Researchers worked with the state government to evaluate the impact of three programs to build demand for vaccination: local immunization ambassadors, small, non-financial incentives, and tailored SMS reminders. The most effective policy option increased measles vaccination by approximately 55 percent by combining local immunization ambassadors selected by the community, incentives that increased in amount across the immunization schedule, and SMS reminders to caregivers about the next scheduled vaccine.

Working with the Rwandan Education Board, Educate!, and Akazi Kanoze Access, researchers are examining the impact of a program that trains teachers in Rwanda’s revised secondary school entrepreneurship curriculum on student academic, economic, and labor market outcomes.

Researchers in Kenya conducted multiple lab studies at the Busara Center for Behavioral Economics to explore the degree of ethnic bias in the local population and assess how bias may affect participants’ behavior. Contrary to existing assumptions about ethnic preferences in Kenya, researchers found no evidence of ethnic bias in decision-making related to sharing of economic benefits and political alignment.

Technology adoption often requires investments over time. As farmers realize new information about the costs and benefits of investments, they may abandon the newly adopted technology shortly after. Researchers partnered with the non-governmental organization Shared Value Africa and Dunavant Cotton Ltd to investigate the effects of subsidies and follow-through rewards on the adoption of an agroforestry tree species.

Researchers are partnering with the Mexico City Labor Court to evaluate whether rotating court notifiers across areas and casefiles can reduce incidences of bribery, increase the notification rates, and improve the functioning of labor courts.

Researchers partnered with a large Indonesian Islamic bank to evaluate the impact of sending moral appeals in reminder text messages to late-paying credit card holders. Messages stating that non-repayment of debts by someone who is able to repay is an injustice increased the number of clients meeting minimum payments, proving more effective than substantial financial incentives for repayment.

Researchers evaluated two approaches to improving the quality of Colombian preschools. Providing additional resources to preschools for materials and new staff did not benefit children’s development and, unintentionally, led teachers to reduce their involvement in classroom activities. However, the addition of teacher training focused on teaching methods offset the negative effects on teacher behavior, improved the quality of teaching, and raised children’s cognition, language and school readiness.

Researchers in Uganda assessed the impact of VSLAs on access to financial services, income, food security, and education.

Researchers randomly assigned voting precincts to a campaign spreading information on corruption and public expenditure one week before the 2009 municipal elections in Mexico. Providing incumbent corruption information not only decreased incumbent party support, but also decreased voter turnout and support for the challenger party, as well as eroded partisan attachments. While information clearly is necessary to improve accountability, corruption information is not sufficient because voters may respond to it by withdrawing from the political process.

In Malawi, researchers examined the effect of bundling rainfall index insurance with a credit program on farmers’ demand for credit. They found that bundling insurance with credit reduced the demand for credit, from 33 percent for credit alone to 17.6 percent for the bundled product.

Taking advantage of a federal anticorruption program that randomly assigned municipalities to be audited, the researchers compared the electoral outcomes for mayors in two randomly selected groups of municipalities: those that were audited before and those that were audited after the 2004 election. Publicly released corruption audits reduced reelection rates of corrupt incumbent municipal mayors.