agree nor disagree, 4=Disagree, 5=Strongly disagree 1=Strongly agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neither agree nor disagree, 4=Disagree, 5=Strongly disagree 1=Strongly agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neither agree nor disagree, 4=Disagree, 5=Strongly disagree
Which of the following statements is closest to your own opinion?	1=Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government, 2=In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable, 3=For someone like me, it doesn't matter what government we have
Overall how satisfied are you with how democracy works in Kenya?	1=Very satisfied, 2=Fairly satisfied, 3=Not very satisfied, 4=Not at all satisfied, 5=Kenya is not a democracy
For each of the following pairs of statements, tell me which of the two is closest to your view about Kenyan politics: 1: The use of violence is never justified in politics. 1: As citizens we should be more active in questioning the actions of our leaders. 1: All people should be permitted to vote, even if they do not fully understand all the issues in an election. 1: Women can be good politicians and should be encouraged to stand in elections. 1: In our country, it is normal to pay a bribe to a government official to encourage them.	2: In this country it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause. 2: In our country these days we should show more respect for authority. 2: Only those who are sufficiently well educated should be allowed to choose our leaders. 2: Women should stay at home to take care of their children. 2: It is wrong to pay a bribe to any government official.
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?	1=Most people can be trusted, 2=Need to be careful
In general, can you trust members of your tribe?	1=Yes, 2=No
In general, can you trust members in other tribes?	1=Yes, 2=No
Do you trust the IEBC, the electoral commission of Kenya?	1=Yes, 2=No
Do you trust the Supreme court?	1=Yes, 2=No
Do you trust the police?	1=Yes, 2=No
Do you think the elections this year were fair and transparent?	1=Yes, 2=No
In general, in your life, are you very happy, somewhat happy or not happy?	1=Very happy, 2=Somewhat happy, 3=Not happy

Appendix Table 2a: Randomization Balance across all treatment cells

	Data Missing	# Registered Voters	# Phones	% Phones	# Streams
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Encouragement, 100%	0.014 [0.009]	10.823 [31.812]	8.616 [22.363]	-0.008 [0.009]	0.006 [0.036]
Encouragement, 50%	0.003 [0.008]	21.164 [29.341]	19.614 [20.313]	0.005 [0.013]	0.024 [0.034]
Positions Info, 100%	-0.005 [0.008]	10.966 [24.880]	-1.935 [17.182]	-0.011 [0.008]	0.020 [0.031]
Positions Info, 50%	-0.002 [0.008]	9.781 [26.203]	10.680 [19.579]	-0.007 [0.008]	-0.000 [0.031]
IEBC Info, 100%	0.007 [0.008]	-5.385 [26.246]	-2.023 [18.919]	-0.001 [0.013]	0.003 [0.032]
IEBC Info, 50%	0.015* [0.009]	-11.285 [24.851]	-16.779 [16.698]	-0.007 [0.010]	0.002 [0.028]
F-test p-value	0.37	0.97	0.83	0.83	0.99
Control Mean	0.074	689.059	403.699	0.561	1.400
R-squared	.14	.43	.42	.06	.43
Observations	12160	11257	12160	12160	11191

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust Standard errors reported in brackets.

All regressions include strata fixed effects.

In each column we report the p-value of a test of joint significance of all the treatment dummies.

Registered voters denotes the number of registered voters per polling station.

Phones denotes the number of registered voters with a valid phone number per polling station.

% Phones denotes the fraction of registered voters with a valid phone number per polling station.

Streams denotes the number of polling booths per polling station.

Appendix Table 2b: Randomization Balance across all treatment cells

	Non-Response	Gender	Age	Years of Educ	Voted 2007	Voted 2010	Registered 2013
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Encouragement, 100%	0.004 [0.015]	-0.023 [0.020]	0.551 [0.497]	-0.020 [0.188]	-0.006 [0.019]	0.018 [0.017]	0.002 [0.004]
Encouragement, 50%	-0.019 [0.015]	-0.027 [0.020]	0.870* [0.513]	-0.183 [0.192]	0.022 [0.018]	0.027 [0.017]	-0.002 [0.004]
Positions Info, 100%	-0.023 [0.014]	0.003 [0.019]	0.532 [0.497]	-0.315 [0.193]	0.017 [0.018]	0.012 [0.017]	-0.004 [0.004]
Positions Info, 50%	-0.005 [0.015]	0.031 [0.020]	0.531 [0.520]	0.068 [0.193]	0.015 [0.018]	-0.002 [0.018]	-0.006 [0.004]
IEBC Info, 100%	0.002 [0.014]	-0.008 [0.020]	0.577 [0.509]	-0.190 [0.187]	0.017 [0.018]	0.002 [0.017]	0.001 [0.004]
IEBC Info, 50%	-0.014 [0.014]	-0.011 [0.020]	0.382 [0.495]	-0.306 [0.192]	0.023 [0.018]	0.011 [0.017]	-0.001 [0.004]
F-test p-value	0.50	0.19	0.72	0.39	0.66	0.70	0.65
Control Mean	0.493	0.612	35.894	9.061	0.726	0.751	0.991
R-squared	.02	.02	.02	.01	.01	.02	.01
Observations	14400	7399	7365	7364	7332	7261	7339

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by polling station. All regressions include strata fixed effects.
 In each column we report the p-value of a F-test of joint significance of all the treatment dummies in each regression.

Appendix Table 3: Effects on Turnout by Position (Survey Data), Additional Results

	President		MP		Senator		Governor		Women's Rep		Ward Rep	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Any 100% Treatment	0.019*** [0.007]		0.020*** [0.007]		0.020*** [0.007]		0.022*** [0.007]		0.021*** [0.008]		0.023*** [0.008]	
Any 50% Treatment	0.008 [0.007]		0.007 [0.008]		0.005 [0.008]		0.007 [0.008]		0.007 [0.008]		0.008 [0.008]	
Encouragement		0.014* [0.008]		0.014* [0.008]		0.016* [0.008]		0.016** [0.008]		0.016* [0.008]		0.017** [0.008]
Positions Info		0.015* [0.008]		0.014* [0.008]		0.011 [0.008]		0.014* [0.008]		0.013 [0.008]		0.016* [0.008]
IEBC Info		0.012 [0.008]		0.012 [0.008]		0.010 [0.008]		0.011 [0.008]		0.013 [0.009]		0.013 [0.009]
Control Mean	0.932	0.932	0.928	0.928	0.928	0.928	0.928	0.928	0.924	0.924	0.923	0.923
R-squared	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02
Observations	7307	7307	7300	7300	7304	7304	7302	7302	7303	7303	7297	7297

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by polling station in brackets. All regressions include strata fixed effects.

Appendix Table 4: Effects on Trust and Satisfaction with Democracy in Kenya, Additional Results

	Trust IEBC	Trust SCK	Fair Election	Satisf Democracy
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Encouragement, 100%	-0.058*** [0.017]	-0.025 [0.018]	-0.028 [0.018]	-0.020 [0.019]
Encouragement, 50%	-0.027* [0.016]	-0.008 [0.018]	0.006 [0.017]	-0.035** [0.018]
Positions Info, 100%	-0.020 [0.016]	-0.011 [0.018]	-0.025 [0.017]	-0.050*** [0.018]
Positions Info, 50%	-0.024 [0.016]	-0.017 [0.018]	-0.003 [0.017]	-0.009 [0.019]
IEBC Info, 100%	-0.034** [0.016]	-0.020 [0.018]	-0.011 [0.017]	-0.007 [0.019]
IEBC Info, 50%	-0.008 [0.016]	-0.002 [0.018]	0.009 [0.017]	-0.026 [0.018]
Control Mean	0.800	0.721	0.715	0.320
R-squared	.1	.07	.16	.04
Observations	7327	7227	7287	7309

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by polling station in brackets.
All regressions include strata fixed effects..

Appendix Table 5: Spillovers

	Voted in 2013		Voted for All Positions		Trust IEBC		Fair Election		Satisf Democracy	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Individual treatment	0.016** [0.007]		0.021*** [0.008]		-0.033*** [0.011]		-0.017 [0.012]		-0.024* [0.013]	
Treatment, 100% Groups		0.020*** [0.007]		0.025*** [0.008]		-0.037*** [0.012]		-0.021* [0.013]		-0.026* [0.014]
Treatment, 50% Groups		0.009 [0.009]		0.012 [0.010]		-0.026* [0.014]		-0.009 [0.015]		-0.020 [0.016]
Spillover	0.004 [0.009]	0.004 [0.009]	0.005 [0.010]	0.005 [0.010]	-0.015 [0.014]	-0.015 [0.014]	0.017 [0.015]	0.017 [0.015]	-0.027* [0.016]	-0.027* [0.016]
Control Mean	0.936	0.936	0.919	0.919	0.796	0.796	0.725	0.725	0.309	0.309
R-squared	.02	.02	.02	.02	.1	.1	.16	.16	.04	.04
Test 100%=50% p-val		0.17		0.12		0.39		0.37		0.69
Observations	7341	7341	7254	7254	7327	7327	7287	7287	7309	7309

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by polling station in brackets. All regressions include strata fixed effects.

In col. (1)-(2), the dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the respondent reports having voted.

In col. (3)-(4), the dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the respondent reports having voted for all six positions.

Across columns (5)-(10), the dependent variable is a dummy for the following survey answers:

Col. (5)-(6), Yes to: Do you trust the IEBC?

Col. (7)-(8), Yes to: Do you think the elections were fair and transparent?

Col. (9)-(10), Very satisfied to: Overall, how satisfied are you with how democracy works in Kenya?

Appendix Table 6a: Effects on Trust: Heterogeneity with Election Violence

	Trust IEBC	Trust SCK	Fair Election	Fair SCK Ruling	Satisf Democracy
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Any 100% Treatment*Violence	-0.078** [0.032]	-0.049 [0.034]	-0.037 [0.030]	-0.008 [0.039]	-0.010 [0.047]
Any 50% Treatment*Violence	-0.057 [0.040]	-0.040 [0.047]	-0.022 [0.046]	0.022 [0.048]	0.009 [0.043]
Any 100% Treatment	-0.028** [0.013]	-0.013 [0.013]	-0.016 [0.012]	-0.010 [0.014]	-0.024 [0.016]
Any 50% Treatment	-0.014 [0.012]	-0.004 [0.015]	0.007 [0.013]	-0.006 [0.014]	-0.024* [0.014]
Violence	0.026 [0.030]	-0.016 [0.040]	-0.036 [0.031]	-0.075** [0.037]	-0.030 [0.037]
Control Mean	0.800	0.721	0.715	0.688	0.320
R-squared	.1	.07	.16	.15	.04
Observations	7327	7227	7287	7204	7309

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by constituency in brackets.

Dependent variables are defined as in the footnote to Table 6. All regressions include strata fixed effects.

Appendix Table 6b: Effects on Trust: Heterogeneity with Winners and Losers

	Trust IEBC		Trust SCK		Fair Election		Fair SCK Ruling		Satisf Democracy	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Any Treat 100%*Kikuyu	0.056** [0.022]		0.020 [0.029]		0.025 [0.023]		0.009 [0.025]		0.003 [0.039]	
Any Treat 50%*Kikuyu	0.005 [0.022]		-0.017 [0.029]		-0.023 [0.024]		-0.038 [0.026]		-0.081** [0.039]	
Any Treat 100%*Luo	-0.020 [0.045]		-0.037 [0.046]		-0.013 [0.045]		-0.099** [0.046]		-0.087** [0.038]	
Any Treat 50%*Luo	-0.077* [0.046]		-0.128*** [0.047]		-0.098** [0.046]		-0.136*** [0.047]		-0.024 [0.040]	
Any Treat 100%*Win		0.041* [0.024]		0.027 [0.031]		0.031 [0.026]		0.014 [0.028]		0.038 [0.035]
Any Treat 50%*Win		-0.016 [0.024]		-0.022 [0.031]		-0.027 [0.026]		-0.048* [0.028]		-0.066* [0.035]
Any Treat 100%*Lose		-0.047 [0.032]		-0.043 [0.034]		-0.053 [0.035]		-0.085** [0.035]		-0.009 [0.032]
Any Treat 50%*Lose		-0.063* [0.032]		-0.096*** [0.034]		-0.095*** [0.035]		-0.103*** [0.035]		0.020 [0.032]
Any 100% Treatment	-0.082** [0.037]	-0.064* [0.039]	0.006 [0.042]	0.016 [0.044]	-0.012 [0.041]	0.004 [0.043]	0.021 [0.042]	0.044 [0.044]	-0.079* [0.043]	-0.093** [0.045]
Any 50% Treatment	-0.031 [0.037]	-0.006 [0.038]	0.008 [0.042]	0.035 [0.044]	0.097** [0.041]	0.128*** [0.042]	0.053 [0.042]	0.087** [0.044]	-0.011 [0.044]	-0.020 [0.046]
Control Mean	0.801	0.801	0.722	0.722	0.714	0.714	0.687	0.687	0.322	0.322
Win = Lose F-stat	2.74*	9.43***	1.34	4.43**	0.69	7.52***	5.15**	9.98***	3.22*	1.72
Win = Lose p-val	0.10	0.00	0.25	0.04	0.41	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.07	0.19
R-squared	.12	.12	.09	.09	.18	.18	.17	.18	.06	.06
Observations	7137	7137	7043	7043	7101	7101	7019	7019	7119	7119

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by polling station in brackets. All regressions include strata fixed effects.

Main effects for Kikuyu, Luo, Winning Coalition and Losing Coalition are included in the regressions but not reported for space reasons.

Dependent variables are defined as in the footnote to Table 6.

In odd-numbered columns, the Win = Lose F-stat and p-value are from the test: Any Treat 100%*Kikuyu = Any Treat 100%*Luo.

In even-numbered columns, the Win = Lose F-stat and p-value are from the test: Any Treat 100%*Win = Any Treat 100%*Lose.

In all columns, we control for education and wealth as well as the interactions of these variables with any treatment.

Appendix Table 7: Effects on Satisfaction with Democracy in Kenya by Tribe, Not Controlling for Other Interactions

	Voted		Trust IEBC		Trust SCK		Fair Election		Satisf Democracy	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Any Treatment*Kikuyu	-0.014 [0.015]		0.021 [0.019]		-0.002 [0.025]		0.003 [0.020]		-0.056 [0.035]	
Any Treatment*Luo	-0.009 [0.016]		-0.049 [0.040]		-0.085** [0.041]		-0.054 [0.040]		-0.055 [0.035]	
Any Treatment*Win		-0.020 [0.016]		0.009 [0.021]		0.003 [0.027]		0.002 [0.023]		-0.024 [0.031]
Any Treatment*Lose		-0.025 [0.016]		-0.056* [0.028]		-0.071** [0.030]		-0.074** [0.031]		-0.004 [0.029]
Kikuyu	0.011 [0.018]		0.129*** [0.023]		0.163*** [0.028]		0.186*** [0.024]		0.123*** [0.036]	
Luo	0.036* [0.021]		-0.168*** [0.044]		-0.158*** [0.046]		-0.236*** [0.045]		-0.033 [0.038]	
Winning Coalition		0.024 [0.019]		0.121*** [0.024]		0.132*** [0.029]		0.182*** [0.026]		0.091*** [0.033]
Losing Coalition		0.043** [0.017]		-0.074** [0.031]		-0.039 [0.033]		-0.093*** [0.033]		-0.045 [0.030]
Any Treatment	0.017* [0.009]	0.026** [0.012]	-0.024* [0.013]	-0.013 [0.018]	-0.002 [0.015]	0.007 [0.020]	-0.000 [0.015]	0.014 [0.019]	-0.007 [0.015]	-0.016 [0.019]
Control Mean	0.935	0.935	0.800	0.800	0.721	0.721	0.714	0.714	0.320	0.320
Win = Lose F-stat	0.07	0.10	3.13*	6.44**	3.66*	6.47**	2.08	7.78***	0.00	0.38
Win = Lose p-val	0.80	0.75	0.08	0.01	0.06	0.01	0.15	0.01	0.98	0.53
R-squared	.02	.02	.11	.11	.09	.08	.18	.18	.04	.04
Observations	7304	7304	7289	7289	7192	7192	7251	7251	7271	7271

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by polling station in brackets. All regressions include strata fixed effects.

In odd-numbered columns, the Win = Lose F-stat and p-value are from the test: Kikuyu*Any Treat = Luo*Any Treat.

In even-numbered columns, the Win = Lose F-stat and p-value are from the test: Winning Coalition*Any Treat = Losing Coalition*Any Treat.

Appendix Table 8: Heterogeneous Effects on Support for Democratic Principles

	Democracy Preferable		Open Elections		Actively Question Leaders		All Permitted to Vote		Violence Never OK	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Any Treatment*Violence	-0.022 [0.026]		0.006 [0.014]		0.020 [0.029]		-0.047** [0.022]		-0.024 [0.015]	
Any Treatment*Kikuyu		0.013 [0.023]		0.011 [0.011]		-0.001 [0.027]		-0.005 [0.019]		-0.017 [0.016]
Any Treatment*Luo		0.024 [0.024]		-0.011 [0.015]		-0.037 [0.031]		-0.022 [0.026]		-0.031 [0.021]
Violence	0.020 [0.022]		-0.001 [0.013]		0.008 [0.029]		0.048*** [0.017]		0.025 [0.020]	
Kikuyu		-0.026 [0.025]		-0.011 [0.013]		-0.017 [0.028]		0.030 [0.020]		0.024 [0.017]
Luo		0.016 [0.028]		-0.016 [0.016]		0.043 [0.035]		-0.009 [0.029]		-0.018 [0.024]
Any Treatment	0.004 [0.008]	0.028 [0.027]	0.001 [0.005]	-0.034** [0.015]	0.000 [0.011]	0.064* [0.035]	0.004 [0.008]	-0.032 [0.021]	-0.008 [0.007]	-0.025 [0.023]
Control Mean	0.898	0.898	0.972	0.972	0.831	0.830	0.918	0.918	0.938	0.938
Win = Lose F-stat		0.15		1.57		0.93		0.29		0.37
Win = Lose p-val		0.70		0.21		0.33		0.59		0.54
Observations	7321	7129	7359	7165	7364	7168	7371	7175	7320	7130

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All regressions include strata fixed effects.

Standard errors are clustered by constituency in odd-numbered columns and by polling station in even-numbered columns.

In col. (1)-(2), the dependent variable is whether respondent answered that democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.

In col. (3)-(4), the dependent variable is whether respondent agreed with: We should choose our leaders through regular, open and honest elections.

In col. (5)-(6), the dependent variable is whether respondent sided with: As citizens we should be more active in questioning actions of our leaders.

In col. (7)-(8), the dependent variable is whether respondent sided with: All people should be permitted to vote. See Appendix Table 1 for full statement.

In col. (9)-(10), the dependent variable is whether respondent sided with: The use of violence is never justified in politics.

Appendix Table 9: Heterogeneous Effects on Information

	Correct Month		Correct Day		Women Role Correct		Party Correct		Museveni Correct		Well Informed	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Any Treatment*Violence	0.008 [0.035]		-0.024 [0.043]		-0.075* [0.041]		0.019 [0.021]		-0.005 [0.023]		0.004 [0.030]	
Any Treatment*Kikuyu		0.010 [0.028]		0.018 [0.033]		-0.013 [0.040]		0.000 [0.014]		0.003 [0.014]		-0.008 [0.024]
Any Treatment*Luo		0.008 [0.032]		0.052 [0.042]		-0.029 [0.045]		0.015 [0.028]		-0.005 [0.015]		-0.048** [0.024]
Violence	-0.017 [0.036]		0.039 [0.031]		0.030 [0.035]		0.002 [0.016]		0.004 [0.021]		0.004 [0.025]	
Kikuyu		0.043 [0.029]		0.013 [0.035]		0.012 [0.041]		0.026* [0.016]		-0.007 [0.014]		0.015 [0.025]
Luo		0.042 [0.036]		0.045 [0.045]		0.071 [0.049]		-0.015 [0.029]		0.001 [0.014]		0.042 [0.028]
Any Treatment	0.005 [0.012]	0.027 [0.038]	-0.016 [0.014]	-0.040 [0.044]	-0.002 [0.014]	0.024 [0.046]	-0.008 [0.008]	-0.044* [0.026]	0.006 [0.005]	-0.017 [0.020]	0.008 [0.009]	0.005 [0.032]
Control Mean	0.820	0.820	0.800	0.797	0.481	0.478	0.930	0.930	0.960	0.959	0.865	0.868
Kikuyu = Luo p-val		0.95		0.49		0.78		0.61		0.65		0.19
R-squared	.01	.02	.01	.02	.02	.05	.02	.04	.03	.04	.02	.04
Observations	6712	6535	5475	5324	6595	6428	6652	6471	6442	6264	7369	7171

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All regressions include strata fixed effects.

Standard errors are clustered by constituency in odd-numbered columns and by polling station in even-numbered columns.

In col. (1)-(2), the dependent variable is whether respondent could correctly name the month of the election.

In col. (3)-(4), the dependent variable is whether respondent could correctly name the day of the election.

In col. (5)-(6), the dependent variable is whether respondent could correctly describe the role of the Women's Rep.

In col. (7)-(8), the dependent variable is whether respondent could correctly name the party of President.

In col. (9)-(10), the dependent variable is whether respondent could correctly name the President of Uganda (Museveni).

In col. (11)-(12), the dependent variable is whether respondent answered yes to: Overall do you feel you were well informed about the election?

Appendix Table 10: Effects on All Other Attitudes

	Trust Police		Trust Own Tribe		Trust Others		Not Run by Few		Complicated		Women		Bribery Normal		Happy?	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Any 100% Treat	0.00		-0.00		-0.02		-0.02		0.00		-0.00		-0.00		-0.02	
	[0.02]		[0.02]		[0.02]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.02]	
Any 50% Treat	-0.01		0.01		-0.01		0.00		0.00		0.00		-0.00		-0.01	
	[0.02]		[0.02]		[0.02]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.02]	
Encouragement		-0.01		0.01		-0.01		-0.01		0.01		-0.00		-0.00		-0.03
		[0.02]		[0.02]		[0.02]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.02]
Positions Info		-0.00		-0.00		-0.02		-0.00		-0.00		-0.00		-0.01		-0.01
		[0.02]		[0.02]		[0.02]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.02]
IEBC Info		0.00		-0.00		-0.00		-0.02		0.01		0.00		0.00		-0.01
		[0.02]		[0.02]		[0.02]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.02]
Control Mean	0.47	0.47	0.53	0.53	0.49	0.49	0.25	0.25	0.80	0.80	0.96	0.96	0.10	0.10	0.51	0.51
R-squared	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.02	.02
Observations	7349	7349	7362	7362	7358	7358	7344	7344	7349	7349	7368	7368	7360	7360	7341	7341

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by polling station in brackets. All regressions include strata fixed effects.

In col. (1)-(2), the dep var is whether respondent answered yes to: Do you trust the police?

In col. (3)-(4), the dep var is whether respondent answered yes to: In general, can you trust members of your tribe?

In col. (5)-(6), the dep var is whether respondent answered yes to: In general, can you trust members of other tribes?

In col. (7)-(8), the dep var is whether respondent agreed with: The world is run by a few people in power. See Appendix Table 1 for full statement.

In col. (9)-(10), the dep var is whether respondent agreed with: Politics and government sometimes seem complicated. See Appendix Table 1 for full statement.

In col. (11)-(12), the dep var is whether respondent sided with: Women can be good politicians and should be encouraged to stand in elections.

In col. (13)-(14), the dep var is whether respondent sided with: In our country, it is normal to pay a bribe. See Appendix Table 1 for full statement.

In col. (15)-(16), the dep var is whether respondent answered very happy to: In general, in your life are you very happy, somewhat happy or unhappy?

Appendix Table 11: Lee Bounds

	Voted 2013		Trust IEBC		Trust SCK		Fair Election		Fair SCK Ruling		Satisf Democracy	
	(1) T	(2) T,100%	(3) T	(4) T,100%	(5) T	(6) T,100%	(7) T	(8) T,100%	(9) T	(10) T,100%	(11) T	(12) T,100%
Lower bound	0.013*	0.019**	-0.030***	-0.037***	-0.017	-0.020	-0.009	-0.019	-0.008	-0.010	-0.038**	-0.034*
	[0.007]	[0.008]	[0.011]	[0.013]	[0.012]	[0.013]	[0.013]	[0.015]	[0.013]	[0.017]	[0.016]	[0.017]
Upper bound	0.030*	0.029*	-0.013	-0.027	-0.003	-0.012	0.007	-0.013	0.003	-0.008	-0.017	-0.020
	[0.016]	[0.016]	[0.016]	[0.017]	[0.016]	[0.017]	[0.016]	[0.016]	[0.016]	[0.019]	[0.014]	[0.014]
Lower CI	0.001	0.006	-0.048	-0.059	-0.038	-0.043	-0.031	-0.046	-0.030	-0.043	-0.065	-0.063
Upper CI	0.058	0.056	0.014	0.002	0.024	0.018	0.033	0.016	0.031	0.029	0.006	0.003
Control Mean	0.934	0.934	0.800	0.800	0.721	0.721	0.715	0.715	0.688	0.688	0.320	0.320
Proportion Trimmed	0.018	0.009	0.016	0.010	0.015	0.008	0.016	0.006	0.011	0.003	0.021	0.013
Observations	14400	9000	14400	9000	14400	9000	14400	9000	14400	9000	14400	9000

Note: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. All dependent variables orthogonalized from strata fixed effects.

The Lower and Upper CI are the upper and lower bound on the treatment-effect 95% confidence interval.

In odd-numbered columns, we report Lee bounds on Any Treatment.

In even numbered columns, we report Lee bounds on Any 100% Treatment.

In these columns, we compare the Any 100% Treatment and Control by restricting the sample to not include the Any 50% Treatment.